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Highlights of Business in December
INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT picked up in December, with in-
creased automotive production an important factor. The
FRB index of production rose 0.7 percent to 132.8
(1967= 100).
All categories of personal income rose in December,
for an overall gain of 1.4 percent to $1,441 trillion. For
1976 as a whole the increase was 10.1 percent.
The BLS consumer price index was up another 0.4
percent in December to 174.3 (1967=100). From
December 1975 to December 1976 prices increased 4.8
percent, compared with 7.0 percent in the previous 12-
month period.
Unemployment Down Slightly
Unemployment declined by 211,000 in December to a
total of 7.56 million; the rate fell from 8.1 percent of the
civilian labor force to 7.9 percent. The figures dropped
to 6.86 million unemployed and a rate of 7.3 percent in
May as the recovery progressed, but the 12 months from
December 1975 to December 1976 have seen only modest
gains in reducing unemployment— 210,000 fewer out of
work and a drop of 0.4 percentage point in the rate of un-
employment. The December 1976 improvement brought
about a slightly better situation for adult men, married
men, household heads, adult women, and teenagers. The
rate for black workers was unchanged.
EmployTTient rose 222,000 in December to nearly 88.4
million and nonfarm payroll employment was up 257,000
to almost 80.0 million. This represents an addition of 3
million workers to the total emplo)Tnent rolls in the year
and 2.2 million to nonfarm payroll employment.
Higher Retail Sales
Retail sales have shown more strengtli in recent
months. Revised figures show an increase of 1.9 percent
from October to November and preliminary figures indi-
cate a further sharp gain of 3.1 percent in December
after seasonal adjustment. The latest advance was the
largest since March 1972. A 9.3 percent gain in car sales
in December contributed handsomely to the upswing, but
even without the automotive sector, the increase was 1.6
percent. Durables rose 3.7 percent in November and
another 5.2 percent in December to $19.1 billion. Non-
durables were up 1 percent in November and 2.1 percent
in December to $38.2 billion.
Total December sales were 11 percent greater than
those in December 1975. Durable goods showed an en-
couraging advance— 15 percent; nondurables rose 9
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percent. WM iteSAdbfesGy'df fajJpNjximately 5 percent in
consumer prices, the real gain in total volume for the
year was about 6 percent.
Recovery in Auto Sales
US auto makers sold 8.6 million cars in 1976, 22
percent more than in depressed 1975. However, that was
still only the sixth-best year for the industry. GM took
nearly 56 percent of the domestic market. Ford 26 per-
cent, Chrysler 15 percent, and AMC less than 3 percent
(only about two-thirds of its 1975 share). Domestic-built
cars accounted for 86 percent of the total US market.
The Big 3 have been doing well in full- and intermediate-
sized cars, and supplies of such vehicles have been rela-
tively tight. Small cars, however, have lagged and dealers'
inventories of those models have built up to such an
excess that all domestic manufacturers have closed pro-
ducing plants and laid off \vorkers for vaiying periods.
American Motors has been especially hard hit because
of its concentration on small cars. The company is plead-
ing hardship as it begins to bargain with its workers,
seeking to induce them to hold down their wage de-
mands. Company officials have been criticized for sharply
hiking executive compensation while asserting a lack of
money for higher wages.
Economic Stimulus Proposed
The Carter Administration, alarmed by the continu-
ing stagnation in economic activity, has proposed a pro-
gram to stimulate the US economy without severely
cutting government revenues on a permanent basis. The
program includes a one-time tax rebate for individuals
($7 billion to $1 1 billion) , federal spending to create jobs
($5 billion to $8 billion), public works projects ($4 bil-
lion), pennanent tax reductions via higher minimum
deductions ($4 billion), and tax relief for business ($2
billion). The two-year program would cost $12 billion
to $16 billion in fiscal year 1977 and $13 billion to $16
billion in FY 1978. The program, which will have to win
the approval of Congress, would raise the budget deficit
to $70-$76 billion this year compared with one of $66
billion in FY 1976, the record previous deficit. The job-
creating and pubhc works projects are projected to add
800,000 to the employment rolls.
We regret that we are unable to publish this month the
customary special article on a topic of current interest.
The Executive Development Center
EDUCATORS have long known that the higher one's level
of prior education, the more likely one is to pursue
further studies. In this context of "the more, the more,"
the outlook for increased enrollment in continuing edu-
cation programs is excellent.
From 1969 to 1972 the number of participants in
adult education in the United States rose 20.7 percent.
About a third of this gain (6.4 percent) can be ascribed
to the growth of the eligible population. The rest must
be attributed to other factors, including recognition of
continuing education activities as a way of meeting indi-
vidual needs.
Of the 16 million adults who participated in educa-
tional activities in 1972, 46.5 jiercent were enrolled in
occupational training programs. An additional 25.9 per-
cent were enrolled in general education programs, many
of which provide an opportunity to improve literacy,
human interaction, and other skills applicable to the job
setting.
The rapid obsolescence of information which provides
professional competence is a fact of life and is evidenced
by trends toward mandated professional relicensing and
recertification and by voluntary commitments by people
seeking new careers, upgrading in present careers, re-
training because of technical obsolescence, or learning
for the sake of learning. The trend is nowhere more
evident than in business-related subjects.
The primary providers of continuing education for
business and industry are (1) colleges and universities,
(2) professional organizations, (3) noncollegiate post-
secondary schools, and (4) community organizations.
Colleges and universities typically lead the way in pro-
gram content. With excellent resources at hand, they
are able to meet the most pertinent and forward-looking
concerns of the business world. Their programs address
management— hence, the University of Illinois Execu-
tive Development Center and others such as the Univer-
sity of Wisconsin Management Institute. The leadership
function of professional organizations includes devoting
some of their resources to improving the performance of
their memberships. The organization often sets policy and
standards for the profession and helps its professionals
meet those aims. Noncollegiate postsecondaiy schools in-
clude long and short courses and correspondence study.
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They address the needs of personnel at all levels. Com-
munity organizations offer a surprisingly large number
of occupationally oriented courses. Of 321,000 courses
offered in 1972, 17,500 provided occupational training.
The University of Illinois Program
The Executive Development Center (EDC) was es-
tablished in 1958 by the Board of Trustees of the Univer-
sity of Illinois to complement the other elements of the
College of Commerce and Business Administration. The
EDC's assignment is to contribute to the effectiveness
with which businesses, professional organizations, and
go\'emment units serve their customers, employees, and
the general public. The contribution is to be made
through education in the context of the American enter-
prise system for practicing executives, administrators, and
professional people.
In these times almost everyone is conscious of his
environment. At the Executive Development Center we
are conscious of an environment that spells opportunity
for continuing education in business and related fields for
Illinois businesspeople. The environment of which I
speak consists of a prestigious faculty, a heavily indus-
trialized state, a state that is "home" to tens of major
financial institutions, and an obviously aggressive univer-
sity support for continuing education. The challenge to
the Executive Development Center is to make the most
of the opportunities afforded by this environment.
The principal project of the Executive De\elopment
Center is also its longest-continuous-running program,
the Executive Development Program. Attendance at the
Executive Development Program has averaged 25 over
the past 19 years. The fee for the 1977-78 session is
$3,250.
Entering its 21st year in 1977, this program is targeted
to develop applicable skills and techniques for the middle
management executive of medium-sized and large corpo-
rations or the policy-level executives of small businesses.
A rigorous, demanding schedule of classes coupled with
case problems, buzz sessions, and substantial reading as-
signments make this program a memorable one for those
who enroll. The results are commensurate to the com-
mitment of the executive. The current class has attracted
women and men from states with a wide geographic
spread and from foreign countries.
In the five weeks (divided into two units over two
summers) of the program, tlie following objectives are
expected to be met : ( 1 ) improvement in the executive's
ability to analyze and solve managerial problems through
an exposure to the latest decision-making techniques, (2)
sharpening of tlie executive's human relations skills
through a better self-understanding and a more acute
recognition of the motivations and needs of others, (3)
improvement in the executive's ability to communicate
at all levels of his organization, (4) development and
expansion of the executive's awareness of and sensitivity
to the many environmental forces affecting his organiza-
tion, (5) broadening of the executive's understanding of
the roles of the executive's peers in the structure of man-
agement and the framework within which the chief exec-
Continued on page 8
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Commercial Job Printing
THE INFORMATIONAL NEEDS of business are well served
by many printed materials, including financial reports,
directories, catalogs, business forms, and advertising ma-
terials. In recent years more and more organizations and
individuals have turned to print media as vehicles to
disseminate information.
The emergence of commercial job printing actually
occurred during the last few decades of the 19th century
when new printing processes established commercial
printing as a viable large-scale operation. Technology
has long since been the most important element in the
industn-. with much of the change resulting from changes
in methods of setting type. Hand composition was the
sole method of typesetting for several centuries until the
first commercial typesetting machines became available
in the 1880s. Today computerized typesetting, cathode
ray tube typesetters, and optical character reading equip-
ment are in common use.
Industry Dimensions
Only the lumber products group has more establish-
ments than commercial job printing. More than 22,000
commercial printers are dispersed throughout the coun-
try, more or less according to population density. The
industry includes general print shops as well as plants
specializing in printing magazines, newspapers, and pe-
riodicals for others. Also included are trade ser\'ice firms
that supply nonintegrated companies with special ser-
vices, such as typesetting, platemaking, and binding.
Total employment in the industry continues to gain
modestly each year. Current emplo^Tnent is estimated
at 360,000, of which production workers constitute 78
percent.
Competition in the industry takes many forms. The
quest for new or expanded markets, utilization of new
technology', and exploration of new media formats exert
considerable pressure on printing firms. Markets for the
.small and medium-sized printers tend to be local, while
large establishments with highly specialized product lines
may serve national markets. More than 80 percent of the
printers in the US employ fewer than 20 workers.
Problems and Trends
The priman' concerns of US commercial printers are
the same as those of other manufacturing groups—
energy, inflation, and materials shortages. Because of a
generally rising level of prices, paper costs as well as
the costs of pressroom chemicals, inks, platemetals, and
other supplies will continue to increase in the near fu-
ture. Printers' supply costs represent nearly 38 cents of
each dollar of sales.
Probably the most notable postwar trend has been
the vigorous growth in the utilization of lithography, a
method by which images are transferred (or offset) from
a thin metallic plate onto a receiving substance (usually
paper) by means of a series of chemically prepared
rollers. Lithographic dollar volume is now appro.ximately
61 percent of the market, compared with 48 percent in
1967; letterpress dollar volume has shrunk to 25 percent
of total commercial work, compared with 44 percent in
1967. Gravure and screen printing share the remainder.
Despite technological improvements being made with
polymer-type printing plates, it is not likely these factors
will make commercial letterpress competitive with com-
mercial lithography in the near future.
Major technological advances have been by far the
most important force contributing to the growth of the
commercial printing industry. The use of diese technol-
ogies has resulted in increased productivity, greater qual-
ity control at a higher level of output, and more flexibility
in what is produced and the manner of its production.
This trend indicates diat large commercial printers will
probably prosper at the expense of the smaller variety
shops.
Innovation has had important implications for man-
power. Some printing occupations, such as typesetters,
have decreased in number, but others— printing press
operators, lithographic platemakers, and computer-re-
lated occupations— have increased. Moreover, skill re-
quirements are changing significantly, making retraining
increasingly necessary. These developments are contribut-
ing to the gradual integration of composition, printing,
and binding operations into one system which can be
fully computerized. These changes, however, have not
reduced employment overall because of the offsetting de-
mand for labor created by growth in output.
Commercial Printing in Illinois
Illinois is the nation's second largest commercial print-
ing center, trailing only New York in volume of produc-
tion. \Vith nearly 44,000 employees, the 1,300 plants in
this State turn out an annual product valued at more
than $1 billion, nearly 12.5 percent of the national total.
The State accounts for nearly 13 percent of total industry
employment. Illinois ranks first in catalog and directory
printing as well as in magazine and periodical printing.
Geographically, more than 80 percent of the state's
commercial job printers are located in the Chicago area,
where production accounts for more than 80 percent of
value added by printing for the State. The city's central
location makes it an economically desirable shipping
point for national distribution. Extensive printing of
books, telephone and business directories, catalogs, en-
cyclopedias, advertising folders, and magazines is done in
this area. The city ranks second nationally among major
urban centers in number of establishments and workers.
Peoria County ranks second in prindng employment
for the State. The county's facilities include two plants
that employ more than 350 workers each. Statewide there
are 75 plants employing more than 100 workers each.
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Recent Economic Changes
Business Conditions Digest Revised
MAJOR REVISIONS have been made by the US Department
of Commerce Bureau of Economic Analysis in its monthly
Business Conditions Digest. Greater emphasis is placed
on the cyclical indicators section, with 32 additional indi-
cators included, for a total of 111. However, the same
series are still used to compute the composite indexes of
leading, coincident, and lagging indicators. Innovations
in the method of constructing the three composites en-
hance the comparability among them. A forthcoming
supplement to Business Conditions Digest will show in
detail the methods used to compute the composites plus
historical data and descriptions of the series.
Slower Rise in Industrial Prices
FOR THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS, sharp advances in the
BLS wholesale price inde.x for industrial commodities
have caused considerable concern. From June through
November 1976, the index of industrial prices rose not
less than 0.5 percent each month and by 0.9 percent one
month. The largest increases continued to show up in
such basic commodities as fuels, lumber, metals and
products, and rubber and plastic products (see chart).
In the two years from November 1974 (after the steep
climb subsequent to the oil price hike) to November
Selected Wholesale Industrial Prices
1967
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Local Illinois Developments
Chicago Aids Home Loan Project
THE CITY OF CHICAGO and a nonprofit organization have
begun a shared-risk program to make up to $7 million
available over a two-year period for conventional low-
down-payment mortgage loans in seven neighborhoods
— South Shore, Rogers Park, Austin, Lawndale, Uptown,
Woodlawn, and Grand Boulevard. The Chicago Home
Purchase and Rehabilitation Plan will be administered
by the Community Services and Research Corporation
and funded by 20 participating banks and savings and
loan associations to finance the purchases of up to 400
homes. The city will provide a $75,000 grant for the pro-
gram's first year; the second year's operating capital will
come from interest on a $500,000 contingency fund.
Prospective home buyers can make preliminary appli-
cation at several Chicago Model Cities offices. If appli-
cants appear financially qualified after local staff pre-
screening, they will be referred to a savings and loan
association where formal application will be made. Bor-
rowers seeking to purchase single-family homes must pro-
duce a down payment equivalent to 8 percent of the total
house cost plus repair expenses. Those seeking to buy
multiunit buildings must make a 20 percent down pay-
ment. Interest rates will not be subsidized. In addition,
mandatory training and counseling on home ownership
and repairs are key parts of the program.
Nonfarm Employment in Chicago SMSA
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Downtown Renewal Takes Place
ALMOST EVERY MAJOR SUBURB in Cook and adjoining
counties is proposing, considering, or implementing plans
to rejuvenate local central business districts in order to
lure both retailers and consumers back to downtown
shopping areas, thus preserving and, it is hoped, expand-
ing the tax bases of these areas. Some of the major efforts
proposed or under way to upgrade deteriorating subur-
ban downtowns include the following
:
Aurora— 100 acres of its downtown are being trans-
formed into an elaborate cultural, civic, and commercial
center. Renovation of the city's downtown bridges across
the Fox River has recently been completed.
Des Plaines— A $12 miUion office and enclosed mall
complex is being constmcted in the downtown area.
St. Charles— In conjunction with a private devel-
oper, St. Charles is planning a commercial-residential
complex, including a pedestrian mall bordered by retail
shops and townhouses adjacent to the Fox River.
Chicago Heights— In addition to general remodeling
of downtown office buildings, a new sLx-story building
for the First National Bank of Chicago Heights was re-
cently completed in a former skid row area.
Joliet— A semipedestrian mall for Chicago Street to
include fewer traffic lanes, more sidewalk area, decora-
tive street lights, and a plaza is being considered.
La Grange— A two-block pedestrian shopping mall
was completed last summer at a cost of $900,000.
Other suburbs planning or implementing major down-
town renewal efforts include North Chicago, Elgin, Oak
Park, Arlington Heights, West Chicago, Waukegan, Na-
perville. and East Dundee.
Chicago Employment Inches Upward
FROM 1967 to 1975, annual average nonagricultural em-
ployment in the Chicago SMSA rose only from 2.89 mil-
lion to 2.98 million, an increase of 3 percent (see chart).
For the US in the same period, it rose 16.9 percent.
Chicago manufacturing registered an absolute decline of
159,000 workers, a net loss of 16.3 percent; durables fell
18.7 percent and nondurables fell 11.9 percent. Also, the
percentage of workers employed in manufacturing fell
from 33.6 percent of nonfarm employment in 1967 to
27.3 percent in 1975. Employment in mining, and trans-
portation and public utilities also showed declines over
the period. Of the sectors showing employment gains,
government and sen'ices and miscellaneous industries in-
creased more than 20 percent; finance and real estate in-
creased 15.6 percent. Wholesale and retail trade employ-
ment rose 5.9 percent.
More information concerning the employment situa-
tion in the Chicago SMS.A is available in Unemployment
— Labor Force Policy: A Special Report of the Mayor's
Council of Manpower and Economic Advisors, Chicago
Civic Center, Room 302, Chicago 60602.
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Highlights of Business in January
iNinsTRiAL OUTPUT fell back in January as the worst
weather in years and a worsening shortage of natural
gas closed factories, stores, and offices and afl'ected the
movement of people and goods. The FRB index dropped
1.0 percent after seasonal adjustment to 131.5 (1967 =
100). It was the sharpest cut since February 1975. De-
clines were widespread ; only utilities showed greater out-
put than in December.
Personal income was not severely affected, but con-
sumption spending is likely to shift noticeably as consum-
ers have to allocate more to food and fuel costs. It is
generally expected that effects will be felt throughout
the first quarter, with economic activity picking up again
in the second quarter.
The cold weather also contributed to the sharpest rise
in consumer prices in 18 months. The BLS index rose
0.8 percent (seasonally adjusted) to 175.3 (1967 = 100).
Increases were widespread, affecting virtually all com-
ponents of the index. Food, housing, and transportation
showed approximately average advances. One of the
largest rises reported for the month was the 2 percent
hike for fuel oil and coal.
Amount of Unemployment Uncertain
The unemployment rate dropped from 7.8 percent of
the labor force in December to 7.3 percent in January.
However, the survey was made in the week ending 15
January, before fuel shortages started closing factories
and businesses. A decrease of 440,000 in the labor force
was thought by many analysts to show the effect of the
cold weather in keeping workers from seeking jobs. The
labor force reduction was a major factor in the drop of
560,000 in unemployment to 7 million. By early Febru-
ary, however, the weather was blamed for the idleness
of as many as 1 .5 million additional workers. New York
and Ohio were especially hard hit.
Wholesale Prices Continue Rise
Prices of commodities at wholesale increased 0.5 per-
cent in January after seasonal adjustment to 188.0 per-
cent of the 1967 base. That advance was about in line
with those of the past few months. Farm product prices
rose 1.1 percent, but processed foods and feeds were off
0.2 percent. Industrial commodities were up 0.5 percent
compared with 0.3 percent in December and 0.7 percent
in November.
As in the case of employment data, price informa-
tion was gathered before the harsh January storms and
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the likely effects are variously described. The US De-
partment of Commerce senior economist expects a price
run-up in February and March, but not to a serious
degree. A private forecasting firm, however, now projects
a rise in the WPI of 8 to 9 percent instead of the 6.9
percent projected earlier. Fertilizer, industrial chemicals,
synthetic rubber, and plastics— all based on natural gas
or petroleum— are expected to show the largest hikes.
Retail Sales Decline
The unusually cold weather in January also affected
retail sales, which dropped for the first time in four
months. The seasonally adjusted 2 percent decline to
$56.6 billion reflected cuts of 3.3 percent in durables and
1.4 percent in nondurables. .-Automobiles, which had been
enjoying particularly strong sales, suffered most from the
severe weather, falling 6.4 percent from the December
level. There was some indication that total sales picked
up again in the first week of February.
On a year-to-year basis, retail sales were up 10 per-
cent in January— 14 percent for durables and 8 percent
for nondurables. Given the changes in the consumer price
index, these gains would indicate advances of 5 to 7
percent in real volume of retail sales.
Fairly Healthy Profits
An early survey by the Wall Street Journal of the
fourth-quarter profits of 470 corporations indicates an
increase of 19.1 percent over the similar period in 1975.
In the third quarter, the year-to-year gain was 17 per-
cent. These advances were substantially less than those
of the first two quarters of 1976, but the first-half com-
]5arisons were made with 1975 quarters affected by the
recession.
The slower growth in profits in the second half of
1976 also reflected the general sluggishness of the econ-
omy. As measured by the real gross national product, the
rate of growth in the final quarter was only about a third
of that in the first quarter of 1976.
The largest percentage gain in the fourth quarter
was shown by farm equipment manufacturers, which
nearly tripled profits from fourth quarter 1975 to fourth
quarter 1976. Six industries - autos and equipment, elec-
trical equipment-electronics, petroleum products, tools
and machinery, utilities, and banks— showed gains of
one-fourth or more over the last quarter of 1975. Makers
of chemicals, steel, and textiles had lower profits than
in the year-earlier period.
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Recent Economic Changes
GNP— Fourth Quarter
GROSS NATioNAi, PRODUCT Tosc $38.7 billion in the fourth
quarter of 1976 to a seasonally adjusted annual rate
of $1,748.5 billion. Personal consumption expenditures
rose $29 billion to $1,117.5 billion. This followed a gain
of $23.8 billion in the previous quarter. Final sales were
up 2.7 percent in current dollars seasonally adjusted.
The increase followed gains of 2.1 percent and 2.3 per-
cent in the two preceding quarters. Final sales rose $148
billion in 1976 compared with $128.5 billion in 1975.
In 1972 dollars, output rose from $1,272.2 billion in
the third quarter to $1,281.5 billion in the fourth. Prices
rose at an annual rate of 5.8 percent as measured by the
GNP chain price index, compared with 4.6 percent in the
third period and 5.4 percent in the second.
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT
(Billions of dollars)
4th
1976» 1975 qtr.
1976''
Gross national product 1,692.4 1,516.3 1,748.5
Personal consumption 1,078.6 973.2 1,117.5
Durable goods 156.3 131.7 161.2
Nondurable goods 440.3 409.1 455.5
Services 482.0 432.4 500.8
Domestic investment 241 2 183.7 249.0
New construction 121 6 101.8 131,4
Producers' durable equipment 106.1 96.4 109.7
Change in business inventories 13.5 -14.6 7.9
Nonfarm inventories only. . 13.6 —17.6 8.9
Net exports of goods and services 6.9 20 ,
5
5.2
Government purchases 365 .
8
339 .0 376 8
INCOME AND SAVING
National income 1,349.4 1,207.6 n.a.
Personal income 1,375.4 1,249.7 1,422.1
Disposable personal income 1,181.8 1,080.9 1,216 9
Personal saving 77.8 84 . 72 .
9
Source: _US Department of Commerce.
•» Preliminary.
*» Preliminary; seasonally adjusted annual rates.
n.a. Not available.
Advances in Industrial Production
FOR the 1976 calendar year industrial production aver-
aged 129.8 on the FRB index, up 10.2 percent from the
Illinois Business Review
Monthly except July-August ivhen biinonthly
Bureau of Economic and Business Research
University of Illinois
408 David Kinley Hall, Urbana, Illinois 61801
Director, Robert W. Resek; Editor, Ruth A. Birdzell;
Editorial Staff, Nelle Wagner; Research Assistants, Lind.s
Krebs, Bruce Sh.m.on, and Michael Trebinc.
The miterial appearing in the Illinois Business Reuiew is derived from vari-
ous primary sources and compiled by the Bureau of Economic and Business
Research. Its chief purpose is to provide businessmen of the Slate and other
interested persons with current mformation on business conditions. Signed
articles represent the personal views of the authors and not necessarily those
of the University or the College of Commerce. The Review will be sent
free on request. Second-class postage paid at Urbana, Illinois.
1975 average. Most of the year's increase occurred prior
to the pause in production of summer and early autumn.
By the end of the year, output had crept a little above the
previous high in June 1974. Consumer goods were above
the earlier high— mainly on the strength of nondur-
ables, which were well ahead. Materials output and busi-
ness equipment have still not recovered all the ground
lost in the 1974-75 downturn.
Expenditures on Residential Improvements
TOTAL EXPENDITURES for the Upkeep and improvement
of residential properties in the third quarter of 1976
showed the sharpest drop in several years (see chart).
The latest Census Bureau report shows spending at a
seasonally adjusted annual rate of $25.1 billion. This was
down nearly 21 percent from the previous quarter and
down 2.3 percent from the corresponding quarter of
1975. The largest decline was in construction improve-
ments and especially in additions and alterations. Such
projects were off 34.3 percent from the second quarter
(35.2 percent in constant dollars) and 24.8 percent from
the third quarter of 1975 (31.3 percent in constant
dollars).
Expenditures on Residential Improvements
(Seasonally adjusted annual rates)
Billions of dollars
32
Maintenance and repairs
1972 1973 1974
Source: US Department of Commerce.
Statistical Summary of Business Activity
Selected Indicators
Percentage changes, November 1976 to December 1976
-20 -10 O .10 -20 -30
CCAL PRODUCTION
ELECTRIC POWER PRODUCTION
EMPLOYMENT-MANUFACTURING
BUILDING PERMITS-RESIDENTIAL
RETAIL SALES
BANK DEBITS
H
FARM PRICES
Illinois Business Indexes
Employment— manufacturing'.
. .
Weekly earnings— manufacturing'
Consumer prices in Chicago^
Life insurance sales (ordinary)'. . . .
Retail sales*
Farm prices'
Bank debits'
Building permits— residential*.
. . .
Electric power'
Coal production'
Petroleum production'
111. Dcpt. Labor; = US
Fed. Power Comn 111. Geol. Survey.
United States Monthly Indexes
Personal income'
Manufacturing'
Sales
New construction activ
Private residential..
Private nonresidential
Total public
Foreign trade'
Merchandise exports
.
Merchandise imports
.
Excess of imports
Instalment credit^
Extended
Liquidated
Business loans^
Gash farm income'
ity
Industrial production'
Combined index
Durable manufactures
Nondurable manufactures. .
Minerals
Manufacturing employment*
Production workers
Factory worker earnings*
Average hours worked . .
Average hourly earnings . . .
Average weekly earnings . . .
Building permits— residential'
Retail sales'
Consumer price index*
Wholesale prices*
All commodities
Farm products
Processed foods and feeds . . .
Industrial commodities
. .
Farm prices'
Received by farmers
Paid by farmers
Parity ratio
Annual rate
in billion S
1,440.7"
l,250.3«.i>
167. 2''' I'-'
60.6
50.8
30.8
127.3
137.4
10.1
200.4"
178. 5»
129.0°
102.0
Indexes
(1967
= 100)
133«
124"
144"
117«
100
191
192
104
215<»
174
187
192
179
187
Percentage
change from
Nov. Dec.
1976 1975
+ 3.6
+ 0.0
-12.5
- 6.1
-14.4
+ 11.3
+ 3.5
-45.0
+ 0.7
+ 0.4
+ 0.6
0.0
+ 0.2
+ 0.6
+ 0.3
+ 0.8
+ 4.4
+ 2.4
+ 0.2
+ 3.5
+ 1.0
+ 3.0
+ 12.6
+ 7.4
+31.3
+ 7.0
-14.8
+ 15.1
+28.9
+ 9.7
+ 8.3
+ 0.8
+ 5.7
+ 5.
+ 3.
+ 3.
- 0.
+ 8.
+ 7.
+42.
+ 11.
+ 4.
+ 6.
- 3.
+ 6.
Not available.
' US Dept. of Commerce; ' Federal Reserve Board; ' US Dept. of Agricul-
ture; * US Bureau of Labor Statistics.
" Seasonally adjusted. ** Revised series. *^ End of month. ^ Data for November
1976 compared with October 1976 and November 1975. « Based on official
indexes, 1910-14 = 100.
United States Weekly Business Statistics
Item
Jan. 22 Jan. 8 Jan. 1 Jan. 24
Production:
Bituminous coal
Electric power by utilities
Passenger cars
Petroleum (daily avg.)
Steel, raw
Rail freight, revenue ton-miles
Retail sales
Prices:
Wholesale, 22 commodities
400 industrial stocks (Standard & Poor's)
.
Finance:
Bond yields, domestic corporate (Moody's)
Business loans
Failures, industrial and commercial
Source: Survey of Currtnl Business, Weekly Supplen
thous. short tons.
mil. kwh
number in thous.
thous. bbl
thous. short tons
bil
mil. dol
1967 = 100
1941^3 = 10....
percent
mil. dol
number
7,805
45,639
162
8,028
1,973
13.
11,331
8.43
15,166
147
9,810
45,459
178
8,028
2,105
13.6
11,148
8.39
115,437
205
11,250
43,927
179
8,028
2,121
13.8
11.463
8.37
116,896
122
40,379
8
8,090
2,051
12.4
12,079
8.40
17,318
137
10,500
40,978
157
8,090
2,000
12.1
15,817
11,905
40,803
177
8,097
2,253
14.
10,370
9.31
118,849
218
Publications
and developments
of business interest
Business Briefs
Shifts in Instalment Debt Holdings
THE Seventh District Federal Reserve Bank points out
tliat over the past decade commercial banks have con-
tinued to hold the largest share of consumers' instalment
debt (see chart). However, the greatest growth has oc-
curred among credit unions. ^Vhereas the bank share has
grown by one-seventh since 1967, the credit unions have
upped their share by more than half. Commercial banks
have been foremost in lending money to finance car pur-
chases and hold almost three-fifths of such debt outstand-
ing. Auto loans, in turn, account for about 40 percent of
bank-held instalment debt. Credit imions hold about 19
percent of car loans ; finance companies hold the remain-
der.
Finance companies' share of instalment credit has
dropped by nearly a third since 1967. In their peak pe-
riod in the 1950s they held 41 percent of instalment debt,
about a tenth more than the banks held. Much of the
drop reflects a shift from automobile credit to other
activities such as financing accounts receivable for busi-
ness firms.
State Revenues, Fiscal 1976
T.AX RECEIPTS of State governments in fiscal 1976 rose to
$89.3 billion, up 11.3 percent from the $80.2 billion col-
lected in fiscal 1975. Sales and gross receipts taxes ac-
counted for 53.1 percent of state tax revenue— general
Holders of Instalment Debt
Billions of dollars
S3 Retailers and others
^ Credit unions
I I Finance companies
^^ Commercial banks
^
1967 '68 69 70 71 72 7
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Rcsen
74 75 1976
sales and gross receipts totaled $27.3 billion, and selective
sales and gross receipts taxes amounted to $20.1 billion.
The second largest source of revenue, state individual
income taxes, yielded $21.5 billion, 14 percent more than
in 1975. Such taxes are now collected in 44 states. Corpo-
rate net income taxes were up 9.3 percent from the
previous year to $7.3 billion. State motor fuel tax revenue
increased 4.9 percent in fiscal 1976.
Eight states accounted for over one-half of state
revenue collected. The top five were California, $10.8
billion: New York, $9.8 billion; Pennsylvania, $5.1 bil-
lion; Illinois, $4.8 billion; and Texas, $4.2 billion. Tax
revenues were up in every state, with all but t^vo showing
gains of at least 5 percent. In the previous fiscal year two
states showed decreased collections and 12 states showed
rises of less than 5 percent.
Productivity and Labor Costs
PRODucTmTY in the nation's private nonfarm sector
dropped during the fomth quarter of 1976, with output
per man-hour declining at an annual rate of 0.1 percent
compared with an increase at a 2.7 percent annual rate
in the third quarter. The last quarter in which a decline
in productivity occurred was the fourdi quarter of 1975,
when it fell at a 1.8 percent annual rate. In manufactur-
ing, productivity declined in the fourth quarter at an
annual rate of 0.5 percent compared with the third
quarter's 5.7 percent annual rate of increase. The most
recent previous decline in manufacturing productivity
was in 1975's first quarter, when it fell at a 12.2 percent
annual rate.
Compensation per man-hour in the private sector rose
in the fourth quarter at an 8.9 percent annual rate, up
from the third quarter's 7.6 percent rate. Reflecting the
changes in compensation and productivity, nonfarm unit
labor costs ro,se at a 7.7 percent rate in the last quarter
compared with a rise of only 4.3 percent in the third
quarter. In manufacturing, compensation per man-hour
increased at a 7.7 percent annual rate; unit labor costs
rose at an annual rate of 8.3 percent, up from an annual
rate of 0.4 percent in the third period.
Preliminary Farm Census for 1974
THE Bureau of the Census has recently published a series
of five preliminaiy reports titled "1974 Census of Agricul-
ture: Northeast, North Central, South, West, and United
States." The number of farms totaled about 2.5 million in
1974 and covered 438 million acres of cropland. At tiie
time of tlie last previous census in 1969, there were 2.7
million farms with a total cropland of 459 million acres.
Other information is presented on crop value, types of
crops harvested, and farm sales and ownership.
Copies of the series can be obtained from the Sub-
scriber Services Section, US Bureau of die Census,
Washington, DC 20233. The price is 25 cents a copy.
Know your Sfofe-
Illinois indusfries
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Natural Gas— Critical Energy Input
THE first recorded use of natural gas in the United States
was in 1821 in Fredonia, New York. A shallow well was
dug and the gas was piped to a nearby inn where it was
used for illumination. Often found along with oil, natu-
ral gas was little more than an annoying by-product
that was flared off— that is. burned off— as it rushed
from the well.
Natural gas. an environmentally clean fuel, represents
one of the nation's dominant sources of energ\'; it ac-
counts for about 25 percent of total energy input to the
US economy. Natural gas contributes over 40 percent
of all energy utilized in the residential and commercial
sectors and 45 percent of that in the industrial sector. In
addition, gas provides about 15 percent of the primary
energy inputs for the generation of electric power. Utility
sales to 44 million ultimate customers totaled 164 billion
therms of natural gas in 1973 and accounted for $13
billion in revenues.
The industry is divided into three segments: produc-
tion, transmission, and distribution. Nearly 75 percent
of US production originates in Texas and Louisiana.
Gas is delivered through 1 million miles of pipeline to
more than 44 million customers in the 48 continental
states and the District of Columbia by 106 regulated in-
terstate pipeline companies and more than 1,500 distri-
bution companies.
Illinois— A Primary Consumer
Illinois production accounts for only one-hundredth of
1 percent of the national total. The State is sei-ved pri-
marily via nine interstate pipelines, most of which
originate in the southern states. Among these are Natural
Gas Pipeline of America, Alidwestern Gas Transmission
Company, Mississippi River Transmission Corporation,
Texas Eastern Transmission Corporation, and Texas
Gas Transmission Corporation. The entire gas distribu-
tion network for the State consists of nearly 50.000 miles
of pipeline. Texas and California are the only states that
exceed this figure.
Taken together, the state's 19 privately owned gas
utilities placed Illinois third in the nation in total num-
ber of customers and volume of sales. In 1975 state utili-
ties delivered 10 billion therms of gas to over 3 million
ultimate consumers, which accounted for nearly $1.5
billion in revenues.
Northern Illinois Gas Company is the state's largest
utility, with 1.3 million customers and $692 million in
revenues in 1975. The Peoples Gas Light and Coke
Company, serving most of the populous Chicago area,
is the state's second largest utility, with gas revenues over
$430 million. Illinois Power Company, sening much of
downstate Illinois, distributes to over 355,000 customers
and its gas revenues amount to more than $132 million
annually. Together, these three utilities account for 85
percent of total Illinois utility sales of gas. Other large
utilities include Central Illinois Light Company, North-
shore Gas Company, and Central Illinois Public Service
Company.
Industrial and commercial establishments in Illinois
account for 55 percent of total therm sales to customers.
Since industrial and commercial rates are considerably
lower than those for residential consumers, industrial and
commercial sales yielded only 48 percent of gas utility
revenues in 1975. Average revenue per therm for resi-
dential customers was 30 percent higher than for the
commercial and industrial class.
Gas Supply— Uncertain Future
The problem with gas is that there is not enough of
it. Reserves are declining with respect to demand at a
rate that already has placed critical restrictions on con-
sumption. The price of natural gas for the interstate
market is regulated at the wellhead by the Federal Power
Commission and to the consumer by public utility com-
missions. Producers of natural gas seek "deregulation" of
their prices, which they assert have been held artificially
low and have not provided them %vith enough incentive
to finance additional gas exploration. Consumers of gas
allege that continued regulation, perhaps in a modified
form, is necessary to protect the public from a struc-
turally uncompetitive producing industr)\ Nevertheless,
according to FPC estimates, natural gas deliveries by
interstate pipeline companies during the 1976-77 season
will fall 21 percent short of what they have agreed to
supply.
.•\s the demand for natural gas increases, underground
storage and temporary supplementar)- supplies will con-
tinue to play an important part in meeting peak demands
and in providing off-peak depositories for pipeline gas.
Gas for storage purposes can be transported through
pipelines during warm weather months to improve the
pipeline load-factor and can be sold during periods of
lieavT demand in the winter. To meet the extreme in
demand of the coldest days, distribution companies, in
addition to taking their maximum contract demand from
their pipeline supplier and taking whatever underground
storage gas is available, operate jieaking plants which
use very high cost liquified petroleum gas (propane or
butane). Illinois currently has 37 such storage facilities
scattered throughout the State. The State also has three
supplemental gas plants that produce liquified and syn-
thetic natural gas. These facilities, together, assist in the
more efficient deliver)' of gas to the consumer market.
The potentially massive gap between natural gas sup-
plies and demand has triggered the search for new ways
to produce synthetic natural gas. Currently in Illinois
there are plans for coal gasification facilities in New
Athens, Pinckne>-\ille, and Pekin. Problems with existing
technology, rising costs, and legal factors have delayed
initial construction at all three sites.
What's new
in Illinois
communities
Local Illinois Developments
Increases in Farmland Values
ON AVERAGE, the valuc of farmland in the five major
Corn Belt states rose one-third last year. The 41 percent
increase in Illinois raised the value of its farmland to an
average of $1,497 per acre on 1 November 1976, com-
pared with $1,184 a year earlier. Advances in other states
in the Corn Belt included Ohio, 32 percent to $1,039;
Indiana, 30 percent to $1,154; Iowa, 33 percent to
$1,222; and Missouri, 20 percent to $472. Farm enlarge-
ment was the key factor in spiraling Corn Belt land
prices: land scarcity, crop and livestock prices, invest-
ment in land as a hedge against inflation, and the avail-
ability of credit also contributed.
For the US as a whole, farmland values rose 17 per-
cent last year compared with gains of 12 percent in 1975
and a record of 21 percent in 1974. Until land prices
turned sharply upward in the early 1970s, the annual
increase was 5 or 6 percent. The average value of US
farmland last November was $445 an acre, up from $380
the year before and $339 in 1974. The 1976 average
covered a range in land costs from a low of $76 an acre
in New Mexico to a high of $2,852 in New Jersey.
Coal Production Down (Again)
IN 1976, Illinois coal production totaled 58 million tons,
a decrease of 2.2 percent from 1975. The division of out-
put between strip mining and underground mining has
remained fairly constant at about 50 percent until last
Illinois Coal Production
Source: Illinois Dcpaj-uni
year, when the shares shifted to 47 percent for under-
ground mining and 53 percent for strip mining (see
chart)
.
The national picture shows coal production continu-
ing to rise slowly. Total US output increased 3.4 percent
in 1976. Bituminous coal production, which accounts
for most of the tonnage, rose 3.5 percent during the
past year.
O'Hare Extension Approved
CHICAGO has received federal approval for a rapid transit
line to O'Hare International Airport. This $136 million
project will extend the Milwaukee Avenue rapid transit
line from Jefferson Park to the O'Hare taxiway bridge
where it will enter a subway for the final link to a station
beneath the main parking garage. Other stations are
planned at Harlem Avenue and Cumberland and River
roads. Construction will take approximately two years.
The federal government is expected to provide about
$109 million for the extension project, the Illinois De-
partment of Transportation $18 million, and the city of
Chicago $9 million.
New Industry in Tuscola
LiTTELFUSE, iNCORPOR.\TED, a manufacturer of fuses used
in automobiles, has opened a new plant in Tuscola to
assemble cylinder-shaped fuses. These will be returned to
the parent company for packaging and distribution.
When in full operation, the plant is expected to produce
600,000 fuses a day. Currently, it employs se\en workers;
80 people are scheduled to be hired by summer, 1977.
Tuscola was selected for the plant because of labor avail-
ability and transportation facilities.
Lasers Make Phone Calls
THE first commercial test of a telephone link using beams
of laser light traveling through glass fibers will be made
soon in downtown Chicago. The .\merican Telephone
and Telegraph Company plans an in-ser\'ice test of a 1.5
mile light wave communications cable between an office
building and two telephone exchange centers. In this
test, expected to be completed next year, a single pair of
fibers will be able to carry nearly 600 telephone conver-
sations or a television signal. In addition, the cable will
carry computer data and picturephone signals. A total
of 24 fibers will be carried within the half-inch cable,
which will take only a small fraction of the space re-
quired for the copper-wire cables having similar capacity.
Illinois Bell also took part in two other major tech-
nological steps for the Bell System last year. The first
was the initial installation of an all-electronic switching
center for routing calls into the Long Lines circuits. The
second involved the first local service application of ;i
high-capacity computer controller, originally designed
for a long-distance system.
Comparative Economic Data for Selected Illinois Cities, December 1976
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-40.6
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Sources: ' Local sources; data include federal construction projects. ' Local power companies. ' Local post office reports; accounting
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•Total for cities listed. '' Data are for standard metropolitan statistical areas. = Includes immediatclv surrounding territory. < Includes
East Moline. " Madison and St. Clair counties, n.a. Not available.
Is the Central Business District Becoming an Anachronism?
RICHARD M. HILL, Professor of Business Administration, UIUC
SUHURBAN SHOPPING CENTERS havc cnjoycd nearly a
quarter century of continuous growth while efTorts of
municipalities and local merchants to revive "down-
town" shopping have been largely unrewarding. Many
investors and businessmen alike were about ready to
"write ofT" the central business district as a marketing
anachronism when the Arab oil embargo of 1973 re-
minded them of the features which made the central
business district a profitable location for retail and ser-
vice outlets in the first place: accessibility and con-
venience. They were accessible by automobile as well as
by mass transit without the customer's having to spend
as much time in travel as in shopping; and they were
convenient to hotels, restaurants, banks, savings and
loan offices, professional offices, theaters, and the head-
quarters of local government.
Although suburban shopping centers rival and often
surpass central business districts in the variety and quality
of merchandise offered, they are typically less accessible
and less convenient. These offsetting disadvantages of
suburban shopping centers were of little consequence un-
til the specter of gasoline shortages produced a reassess-
ment of how we use what remains of this dwindling
source of energy.
Consumers' Viewpoint
Consumers, of course, are the final arbiters. They are
the benefactors who collectively compare the advan-
tages and disadvantages of "downtown" versus shop-
ping centers as a place to shop. It is through their eyes
that such conditions as variety, price, parking, traffic,
crowding, and distance become meaningful motivational
factors. Weighing the merits of "downtown" versus sub-
urban centers and attempting to compare the future of
one with that of the other is not merely a matter of con-
sidering shopping satisfaction. Which location ultimately
prevails in the contest for the consumers' patronage will
depend in large part on how seriously they view energy
conservation and on what downtown merchants do to
enhance and embellish the inherent advantages of their
location.
The cost of gasoline is sure to rise as its supply and
availability become more uncertain. Although supply
seems to be plentiful now and the West Coast is even
bracing for an oil glut, this picture could change dras-
tically in a few years. As the prices of everything else
the consumer buys continue to rise, will the cost of living
reach such levels that consumers who patronize shopping
centers begin to add transportation to the cost of pur-
chasing there? This is a distinct possibility in view of the
distance over which suburban shopping centers, particu-
larly the large ones, draw their patrons. It is not unusual
for a center of 800,000 to 1 million square feet to attract
customers over an area of 50 to 75 miles radius. The
likelihood of such centers being able to survive on busi-
ness generated by customers living in their immediate
vicinity is questionable. A corollary question is whether
the advent of rationing would reveal that motorists
placed a higher priority on the use of gasoline for activi-
ties other than shopping.
Investors' Concerns
At the present time, it is clear that investors have
few doubts about the continued ability of shopping cen-
ters to draw shoppers to the suburbs. Forbes magazine
estimates that real estate investors have committed $60
billion to the development of shopping centers in the US
(1 June 1976, p. 35). The International Council of
Shopping Centers (New York based trade association)
reports that about 2,500 centers were either built or ex-
panded here last year.
Shopping centers also have attracted some of the
nation's largest and most prestigious lending institutions,
that is, those generally credited with the technical ex-
pertise to assess future trends with considerable accu-
racy. Connecticut General Life Insurance Company has
nearly $100 million in shopping center loans outstanding
and owns all or part of nine large centers (US Securities
and Exchange Commission, 10-K Reports, 31 March
1976, pp. 5-9; Forbes, 1 June 1976. p. 35) . Northwestern
Mutual Life Insurance Company has a $30 million shop-
ping center loan portfolio and direct equity totaling $250
million in a number of regional shopping centers (SEC
10-K Reports, 31 March 1976, p. F-]6[ Forbes, 1 June
1976. p. 35).
There are also the new commingled real estate funds
set up by insurance companies and banks which en-
courage investment in real estate by other institutions.
This device has opened another substantial source of
capital to shopping center developers: pension funds.
Recent stock market behavior appears to have convinced
pension fund managers that real estate loans are a pru-
dent diversification. Since most of them have had little
experience in real estate, they have turned increasingly
to commingled funds. Prudential Insurance pioneered
this kind of investing in 1971 with the Prudential Real
Estate Investment Separate Account fund. Since that
time at least a score of other insurance companies (and
banks) have launched commingled funds (Forbes, 1 No-
vember 1975. p. 70). Such a stimulus to real estate in-
vestment has made it easier for shopping center devel-
opers to finance higher risk ventures.
Investor enthusiasm for shopping centers has also
been supported by at least three other circumstances : tlie
rising volume of retail sales, fa\orable leases, and the
consumer appeal of suburban locations. The upward
spurt in total retail sales, particularly since the fourth
quarter of 1972, has encouraged shopping center devel-
opment, because the largest single share of sales by all
but automotive and building material retailers (36 per-
cent) is accounted for by shop])ing centers {Slwpping
Center World Trade Magazine, various years). Conse-
quently, the value of existing centers is appreciating.
The manner in which shopping center leases are cus-
tomarily written is favorable to owners. Leases t^'pically
contain clauses stating that sales volume over a specified
amount must be shared with the developer (Leonard A.
Jones, Jones Legal Forms: Contractual Business and
Conveyancing Forms, 10th ed. (Indianapolis: Bobbs-
Merrill. 1962), pp. 592-93). During inflationary periods,
such as the present one, these "overage rents" can
amount to substantial sums. (General Growth Proper-
ties, a real estate investment trust which has consistently
kept most of its $224 million assets in shopping centers,
reported overage rents in excess of $1 million for 1975
(SEC 10-K Reports, 13 March 1976).) Moreover, many
leases contain clau.ses which require tenants to absorb in-
creases in such operating costs as utilities, insurance pre-
miums, and property taxes. Owners are in effect par-
ticipants in, rather than victims of, inflation.
Land and Development Costs
The relatively lower cost of suburban real estate
makes possible the inducement of free parking (acres of
it) and traffic patterns which permit easy entrance and
exit from parking areas. The architectural freedom
;.
available when designing new structures, as opposed to
, adapting or remodehng existing ones, permits the erec-
tion of those which provide completely indoor shopping.
The consumer appeal of these characteristics has been
dramatic. With the possible exception of free parking,
these are features which central business districts find it
difficult to match. When the quality and variety of
merchandise ofTered equals or surpasses that available
in the central business district, the pulling power of the
shopping center is irresistible.
Central business districts, by contrast, have generally
been unable to attract large investors, at least those
willing to put their trust in the viability of downtown
retailing, the traditional mainstay of downtown business
activity. The very qualities which have made shopping
centers so appealing to retail shoppers have been missing
in many central business districts. Because of the build-
ing concentration in downtown areas, parking there is
not plentiful and where it does exist in something like
ample dimensions most municipalities cannot justify
permitting it to be free.
Downtown areas which were laid out a century
ago, when urban concentration was limited to a relatively
few cities, cannot readily be altered to permit easy traffic
flow into, out of, or around them. The city of Cham-
paign, Illinois, for example, was originally laid out in a
northeast-to-southwest direction like the IC & G railroad
tracks. This does not match the grid pattern which pre-
vails elsewhere in the city where the plotting is of more
recent date. As a result, the blocks in downtown Cham-
paign not only are of odd shapes and sizes but many
streets are not through routes. This has produced a con-
fusing and inconvenient traffic pattern which virtually
defies alteration.
Merchants in the downtown area also ha\e been
plagued with higher crime rates than those in suburban
shopping centers, with out-of-town store owners \\ho
have little interest in downtown development, and with
multiple owners of downtown real estate. Multiple own-
ijHers can severely complicate the problem of land acquisi-
tion for any prospective developer. Then too, it has been
difficult to maintain the enthusiasm of local merchants
for downtown development. Proposals for revitalizing
the central business district have tended to possess an
on-again, off-again character which invariably taxes the
interest span of many businessmen.
It is not unusual for the first consultant retained to
conduct a feasibility study to be advised to "shoot high."
More often than not, this results in a proposal which re-
ciuires such a staggering investment as to render it utterly
unrealistic. Discouragement weakens interest and further
thought of downtown redevelopment is postponed. A few
years later interest may be revived, another consultant
retained, and another feasibility study undertaken. This
one may or may not produce a plan that is any more
financially realistic than the first. The inescapable fact
remains that because of the dimensions of the task, al-
most any downtown redevelopment has to be done in
phases. This still requires a long-tenn commitment which
is almost certain to involve changing traffic patterns,
which in turn will require the approval and cooperation
of local government.
Depending on the degree of initiative local govern-
ment has been willing to assume, the initial step in
undertaking central business district redevelopment fre-
quently has been the organization of a development
corporation. This has usually been necessary for three
reasons : ( 1 ) to raise money which could be used to ac-
quire real estate, (2) to conduct as well as finance
feasibility studies, and (3) to give direction and focus
to the task of identifying and negotiating with prospec-
tive developers.
Owing to the natural interest of the public in its
purpose, the activities of the development corporation
must be guided with some discretion. Unlc-^ Iru.il gov-
ernment is kept apprised of the corporaiidn^ .u \\\\\\. or
itself becomes an active participant in tlio nutlidi i/.ition
of studies and shares in their results, local councilmen
are likely to look upon the activities of a private develop-
ment corporation with some suspicion. Lack of public
relations finesse on the part of development corporation
management has been a frequent cause of delay and
frustration in implementing the recommendations of
feasibility studies. It is also true that lack of business
acumen on the part of local government officials has led
them to misread the motives of developers.
These drawbacks of the central business district when
compared with the advantages of the suburban shopping
center ha\e induced many downtown merchants to re-
locate in shopping centers. Moreover, there has been lit-
tle incentive for others to take their place. This limits
the variety of merchandise a\ailable to downtown shop-
pers, which in turn limits the sales potential of the area
— a strong deterrent to any retailer considering the
central business district as a place to conduct his business.
The depressive effect is cumulative. For retailers,
competition is not always a bad thing, particularly when
it generates traffic, as it does when they cluster together.
If there is easy access to this cluster and shopping can be
done there widi ease and comfort, customers will be
drawn to it. This largely explains the faltering perfor-
mance of downtown retailers whenever they have been
obliged to compete with suburban shopping centers.
Outlook
What then does the future hold for central business
districts? Should merchants who are still there relocate
as quickly as possible in a suburban shopping center? Or
is there some strategy of downtown revitalization which
promises some measure of success? A more direct and
positive answer could have been given to this question
several years ago than is possible today.
First, it should be observed that not all shopping cen-
ters have been equally successful. The depressed eco-
nomic conditions of the early 1970s were felt by all re-
tailers regardless of location. However, available data
appear to indicate that all of the large shopping centers
were able to meet their costs with some room to spare. A
Chicago Tribune survey revealed that all suburban shop-
ping centers in the greater Chicago area registered sales
gains between 1974 and 1975, a period fairly typical of
the recent recession. In every instance but two, the in-
crease in sales was comfortably greater than the increase
in the consumer price index (see Table 1 )
.
Smaller centers, particularly the so-called strip centers
(those with stores strung out along a major thorough-
fare), did little better than their downtown counterparts.
There have even been a few shopping center failures, the
most spectacular being the $40 million Staten Island
Mall in New York City. Opened in 1974 with an area of
850,000 square feet and anchored by Sears and Macy's,
the center soon fell victim to high rents and low occu-
pancy. Average utility costs soared to over $3 a square
foot, taxes to $5.12 a square foot, and construction costs
to $80 a square foot. Not only did the mall's owners pay
$75,000 an acre for the land, but the city of New York
then assessed it for tax purposes at $230,000 an acre.
Owners have not even been able to pay interest charges
{Forbes, 1 June 1976, p. 36).
Second, suburban shopping center developers do not
have a monopoly on ways to attract investors. If the
downtown area can be altered to provide convenient and
ample parking, if traffic flow can be rerouted to allow
easy entrance and exit, and if it is architecturally feasible
to enclose the area in a way which pro\ides year-round
comfort, downtown retailers probably would be well ad-
vised to "stay put" and map out a strategy to "sell" the
Table 1. Leading Suburban Chicago
Shopping Centers
Year
Square Sales (millions)
^^^
opened
^J^^^^^ 1974 1975 ^m^^
Woodfield 1971 2.1 $210 S240 14.3
Oak Brook 1962 1.25 160 175 9.4
Ford City 1965 1.42 138 165 19.6
River Oaks 1966 1.25 130 143 10.0
Old Orchard ... . 1965 1.20 130 139 6.9
Yorktown 1968 1.50 125 135 8.0
Evergreen Plaza.. 1952 1.25 110 115 4.5
Randhurst 1962 1.20 100 103 3.0
Lincoln Mall ... . 1973 1.20 84 90 7.1
Golf Mill 1960 .90 80 85 6.3
Hawthorn 1973 1.30 70 75 7.1
Lakchurst 1971 1.20 65 71 9.2
Source: Chicago Tribune.
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opportunities in the area to large real estate investors.
As a minimal step, downtown developers would have to
be prepared to offer investors a climate in which business
would be treated as an equal in a partnership with local
government as well as land costs which can be justified in
view of the inherent advantages of downtown location.
A Climate for Revitalization
Contrary to much popular opinion, investors and
developers are not primarily looking for tax breaks and
favored treatment. They are looking for fair and equita-
ble treatment in an environment which will assure them
a competitive rate of return on their capital without the
assumption of unreasonable risks. A city is forever, at
least in the minds of many mortals, and investors in
downtown development must carefully appraise the cen-
tral city in terms of its long-term prospects as a trading
area. The prospects for a relationship of cooperation and
mutual understanding with local government are a key
factor in such an appraisal. The nature of local codes,
the reasonableness of their enforcement, the adequacy
and efficiency of police and fire protection, and the
availability of other services are all sensitive elements
in the local business climate.
A climate which fosters government-business coopera-
tion will also contribute to the type of organization
among downtown merchants which permits consistent
action. Such action as uniform store hours, uniform
housekeeping standards, cooperative promotions, and a
reasonable similarity in selling policies can do much
to create a favorable image of downtown retailing in the
minds of shoppers. There is at least a semblance of agree-
ment among retailers, as well as among a number of
those who advise them, that the most successful shopping
centers, whether they are downtown or in suburbia, pre-
sent a consistent image to the pubhc. Whether it is an
image of quality and service or of discount house bar-
gains, the stores in the complex should offer merchandise,
service, and prices consistent with this image. The more
confusing the image of downtown retailing in the minds
of consumers, the more its attraction for them is likely
to be compromised. It is perhaps needless to comment
that the image projected should be die result of investiga-
tion designed to determine what kind of image would
possess the strongest appeal in those areas from which
retailers expect to draw most of their customers.
Almost without exception the costliest land in a city
is that situated in its central business district. The ques-
tion is. How can the cost of such land, which has to be
cleared of existing structures before new facilities can be
built, ever be justified in comparison wiUi the much lower
cost of that on a city's outskirts? There is at least one
possibility: closing downtown streets and including their
acreage in the parcel of land to be developed. Since
streets cost the city nothing— that is, what acquisition
costs may have been incurred have long since been re-
covered — adding their acreage to downtown retail de-
velopment would represent no cost to a city. In fact, if
adjacent parcels of land to be incorporated into a devel-
opment project are separated by streets, tlie closing of
these streets and their incorporation into the project
would probably enhance its convenience to shoppers.
Averaging the cost of cleared land over the additional
acreage provided by closed streets could well bring the
per-acre cost of downtown land to a level which makes it
economically attractive when total costs are considered.
Net land cost in the central city does not have to be
equivalent to that in outlying areas to attract developers,
merely close enough that downtown's inherent advan-
tages become pivotal considerations. For example, utili-
ties and public services (police and fire protection) are
already "in place" downtown; they do not have to be
extended there as in the case of outlying locations. People
— a core of shoppers— are already there and accus-
tomed to going there to patronize theaters, hotels, and
restaurants, transact business at professional and govern-
mental offices, and avail themselves of the numerous
services offered in the typical central city business dis-
trict. They do not have to be drawn there by gala open-
ings and lavish promotions.
By virtue of being the hub around which the city has
developed, the central business district has an inherent
drawing power unmatched by any suburban location.
Geographically, downtown is an optimal location. It is
interesting to observe that in four of the six Illinois cities
for which central city retail sales data are available, sales
increased from 1972 to 1974 (see Table 2). The sales/
population ratios for these cities indicate that those fami-
lies which did not leave the central city continued to
shoj) there (Table 3)
.
Unfortunately, the key to capitalizing on this slaying
power to rebuild a flourishing retail trade downtown is
enlightened local government— a political rather than
an economic challenge. The challenge is all the more
formidable because examples of politically adept busine.ss
leaders are difficult to find. Equally diflScult to find are
examples of local political leaders willing to risk their
popularity in laying the foundations of long-term eco-
nomic growth who.se benefits are not readily apparent.
However, one subject all can perceive without much in-
struction is taxes. Perhaps that is the most compelling
argument for the re\italization of downtown.
In those cities which are losing to other cities retail
trade that used to be transacted "at home," recouping
the viability of downtown retailing is an urgent matter.
But it cannot be done without close business-go\ernment
cooperation which produces a climate conducive to sub-
stantial long-term investment in downtown retailing.
Table 2. Central City Retail Sales Performance,
1972 and 1974
Total retail sales
<-*'?fa' (millions of dollars)
city
1972 1974
Champaign 194.2 213.5
Chicago 7,301.3 8,637.5
Peoria 534.9 494.2
Rock Island 106.4 115.7
Rockford 447.3 537.6
Springlield 398.9 355.5
Source: Marketing Economics Institule, Marketing Economi
74, Sec. 2, pp. 31-34, and 1975-76, Sec. 2, pp. 31-34.
Percent
change
Table 3. Central City Population Change and
Sales/Population Ratios, 1972 and 1974
Population
nhange
1970-75
Cpercent) 1972
Sales/population
change
1 sales/
1 974 population
ratio
Champaign
Chicago
Peoria
Rock Island
Rockford. .
.
Springfield
. .
3,455
2,207
2,720
1,869
3,079
4,252
3,839
2,722
3,864
2,347
3,780
3,835
Market;, Marketing Ecot
Downtown is not simply a shopping and service area,
it is a tax base for an entire city. It is not unusual for
the central business district to account for as much as 15
to 20 percent of a municipality's total tax revenue. More-
over, if that tax base deteriorates, the entire city will have
to pay for the decay either with increased taxes or cur-
tailed services.
The effect of central business district decay is not
limited to economic considerations. As the hub around
which a city has developed, the downtown area provides
the whole community with an identity. The more drab,
run-down, and economically crippled it is, the more
deleterious its psychological effect. Although the eco-
nomic impact of such influences on a community virtu-
ally defy accurate measurement, they are none the less
real, as any merchandiser, large or small, can testify.
Reestablishing the preeminence of downtown as a
retail trading center is not the only way to revitalize it.
.\nother option is to develop the central business district
as a convenience center. Such centers feature a cluster of
specialty shops offering a wide assortment of merchandise
to appeal to a variety of tastes and needs. Gift shops, sta-
tionery stores, office supply dealers, jewelry stores, phar-
macies, variety stores, and yarn shops all complement the
services offered by banks, savings and loan associations,
restaurants, and professional offices.
Typically, financial and professional offices are al-
ready in the downtown area and unlikely to be drawn to
a suburban location. If indeed these offices are well
established in the central business district, they can serve
as the anchor for specialty retailers - - a function nor-
mally filled by a well-known department store. The loss
of such a store to a suburban shopping center, or the
inability to attract one because of a shopping center, is
not necessarily fatal to plans for downtown redevelop-
ment. The drawing power of governmental agencies,
good restaurants, theaters, and financial and professional
offices can be just as penasive.
Another option is to develop downtown simply as a
center for professional offices. Accountants, lawyers, ar-
chitects, and physicians can be attracted there with suffi-
cient parking, good restaurants, and the construction of
apartments and condominiums adjacent to the downtow n
area. This will require the encouragement of in\estment
but not in the amounts needed to rebuild downtown as
a retail trading center.
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Economic activity has rebounded sharply from the
effects of the winter storms. Output and employment
have expanded. Consumer and business spending have
moved up. At the same time, the rate of inflation has
quickened. Reflecting the improvement in business activ-
ity, credit markets appear to have tightened, as business
borrowing has expanded and interest rates have stabi-
lized.
Government economic policy has not yet made a dis-
cernible shift since the inauguration of the Carter Ad-
ministration. Monetary aggregates continue to rise at a
moderate and reasonably steady pace— as they have
over the past two years. Fiscal developments have not
been expansive in recent months, but are expected to be
more stimulative in the near-term future.
Output Expands
The nation's output has risen sharply since Januaiy,
more than offsetting earlier weather-induced declines.
Industrial production, which fell abruptly in Januar)^
because of severe winter storms, has since risen at a 12
percent annual rate. The output expansion in Februar>'
was achieved notwithstanding crippling weather condi-
tions early in the month, and despite a dip in auto pro-
duction. Recent output increases have occurred against
a backdrop of generally slower gains in production. Since
last .\ugust, industrial output has risen at a 2.9 percent
rate, substantially slower than the 8.5 percent rise in the
preceding year (see chart)
.
Home-building has also rebounded from weather-re-
lated declines. Housing starts rose to an annual rate of
1.8 million units in Februar)', nearly regaining the De-
cember pace. Home construction has risen about 20 per-
cent above its year-earlier rate, but remains well below
prerecession levels. Funds are readily available to finance
residential and commercial construction as interest costs
for mortgages have backed off.
Labor Market Improves
Conditions in the labor market have improved since
last fall. Employment has expanded at a 4.2 percent rate
Industrial Production
since October. In contrast, the number with jobs was
virtually unchanged on balance during the preceding
half year. Reflecting shifts in employment growth, un-
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employment rose during the summer and autumn of
1976, and has since declined. The unemplo)Tnent rate,
at 7.5 percent in mid-Februar)', is down substantially
from the 8 percent level reached last November.
Recent labor market gains have occurred despite a
longer-term moderation in employment growth. Since last
August, total employment has expanded at a 2.6 percent
annual rate; in the preceding year, the number at work
rose 3.2 percent. These employment developments have
run parallel to underlying changes in production. More-
over, recent labor market inprovements fly in the face of
demographic forces serving to push unemployment higher.
There has been a marked and sustained increase in the
proportion of the working-age population seeking job
opportunities. Job growth over the past decade has been
generally unable to keep pace with labor force growth.
Spending Increases
Consumer spending has continued to surge forward,
reflecting increases in employment and income. Retail
sales jumped upward at more than a 20 percent annual
rate in February, nearly regaining their bloated Decem-
ber level. In early March, automobile sales registered a
19 percent gain over the corresponding year-ago pace,
and were up sharply from February's rate. Although re-
tail spending fluctuates erratically on a month-to-month
basis (see chart), sales rose 9.4 percent during the year.
However, nearly two-thirds of the year-to-year gain re-
sulted from inflation, with physical sales rising only about
3.4 percent.
Business spending has also moved upward. New or-
ders from manufacturers have strengthened to such an
extent that shortages have begun to surface. Puichasing
agents report short supplies in a variety of materials and
commodities— including fuel oil, natural gas, bearings,
selected castings, and large electric motors.
Aside from spending generally associated with current
output, businesses have accelerated their plans for capital
expenditures. The most recent Commerce Department
survey of business capital spending plans for this year
project an 11.7 percent increase, compared with a 6.8
percent rise in 1976. Moreover, government economists
expect these projections to be revised upward. Reinforc-
ing the view that business investment expenditures are
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likely to expand in the near future, a recent Conference
Board survey reported a marked rise in capital appropri-
ations, as distinct from projections. Capital appropriations
are authorizations for future spending. In the capital
expenditure process, appropriations precede the place-
ment of orders for new capital equipment.
Inflation Quickens
The rate of inflation has accelerated to a "double-
digit" pace in recent months. Consumer prices have ex-
ploded at an 11 percent rate so far this year. By com-
parison, during 1976 consumer prices rose less than 5
percent. VV'holesale prices, which rose 4.6 percent in 1976,
have since risen at an 8.3 percent rate. The intensification
Retail Sales
lions of dollars
1975 1976
Source: US Department of Commerce.
of wholesale price pressures has centered in food prices,
as industrial prices have continued to move up at a 6.4
percent rate, the same as in 1976.
It is believed the recent inflation stems chiefly from
temporaiy supply constraints, rather than from persistent
aggregate demand pressures. The supply problems appear
to be traceable to the unusually cold and stormy winter,
drought, and other "acts of God." Even so, the price in-
creases are now embedded in our price structure, and
some time will be required before a full adjustment has
been made.
Credit Markets Tighten
Credit markets are just beginning to show some of the
characteristics that typically emerge during a business
expansion. Bank loans have risen at about a 10 percent
annual rate since last fall. However, much of the loan
expansion has resulted from bank acquisitions of com-
mercial paper and bankers' acceptances rather than from
commercial lending. Interest rates have moved moder-
ately upward since December (see chart) . It is likely that
the recent acceleration in inflation will augment upward
interest rate pressures.
Even though the current economic expansion is nearly
two years old, credit markets— and financial markets
generally— have retained many of the characteristics of
a recession. While bank loans and interest rates have
risen somewhat in recent months, the upward trend is
not yet firmly established.
Monetary Policy Unchanged
Monetary aggregates have continued to expand at a
reasonably moderate pace. The monetary base — con-
sisting of bank reserves plus currency— is viewed by
some analysts as an important policy variable of the
Federal Reserve System. Its growth is a chief prerequisite
for an expansion in the money supply. The monetary
base rose about 7 percent over the past year, not mark-
edly different from rates of increase over the past several
years. Moreover, the growth in the base has been fairly
stable, not occurring in fits and starts.
The money supply rose about 6 percent last year.
Reflecting stability in growth of bank reserves, the money
Interest Rates
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supply also grew steadily throughout the year (see chart)
.
Monetary policy actions during the recovery cannot be
regarded as stimulative, as money supply growth has not
even kept pace with inflation rates. Even so, there is a
view among economists — probably a minority view —
that a moderate growth in the supply of money has been
appropriate.
Fiscal Policy Easing
Fiscal policy has not been strongly expansive thus far
in the business recovery. While burgeoning federal deficits
have created the impression that fiscal policy has been
stimulative, the deficits chiefly reflect a shortfall in tax
receipts— not new spending initiatives. In fact, the rate
of increase in federal e.xpenditures has been cut in half
over the past year. Meanwhile, tax reductions have not
yet moved through the US Congress. However, in coming
months fiscal actions are likely to turn increasingly stimu-
lative. The Carter Administration has proposed an eco-
nomic package involving both spending increases and
modest tax cuts. It is estimated that the stimulus program
would add $22 billion to $33 billion to the budget deficit.
Money Supply
Billions of dollars
340
Local Illinois Developments
IIDA Makes Business Loans
The Illinois Industrial Development Authority (IIDA)
provides loans to people who want to start new businesses
or expand existing facilities and have been unable to
raise money through other sources. Loans have ranged
in size from $20,000 to $125,000. Interest charges are
based on the prime rate, with a minimum interest rate
of 8 percent and a maximum rate of 10 percent. Besides
loaning money directly to businesses, IIDA is interested
in helping local development corporations to attract in-
dustry. In many cases when federal funds can be ob-
tained with local matching funds, IIDA can supply the
local money, thus allowing the completion of the trans-
action.
IIDA loans are available in areas throughout the
Illinois Business Indexes
Blast Furnaces and Steel Mills
Steel is basic to any industrialized economy, since it
supplies the essential materials for neariy every industr)'
— virtually everything manufactured either contains steel
or is made with the aid of steel tools. The industr)-'s
principal markets, however, are the automotive industry,
construction, machinery and industrial equipment, appli-
ances, the oil and gas industry, shipbuilding, agriculture,
the railroads, and mining. The interdependence of mar-
kets for steel makes the industry especially vulnerable to
fluctuations in the national economy. Historically the in-
dustry has followed cyclical patterns but with greater
volatility than the general economy in both the down and
the up phases.
The blast furnace and basic steel industry includes
those "establishments primarily engaged in manufactur-
ing hot metal, pig iron, silvery pig iron, and ferroalloys
from iron and steel scrap; converting pig iron, scrap iron,
and steel scrap into steel ; and in hot rolling iron and
steel into basic shapes such as plates, sheets, strips, rods,
bars, and tubincr." In the US there are approximately
500 such establishments and they employ more than
570.000 workers. Basic steel-producing facilities are lo-
cated in 38 of the 50 states, but there are some very
heavy concentrations, mostly within a six-state area
stretching from New York and Pennsylvania to Illinois.
Much concern has been expressed over the past de-
cade regarding the financial condition of the steel com-
panies. The industry has been plagued with a large
number of important problems including skyrocketing
material and energy costs, a high rate of mandatory capi-
tal investment for pollution abatement, rising labor costs,
a slow growth in productivity, an increasing rate of for-
eign imports, a high degree of government intervention in
output pricing, and a lackluster demand for steel— pri-
marily a result of decreased demand for durable goods
such as automobiles, tool machinery, and commercial
construction.
The most controversial of these problems has been
the effect of foreign competition. The American Iron and
Steel Institute, a steel trade organization, has estimated
that imported steel accounted for 14 percent of the ap-
parent steel supply in this country in 1976. A very large
percentage of this total is accounted for by Japan, the
world's largest exporter. In some "specialty steel" cate-
gories, Japan has gained as much as 40 percent of the
US market. Much to the dismay of free trade advocates,
: cry for imposing protective tariffs and quotas has
come from many quarters— especially labor represented
by the United Steelworkers of America.
Illinois— Primary Producer
In 1976 Illinois accounted for 8.6 percent of total US
production of raw steel and ranked fourth in state out-
put, trailing only Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Indiana. Steel
Comparative Economic Data for Selected Illinois Cities, January 1977
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Comments on Three Aspects of Farm Taxation
C. ALLEN BOCK, Associate Professor of Agriculture Law, UIUC
The business of farming has been the object of nu-
merous special tax provisions. Some of these special pro-
visions stem from federal law; some relate to Illinois
law; still others are embedded in the Illinois constitution.
This article discusses three areas of special ta.x provisions
for farm businesses : ( 1 ) special provisions relating to real
and personal property taxes, (2) special Illinois sales tax
treatment, and (3) special provisions in estate and gift
tax treatment at the state and federal levels.
Real and Personal Property Taxation
The Illinois tax structure has been changed signifi-
cantly in recent years. The chief trend has been to shift
the ta.x burden from local to state government and from
state to federal government, and in doing so, to shift the
burden from the property tax to other sources of revenue.
E\pn with increased state and federal spending, however,
the demand for local property tax revenues continues to
f^row and farm property taxes remain high.
The property tax provides a large proportion of the
financial support to local government in Illinois. An ex-
ample of our hea\7 reliance on this tax is shown by a
comparison of per-acre property taxes on farm real estate
in Illinois and in other midwestem states for 1972 (US
Dej)artment of Agriculture, Farm Real Estate Taxes,
1974) :
National average $2.63
ILLINOIS 7.83
Iowa 5.89
Michigan 6.53
Indiana 5.93
Wisconsin 5.59
Ohio 4.10
Missouri 1 .98
Illinois local governments still rely heavily on the
property tax (see chart). Without state aid or shared
revenues, the property tax would have supplied 65.8
percent of the total revenue to local governments in
1974-75.
Illinois Constitutional Provisions, .\rticle IX, Section
4(a) of the 1970 Illinois Constitution requires real
property taxes to be levied "uniformly by valuation ascer-
tained as the General Assembly shall provide by law."
However, Section 4(b) permits counties with a popula-
tion of 200,000 or more to classify real property for pur-
poses of taxation, as limited by state law. Two important
limitations affect farm real estate
:
(1) The level of assessment or rate of tax of the
highest class in a county cannot exceed two and one-half
times the level of assessment or rate of tax of the lowest
class in that county.
( 2 ) Real property used in farming in a county cannot
be assessed at a higher level than single-family residential
real property in that count)'.
The agricultural lobby at the constitutional conven-
tion evidently thought that if a county classified real
Revenue Sources, Illinois Local Governments,
1974-75
(Dollars in millions)
/ Property tax /
by townships. Eighteen counties not organized on a town-
ship basis and one county organized on a township basis
have elected county assessors or a county board of asses-
sors. Real estate is assessed every four years, between 1
January and 1 June, the assessors fixing value as of 1
January.
Considerable criticism of the property tax system by
farmland owners has centered around the actual assess-
ment process. Some of the criticism has been eliminated
by improved training programs for assessors and by better
assessment techniques based on soil productivity indexes
developed by members of the Department of Agronomy
at the University of Illinois. In the opinion of many prop-
erty tax specialists, however, modernization of the assess-
ment process has just started.
One special Illinois law provides possible relief for
some farmland owners {1975 Illinois Revised Statutes,
Chapter 120, Sec. 501(a) (l)-(3) ). Most farmland own-
ers can, upon application to the county super\'isor of
assessments, have their property valued at 33'/3 percent
of the fair cash value the property would bring at a vol-
untary sale where the buyer would use the property for
farming or agricultural purposes. The property would
also be valued at 33 Vi percent of its fair cash value with-
out reference to its agricultural use.
If the agricultural assessment is lower, the owner pays
property taxes on that valuation. If the land ceases to be
used for farming or agricultural purposes, the person
liable for the taxes on the property must pay the differ-
ence (plus interest) between the taxes actually paid and
the taxes that would have been levied if the property
had been valued without reference to the agricultural
use. This repayment requirement applies to the three
years preceding the conversion of the land to a non-
agricultural use.
Abolition of the Personal Property Tax. Article IX, Sec-
tion 5(b) of the 1970 Illinois Constitution carried for-
ward the amendment to the 1870 constitution abolishing
personal property taxes on individuals. This amendment
was later sustained by the United States Supreme Court.
Therefore, farmers operating as sole proprietors no longer
pay personal property tax on grain and livestock inven-
tories, farm machinery, and so on. However, as a result
of a definition by the Illinois Supreme Court, farm part-
nerships and corporations still must pay personal property
tax on the personal property owned by those entities.
The 1970 constitution appears to provide some relief
for corporations and partnerships. Article IX, Section
5(c) provides that "On or before January 1, 1979, the
General Assembly by law shall abolish all ad valorem
personal property taxes." However, Article IX continues
by stating that
Concurrently therewith and thereafter [the General Assembly]
shall replace all revenue lost by units of local government and
school districts as a result of the abolition ... by imposing
statewide taxes, other than ad valorem taxes on real estate,
solely on those classes relieved of the burden of paying ad
valorem personal property taxes because of the abolition of
such taxes. . . .
One result of the imposition of the tax on fann part-
nerships and corporations is the trend toward the lease
of farm machinery to these entities. Leasing provides a
potential personal property tax saving of $3,000 in many
counties if the machinery has a fair market value of
$200,000, not an unusual amount for many Illinois farm
operations.
Although the fact is not readily apparent, the consti-
tutional provision is a "mandate" and not enforceable if
the legislature chooses not to act (Elk Grove Engineering
Co. V. Korzen, 55 I11.2d 393, 304 N.E.2d 65 (1973)).
Even if it does act, the farm partnerships and corpora-
tions must still be concerned about the kind and extent
of the replacement taxes. This is of special concern to
those farm partnerships and corporations presently pay-
ing no personal property tax because of the lack of own-
ership of any personal property. These same entities ap-
pear to be within the "class" relieved of paying such
taxes, if they are abolished, and would be subject to the
replacement taxes.
Illinois Sales Tax
The Illinois retailers occupation ta.x on the sale of
tangible personal property at retail in Illinois does not
generally apply to the farmer because his sales are not
retail sales. Although a farmer might occasionally sell a
quarter of beef or a part of a butchered hog at retail,
most of these sales are exempt from the sales ta.x as a
result of the provisions of Section 1 of the retailers oc-
cupation tax:
The isolated or occasional sale of tangible personal property
at retail by a person who does not hold himself out as being
engaged (or who does not habitually engage) in selling such
tangible personal property at retail does not constitute engaging
in the business of selling such tangible personal property at
retail. . . .
Many of the products sold to farmers are not subject
to the sales tax.
Farm chemicals are exempt from the sales tax ( Pub-
lic Act 79-946). "Farm chemicals include any chemical
product used in the production of crops that are to be
sold or in the production or care of animals that are to
be sold or the products of which are to be sold" (Bulletin,
Department of I\evenue, 1 October 1975)
.
Seeds sold to purchasers who use the seeds in raising
grass, vegetables, crops, or other plants for sale are ex-
empt from sales ta.x. Likewise, fertilizers sold to purchas-
ers who regularly engage in tlie business of producing
agricultural products for sale are exempt from the sales
tax (Department of Revenue Rule 33)
.
Feeds sold to purchasers for feeding livestock or
poultry for marketing or for producing dairy products
or eggs for marketing are also exempt from sales tax
(Rule 32).
Farmers or producers of breeding livestock are not
liable for the sales tax on the money received from the
sale of bulls, stallions, or other serving animals sold for
breeding purposes (Rule 32).
Most of these products are not subject to the sales tax
because tliey are considered to be sales for purposes of
resale and not sales at retail where the products will be
consumed.
Federal Estate and Gift Taxes
Inflation, rising prices, and improved technology in
recent years have pushed values of farm property up-
ward. US farm real estate values per acre in early 1975
averaged about 11 times higher than in 1940 and 3 times
higher than in 1960. Since 1940, the average size of farms
has more than doubled. Consequently many landowners
find that the value of their farm property is greater than
they had ever expected it would be.
Medium-sized farm properties that would have es-
caped estate taxes a few years ago are now of such value
as to incur major estate tax payments. An average mid-
western farm owner now may have accumulated an
estate worth a quarter to half a million dollars. The large
landowner may be worth several millions.
1976 Tax Reform Act. The new act, generally effec-
tive 1 January 1977, substantially changed the previous
rules governing the taxes assessed on the transfer of prop-
erty at death or during lifetime by gift. The effect on
farm estates and the transfer of those farm estates to the
next generation was also changed.
Prior to the new act a person could transfer up to
$60,000 in property value on his death without incurring
any federal estate tax. The $60,000 exemption had been
in effect since 1942 and was replaced in the 1976 act by
a tax credit which will reach $47,000 in 1981. Table 1
shows the impact of the federal estate tax on the transfer
of farm estates of $275,000, $775,000, and $1,525,000 to
the children (next generation)
.
The table assumes the husband dies first and leaves
all his property to his wife. It also assumes that the wife
has property of her own equal to the taxes, debts, and
expenses of her husband's estate, and that the wife lives
for at least 10 years after her husband's death. If the
husband has planned his estate and restricted the kind
of interest in property transferred to his wife, then the
tax amounts would be different. Assume all deaths are
1981 or later when the tax credit has reached $47,000.
As the table indicates, careful and sophisticated plan-
ning is necessai7 to transfer the family farm to the next
generation. Combinations of gifts, sales, trusts, and mari-
tal deduction planning are sometimes used in an attempt
to substantially reduce the federal estate tax liability.
Two 1976 Tax Reform Act provisions may be of spe-
cial significance to the farmer— the special valuation for
farmland and the delayed pa^Tnent of estate taxes.
Special Valuation of Farm Realty. Partly as a result of
considerable pressure by fann interest groups, Congress
included a section in the 1976 Tax Reform Act which
pennits a special valuation procedure for some farm real
estate for estate tax purposes.
Essentially, the new section permits the executor of
the estate to use a valuation technique other than an ap-
praisal of the property at its fair market value.
Section 2032A(e) (7) of the Internal Revenue Code
(IRC) provides that the value of a farm for farming
purposes can be determined by the following formula
:
excess of average annual gross cash rental for com-
parable land used for farming over average annual state
and local real estate taxes for such comparable land
divided by
the average annual effective interest rate for all new
federal land bank loans.
(Average annual computations are based on the five
most recent calendar years ending before the decedent's
death.) A practical application of this formula in Cham-
paign County would yield the following result: ($120
per acre rent minus $20 property taxes) -=- (8%) =
value of $1,250 per acre.
Without the benefit of this special provision, this same
land probably would be valued for estate tax purposes at
$2,500 to $3,000 per acre.
If for some reason this formula cannot be used, an
alternative procedure is provided to permit qualifying
fannland to be valued not at its fair market value but
instead at its fair market value for farming purposes.
Limitations on the Use of the Special Valuation. In an
attempt to limit the availability of such a formula to
family farms. Congress included a nimiber of qualifying
limitations in IRC Section 2032A. They may be simi-
marized as follows.
(1) On the date of decedent's deatli 50 percent or
more of the adjusted value of the gross estate must be
made up of farm real and personal property and it must
pass to a qualified heir (generally a close family mem-
ber).
(2) Same as (1) except that 25 percent or more
must be farm real estate.
(3) During the eight-year period ending on the death
Table 1. Federal Estate Taxes, Three Examples
of the decedent there must be periods aggregating five
years or more during which
(a) the property was owned by the decedent or
a member of his family, and
(b) there was "material participation" by the
decedent or a member of his family in the operation of
the farm.
(4) All heirs receiving an interest in the property
which will be specially valued must agree to the proce-
dure.
(5) The most the procedure can reduce the value of
the qualified real property is $500,000. Note: If a farmer
has a $1,000,000 estate prior to the special valuation and
a $500,000 estate after, there would be a potential estate
tax saving of $210,000.
(6) The saving in ta.x will have to be paid back to
the United States government if within 15 years after
the decedent's death and before the death of the qualified
heir receiving the property
(a) the heir disposes of any interest in the prop-
erty other than to a member of his family or
(b) the heir no longer uses the qualified prop-
erty for farming purposes.
The tax is imposed on the heir described in (a) or (b).
(7) Under IRC Section 6324B, the United States
will take a lien in the property for the amount of the re-
duction in taxes until the liability period as described in
(6) terminates.
Although this procedure will substantially reduce the
estate tax liability of many Illinois farmers, the procedure
is very complex and administration by the Internal Rev-
enue Service will be difficult. The attempt to exclude
nonfarmers from qualifying was admirable and well con-
sidered, but it is the opinion of many estate tax planners
that a nonfarmer could, with proper planning, qualify
under this procedure and save substantial estate taxes.
Congress may have unintentionally created an estate tax
shelter for nonfarmers, thereby encouraging such indi-
viduals to purchase farmland. This may have undesirable
agricultural policy implications.
Land owned by family farm corporations, partner-
ships, and trusts may or may not qualify for this special
valuation. The Treasury is to issue specific regulations
clarifying the matter.
Delayed Payment of Estate Taxes. The estate tax attrib-
utable to a farm or other closely held business can be paid
over a 15-year period if the value of the closely held
business (farm business) is at least 65 percent of the
decedent's adjusted gross estate (IRC Section 6166)
.
If the estate qualifies, it can defer any payment of
tax for up to five years and then pay the tax in equal
instalments over the next 10 years. The deferred estate
tax attributable to the first $1 million of farm business
property is subject to an interest rate of only 4 percent.
Farm Corporations and Income Tax Savings
As taxable incomes of farmers increase, federal in-
come tax considerations become more important. Many
top Illinois commercial farmers had taxable incomes dur-
ing the last three or four years of $40,000 or more. These
10
farmers have typically reinvested $20,000 to $30,000 of
that amount in the farm business, using the remainder
for personal living expense. For these individuals, the
farm corporation as a tax saver is an attractive t)'pe of
business organization to consider.
.\ corporation is a separate taxpayer for most tax
purposes and the recent interest in farm corporations can
generally be attributed to a change in the federal corpo-
rate income tax rates. As of 1 January 1975, the tax rate
on the first $25,000 of taxable income was 20 percent;
the tax rate on the next $25,000 of taxable income was 22
percent. On income exceeding $50,000, the corporate tax
rate is 48 percent. These rates are effective through 1977.
.\ssuming the corporation pays the former sole pro-
prietor a salary (deductible to the corporation) of
$20,000, Table 2 illustrates the potential annual income
ta.x saving of the corporation at various taxable income
levels.
Table 2. Tax Savings Possible
Incorporation
The Personal Exemption: Deduction or Credit?
RICHARD FRYMAN, Associate Professor of Econom/cs, Southern Illinois University at Carbondale
President Carter has recently recommended that the
personal exemption under the federal personal income
tax be converted from its present form as a deduction
from adjusted gross income (AGI) to a tax credit. About
a half dozen states presently use a tax credit for their
income tax exemption, and some writers have long ad-
vocated the same for the federal tax.
A tax credit— being a deduction directly from taxes
owed— reduces tax liability by the amount of the credit.
The present e.xemption— a deduction from adjusted
gross income— reduces taxable income before the rates
are applied, and the tax saving differs depending upon
the bracket in which the taxpayer falls. For example, a
taxpayer in the 14 percent bracket finds that the $750
e.xemption reduces his ta.xes by $750 X .14 = $105. The
same $750 exemption for a taxpayer in the 50 percent
bracket reduces ta_xes by $750 X .50 = $375.
It is argued by some that it is unfair for high bracket
taxpayers to save more from an exemption than taxpayers
in lower brackets. A tax credit, it is noted, would reduce
taxes by an equal amount per exemption for all taxpay-
ers regardless of bracket.
Defenders of the present exemption argue that if it
is fair for increases in taxable income to bring relatively
large ta.x increases for high-bracket taxpayers, then it
should be considered fair for decreases in taxable income
from any source— exemptions, personal deductions, busi-
ness expenses— to bring relatively large tax reductions.
These relatively large tax savings from an exemption for
high-bracket taxpayers, it may be argued, are simply
"symmetrical" to large tax increases— both being brought
by graduated rates— and should not be regarded as un-
fair.
Such debate is important, and since the issue is fair-
ness, the arguments must be judged right or wrong de-
pending upon one's opinion.
The puipose of this article is to facilitate the deduc-
tion versus credit debate concerning the personal e.xemp-
I
tion by attempting to clarify some of the issues. The
I paper will point out that Mr. Carter's suggestion, if
j adopted, would increase the degree of progressivity of tlie
i federal personal income tax, and that therefore two im-
1 portant issues in the debate are (1) Should the federal
j
income tax be made more progressive? and (2) If so, is
j
a change in the form of the exemption a proper method
for achieving the goal?
Effects on Progressivity
The accompanying table illustrates the effect on single
taxpayers A and B of converting the personal exemption
from its present $750 deduction from AGI to Mr. Car-
ter's suggested $240 tax credit. .After deducting the $750
exemption from .\'s $5,000 AGI and R"s $35,000, their
respecti\e taxes are computed to be 14.9 percent of AGI
and 32.6 percent. (For simplicity personal deductions and
tax credits are ignored.) Taxpayer A's exemption re-
sults in a tax saving of $750 times his marginal bracket or
$750 X .21 = $157.50; B's tax saving from the exemp-
tion is $750 X .50 = $375.
Now suppose Mr. Carter's recommendation is adopted
and the e.xemption is converted to a $240 tax credit.
Taxpayer A's exemption now reduces his taxes by $2-10.
up from the previous $157.50. B's exemption, however.
now saves him less in taxes than before— $240 compared
with $375. A's income tax now represents 13.2 percent of
his AGI, down from 14.9 percent; B's tax has risen to
33.0 percent of his AGI, up from 32.6 percent. By reduc-
ing the tax on low-bracket taxpayers and raising it on
high-bracket taxpayers, the conversion of the personal
exemption from a $750 deduction from AGI to a $240
tax credit would increase the degree of progressivity of
the tax. This of course would be true of any change
which reduced taxes on low incomes and/or raised taxes
on high incomes. Thus the degree of progression could
also be increased, for example, by reducing or eliminating
the present deduction exemption for high-bracket tax-
payers.
Is Greater Progressivity Desirable?
Since conversion of the personal exemption to a flat
sum tax credit would make the tax more progressi\e, the
question arises. Should the federal income tax be more
progressive? From the point of view of equit)', diere is
no scientific answer to this question. It is a matter of
opinion. It cannot be shown that to be fair a tax must
be progressive or proportional or regressive. .And it cer-
tainly cannot be proved that a particular level or degree
Example of Effect on Progressivity of Converting
a Deduction to a Credit
„ , .. Single SincleForm of exempt,on taxpayer A taxpayers
Deduction from .\GI = $750
AGI 55,000 $35,000
Less 8750 exemption 750 750
Taxable income" 4,250 34,2.50
Marginal bracket'' 21% 50%
Tax 742. .50 11,415
Tax as percent of AGI 14.9% 32.6%
Tax saving brought by exemption . . 1 57 . 50 375
Tax credit = 8240
.\GI = taxable income" J5,000 S.35,000
.Marginal bracket'' 21% 50%
Tentative tax 900 1 1 ,790
Less S240 credit exemption 240 240
Tax 660 11,550
Tax as percent of AGI 13.2% 33.0%
Tax saving brought by exemption . . 240 240
Assumes no personal deductions.
*> 1975 rates of federal penonal income la.\.
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of progressi\eness is necessary for fairness. It can be ar-
gued that a fair solution to questions of equity requires
a knowledge of the collective opinion of the electorate.
There are other grounds besides equity for favoring
or opposing increased progressivity for the federal income
tax. These include effects on work incentives and the
supply of labor, effects on investment and risk taking,
and effects on the "built-in stability" feature of the in-
come tax. My purpose is not to attempt to reach conclu-
sions concerning these possible effects; it is to point out
issues which might be considered in the debate. A care-
ful consideration might or might not find these issues
significant in the decision concerning the form of the
exemption.
Pros and Cons of the Change in Form
Richard Goode, an eminent authority on the income
tax, has pointed out that much of the present effective
progression of the federal personal income tax is due to
exemptions and the standard deduction rather than to
graduated rates. It should also be noted that personal,
exemption-like credits already exist under the federal in-
come tax, having been introduced as a $30 per person
credit in 1975 and increased to the larger of $35 or 2
percent of the first $9,000 of taxable income in 1976.
Hence precedents exist both for using the exemption as
one means of making the tax progressive and for using
personal tax credits.
Some writers have even made a case for all progres-
sion under the income tax being brought by a credit.
This would be accomplished by eliminating graduated
rates, greatly broadening the base, and substituting a
large flat sum tax credit for the present exemption. Even
though flat rate, such a tax would be progressive, since
the credit would exempt a larger portion of low incomes
than of high incomes. It would also probably be simpler
and avoid many distortions found in a steeply graduated
tax.
Graduated rates also have the important disadvan-
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tage of sometimes treating differently taxpayers who ap-
parently have equal incomes. For e.xample. two taxpayers
with equal incomes over, say, a two-year period would
pay considerably different taxes if one earned all his in-
come in one year while the other earned the same total
evenly spread between the two years. Other "horizontal
equity" problems caused partly or entirely by graduated
rates include the treatment of married couples versus
single individuals and the effects of inflation on taxes
paid. If the rate schedule were changed to attempt to
make the tax more progressive, these horizontal equity
problems would probably become more pronounced.
Making the tax more progressive by changing the form
of the exemption apparently would result in less aggra-
vation of these problems.
From a ta.x consciousness point of view, it might be
argued that if the goal is to make an income tax more
progressive, it should be done by changing the rate
schedule, since this is probably the most understandable
way of doing so. Making the tax more progressive by
changing the form of the exemption might be considered
a "backdoor" or hidden approach, which tends to ob-
scure the true degree of progression of the rate schedule.
On the other hand, it could be argued that changing the
form of the exemption to a credit could ser\e to offset
to a slight extent the present distortion of the rate sched-
ule caused by the present exemptions and personal de-
ductions.
There are, then, some arguments both for and against
changing the form of the personal exemption as a means
of increasing the progressivity of the personal income tax.
It would appear, however, that die basic issue in prac-
tice is not the means of making the tax more progressive,
but whether or not the end of greater progression is de-
sirable.
If one feels that the tax should be more progressive,
there appears to be no great argument against Mr. Car-
ter's suggestion to change the present exemption to a tax
credit. If one feels that the tax should not be more pro-
gressive, then Mr. Carter's plan is probably objectionable.
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Current Economic Developments
The economy has bolted upward since early this year.
Real output rose rapidly in the first quarter despite the
adverse effects of the winter storms. Reflecting the gains
in output, employment has expanded and unemployment
has edged lower. Household incomes have moved strongly
upward and, as a result, consumer spending has jumped
higher. Accelerating inflation is an unwanted symptom
of the strengthening in the economy.
The marked improv-ement in business coupled with
sharp price increases have muted the thrust of the Ad-
ministration's economic policy. According to tlie budget
program announced in February, fiscal policy will move
toward less stimulation over the next 18 months. The
focus of concern is shifting from unemployment toward
inflation. Hence, it appears that increased weight may be
given to the inflationaiy implications of future policy
initiatives.
Growth in Real Output
Real output spurted upward in the first quarter fol-
! lowing a lackluster performance in the final quarter of
I last year. Real gross national product— that is, GNP
I adjusted for the effects of price changes — rose at a 5.2
j
percent annual rate in the quarter just ended. The first-
!
quarter rise was double the pace achieved in the Decem-
ber quarter, and was the eighth consecutive quarter-to-
quarter gain. A major factor accounting for the jump
'' in the growth rate was a large increase in the rate of in-
ventory accumulation. The pace of inventoiy growth
rose $7.5 billion in the first quarter, compared with a
$17 liillion rise in the preceding quarter.
I'iie impression of rapid real growth is confirmed by
iiiliiT measures of physical output. Industrial production
rose at a 5.3 percent annual rate from the fourth quarter
ol I ''76 to the first quarter of this year, despite a shaqj
clip in January (see chart). There is continued recovery
in iiome building. Housing starts, which averaged just
under 1.8 million units in last year's fourth quarter,
appear to have moved higher— reaching a 2.1 million
unit rate in March.
Expansion in Labor Market
Employment has risen strongly in 1977. Since Janu-
ary, the number with jobs has expanded at a 6.4 percent
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annual rate (see chart). During 1976 employment rose
3.5 percent. Other measures of market conditions among
those with jobs show either stability or improvement. The
manufacturing workweek has lengthened, and overtime
work has remained at 3.3 hours. As a result of the
brightened employment picture, household incomes have
risen sharply this year. The March increase in personal
income, at about a 20 percent annual rate, was the
largest since these statistics began being reported.
Unemplo)Tnent is down substantially from the level
reached last fall, but is little improved from a year earlier.
The unemploN-ment rate declined to 7.3 percent in mid-
March, regaining the January- level (see chart). In
terms of raw numbers, 7.1 million people were out of
work in mid-March, a drop of about 100,000 from the
February level. Declines in unemployment have been
especially pronounced among heads of households. Un-
emplo)Tnent among adult women and teenagers remains
near its recession high. It has often been said that these
workers are "the last to be hired and the first to be fired."
Increased Demand
Consumer spending rose markedly in the first quarter,
and the flow of saving moderated. Personal consump-
tion expenditures expanded $34.8 billion in the March
quarter, somewhat larger than the increase in the pre-
ceding quarter. Increased household e.xpenditures for
automobiles accounted for about one-third of the gain.
Monthly retail sales statistics indicate that following the
weather-induced January dip, sales jumped rapidly (see
chart) . Rising consumer expenditures were made possible
by a strong growth in income, and from consumers' desire
to reduce their saving rate— to 5 percent, down from
5.6 percent in the fourth quarter of 1976.
Business capital expenditures registered a significant
first-quarter gain. Investment in plant and equipment
rose $7.5 billion compared with a meager $2.6 billion
rise in the fourth quarter. Durable goods orders rose
6.8 percent in March. Even so, expenditure increases of
this magnitude barely keep pace with the rate of inflation.
The US trade position worsened in the first quarter,
as imports exceeded exports by $4.9 billion (annual rate)
.
Heavy US purchases of expensive foreign oil were a chief
factor accounting for the deterioration.
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Passive Monetary Policy
Monetary growth rates remain well within the target
range announced earlier by Chairman Bums. The mone-
tary base (currency plus bank reser\-es) has risen more
than 7 percent over the past year. Changes in the
monetary base are caused in large measure by purchases
and sales of government securities. .Accordingly, some
analysts interpret monetary' policy actions in terms of
shifts in growth rates of the base.
Money supply growth has remained reasonably stable
over the past year. Since December, the money stock has
expanded at a 7.5 percent rate, somewhat more rapid
than the 6.2 percent growth over the past year. The
money supply plus time deposits (sometimes referred to
as M2) maintained a stable growth rate of about 10
percent during the past year.
Changes in the growth of monetary aggregates —
such as the monetary- base and the money supply— are
aflected by shifts in the demand for credit. If there are
upward interest rate pressures reflecting increased credit
demands, the Federal Reserve is likely to engage in open
market purcha.ses. The Fed tends to moderate what
would otherwise be abrupt movements in interest rates.
Open market purchases ser\e to increase the monetary
base and, hence, the money supply. In contrast, down-
ward interest rate pressures tend to be associated with a
1 moderation in money supply growth.
I
Loan demands have strengthened since last sum-
mer. Bank loans have e.\panded at about a 10 percent
I
rate since .August. The increase in loans was accom-
I
plished while banks were also increasing their invest-
j
ment portfolios. Notwithstanding the growth of credit,
I
interest rates remain generally weak. Historical perspec-
j
tive gives investors little guidance in coping with current
credit markets. Although economic activity has expanded
for two full years, interest rates are lower now than they
were at the trough of the 1973-75 recession. Over the
past five months interest rates have been virtually un-
changed, fluctuating within a narrow range— of about
25 basis points.
Evolving Fiscal Initiatives
Fiscal policy will tend to tighten over the next year
unless new initiatives are undertaken. .According to the
Budget Message on 22 February, federal expenditures
will rise 1 1 percent in the fiscal year ending 30 Septem-
ber, then 10 percent in fiscal 1978. By comparison, ex-
penditures rose 21 percent in 1975 and 12 percent last
year. While the budget position will remain in deficit, it
will move toward balance over the next several years.
In light of the improvement in economic activity
without significant additional fiscal measiu-es, it is likely
that President Carter may be willing to abandon some of
his stimulus package. Indeed, he has already given
ground on his proposal for a $50 rebate. Some political
observers believe he may "horsetrade" features of his
stimulus package in return for support of his energy
program.
Even so, the Administration's stimulus package is
wending its way through Congress. Issues will be resolved
through persuasion or compromise. The major risk of
compromise is that it often results in the marriage of por-
tions of several programs— without regard to whether
the marriage can be harmonious. As a result, the econ-
omy is frequently burdened with one more unworkable
program.
In any event, a stimulus program will emerge at
length. We are hopeful that its stimulative effects will
surface in time to be of benefit to the economy. In par-
ticular, we hope that the stimulative impact will not
simply add to inflationary pressures.
WILLIAM R. BRYAN
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Local Illinois Developments
Crops Down In 1976
Com and soybean production of Illinois farms de-
clined last year. Illinois farmers harvested 23.1 million
acres of crops during 1976, up slightly from 22.9 million
acres in 1975. However, yields for most crops were below
their record 1975 levels.
Com production in Illinois was estimated at 1,251
million bushels last year, only slightly less than 1975's
record high. Although the 1976 acreage was 8 percent
above the 1975 level, the yield of 107 bushels per acre
was down 8 percent from the 1975 yield of 1 16 bushels.
Yields were lower because of below-normal moisture
supplies throughout the summer. Even so, yields in 1976
remained above most other years in the past decade.
Soybean production, totaling 242 million bushels in
1976, was down 18 percent from the previous year. Farm-
ers in Illinois harvested 8 percent fewer acres; yields, at
32 bushels, declined more than 11 percent. Again, dry
summer weather cut production.
As in die recent past, Illinois crop yields in 1976 ex-
ceeded national averages. Outputs of corn and soybeans
were 22 percent and 25 percent higher than their re-
spective national averages (see chart). In addition, win-
Corn and Soybean Yields, US and Illinois
Illinois Business Indexes
Recognizing the Environment
Within the past decade the natural environment has
been explicitly recognized as our most important re-
source. On 1 Januarv' 1970 the President signed into law
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), which
provided the legal framework for government to "use all
practical means and measures, including financial and
technical assistance" to promote environmental har-
mony.
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was
also established in 1970. As a result, many environmental
protection programs previously scattered among several
branches of the government were brought together in
one federal agency. EPA's mandate was to mount an in-
tegrated and coordinated attack on pollution in coopera-
tion with state and local governments. EPA is required
to establish and enforce environmental standards for
pollution control. The states are responsible for their
own implementation plans for meeting the standards,
and the federal EPA shares enforcement only if state
enforcement is inadequate.
Capital expenditures made by United States manu-
facturers to tr)- to meet these abatement standards
amounted to over $3 billion in 1974. In addition, operat-
ing costs relating to pollution abatement (including pay-
ments to government units) totaled another $3 billion
that year.
What Illinoi.s Has Done
This state's legal approach to the problem of pollu-
tion was initiated with the passing of the Environmental
Protection .\ct of 1970. Responsibility for pollution con-
trol was divided among three agencies — the Pollution
Control Board (PCR1, the Illinois Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (lEPA), and the Illinois Institute for
Environmental Quality (lEQ). The PCB, a five-member
board, is primarily responsible for the adoption of en-
vironmental laws and standards and is the state judicial
body for environmental affairs. The IEP.\ is responsible
for sur\eillance and enforcement and the lEQ provides
the necessary research and technical expertise.
The financial outlays of the state government have
been substantial. In 1976 state budget appropriations for
I
the environment amounted to approximately $480 mil-
lion, a 71 percent increase over 1975. Through fiscal 1977
more than $495 million in state funds and $1.1 billion
'in federal assistance will have been made available for
jneeded wastewater pollution control facilities alone.
I The Illinois program is considered one of the stron-
gest in the nation. Since 1970 the PCB has seen more
than 900 enforcement cases ( 18.4 percent of which have
oeen filed by citizens), has granted more than 1,700
It-ariances, and has levied $1.7 million in penalties. The
."esults have been substantial, .\verage annual statewide
poncentrations of particulate matter (dust), sulfur di-
;>xide, and nitrogen dioxides have dropped below the
health-related ambient air quality standards. In 1976
approximately 85 percent of the major air and water
pollution sources were in compliance with national
standards or were on special timetable programs to meet
the standards. Overall water quality has been improved
by state and federal grants which have paid 75 percent
of the cost of more than $950 million worth of waste-
water treatment facility construction since 1973. Addi-
tionally, Illinois is one of the few states requiring an
economic impact study in connection with each proposed
environmental regulation.
In the area of land pollution and refuse disposal, the
PCB in 1973 adopted a set of Solid Waste Rules and
Regulations that established stringent operating require-
ments for sanitary landfills and a sophisticated permit
system. Open dumping was prohibited in the State as
early as 1966 and by 1974 open dumps had, in effect,
been eliminated. The lEPA's permit denial rate is esti-
mated to be four times the rate of permit issuance, sug-
gesting the vigorous inspection by the agency. As a re-
sult of such a staunch enforcement program, almost
300 (80 percent) of the state's sanitary landfills now
have state permits and it is expected that the remaining
ones will soon be in compliance with the law.
The Illinois Industrial Pollution Control Financing
Authority has been given the power to issue up to $500
million in bonds to help finance pollution control facili-
ties for small businesses. It is estimated that $95 million
will be issued in fiscal year 1977 alone.
Illinois industry spent ^v•ell over $300 million in 1974
for pollution abatement capital and control costs. The
naarket has generally responded well to these needs—
more than 130 private firms in Illinois currently manu-
facture pollution equipment or supply environmental ser-
vices to business.
The Illinois Institute for Environmental Quality has
recently launched a "Master Plan for Enviroiunental/
Energy Higher Education in Illinois." The General As-
sembly has recognized that problems of environmental
protection and energy conservation should receive a
greatly expanded emphasis in the state's overall educa-
tional policy, .\cademic programs are being expanded
throughout the State to meet tiie ever-growing needs for
manpower trained in the environmental area. Applied
degree programs and basic research facilities have been
established and expanded in almost every state univer-
sity within the past five years.
Illinois is the home of one of the nation's largest
federally funded research and development centers—
Argonne National Laboratory', located in DuPage
County. The laboratory carries out broad research and
development programs in the physical, biomedical, and
environmental sciences. .Mthough much of Argonne's ac-
tivity is directly related to national research and develop-
ment, a small but significant amount of work is being
done directly for the State.
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EFTS: An Evolution of the Payments System
MORGAN J. LYNGE, JR., Assistant Professor of F/nance, UIUC
The teiTn EFTS, for Electronic Funds Transfer Sys-
tem, is being heard with increasing regularity. It is dis-
cussed by legislators, bankers, the courts, and special
commissions established to study EFTS. What is EFTS?
Is it important? What impact will it have? On whom?
This article places EFTS in perspective as a stage of
evolution in the nation's payments system. I shall also
take a quick look at what EFTS is (or may become) and
suggest the impact it may have. Finally, the development
of an EFTS in Illinois will be described.
The Payments System
In a monetary economy such as die US, the exchange
of goods and services is facilitated by the use of money.
Although what constitutes "money" is a subject of de-
bate among economists, today we use coins, currency, and
checking account deposits to make payments for goods
and ser\'ices. The most familiar fomi of money is coin
and currency. However, these make up only about one-
fourth of the stock of money in the US and account for
only about one-tenth of the dollar amount of payments
made. Checking account deposits dominate as the kind
of money used in most transactions. Thus the payments
system is dominated by the use of checks drawn on com-
mercial banks. The extensive use of this form of payment
is relatively new; only since the late 1800s has checking
account money been widely used.
Since checking account money payments require the
use of a piece of paper (the check), this payments sys-
tem requires the handling of large numbers of these
pieces of paper. Each check represents authorization to
reduce the balance of the writer's checking account and,
unless taken in coin and currency, increase the balance
of the recipient's checking account. When these checking
accounts are in two diflerent commercial banks, there
must exist a means of arranging the proper changes in
each balance. It is this task that is carried out by the pay-
ments system. This system involves and is operated by
the Federal Reserve System and all commercial banks.
Why Is EFTS Being Developed?
The payments system has had to handle an increasing
volume of checks over the years. .Although estimates vaiy,
it is projected that 30 billion checks will be processed in
1977 and that this figure is growing at about 7 percent
a year. This means that volume doubles every 10 years.
With this increase have also come improvements in the
methods of handling these checks. Machines read and
sort the checks according to the machine-readable sym-
bols imprinted on each check. However, many functions
are still performed by hand. In view of rising labor costs
it is difficult to foresee a continuation in the decline in
the average cost of processing a check (now about 30
cents)
.
Economies of scale may have been exhausted.
The pressures of rising check volumes and the inabil-
ity to further reduce costs have caused many to seek
another method of making payments. Increased pres-
sures for change have also resulted from the desire of
all financial institutions (including savings and loan as-
sociations, credit unions, and mutual savings banks) to
increase their retail markets by attracting more depositors
and borrowers. Much of this pressure comes from the
nonbank institutions, which realize that they must get
involved in the payments system to increase their market
share. If the paper check which carries the payment
information could be replaced by an electronic signal,
manual processing could be reduced and the payments
transfers could be completed more quickly, and non-
bank institutions could become an integral part of such
a new system. This is the hope of the financial institu-
tions for an electronic funds transfer system.
Paralleling the increased pressures for EF'FS from the
financial institutions has been the improvement in and
increased use of the computer. The computer is essential
to any EFTS in that it provides the capability of pro-
cessing huge amounts of data in short periods of time.
.\nother contributing force for the development of EFTS
is the increased use of the bank credit card. Such a card
plays a key role in many EFT systems and customer
acceptance and use of these cards is a necessary step for
accomplishing funds transfers electronically.
The Shape of an Evolving EFTS
An EFTS is not an all-encompassing panacea that
will sweep all paper-based payments aside. EFTS is
manifested in many ways, in many small improvements
affecting different parts of the payments system. It is
more correctly described as evolutionary, rather than
rcvolutionan-. Most of the elements of the EFTS are
in use in different parts of the US today although none
is in nationwide use. Let us examine some of the develop-
ments that are included under the EFTS umbrella.
Automated Clearing Houses (ACHsJ. Clearing houses
have existed for years for the clearing of checks drawn
on and payable to each of the local banks participating
in the clearing house. In an automated clearing house
the additions to and subtractions from balances are in
the form of electronic signals, usually on computer tape,
rather than paper checks. This facility makes possible the
direct deposit of pay into employee accounts at partici-
pating banks by use of a computer tape prepared by the
firm. Also many regular, recurring payments such as
insurance premiums and mortgage payments can be
made automatically to recipient firms from depositors'
accounts. In all of these cases the need for paper checks
and manual processing is eliminated.
Automated Teller Machines (ATMs). Such ma-
chines, either manned or unmanned, can expand the
reach of a bank to areas beyond its usual physical fa-
cilities. These machines can perform services such as
receiving deposits, dispensing cash from checking or
savings accounts, transferring funds between accounts,
and receiving loan payments. Besides expanding the
geographic reach of the bank, ATMs also reduce the
number of paper checks required, replacing them with
electronic impulses from the ATM to the bank's
computer.
Point of Sale (POS) Systems. These systems offer
perhaps the greatest possibilities for reducing the use of
paper checks. At its most developed level, a POS system
consists of a computer connection between retail estab-
lishments and a bank. .\ retail customer pays for a pur-
chase by having funds transferred electronically from his
account to the merchant's account. Such transactions
may be accomplished through the use of a "debit card"
which contains the purchaser's account information.
This card is inserted in the computer terminal at the
merchant's location, the price of the transaction is keyed
in, and the transfer is automatically made, with a receipt
printed for each participant.
An earlier stage in POS systems utilizes the computer
terminals for check authorizations. The merchant's com-
puter terminal is used to access the check writer's ac-
count to assure that the necessary funds are present.
Although this system reduces merchant losses from re-
turned checks, it does not directly result in a reduction
of checks written.
Roadblocks to EFTS
The automated clearing houses, automated teller
machines, and point of sale systems are only three facets
of an evolving EFTS. Other means of converting trans-
actions from a paper-based system to an electronic sys-
tem are being developed. However, many important is-
sues remain to be settled before even these three facets of
EFTS can become widely used.
Technically, electronic transfers can be made from
any kind of deposit account, checking or savings. Unless
legal and regulatory definitions become uniform for all
financial institutions, the nonbank thrift institutions may
be able to compete more aggressively for customer de-
posits. Currently the Federal Home Loan Bank Board,
the regulator for federally chartered savings and loan
associations, allows the use of remote computer terminals
at any location for these savings and loan associations.
This competition is creating a situation to which com-
mercial banks must respond in order to maintain con-
sumer deposits. Likewise, regulators and legislators must
decide whether to approve this new role for all nonbank
thrift institutions.
The response of commercial banks to this challenge
has been hampered, in part, by laws designed for a dif-
ferent technological environment. An attempt by t^vo
banks in Chicago to establish ATMs separated from the
main oflfice illustrates this problem. These ATMs in Illi-
nois were declared by the courts to be branches and thus
not allowed under Illinois law that prohibits branch
banking. This legal stand has been duplicated in other
unit banking and limited branching states. If banks join
together to pool knowledge and share the costs of devel-
oping an EFTS, further complications can result. The
L'S Justice Department recently objected to a proposed
joint venture among Nebraska banks to develop a state-
wide EFTS. The department's Antitrust Division indi-
cated that there was not enough evidence to support the
need for an EFTS and that the joint venture could vio-
late federal antitrust laws.
Will the spread of EFTS result in the hoped-for
economies in handling payments? The answer to this
question is not clear. Certainly a huge investment in
equipment will be necessary and start-up costs will be
significant. However, since labor and other variable
costs will be very low, processing a large volume of pay-
ments electronically should eventually lower the unit
costs of processing. Still, this remains a projection and
not a fact.
In order to obtain the volume needed to achieve
lower unit costs, a substantial portion of present pay-
ments must be switched to electronic pa^Tnents. Will cus-
tomers accept and use these alternative means of making
payments? There seems to be little incentive for cus-
tomers to demand a change from a paper check to an
electronic transfer system. From the consumer's point of
view the present payments system seems to be working
well. The check is a reliable method of making pay-
ments and provides many conveniences to the check
writer. The typical bank practice of not charging the full
cost of check processing has insulated the checking ac-
count holder from the rising costs of check processing.
Thus the benefits of lower processing costs, if they ma-
terialize, will accrue to banks rather than checking ac-
count holders.
Other issues of significant concern impede consumer
acceptance of EFTS: the loss of control over the trans-
fer of funds, the loss of float that results from instan-
taneous payments, and fears of possible misuse of large
amounts of individual financial information stored in
computers. The increased convenience of EFTS to cus-
tomers will have to be emphasized, and perhaps ex-
panded, to ofTset these consumer concerns. Controls will
liave to be established, as has been recently suggested by
the National Commission on Electronic Fund Transfers,
to assure that proper safeguards exist to protect the
consumer.
EFTS in Illinois
EFTS is developing in Illinois. Many banks have
some form of automated teller machine that provides
a limited set of banking services on a continuous basis
(24-hour-a-day cash dispensing, for example). Because
of the court decision involving the Chicago banks,
these automated teller machines are located on bank
premises.
A more ambitious development is EFI or Electronic
I'linds Illinois, sponsored by the Illinois Bankers Associ-
ation. This is a network of Illinois banks that are hooked
into a computerized communications system that allows
the depositor of any one of the member banks to cash
checks at any other EFI member bank without charge.
The customer provides an encoded plastic card which
the bank can plug into the computer network to verify
the account status. This is. of course, only the initial stage
of service planned by EFI. The computer network could
be capable of making funds transfers among banks to
eliminate the need for checks. A further development
would result in the linking of retail stores to the network
so that purchases could be paid for with an electronic
transfer of funds. Although it is now planned to be
simply a check verification system, EFI lays the ground-
work for the possible development of a more sophisti-
cated payments system throughout the State.
In Illinois, as in other unit banking states, the fur-
ther development of EFTS has been slowed by laws and
court decisions. Owing to the court decision that ATMs
and other bank communication devices separated from
a bank's facilities are branches, the progression of EFTS
is in jeopardy. The Illinois state legislature has estab-
lished a Commission on Electronic Funds Transfer to
study the issues and make legislative recommendations.
This commission has issued an interim report but its
life has been extended to investigate the matter further.
Interest groups have been actively articulating their
positions.
It is because the issues of EFTS are intertwined with
the issues of banking structure (for example, branching
and multioffice bank holding companies) that progress
is slow. Many critical issues must be resolved before a
complete, statewide EFTS can develop. Still, local and
regional efforts involving ATMs, check verification ar-
rangements, and automatic deposit and payment of
some items continue to grow, leading to some benefits
for the state's payments system.
Conclusion
Advances in technology, competitive pressures among
financial institutions, and an increasing volume of paper
checks have coalesced to assure that the EFTS evolution
will continue. The final form may be different from that
envisioned now and the implementation time may be
longer (or shorter) than projected, but EFTS is coming
in a variety of forms. Local EFT systems may not be
linked into a nationwide system as was anticipated by
some several years ago ; however, the pressures for change
will not permit the current pattern of EFTS to fall apart.
Electronic transfers of funds will increase and may dom-
inate paper check payments in the future just as, a cen-
tury ago, paper checks came to dominate coin and cur-
rency payments.
What New York City Has Done to Avoid Bankruptcy
ROLAND W. BARTLETT, Professor of Agrkulfural Economics, Emeritus, UIUC
Early in 1975 the banks in New York City closed the
normal financial markets to the city's borrowing. This
action was taken because of mounting bank concern
about the city's practice, over a long period of years, of
borrowing money from the banks and then using capital
to pay operating expenses. The closing of these financial
markets provoked a panic for Mayor Beame and other
officials responsible for meeting ])ayrolls and otlier costs
of running the city government.
Roy Bahl, professor of economics and director of the
Metropolitan Studies Program at Syracuse University,
summarized the situation for New \'ork State in the fol-
lowing manner
:
New York State's fiscal problem is that its public sector
is overdeveloped. The State resource base will no longer
support the high load of public services provided in the
State unless tax rates are continuously increased . . . the
State has retained its dominance and relative national role
in state-local fiscal activity. This can no longer be done. A
period of downward transition must be recognized and
policy should center on selecting priorities in the adjustment
of public service levels.
New York City's fiscal problem is the same as that
for New York State, namely, its public sector is over-
developed.
The dilemma facing New York City was caused pri-
marily by ( 1 ) failure to collect vast amounts of taxes due
and owing to the city, (2) excessive expenditures for
welfare and education, and (3) payments in wages and
fringe benefits including pensions far in excess of similar
payments in the federal government and in other cities
around the nation.
To prevent bankruptcy, Mayor Beame with other city
officials early in 1975 went before the Senate Committee
on P.ankiii':. Housing, and Urban Affairs in Washington
seckini; loans from the federal government to give diem
time to make adjustments needed for balancing income
with expenditures. Following a series of hearings. Con-
gress passed the New York City Seasonal Financing .Act
of 1975. This act provided for (1) loans up to $2.3 bil-
lion a year during a three-year period, (2) total re-
payment of these loans with interest at scheduled dates
within the three-year period, (3) specific actions by New
York City which would enable them to balance the city's
budget by 30 June 1978, and (4) an understanding that
after 30 June 1978, New York City would be on its own
and would no longer be able to look to the federal gov-
ernment for loans to hclj) the city bring its budget into
balance.
City Actions Taken to Avoid Bzmkruptcy
Immediately following the passage of the New York
City Seasonal Financing Act of 1975, Secretary of the
Treasury Simon hired Arthur Andersen and Company
to help straighten out the financial mess in New York
City. They were asked to set up a long-term reporting
and accounting system which would help avert a recur-
rence of a future loss of market for New York City
securities. In a report to the US Treasury in the latter
part of 1976, Arthur Andersen concluded that New
York City had taken the necessary administrative steps
to implement its deficit reduction program in concrete
terms. The report stated that
Since the beginning of the financial crisis, New York has
reduced the size of its payrolls by more than 50,000 jobs;
The city has reached agreements with its unions, repre-
senting more than 200,000 employees, providing for a wage-
freeze through fiscal 1978 and a $24 million reduction in
fringe benefits;
The city has closed down all or major portions of three
hospitals and expects to close down additional health
facilities; and
The city has ended a century-old tradition of free tuition
at its City University and has announced it will not con-
tribute to the operating expenses of CUNY's senior col-
leges in fiscal 1978.
These measures and many others resulted in achieve-
ment of the objective of $200 million in budget cuts in
1976. Moreover, according to the Andersen review, the
necessary administrative actions to accomplish a $400
million budget reduction in the current year (1977) were
on schedule. With this, there is a substantial basis for
concluding that at least $400 million in budget reduc-
tions will be realized in fiscal 1977.
In addition to the specific items listed, the Andersen
report concluded that the city's present financial report-
ing, record-keeping, and control systems were inade-
quate. In this connection, Andersen reported tliat
Touche Ross and Company and American Management
Systems were designing a new accounting and controls
system to be in place 1 July 1977. It is believed that this
system will aid in controlling unbudgeted spending
which, up to this time, has been a problem of serious
concern.
Another plus factor in the picture is that not only
have loans made by the federal government to the city
been paid on or ahead of time but it appears that, at
the end of 1976, the loan program to New York City
had cost the federal government nothing. Secretary Si-
mon stated that in 1976 tlie federal government would
net $12 million to $13 million over and above all costs
including interest and administration. From the view-
point of New York City, total costs for federal loans
were less than they would have been had they been ob-
tained from city banks.
Let us now examine in some detail what New York
City has done toward reducing its deficit so that it can
obtain its objective of a balanced budget by 30 June
1978. This examination will include actions taken by
the city to collect unpaid taxes, to reduce excessive wel-
fare and education costs, and to reduce excessive costs
for wages and fringe benefits.
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More Auditing to Improve Tax Collections
Failure to collect taxes has been one of the under-
lying causes of deficits in the budget of New York City.
Records showed that uncollected taxes for the city in
early 1975 were as follows (in millions of dollars) :
Real estate taxes 500
Corporate taxes 200
Parking fees 200
Income taxes 100
Cigarette taxes 100
Other (8 or 9 taxes) 200
Total uncollected taxes 1,300
Concerning this problem, Senator William Proxmire
made the suggestion that New York City follow Wiscon-
sin's example of increasing the number of auditors. With
more auditors a greater effort could be made to identify
those not paying taxes owed the city. Proxmire asserted
that a study of Wisconsin's experience showed that audi-
tors in that state collected more than 10 times the cost of
those auditors.
Mayor Beame reported that New York City had
acted on this suggestion and substantially increased the
number of auditors assigned to collect taxes. Results of
this action will accompany a more complete reporting
and accounting scheduled to be in efTect as of 1 July
1977.
Cutting Costs of Welfare and Education
As stated earlier. New York City has ended free
tuition at its City University and has announced it will
not contribute to the operating expenses of CUNY's
senior colleges in fiscal 1978, This action, accounting for
the chief reduction in education costs, will reduce the
city's expenditures about $150 million a year.
Senior colleges in New York City have now been
incorporated into New York State's system of higher
education. Tuition for these colleges will be charged on
the same basis as for other senior colleges in the New-
York State system.
Over a long period of years, senior colleges in New
York City have been a great asset to the city. It is pleas-
ing to know that its senior colleges will continue to serve
the city even though enrollments, because of tuition,
are likely to be somewhat less than formerly.
Other cuts in budget in 1977 and 1978 as reported
by Mayor Beame include $147 million for education in
elementary and high schools, $57 million in health and
hospitals (includes closing of three city hospitals), and
a $60 million reduction in welfare costs. Reductions for
these services, for the most part, are small relative to the
total amounts still being paid for them.
Reducing Wages and Fringe Benefits
Excessive payments for wages and fringe benefits are
another factor underlying New York City's inability to
balance its budget. In 1976 the average income for New
York City employees was $26,000, 40 percent more than
for employees of the federal government. With 230,000
full-time employees in New York City, the net difference
of $7,500 per employee indicates that if the city could
reduce the averaeje wage to the federal level, it could cut
its wage bill by $1.7 billion a year.
Fringe benefits in Xew York City in 1976 averaged
68.7 percent of the base pay. This was more than double
the average of fringe benefits of 33 percent received by
state and local go\ernments generally.
Another factor affecting New York City expenditures
is excessive pensions. Currently for those who retire at
65, pensions are 125 percent of the take-home pay of
the employee during his last year at work. This compares
with 43 percent in .\tlanta, 47 percent in Chicago. 52
percent in Dallas, and 54 percent in Los Angeles and
Memphis. Two of the highest-pension cities other than
New York are Denver with 91 percent and Detroit with
104 percent. Patrolmen in New York City work an
average of 35 to 37'/2 hours a week as compared with a
normal period of 40 hours in other cities.
On the plus side, the members of the city's work
force have come through in good style to help city offi-
cials meet its financial crisis. This includes (1) accep-
tance by over 200.000 union members of a three-year
wage freeze and a $24 million cut in fringe benefits ; ( 2 i
acceptance of a reduction of more than 60.000 in the
number of city employees since 1975; and (3) efforts in
each department to increase efficiency. For example,
with a decrease of 19 percent in numbers, response time
to fire alarms has not increased since 1975 despite a 26
percent increase in the number of alarms. A decrease
of 21 percent in personnel in the sanitation department
has been offset by an increase in tonnage of refuse per
truck shift. In the parks department, 50 percent of the
seasonal employees have been separated and 25 percent
of the overall staff. Despite this, the department has
continued to operate reasonably well.
1975 Moratorium Act Unconstitutional
.\s one way of meeting the financial crisis in 1975,
Xew York State passed an Emergency Moratorium Act.
This law suspended the judgment on short-term city
notes for a three-year period ending 15 No\cmber 1978.
City notes included $983 million of notes held by the
public. In addition, about $819 million of notes were
held by New York City commercial banks and by the
city's five actuarially funded pension systems.
The state legislature also established the Municipal
Assistance Corporation (M.\C) and gave it power to .sell
debt obligations up to $3 billion. The proceeds could be
made available to the city. The agency was also to try
to untangle the city's finances and help the city develop
a budgetaiy plan to achieve a balanced budget.
On 19 November 1976, the New York State Court of
Appeals declared the 1975 Emergency Moratorium Act
unconstitutional. Recognizing the city's delicate financial
balance, the court rejected instant judicial remedies
which would have given the city no choice except to pro-
ceed into bankrviptcy.
On 15 December 1976, the city and the Municipal
Assistance Corporation submitted a proposal for a cash
settlement of at least 50 percent of the publicly held
moratorium notes by 30 June 1977 and the remainder by
19 November 1977, one year from the court's decision.
To relieve pressure while New York City was repaying
loans to the federal government, it was suggested that
moratorium notes of $1.8 billion of M.VC debt held by
certain institutions be restructured whereby those hold-
ers would voluntarily defer all principal payments until
1982. This would provide $206 million in cash to the
city in 1977. $203 million in fiscal 1978, and $170 million
in 1979 and 1980.
A logical question is. Would MAC bonds with defer-
ral of principal until 1982 be marketable? An offering of
$253 million of MAC bonds in November 1976 was
subscribed to by public investors. Certain institutions,
including New York State pension funds, commercial
banks, and savings banks, indicated that they would have
purchased 56 percent of the MAC bonds had they not
been sold to public investors. Because of the progress
made in balancing the city budget during 1976, Mayor
Beame is confident that the moratorium note problem
can be resolved without affecting the timetable for re-
pa^Tnent of federal loans.
Credit Market Reentry in 1978 or 1979?
There is a difference of opinion as to whether New-
York City can repay its loans from the federal govern-
ment on the dates scheduled and be able to reenter the
credit market. According to the New York Seasonal Fi-
nancing .\ct of 1975. New York City was to have bal-
anced its budget by 30 June 1978 and repaid its govern-
ment loans. It was further understood the city would not
ask Congress for an extension of time for repa\Tnent of
loans. This would necessitate reentrs' to the credit
market.
One concrete fact is that through 1976, New York
City had repaid all federal loans on or ahead of schedule.
Secretary Simon believed that the city could repay its
loans on schedule and be able to reenter the credit
markets in 1979, He told the Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban .\ffairs, as shown in the Senate
Hearings Report of February 1977, "that he continues
to be cautiously optimistic" about the city's prospects.
... if they proceed down the road of achieving budget
balance, fiscal and financial credibility at the end of 1978
and have an accounting system that the people can under-
stand and audit, then they can return to the capital markets
in 1979.
City and state officials were more cautious about the
prospects for New York City reentering the credit
markets in late 1978 and somewhat less optimistic.
Governor Carey put it this way
:
We will be in technical balance in 1978. But we have to
ask the question as to whether a market will open up for
a city in which the schools, the state of health, the state
of transportation are all in decline. This is a question which
I think investors are going to look at as hard as they are
going to look at the balanced budget sheet.
In light of the fact that other municipalities around
the nation are encountering difficulties similar to those
outlined here, New York City's progress in solving its
problems will be followed with close interest.
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Publications Available
Planners Handbook
The US Department of Commerce Bureau of
Economic Analysis and the Social Security Admin-
istration have cooperated to publish a new aid for
local planners. The 308-page publication examines
the Continuous Work History Sample ( 1 percent and
10 percent samples of the active work force) and dis-
cusses applications of the CWHS, its comparability
with other series, and its limitations. CWHS data are
expected to be especially useful for planners in such
program areas as housing, government sei-vice and
finance, transportation, health, and manpower devel-
opment.
Regional Workforce Characteristics and Migration
Data: A Handbook on the Social Security Continuous
Work History Sample and its Applications is avail-
able from the Superintendent of Documents, US Gov-
ernment Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402.
The stock number is 003-010-00055-4. The price is
$5.10 and payment must accompany the order.
IBR Index
An index for volumes 1 through 32 of the Illinois
Business Review is available. The index includes ( 1 i
a subject index to editorials and feature articles; (2)
an author/title index; (3) an author/editorial index:
(4) an index to the Know Your State articles; and
(5) an index of selected tables (with time span cov-
ered) . It is available from the Bureau of Economic
and Business Research, 408 David Kinley Hall, Uni-
versity of Illinois, Urbana. Illinois 61801. Price: $2.00
prepaid.
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Business activity in Illinois has made progress in
recovering from the 1974-75 recession. In general, how-
ever, gains have not matched diose at the national level.
Gains in Gross State Product
The estimated 1976 gross state product for Illinois
reached a record high of $95 billion (see chart), about
6 percent of the national total. The rate of growth over
the previous year, 7.6 percent, was substantially less than
the 1 1 .6 percent rate for the nation. The estimated gross
state product also rose 7.6 percent in 1975, just slightly
more than the 7.3 percent growth rate for the gross na-
tional product.
A]\ of the industry divisions showed increases in dollar
value. Manufacturing accounted for $2.1 billion of the
$6.7 billion increase in 1976; retail and wholesale trade
increased $1.6 billion. The remaining sectors experienced
gains varying from $500 million to $900 million. These
sectors were finance, insurance, and real estate; transpor-
tation, communication, and utilities; and government.
In real terms, the Illinois gross state product in-
creased 2.4 percent over the 1975 figure. By comparison,
real state product in 1975 showed a 1.5 percent decline
from 1974. Over the period 1961-76, the average annual
rate of real growth was 2.5 percent. The recession of
1970 effectively cut long-term growth rates below the 4
percent level of the late 1960s, and the 1974-75 recession
further reduced the rates of growth to less than 3 percent.
Prices Still Rising Rapidly
One measure of inflation for Illinois is the consumer
price index for the Chicago standard consolidated area.
That index continues to climb, registering a 6.7 percent
advance from a year ago (see chart). The increase for
the nation as a whole was 6.8 percent. .Mthough recent
price increases have been marked, they have slowed from
earlier rates. For example, prices for the Chicago area
rose 7.9 percent in 1975; the US experienced an infla-
tion rate of 9.1 percent. Unfortunately, the rate of in-
flation has picked up again, with an annual rate of
increase of 8.4 percent in March and 9.6 percent in April.
From the beginning of 1974 to April 1977 commodity
prices rose less rapidly than the overall index. Food
costs advanced 22 percent in the Chicago area compared
with a 24.2 percent increa.se nationally. The rate at
which food costs continue to rise will, in large measure,
be determined by current drought conditions in large
food-producing areas.
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The component most important in pushing com-
modity prices higher has been the spirahng costs of fuel
and utiHties. In the past 40 months fuel oil and coal have
risen 43.9 percent in Chicago; gas and electricity have
gone up 58.7 percent. Nationally, these components rose
44.9 percent and 56.2 percent, respectively. The increases
in fuel oil have, in turn, been important factors in push-
ing the costs of private transportation and housing
sharply upward.
Services are playing an increasingly important part
in even'day life. Because demand has risen more rapidly
than supply, prices have increased significantly, espe-
cially since the beginning of 1976. The price of medical
care has shown one of the sharpest rises among index
groups, chiefly reflecting higher medical insurance and
hospital costs. In the past year prices for medical care
were up 12.4 percent in the Chicago area, substantially
more than the national increase of 7.5 percent.
Chicago— An Important Headquarter City
The Chicago area is home to many of this nation's
largest corporations— including producers of food, elec-
tronics, drugs, and clothing as well as a wide variety of
industrial goods. Sales for the 50 largest firms headquar-
tered in Chicago totaled $74.7 billion in 1976— an
increase of 10.5 percent over 1975. Even so, these sales
lagged significantly behind the growth rates of 25 per-
cent and 18 percent in 1974 and 1973, respectively.
Of these 50 firms, 20 had sales of at least $1 billion
during 1976. In 1975 only 16 firms achieved $1 billion
in sales; 10 firms reached that level in 1974. Such de-
velopments reflect inflation as well as actual growth.
Higher oil prices have enabled Chicago's Standard Oil
Company of Indiana to widen its sales lead over second-
ranked International Harvester. While 12 of the top 50
firms experienced drops in sales during 1975, only 4 of
the top 50— G.\TX Corporation, Amsted Industries,
Chemetron Corporation, and International Mineral and
Chemical— experienced declines in 1976. The largest
percentage gains in sales were achieved by Gould In-
corporated (66.5 percent), Masonite Corporation (34.1
percent) , Signode Corporation (24.7 percent) , and Nalco
Chemical (22.8 percent).
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and the US. Except for construction, state employment
experienced increases,
Cement Manufacturing in Illinois
With its economy, durability, and versatility, cement
has become the most essential of raw materials used in
construction. Hydraulic cement manufacturing and
ready-mix concrete establishments have, together, pro-
vided the production and distribution services to meet the
final demands for this basic product. In 1976, US cement
manufacturing firms shipped products valued at $2.7
billion. The industry currently employs nearly 30,000
workers.
The hydraulic cement industry is defined as that
group of establishments primarily engaged in manufac-
turing Portland, masonry, and pozzolan cements. It is
one of the most "specialized" manufacturing industries,
and one with the highest ratio of primary product to total
output— hydraulic cement makes up 99 percent of the
industry's final products. Moreover, 96 percent of this
output is Portland cement.
The manufacturing of cement requires a series of
fully automated operations to process raw materials con-
taining lime, silica, alumina, and iron. Rock is fed in
large pieces into primary and secondary crushers which
reduce it to fragments about three-fourths of an inch in
size. Correct proportions of the crushed raw materials are
fed into a slightly inclined cylindrical kiln which is lined
with firebrick and which may be as much as 25 feet in
diameter and 750 feet long. The raw materials are heated
to about 2700 degrees Fahrenheit until they fuse to form
a new, harder substance, called "clinker." The clinker, in
marble-sized pellets, is cooled and then ground with gyp-
sum (which regulates the setting time of the cement) into
the extremely fine powder of cement. The cement is then
either sacked or loaded directly onto trucks or rail cars to
be transported.
The end-use markets of cement are residential, 31
percent; industrial and commercial, 24 percent; public
buildings, 7 percent; and miscellaneous construction proj-
ects, 5 percent. Ready-mix concrete producers are the
biggest customers— they purchase about 63 percent of
total cement produced. Concrete product manufacturers
(block, brick, pipe, and prestressed) buy approximately
14 percent, and building material dealers and highway
construction contractors account for about 8 percent. The
remainder is purchased by government agencies, private
contractors, and others.
The hydraulic cement industry has been perpetually
plagued with a fluctuating demand for its product, pri-
marily because of the cyclical nature of building activity.
Shipments in 1975 were at the lowest level since 1964, but
demand has been bolstered more recently by a pickup in
construction activity— especially residential. Prices have
risen rapidly in the past two years, with the wholesale
price index for cement rising 19 percent in 1975 and
about 10 percent last year. Rising energy costs— at-
tributed to the fact that the industry is energy intensive
— have been the major cost-push factors. These energy
costs currently accoimt for close to half the variable cost
of production for the industry. The cement business is
the most energy intensive of all manufacturing in the
US, and as an industry, it is the sixth largest consumer of
energy. The current industry fuel-mix is approximately 31
percent natural gas, 29 percent coal, 20 percent heavy
fuel oil, and 17 percent electricity. Raw materials—
limestone, clay, shale, gypsum, and other materials—
are in ample supply, and no short-run supply problems
are envisioned.
Illinois Industry
Illinois has four firms that manufacture hydraulic
cement. They include Illinois Cement Company,
Oglesby; Marquette Cement Company, LaSalle; Medusa
Corporation, Dixon; and Missouri-Portland Cement
Company, Joppa. Each employs between 100 and 250
workers. In 1974, state employment in the industry to-
taled about 540 workers. The population density associ-
ated with the Chicago area, plus abundant raw material
supplies, largely explains the concentration of the indus-
try in the northern part of the State.
The Illinois cement industry has showTi almost no net
growth over the past 20 years. In 1974 Illinois produced
nearly 1.6 million tons of pordand cement and accounted
for a meager 2 percent of the US total; the three major
producing states (California, Pennsylvania, and Te.xas)
accounted for over 30 percent of the total. Illinois pro-
duction of Portland cement in 1974 was only 96 percent
of its 1955 total. The state's share of total national output
dropped from 3.5 percent in 1950 to about 2 percent in
1974. This can be attributed to a decline in the number
of establishments over the past several decades. In 1966
there were 9 producing firms in the State compared with
4 in 1974. The highest production levels were reached in
1964 when more than 1.8 million tons of cement were
produced. Cyclical fluctuations in the construction in-
dustiy and shifts in the number of producing firms within
the State have contributed to a drastic fluctuation of state
output over time.
Illinois cement manufacturers have been somewhat
shielded from the energy crunch of the past decade. All
of the state's fii-ms consume abundant southern Illinois
coal as their primary energ)' input. In view of the scar-
city and rising costs of other fossil fuels, many companies
have begun to plan for the conversion to the exclusive use
of coal. Thus, with coal more abimdant, Illinois firms will
probably command a competitive advantage over other
producers.
Distribution services are provided by more than 250
ready-mix cement establishments scattered throughout
the State more or less according to the distribution of
population. Most of these establishments are small with
95 percent of them having 1 to 50 employees. In 1974
state employment in the ready-mi.x industiy totaled over
5,800 workers.
The Carter Energy Proposals— Two Views
Since the start of the oil embargo late in 1973, three
presidents of the United States have endeavored to put
together an energy program that would (1) allow tlie
nation to continue to grow but (2) avoid a severe wrench
to the economy and (3) not leave the US at the mercy
of foreign countries for much or most of its fuel. Very
little of permanence came out of the Nixon and Ford
programs. Their most noticeable and durable legacy
seems to have been the nationwide lower speed limit. It
is now President Carter's turn to try to hold down de-
mand, foster production, and promote shifts from scarce
sources of energ)' to more plentiful sources.
The President spent virtually the whole thhd week
of .^pril seeking support for the program he proposed to
the Congress on 20 .^pril. Since then, he and his assistant
for energy affairs, Dr. James Schlesinger, have spent
much time explaining the program and answering ques-
tions about it.
The Program in Brief
Conservation. Among the conservation measures pro-
posed are taxes on cars with low gas mileage coupled
with rebates on cars with high gas mileage, a standby
additional and increasing tax on gasoline, tax incentives
to insulate homes and businesses, mandatory efficiency
standards for appliances, and a restructuring of electricity
rates to avoid encouraging wasteful consumption.
In order to reduce US dependence on oil, especially
imported oil, the President proposes to impose a gradu-
ated excise tax. beginning with 1978 models, on automo-
biles and light trucks that fail to meet government stan-
dards for mileage. Vehicles that produce mileage better
than the standard would receive rebates. The 1978
standards would give rise to a maximum tax of $449 on
cars giving less than 13 miles per gallon and a maximum
rebate of $473 on cars with more than 39 miles per gal-
lon. Levies/rebates would increase annually until 1985
when cars are expected to produce an overall average
27.5 miles per gallon. Both taxes and rebates would be
paid to manufacturers and would be expected to be re-
flected in prices. The Internal Revenue Service would be
charged with balancing rebates and levies each year.
The President also proposed to levy an additional 5
cents tax per gallon of gasoline beginning 15 Januar)'
1979 if consumption in 1978 exceeds targeted usage by 1
percent or more. The tax could rise in 5 cent increments
to a maximum of 50 cents a gallon if successive targets
are exceeded. The tax would be reduced if consumption
decreased. To mitigate the tax's effect on the economy,
money collected via the gasoline excise tax would be
rebated via the income tax system and by direct pay-
ments to people who do not pay income taxes.
The Administration expects that .Americans can re-
duce gasoline consumption 10 percent by 1985 without
reducing miles driven by shifting to a considerable extent
to smaller cars.
Proposals were also made regarding efficiency stan-
dards for trucks weighing 5 tons or less, removal of the
excise tax on intercity buses, elimination of the existing
excise tax preference given general aviation and motor-
boat fuel, and help to the states to make up for revenues
lost as gasoline consumption declines.
Homeowners would be induced to undertake energy
conser\'ation measures until the end of 1984 by a tax
credit of 25 percent of the first $800 spent and 15 percent
of the next $1,400. Utilities would also be required to
offer their customers insulation programs which could
be paid for over a period of time as part of the customers'
monthly utility bills. Businesses would receive a 10 per-
cent tax credit in addition to the existing investment
credit for approved conservation measures; and non-
profit schools and hospitals would be eligible for assis-
tance grants for conservation measures. The 1985 goal
would be insulation of 90 percent of all residences and
other buildings.
In place of the current voluntary standards, the pro-
gram would set mandatory efficiency standards for home
appliances such as air conditioners, furnaces, refrigera-
tors, and hot water heaters.
To foster conservation of electric energy, the program
would require utilities to phase out promotional rates for
electricity and to schedule off-peak rates and lower rates
for interruptible service under specified conditions, and
would prohibit master metering in new structures.
Also listed under conservation is cogeneration— the
production of electric power and heat or process steam
from the same facility. An additional 10 percent tax
credit for the purchase of generating equipment was pro-
posed to encourage industries to use otherwise wasted
heat to produce electricity.
Oil and natural gas. The current price ceilings for
previously discovered oil would be continued with escala-
tion for the general rate of inflation. The price of newly
discovered oil would be allowed to rise over a three-year
period to the current world price (adjusted for inflation)
.
Domestic cmde oil would be subjected to a tax to equalize
the controlled domestic price and the world price; im-
position of the tax would occur in three phases so that
by 1980 the tax would equal the difference bet\veen the
domestic and world prices. Revenues generated by the
tax would be returned to the public on a per capita basis
via tax credits or direct payments.
The ceiling price for newly discovered natural gas
would rise to $1.75 per thousand cubic feet on 1 January
1978; the present ceiling is $1.44. The ceiling would ap-
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ply to gas sold within a state as well as to gas moving
between states ; at present intrastate gas is not subject to
federal price controls.
In addition, in order to promote shifts from oil and
gas to coal the Administration has proposed taxes on
industries (beginning in 1979) and utilities (beginning
in 1983) that use oil and natural gas and has proposed
an additional 10 percent investment credit for expendi-
tures for conversion to coal or other fuels. The later
starting date for utilities recognized their greater difficulty
in completely converting to coal. The use of oil or natural
gas in new boilers, either by industry or utilities, would
be prohibited.
Nuclear and solar power were also referred to in the
program. Increased use of nuclear power is labeled "a
last resort." Tax credits were proposed for solar installa-
tions: 40 percent of the first $1,000 and 25 percent of
the next $6,400, up to a maximum of $2,000. The credit
would be available from 20 .April 1977 to 31 December
1984 and would decline over time. Businesses investing in
solar equipment would receive an additional 10 percent
tax credit.
The program speaks of the long-run hope that lies
in such renewable sources as solar and geothermal energy
and promises to promote aggressively the development of
those sources.
The overall goals for 1985 are ( 1 ) to reduce the an-
nual growth of US energv' demand to less than 2 percent,
(2) to cut oil imports to less than 6 million barrels a day
(from the potential 16 million barrels), (3) to reduce
gasoline consumption by 10 percent, (4) to insulate 90
percent of all residences and other buildings, (5) to in-
crease coal output by at least 400 million tons a year, and
(6) to use solar energy in more than 2.5 million homes.
Toward those ends, the President proposed a program
widely characterized in the press as a "carrot and stick"
program.
Two Views
We present on the following pages two views of the
proposals sent to Congress. The articles are in no sense
a debate but are, rather, brief comments on a set of ques-
tions addressing some of the broad aspects and implica-
tions of the .Administration's plan of action.
RUTH A. BIRDZELL
Get Government Out of Energy
A. JAMES HEINS, Professor of Economics, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
What is your general assessment of the President's energy
program? President Carter's energy program reflects tra-
ditional liberal thinking in this countiy; if there is a prob-
lem, get government to solve it. And, in the process,
create a new cog in the giant federal bureaucracy. A
major aspect of the current energy problem is the short-
age of natural gas. The seeds of that shortage were sown
more than 20 years ago with federal regulation of the
price of natural gas. Energy problems have been exacer-
bated in recent years by price freezes or threat of price
freezes. In addition, oil companies have been threatened
by excess profit taxes and dissolution. All of these aspects
of federal policy have acted to increase energy problems
by encouraging consumption and discouraging pro-
duction.
The Carter plan proposes to continue the ridiculous
price distinction between "new" and "old" oil. In the
process it keeps the price of both below the world price,
and equalizes the prices of domestic and foreign oil with
a special tax. This continues the process of government
price rigging; it can come to no better end than the price
rigging of the past 25 years. Now is the time to solve the
energy problem by getting the government out of the
energy business instead of further in.
How will Illinois be affected by the program? States in
which driving is popular— California, for example—
will suflfer under the gas tax proposal. They will send
more tax money to Washington than they will receive
back in rebates. The reverse will happen in states like
Washington where driving is less popular. Michigan will
suffer if the energy program results in reduced auto pro-
duction. In the main, these effects should be average in
Illinois. In the long run, however, Illinois may benefit
if the pricing up of oil results in greater in\'estment in the
technology of reclaiming energy from high sulfur coal.
The prime benefit here would flow to southern Illinois.
Will the program serve to increase unemployment? Yes,
temporarily ; any government program that drives up the
price of a prime input in the production process to reduce
consumption— and energy is a prime input— will de-
press the economy and increase unemploNinent for a
while. The Arab oil boycott had that result four years
ago; if Washington adopts a program that amounts to
the same thing, the effect will similarly depress the econ-
omy. Of course, unemplo^Tnent \vould not be \vorrisome
in this case, because the government will have to hire
those people to man the bureaucracy required to ad-
minister the program that put them out of work.
What is the likely impact of the program on inflation?
The Arab oil boycott caused simultaneous inflation and
unemployment in 1974 by raising the price of energ\\ If
Carter's program were to cause a significant increase in
the price of energy-, the result should be the same as in
1974— more inflation as well as unemployment. This
problem results because government took actions to hold
down the price of energy for 25 years, supposedly in the
interest of consumers. Naturally, when you tiy to undo
25 years of mistakes in a short period of time major dis-
ruptions will occur.
How will the program affect economic growth? It is diffi-
cult to say what the effect of Carter's program on growth
will be. What is economic growth? In the short run, in-
flation and imemplo)Tnent will result. The long-nm effect
will be to change modes of production and the life style
of consumers. Some of these changes are undoubtedly
due. In fact, they are overdue and would have occurred
years ago with wiser government policy then. The effect
of the Carter program wall be on the shape of economic
growth, not its amount.
Which industries will benefit most from the program? If
people spend less money on cars and gas, they will have
more money to spend on other things. The industries that
produce those other things will benefit. Of course, the
world will beat a path to the door of any firm that de-
velops more energy efficient methods of production,
transportation, or heating. The Carter program places a
greater premium on such dexelopments, and the indus-
tries that respond will profit. And companies that pro-
duce home insulation could look for a boom in sales.
Which industries will suffer most? Certainly, any industry
producing consumer goods that require major amounts
of energy— autos and recreation— will suffer in the
short run. When those industries suffer, workers and sup-
pliers suffer as well as stockholders.
Do you feel that the uncertainty associated with contro-
versy is adversely affecting business investment? Uncer-
tainty of this kind is bound to affect investment adversely.
A producer cannot make a wise decision on a new pro-
duction process without knowing how expensive energy
will be in the future. But alas, we probably cannot mea-
sure the amount of such an impact.
Do you really believe the adjustments asked for entail sac-
rifice? Or will they merely require a more efficient use of
our resources? The United States economy is the most
efficient in the world. There is precious little to be gained
from improvement in efficiency anywhere. Yes, a major
reduction in energy usage will entail sacrifice. The sacri-
fice involves a reduction in current living standards.
What is offered in exchange under the Carter program
is a more productive future. The reduction in current
living standards is for sure; the more productive future is
for maybe.
Do you approve of the goal to become independent of
foreign oil? Certainly. But what is independence? As oil
imports increase, people are wont to say that we arc
becoming more dependent on foreign oil. The reverse is
true, of course, and fuzzy thinking prevails again. To as-
sure our independence in oil, we should import 100 per-
cent of our current consumption and cap our own wells.
Government policies designed to restrict imports actually
tend to increase our dependence on foreign oil by en-
couraging us to use our own. If the government would
get out of the business altogether, private comjjanics
would find it in their interest to hoard our own expensive
oil (cap the wells and store the oil in the ground) and
import the cheaper oil from abroad. Therein lies energy
independence.
One of the criticisms of President Carter's energy pro-
gram is its emphasis on techniques to reduce demand. Do
you feel that there should be incentives for production?
Of course not. It would be silly to have policies to de-
crease consumption and increase production. The vice
of increasing production in the United States is that we
will be using our own oil rather than saving it. For in-
stance, if consumption decreases and our own production
increases, it must be that imports decline. This is pre-
cisely what we do not want. What we need is to get the
government out of the business of trying to rig a solution
and let the market do the job.
Do you favor the standby ta.x on gasoline? Do I approve
of the tax? Or the fact that the tax is standby? I gen-
erally disapprove of taxes when the sole motive is the
regulation of consumption. If we need better roads and
the benefits of mass transit, then a gas tax is a reasonable
way to finance those programs. In the Carter proposal,
however, monies raised by the gas tax will be rebated.
Thus, this tax is designed purely to reduce consumption.
Regulation of consumption by taxes and subsidies con-
stitutes the worst sort of infringement of our economic
freedoms. What happened to the notion that the govern-
ment should tax for revenue only? As to the standby part
of the tax, the Congress should not give this much dis-
cretion to any president, even a peanut farmer.
Were you disappointed with President Carter's failure
to include mass transit initiatives in the energy program?
The biggest problem with financing mass transit is politi-
cal. Federal finance of mass transit means a tax on every-
one to provide benefits for city folks. That kind of legisla-
tion is difficult to enact. What is required is a way of
harnessing the resources of metropolitan areas to provide
the benefits of mass transit that go to those areas. Presi-
dent Carter has enough political problems with his energy-
proposal without taking on the problems of financing
mass transit.
Comment on whatever aspect of the program you con-
sider to be important which has not been covered in the
foregoing. These questions do not reflect the understand-
ing that our biggest fear from this and other federal pro-
grams is the increasing regulation of our daily lives. We
focus too much on the likely outcomes of those programs
and too litde on the point that government programs
designed to deal with problems— sometimes falsely per-
ceived— erode our economic freedoms. Many problems
with our economy— energy, welfare, inflation, whatever
— can be directly traced to actions taken in Washington.
It is incredible to me that the American people look
to Washington for solutions to the very same problems.
We create a bureaucracy to solve a problem and other
bureaucracies to solve the problems created by the fii-st
one.
If the Carter energ\' program were to become law, it
would owe its political success to acres of misinformation
held by tlie American public. People fear "vast profits"
in oil, and they respond positively to politicians who call
for watchdog government agencies designed to protect
the interest of consumers. But the politicians are ripping
off the public because those agencies only serve to ad-
vance the interests of die bureaucrats. The profits in oil
are small potatoes when compared with the power of the
federal bureaucracy.
The Economics of Energy with a Sense of Urgency
WALTER W. McMAHON, Professor of Economics, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
A general assessment. The energy policy amounts in
effect to production incentives that will use price effects
to stimulate the production of solar energy, coal, geo-
thermal energy, and nuclear power. It encourages substi-
tution away from the ever increasing use of oil, partly
by increasing its price through taxes, and seeks to con-
serve our dwindling reserves of oil, which the experts
agree are running out.
As such it makes good economic sense. The program
is consistent; all parts of the policy operate in the same
direction, and not at cross-purposes, although these are
not the only policies that would operate in that direction.
We have been without a comprehensive policy for too
long. The oil will run out, in the sense of there being an
acute shortage, even if the Saudis more than double out-
put within 10 years, according to the new 2'/2 year study
Energy: Global Prospects 1985 issued by 35 industrial,
government, and academic petroleum economics special-
ists centered at MIT.
It is important that we develop alternative sources
of energy before that time. It also seems reasonable that
we should simultaneously conserve our domestic oil re-
serves, both proved and unproved, for uses later where
substitutes for oil cannot be developed and for use in
emergencies as this policy seeks to do. The details will be
refined and modified, as they should be in a democracy.
But the US has been hostage once to OPEC during the
Arab boycott, that ever since has had a continuing infla-
tionary impact on the economy that is not desirable to
repeat. Last winter brought the first experiences with
serious heat, light, and energy shortages. It is about time
that something is done to conserve oil and to provide
production incentives to develop alternative sources of
energy. That is what this energy policy seeks to do.
How will Illinois be affected? Coal production in
southern Illinois will be stimulated. Heating costs, espe-
cially of those who use natural gas and oil in the northern
tier of counties, will increase. But residents of Illinois will
experience even sharper increases in heating costs by
1987 if steps are not taken now to develop substitute
sources of heat and energy. The program provides for
partial subsidies for additional insulation which could
significantly reduce the increase in heating costs.
The gas tax is likely to increase the cost of air travel
and of big cars, but this and other effects are not unique
to lUinois.
Will the program increase unemployment? No. Unless
the extraordinary inflation of 1973-74 is repeated. That
led to restrictive policies. More modest tax-price effects
will reallocate employment to different industries and
lead to some temporary frictional unemployment. The
fact that the taxes proposed are to be spent or rebated
means that some jobs will be destroyed but others will be
created, neutralizing the net effect on employment. Em-
ployment will be increased, for example, as the result of
tax credits for solar installations and for insulation of
homes. As the proceeds of the gas tax are used to "help
develop alternative modes of transportation, rapid or
otherwise" as proposed by Transportation Secretary
Adams and by Senator Cranston, employment will be
stimulated in mass transit and railroads.
More important, if effects on unemployment are to
be considered, this one energy policy cannot be consid-
ered in isolation. The economy is recovering, with a 6.75
percent growth in real gross national product in the first
quarter of 1977; that is very close to the target 7 percent
which most economists regard as desirable for a smooth
recovery toward a sustainable long-run 4 percent full
employment growth path. Other policies have been pro-
posed by the Carter Administration and are being en-
acted as a portion of the new budget for fiscal 1979 that
are part of the excess of federal expenditures over total
tax receipts. The net effect of this planned fiscal policy
will be to create more jobs, increase emplo)'ment, and
maintain the recovery. With a good recovery underway,
the energy program will have relatively minor and largely
frictional effects on employment.
Will the program aggravate inflation? Yes, to some
extent, because it largely relies on price effects to achieve
the desired reallocation. Prices of heating, transportation,
and electric power are likely to rise, at least until substi-
tute sources of energy and improved technology in their
use are developed.
Prices tend to be inflexible downward for most other
goods and services for which there is somewhat less effec-
tive demand, with the minor exception of some agricul-
tural products. So as demand shifts and as oil, gasoline,
and natural gas prices are increased permanently, the
increased costs are passed on to all products eventually.
The effect would not be as drastic as when OPEC raised
the world price of oil manyfold to the current $14.50 per
barrel. That is like a tax; but it goes to the Arabs.
Again, however, if effects on inflation are to be con-
sidered, this energy policy cannot be considered in isola-
tion. The Administration has proposed an entire anti-
inflation program only recently which contains a broad
range of anti-inflation policies that can serve to dampen
the effect. Furthermore, the inflationary impact of die
energy policy in the short run will be less serious than
continuing vulnerability to the potential inflationary
impact of further increases in the world price of oil
decreed by the OPEC cartel.
How will the program affect economic growth? An
increasing shortage of cheap sources of energy acts to
retard higher growth rates. The program per se will re-
tard growth in some industries while stimulating growth
in others.
Again, however, a broader set of fiscal policies, mone-
tary policies, and poUcies designed to support research
and development of cost-saving technologies are more
relevant than the energy policy to the overall rate of
economic growth. As indicated earlier, these policies,
which are partly in place, seek to maintain a 7 percent
real growth rate during recovery and to sustain thereafter
a 4 percent or 4.2 percent real growth rate after full em-
ployment is achieved. The energy policy has a modest
significance in this broader context.
Which industries will benefit most? Heat pumps, solar
heating equipment, coal, insulation, mass transit, makers
of smaller cars, nuclear and coal-based electric power
generating companies, bicycle makers, makers of "scrub-
bers" that reduce smokestack emissions, possibly railroads.
Which industries will suffer most? Makers of gas guz-
zlers (for example, the large car makers in Michigan,
makers of large recreation vehicles), makers of large oil
furnaces, utility companies that bum oil (for example,
those throughout New York and New England), recrea-
tional air travel, and possibly long-haul trucking.
Is uncertainty adversely affecting investment? Not se-
riously, although uncertainty would of course cause in-
vestors in the most seriously affected industries to wait.
As the congressional acceptance of the program becomes
more specifically defined, investment in the adversely
affected industries is likely to be retarded because of
lower prospective rates of return. Investment will be
stimulated in those industries likely to benefit.
Will the adjustments entail sacrifice? Some, but not
any substantial amount unless smaller cars mean "sacri-
fice." Europeans have always used smaller cars and paid
gasoline taxes that are much higher than those proposed.
Yet the standard of living in northern Germany, Den-
mark, and Sweden is higher than in the US. People
there are living very well. A more efficient use of oil and
natural gas is not inconsistent with a high standard of
hving.
Do you approve of the goal to become independent of
foreign oil? Yes, although becoming totally independent
of foreign oil is hardly realistic. The problem is that we
have become increasingly dependent on oil, sharply in-
creasing our imports of oil since the OPEC boycott in
1973. This trend needs desperately to be reversed. A no-
action policy by the US government has not reversed it
in the past.
The Middle East is a very volatile area. The current
involvement and potential involvement of the USSR
with some of the Arab nations, when taken with the
dependence of our economic stability on an uninterrupted
lifeline of oil flowing from there, is very dangerous.
Do you feel that there should be incentives for pro-
duction as well as techniques to reduce demand? The
whole program is full of incentives to increase production
of substitute forms of energy. Price incentives to this end
are its main thrust. The real problem is to become more
independent of all oil, domestic and foreign. Domestic
oil and foreign oil are linked in various ways already. To
let domestic prices drift free and follow this world price
of oil, which is what some mean when they say "incen-
tives for production," will exhaust our domestic oil re-
serves even faster.
There are, of course, incentives in the energy program
for production of domestic oil and natural gas. The price
of newly discovered oil is to be allowed to rise over a
period of three years to the world price. Similarly, federal
price ceilings would be lifted on newly discovered natural
gas from $1.44 to $1.75 per thousand cubic feet, linked
with the elimination of the $2 intrastate market within
Texas and Louisiana that contributed to the critical gas
shortages in Ohio and New England last winter. To go
beyond these production incentives would involve large
capital gains for oil and gas producers on their existing
reserves, which they must be expected to continue to
want and to argue for.
The simple fact remains, however, that the US should
probably conserve its oil and natural gas reserves, in un-
discovered form if necessary, and stress production in-
centives for substitutes. To let domestic prices drift free
under total decontrol and follow the world market price
would not only exhaust domestic natural resources faster,
but be even more inflationary, and, as our reserves are
exhausted, link the US inflation rate increasingly to the
prices established by the OPEC cartel. Without substitute
fuels in place, US stability and security will be increas-
ingly linked to the oil industry and to the OPEC cartel.
Do you favor the standby tax on gasoline? Yes. A tax
on gasoline is fundamental to the reduction of consump-
tion by large cars, recreational vehicles, and trucks and
at the same time to the conservation of our domestic oil
reserves. A gas tax will encourage the shift to smaller
cars, as it has in Europe. It will encourage some freight
to move to the railroads, which are more energy efficient
than trucks. It will provide some revenues to alleviate
the burden on the lower-income groups through assis-
tance, for example, to mass transit.
Were you disappointed with the failure of the Ad-
ministration to include mass transit? Yes. The Congress
and the Secretary of Transportation, however, are now
getting together on amendments that designate mass
transit as one of the recipients of funds from the gas tax.
Are there other important aspects? Yes. Other recrea-
tional vehicles should be covered by the big car tax, such
as private planes, campers, large trucks, and large plea-
sure boats. Some of these burn as much as 30 gallons an
hour. It would make the tax on cars, which many see as
more of a necessity than these recreational vehicles,
easier for car owners and the auto industry to bear.
Also little has been said in the energy plan about
the railroads. They are more fuel-efficient than the huge
trucks that have taken over the highways. There should
be some public investment in improvement of the rail-
road right-of-ways, perhaps through the Anny Corps of
Engineers, the jobs programs, or through use of some of
the proceeds of the gas and diesel fuel taxes. One by-
product would be that everyone could drive more safely
on the highways in their smaller cars.
Many have suggested that the conversion away from
the use of gasoline, oil, and natural gas is not likely to be
as large as envisioned by the White House. The policy,
however, in this and other respects is a middle-of-the-
road policy. The conservative right argues for complete
decontrol, a policy that would be even more inflationar)',
not operate to conser\'e domestic production of a dimin-
ishing natural resource, and make oil prices even more
dependent on the OPEC cartel. The left criticizes the
absence from the program of mandatory controls (for
example, a law against producing any cars or recreational
vehicles that cannot get at least 15 miles to the gallon),
and for split-up of tlie domestic oil companies from their
international holdings in OPEC countries. Although the
current policy avoids these extremes, if the gas tax is too
low or if the policy is not strong enough for other reasons
to be sufficiently efTective, there is likely to be a public
outcry later for the more drastic policies of these types.
A three-day conference at the Brookings Institution
has recently arrived at the conclusion that as a result of
inaction there has been a massive increase in the use of
foreign oil. These experts also conclude that we are run-
ning out of oil and are rapidly headed for disaster. Most
of the opposition to getting some energy policy in place
that has not been based on narrow self-interest has been
based on a feeling of a lack of urgency. Now an energy
policy is emerging, since there is a sense of urgency— a
program that will continue to be refined for years to
come. It is a plan for an orderly transition in a direction
that is inevitable, but a plan that is likely to move the
economy only part way. That inevitable direction is away
from oil. It is toward production incentives for substi-
tutes, such as solar, coal, geothermal, and nuclear forms
of energy, toward substitutes for energ)', and, at least in
the short run, toward less waste and more conservation.
GNP: Potential, Performance, and Predictions
Economic activity has expanded rapidly so far this
year. Even so, the performance of the economy is some-
what below earlier predictions and substantially below
estimates of its potential. At the same time, the rate of
inflation has been greater than predicted. Economic pol-
icy remains unchanged, notwithstanding reports of a
tightening in monetary policy.
Potential Economic Growth
There is a view that the potential output of the econ-
omy grows year after year, without regard to its actual
performance. This view is based on the idea that the
economy's capacity to produce depends upon the growth
of its labor force, the stock of productive facilities (plant
and equipment) , and the level of technology. Pre-
sumably, these factors change vei7 slowly, and are typi-
cally growing. Hence we expect potential gross national
product to grow slowly through time.
Even though we expect potential GNP to grow inde-
pendently of cuirent performance, it is plausible to be-
lieve that there is at least some "feedback" between per-
formance and potential. To caricature the matter, it is
unreasonable to suppose that during a 10-year depres-
sion potential GNP would simply rise willy-nilly.
The accompanying chart shows potential GNP rising
at about a 3.5 percent annual rate during the period. The
reader's eye will quite naturally be attracted to early
1973, when actual real GNP was higher than the esti-
mates of potential GNP. This does not mean that the
economy exceeded its ability to produce. Rather, it means
that unemployment, which was 5 percent or lower for
the entire year, was below its sustainable level — given
the present composition of the labor force.
Thus, estimates of potential GNP are sensitive to as-
sumptions regarding what constitutes "full" employment.
Several decades ago, full employment was thought to
mean unemployment of about 3 percent. More recently,
economic policy aspirations have grown increasingly lax.
Concern has grown about the inflation thought to be as-
sociated with low levels of unemployment. Also, the com-
position of the labor force may create a bias toward
10
higher unemployment. There has been a marked increase
in women and teenagers in the labor force. Typically,
these segments experience higher unemployment.
Performance
The economy has e.xpanded rapidly for the past two
years. Actual output has risen at just under a 6 percent
annual rate since the first quarter of 1975, one and two-
thirds the rate of increase in potential output. Even so,
the pace of economic activity remains nearly 7 percent
below its potential.
Such a state of affairs largely reflects the depth of the
1973-75 recession. From the final quarter of 1973 to the
first quarter of 1975, real output fell 6.6 percent. During
that same f>eriod, potential output rose 4.5 percent. As a
result, by the trough of the recession actual output had
fallen 10.7 percent below potential output.
Gross national product statistics for the recent first
quarter have been revised upward. Real GNP rose at
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a 6.4 percent rate from the final 1976 quarter to the
initial quarter of this year. At this rate of growth, about
two and one-half years would be required to bring the
economy to its potential. Presumably, not until then
would unemployment fall to 5 percent.
Measures of economic performance since the first
quarter present a picture of strong growth. Industrial
production continues to surge fonvard, expanding at a
9.6 percent rate through April. Although housing starts
dipjjed sharply in April, these statistics tend to move
erratically on a month-to-month basis. Housing starts are
running more than one-third higher than a year ago.
Employment has moved up, reflecting expansion in
output. So far this year employment has risen at a 5.5
percent rate— as 1.6 million workers have been added
to payrolls (see chart). Unemployment declined to 7
percent in mid-April, the lowest level in more than two
years.
Consumer spending remains strong, as household con-
fidence is buoyed by the improved job picture and ex-
panding incomes. Retail sales in .'^pril remained near the
record March le\el and 1 1 percent higher than in .'Vpril
1976. The relatively strong April performance occurred
despite a 4 percent decline in auto sales. Car sales rose
more than 7 percent in early May, chiefly reflecting
strength in sales of intermediate and full-sized models.
Business capital spending plans appear to be getting
into the spirit of the economic expansion. The most re-
cent McGraw-Hill sur\ey indicates that business expendi-
tures for plant and equipment will rise 18 percent this
year. Price increases are expected to account for 7 per-
cent of the rise, leaving a real year-to-year growth of 1
1
percent.
The rate of inflation continues to accelerate. Whole-
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Available for the first time . .
.
... an abstract of economic
and related data on Illinois— the composition of its
economy, how it compares with neighboring and other
industrialized states, and how it fits into the national
economy.
In 700-plus pages, the Illinois EcoTiomic Abstract pre-
sents information on area and climate, population, ed-
ucation, labor force, employment, income and earnings,
agriculture, mining and minerals, housing, manufac-
turing, transportation, communications, public utilities,
trade, services, finance and insurance, and government.
Business people, local government officials, planners.
educators, and students will find the Abstract useful as
a reference volume and as a guide to sources of addi-
tional and subsequent data they need for their activ-
ities.
You may now order the Illinois Economic Abstract at
the prepublication price of $9.95 a copy prepaid
(order must be received by June 30). After publica-
tion (in July), the price will be $11.95. To receive
your copy of this basic reference volume on the Illinois
economy, mail your order now to the Bureau of Eco-
nomic and Business Research, University of Illinois.
408 David Kinley Hall. Urbana, Illinois 61801.
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Most analysts, like "the thundering herd" of Merrill
Lynch, are bullish on America. The nation's factories are
turning out a record volume of goods, housing is ex-
panding at the fastest pace in several years, emplo^-ment
is reaching new highs, households are making near-
record additions to their instalment debt and are main-
taining their retail buying on incomes that are continu-
ing to rise, and businesses seem a little more ready to
spend on new capital and equipment.
Though rates of increase appear to be slowing in
some areas, such declines may be salutary— some of the
very sharp gains early this year were considered un-
sustainable. Less exuberant rates of increase are often re-
garded as surer for the long run and less likely to en-
courage further outbreaks of contagious inflation.
Substantial Growth in Production
The strong ex-pansion in industrial output continues,
with the gain in May amounting to more than 13 pier-
cent at an annual rate. Since February, when produc-
tion started upward again after the reduction caused by
January's foul weather, the FRB's index has shown an
advance of more than 14 percent (annual rate). Mrtu-
ally all industries are showing improvements. The most
welcome increase has taken place in production of busi-
ness equipment, up 22 percent at an annual rate in May
following a hike of about 20 percent in April. Car pro-
duction has slowed a bit from earlier levels, but output of
other consumer durables has surged ahead. Household
goods have been especially strong.
New housing starts are holding to their fast pace. A
drop from March's 2.1 million units (seasonally adjusted
annual rate) to 1.9 million in April was partly erased in
May. The March level was the highest since August
1973. Single-family dwellings accounted for three-fourths
of May's starts. There are some signs that one-family
dwelling starts will begin to level of! and multiunit struc-
tures will begin to increase. So far units for two or more
families have not recovered to anything like the degree
of single-family dwellings.
At least for the sV:^i\f^;^^^fM^^r. seem to
favor continuation of the housmg boom. Household
formation is expected to increase: the recent housing
slump has left the supply far behind demand : mortgage
rates are somewhat lower than they were during the
credit crunch; mortgage money is readily available; and
despite the rapid rise in prices, houses are still considered
a good hedge against inflation.
Employment Still on the Way Up
By either of the two standards commonly used, the
employment situation continues to show substantial im-
provement. The so-called household survey, which is
used to measure overall employment and unemplo>'ment,
indicated that an additional 385.000 workers found jobs
in May, bringing the number of jobholders to a record
90.4 million. The unemployment rate, at 6.9 percent,
dropped below 7 percent for the first time since Decem-
ber 1974.
The new high in the employment figure reflects an
expansion of nearly 6.6 million jobholders since the re-
cover)' began in early 1975 and nearly 3.9 million over
the previous peak.
Nonfarm payroll worker data, based on establishment
reports, show that the private sector has provided most
of the new jobs (chart, p. 2). Nearly 5 million work-
ers have found jobs in private industry since the upturn
began roughly two years ago. Just since the dip last Oc-
tober, nearly 1.9 million workers have been added to
private nonagricultural payrolls. Construction and man-
ufacturing, which lagged behind other sectors earlier in
the recovery, have made especially welcome gains. In
construction, the housing pickup has been a major factor
in putting 250,000 construction workers back on the pay-
rolls. In manufacturing, such industries as metal fabri-
cating, machinery, and equipment have finally gathered
momentum; and of course the continued (and somewhat
surprisingly) strong showing of automobiles has also
helped.
Government employment has been in the neighbor-
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hood of 15 million for over a year. Declines at the fed-
eral level have just about balanced modest increases in
state and local government.
The growth in employment has not resulted in a cor-
responding cut in the number out of work. The chief
reason is that increasing numbers are coming into the la-
bor market. Nearly 400,000 people entered the civilian
labor force in May alone, and 2.6 million in the past
year. The civilian labor force participation rate (the
percentage of civilian noninstitutional population work-
ing or looking for work) is up to 62.2 percent, a record.
Much of the expansion has occurred among adult
women. In the past year the participation rate of adult
women has risen 1.5 points to 48.2 percent, representing
an additional 1.6 million women in the labor force. In
contrast, the participation rate of adult men has de-
clined 0.3 point to 79.6 percent and the number in the
labor force has grown by 847,000.
Retail Spending Rises at Slower Rate
Consumers have continued to increase their retail
purchases, but the rate of gain has slowed. May retail
sales of $60 billion represented an annual rate of ad-
vance of 8.4 percent. This was only about one-third of
the very sharp increases seen in February and March,
and probably indicates slight, if any, improvement in the
real volume of sales. An important prop to recent sales
has been a recovery in auto sales after a dip in April. A
sizable share of that gain has been in imports, which
seem to be benefiting from some buyers' pessimism about
the future of gasoline prices. The annual rate of car
sales in May reached 11.7 million units. Domestic sales
held at about the 9.2 million rate that has prevailed for
several months. In contrast, imports rose to a 2.5 million
rate, a record nearly a third above the first-quarter rate.
Other durables have also been picking up as consumers
acquire appliances they had postponed purchasing dur-
ing the recession.
A good part of the support for the increased buying
comes from an expansion of consumer instalment debt.
This is especially true of durables and car purchases. In
April consumers added to their instalment credit out-
standing at a near-record annual rate of $28 billion.
Cars accounted for nearly half of that. In automobile
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Nonfarm Payroll Employment
llions of employees
f 1 > M , 1 I M ,
least the prospect for a little more enthusiasm, in this
sector. Capital appropriations— authorizations to spend
money— are at a high level ; businesses are spending
more than they had projected earlier; some industries
are beginning to show signs of strained capacity; and
business in the aggregate is enjoying a high degree of
liquidity. Furthermore, the President is expected to pro-
pose additional tax incentives for capital investment as
part of his tax reform package later this year.
For now, the chief deterrents to capital spending are
seen to be uncertainties of one sort or another— pollu-
tion regulations, the outcome of the energy proposals,
the level of government spending, and inflation.
A Little Hope for Prices
Consumers and businesses alike would be helped by
some letup in the rate of increase in prices. The latest
reports offer some slight encouragement. Earlier this
year, the wholesale price index rose at rates of 10 to 13
percent. In May the index rose at an annual rate of
about 5 percent, the best showing since August 1976.
The fastest rate of advance— nearly 22 percent at
an annual rate — showed up in foods and feeds. How-
ever, the farm product part of the index was off at an
annual rate of about 28 percent, which may presage
some future slackening in the increase of food/feed
prices. Forecasts of large harvests this year in the United
States and elsewhere— if the weather cooperates— are
fueling hopes for additional moderation in food and feed
prices.
The farm and food/feed parts of the WPI are over-
shadowed by industrial commodities, which account for
roughly two-thirds of the index. Industrial prices con-
tinue to rise but at a slower pace. In May such prices
were up at an annual rate of 4.8 percent, two-thirds of
the April rate and the smallest advance in five months.
The rate of increase in the consumer price index also
slowed in May. An annual-rate rise of 7.2 percent was
three-fourths of that in April. As they have been since
the first of the year, food and fuel were the chief factors
in higher prices. The year-to-year advance in the CPI
was 6.7 percent, which was better than the earlier dou-
ble-digit rates but still uncomfortably high.
Problems Beset Foreign Trade
However well the domestic economy is going, our for-
eign trade relations are not going well at all. Because
the economy of the US has for many months been re-
covering at a faster pace than those of our trading part-
ners, our imports have been increasing more rapidly
than our exports. Consequently, our balance of merchan-
dise trade has been in an almost-unbroken year-long
plunge (see chart). In April the excess of imports over
exports was more than $2.6 billion (equal to more than
$31 billion a year). For the first four months of this year,
the deficit totaled $8.55 billion, compared with one of
$5.9 billion for all of 1976. A huge oil bill, running at an
annual rate of $44 billion in April, is weighing very
heavily in the import balance. Agricultural exports,
Balance of Merchandise Trade
Millions of dollars
-1,800
-2,400
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Local Illinois Developments
Family Budget Costs Rise
The cost of maintaining an urban family on an inter-
mediate standard of living was $1,353 per month in
1976. To maintain a family of four cost $78 or 6 percent
per month more than in 1975, compared with an $80
increase in the preceding year. The annual cost of this
intermediate budget was $16,236.
The US Bureau of Labor Statistics also computes a
lower and a higher budget for urban four-member fami-
lies. (Such a family, as defined by BLS, includes a 38-
year-old husband working fvdl time, his nonworking wife,
a boy of 13, and a girl of 8.) In 1976 the low budget
costed out at $10,041, representing an increase of 4.7
percent over the preceding year. The high budget cost
$23,759, a 6.6 percent rise between the autumn of 1975
and the autumn of 1976.
Estimated Annual Budgets, Urban Family
of Four, Three Levels, Autumn 1976
Illinois Business Indexes
Illinois Coal
Shortly after World War I, coal provided over 75
percent of total US energy requirements. Although oil
and gas had surpassed coal as the nation's primary en-
ergy source by 1946, coal still accounts for a critical 18
percent of our total energy needs. More than 50 percent
of our electricity generating capacity is derived from
coal and 32 percent of the industrial sector's energy
needs are satisfied by the mineral.
Moreover, coal commands an economically competi-
tive advantage over other fossil fuels. According to the
National Coal Association, coal costs 87 cents per mil-
lion BTUs, compared with $2.04 for oil and $1.13 for
gas. Additionally, oil and gas prices are rising faster than
that of coal.
The US possesses an estimated 31 percent of the
total coal reserves of the world— enough coal to last
200 to 400 years at present rates of use. Considering our
prevailing energy dilemma, the current administration
has called for a 65 percent increase in our production
capabilities by 1985 and to restore coal as a primary en-
ergy source— especially in the generation of electricity.
Illinois will figure prominently in any discussion to
bolster the development and use of coal for future energy'
needs. The State, with more than 160 billion tons, has
greater total reser\-es of bituminous coaJ than any other
state. Additionally, Illinois ranks second in currently
economically recoverable reserves, with 65 billion tons,
and its coal e.xhibits a high heating value (a hot burning
coal) with more BTUs per ton than less potent subbi-
tuminous or lignite coal. The state's annual production
— over 59.5 million tons in 1975— accounts for 11 per-
cent of the nation's total output.
Coal fields lie under approximately 65 percent of
Illinois with the overall quality of coal mined (heating
value and volatility) increasing toward the southern end
of the State. More than 4.5 billion tons of coal have
been mined in Illinois since 1833; this represents only
about 5 percent of total reserves. The peak production
level was reached in 1918 when 90 million tons were
produced. In 1976 more than 14.700 coal miners were
employed in the State and over 90,000 Illinois residents
are directly affected by coal operations.
There are currently 23 underground mines and 32
strip mines operating in the State, with over 70 percent
of the state's production originating from six contiguous
counties stretched out over the southern part of the
State from Belleville to Shawneetown. Smaller mines,
located near Danville, Springfield, and Peoria, con-
tribute most of the remainder. The largest producing
county is Perr)', which accounts for almost 20 percent of
the state's total output. The leading counties in the em-
plo)-ment of miners are Jefferson, Franklin, Perry, and
St. Clair; together they employ 43 percent of total state
mining personnel.
In 1974 IlHnois consumed approximately 44 percent
of its own coal production. Shipments into the State
accounted for about 35 percent of total state coal con-
sumption. Electric utilities account for about 79 percent
of all coal consumed in Illinois; industrial use, 11 per-
cent; coke and gas plants, 8 percent; and residential and
commercial establishments, 2 percent.
Railroads are the predominant movers of coal
throughout Illinois (65 percent of total coal moved).
Nearly 78 percent of this rail traffic has the destination
of an electric utility. River transportation of coal ac-
counts for 23 percent of the state total, and trucks and
the Great Lakes contribute 10 percent and 2 percent
respectively.
Energy vs. the Environment
In spite of the availability of large quantities of coal
and the accessibility to large coal-consuming markets,
the development of Illinois coal is lagging. Over the past
10 years, Illinois coal production has shown virtually no
growth while US production has increased at an annual
rate of 2.1 percent.
The chief explanation for the slow growth of the
coal industry in Illinois lies in the "dirty" burning char-
acteristics of Illinois coal: it has a relatively high sulfur
content. When it bums it produces sulfur fumes and soot
which combine with elements in the atmosphere to pro-
duce a sulfuric acid mist. The Clean Air Act of 1970
limits the use of high sulfur coals unless expensive pol-
lution abatement equipment is installed to remove the
sulfur. Since enforcement of these environmental stan-
dards, low-sulfur coals (primarily from western states)
have made deep inroads into the markets historically
served by Illinois producers. Electric utilities, which
are the principal market for Illinois coal, have shifted
drastically to low-sulfur coals— Illinois utilities cur-
rently obtain approximately one-third of their coal from
western suppliers.
Some utilities have been required to install "scrub-
bers"— costly antipollution devices attached to smoke-
stacks to remove sulfur dioxide gas. It is estimated that
such devices account for 10 percent or more of the cost
of a new power plant. The industry argues that this cost
is often prohibitive. The current administration has pro-
posed mandatory scrubbers, regardless of the type of
coal to be burned. This would probably offset the com-
petitive edge western coal now enjoys.
Much research is being carried out to develop more
efficient and economical means of removing sulfur from
coal and flue gases. Once successful methods are fully
developed, the demand for Illinois coal would probably
increase substantially.
Strip mining and its environmental impact are also
the subject of considerable controversy. Since 1962, Illi-
nois has required the reclamation of strip-mined land and
requires permits before coal is mined. This type of mining
accounts for nearly half of Illinois coal production.
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Deficits and the Economy
WILLIAM R. BRYAN, Professor of Finance
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
The large federal deficits of the past several years
are generally regarded as undesirable. Such deficits are
often cited as a chief cause of inflation and high interest
rates. Indeed, a major goal of the Carter Administration
is to achieve a balanced federal budget by 1980.
This article reviews developments regarding govern-
ment deficits over the past two decades. One aspect of
the review is a description of relationships among sector
surpluses and deficits. Next, there is a consideration of
possible causal relationships running from government
deficits to inflation.
The Data
There is always equality between income and expen-
ditures— during any period of time, one person's ex-
penditure is someone else's receipt. Therefore, it is pos-
sible to view gross national product either as a flow of
expenditures or as a flow of income receipts. However,
as we look across an economy, the distribution of spend-
ing will differ markedly from the distribution of income.
Some units in the economy— households, governments,
or business firms— spend less than their income, thereby
achieving surpluses; other units spend more than their
income, thereby incurring deficits. But the sum of all
surpluses necessarily just equals the sum of all deficits.
Table 1 shows this identity relationship in some detail
for last year, and Table 2 summarizes sector surpluses
and deficits for the past 21 years.
Table I. Sector Deficits and Surpluses, 1976
(Billions of dollars)
Receipts
House-holds II 81.
8
Businesses 198.6
Government 591.1
Foreign
Statistical discrepancy. .
Source: US Deparlment of Commerce.
Surplu
penditures
growth in gross national product. At the beginning of
this period government expenditures accounted for 25.6
percent of GNP; at the end of the period they accounted
for 28.9 percent. However, since 1965 government has
expanded sharply. Receipts have risen at a 10.4 percent
average annual rate, and expenditures have jumped
upward at an 11.1 percent rate. By 1976 government ex-
penditures accounted for 37.6 percent of GNP.
Government receipts fluctuate somewhat more on a
year-to-year basis than expenditures. For the most part
these changes reflect fluctuations in the rate of growth
in dollar income— not new economic poHcy initiatives.
With a progressive tax system, receipts tend to expand
slowly during periods of recession. This can be seen from
an inspection of the 1957-58, 1960-61, 1969-71, and
1974-75 periods displayed in Chart 1. With our tax sys-
tem, tax receipts accelerate during periods of strongly
expanding economic activity and/or in periods of strong
inflation.
In contrast, business expenditures fluctuate markedly,
whereas receipts move upward along a reasonably steady
path (see Chart 2). What we refer to as business expen-
ditures in this article are usually referred to as gross
private domestic investment. These expenditures in-
clude investment in plant and equipment, changes in in-
ventories, and spending on residential construction. What
we call business receipts is usually referred to as business
saving. It consists chiefly of depreciation allowances and
retained earnings.
Business receipts demonstrate reasonably stable
growth because in any given year a major component—
depreciation— has little if anything to do with what is
currently going on in the economy. In contrast, business
expenditures vary widely from year to year. They tend to
Chart 1. Government Receipts
and Expenditures
Billions of dollars
650
I960 1965
Source: US Department of Commerce.
decline in periods of economic recession and to ex-pand
rapidly in periods of ex-pansion. Marked declines oc-
curred during the 1957-58, 1960-61, and 1973-75 re-
cessions (see Chart 2). Businesses often allow their in-
ventories to run down— a chief method of making rapid
reductions in expenditures— using the proceeds to main-
tain their dividend payouts and, perhaps, their retained
earnings. In periods of expanding economic activity,
there are marked increases in spending on inventories,
machinery, and other productive facilities.
Table 2. Sector Surpluses and Deficits, 1956-76"
Foreign Discrepancy
Chart 2. Business Sector Receipts
and Expenditures
Billions of dollars
300i I
I
I
I
I I I I
I
Expenditures
Source: US Department of Co:
Government and Business "Cooperation"
As indicated, surpluses plus deficits sum to zero.
Thus, as the government sector moves toward surplus,
the remaining sectors— households, businesses, and the
foreign sector— must somehow generate an accommo-
dating deficit. As government moves toward or into
deficit, the remaining sectors must somehow move
toward or into surplus.
It turns out that offsetting, or accommodating, roles
are played by the government sector and the business
sector. As with dancers, who, as one steps forward the
other steps backward, so too, as the business sector moves
toward deficit the government sector moves toward sur-
plus. This relationship is shown in Chart 3.
Chart 3 is drawn so that an upward movement of the
line implies a movement toward deficit for the govern-
ment sector (whose scale is shown on the right) but a
movement toward surplus for the business sector (whose
scale is shown on the left). The congruence of the two
lines is striking. However, that the two sectors "dance
well with each other" is no accident. The economic
factors that propel the business sector toward a greater
deficit move the government sector toward a surplus—
and conversely.
As businesses expand their investment expenditures,
there is an accompanying deepening of the business sec-
tor's deficit. At the same time, as was indicated, such
developments tend to be associated with strong expan-
sions in economic activity. Indeed, there is a widely held
view that expansions in economic activity are caused by
rising investment expenditures. Whatever the direction
of causation, it is clear that there is a strong association
between changes in business investment and changes in
economic activity.
To complete the picture, as economic activity ex-
pands there is a concomitant rise in tax revenues. In
turn, the government sector moves toward surplus.
According to this view of matters, the government
sector plays a passive role. Given its expenditure plans
(which cannot be substantially adjusted in the short
run) and the tax structure (which is also controlled by
Congress) changes in the government sector's deficit
or surplus reflect developments in the economy. Such a
view is in sharp contrast to the popular notion that an
increase in the government deficit is a useful summary
measure of the economic impact of federal fiscal initia-
tives. Let me highlight the word "popular" ; of course, all
well-trained economists understand these matters com-
pletely!
But this is only part of the picture. The "dancers"
do not merely glide across and around the floor. There
is always a modicum of exertion, and some economists
report that, from time to time, there may be outright
pushing and shoving. Thus, for example, even if the
federal government may be moving toward surplus dur-
ing an economic expansion, it may not be moving fast
enough. If real economic activity cannot expand with
adequate rapidity, inflation may accelerate to "feed"
the household sector's dollar surplus and the govern-
ment sector's tax receipts.
Also, upon occasion both government and business
may move toward greater deficit. There is a view that
Chart 3. Changes in Sector Surpluses
and Deficits
(Billions of dollars)
Business
sector
surplus
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Chart 4. Government Deficits and
the Money Supply
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fact that government and business "dance together," an
implication of this finding is that money supply increases
are more closely related to deficits by the business sector.
That is, business deficits are monetized -— not federal
deficits— even though the Federal Reserve consummates
the act by purchasing federal debt.
The association between business sector deficits and
money supply growth is rooted in an unhappy Federal
Reserve operating tactic. On a short-run basis, the Fed
tends to gear its operations toward movements in interest
rates— especially the federal funds rate. Monetarists
have bemoaned this for years, arguing that such an oper-
ating procedure tends to result in perverse behavior of
the money supply. That is, money supply growth tends
to accelerate in periods of economic expansion and rising
interest rates, and to diminish in periods of economic
weakness and falling interest rates.
In light of these considerations we might expect shifts
in the rate of inflation to be closely related to changes
in the business sector's deficit. In fact, this is the case.
As Chart 5 indicates, during periods when the business
sector's deficit was growing (shown on the left-hand
scale) the rate of inflation quickened (shown inverted on
the right-hand scale). Conversely, as the business sector
has moved toward surplus there generally has been a
diminution in the pace of inflation.
There were exceptions to these tendencies in the
period studied. From 1970 to 1972, a period of sluggish
economic growth, the rate of inflation diminished—
even though there was growth in the business sector's
government— because of its superior access to credit
markets— may "crowd out" private investment. That
is, government may force business to "dance" to its tune.
Such coercion cannot be seen in the data shown in
Table 2, even though it may be there. However, it might
show itself in the form of higher interest rates and ac-
celerated inflation. But these effects would not be visible
to casual analysis.
Government Deficits and Inflation
There is a popular view that government deficits are
inflationary, and contribute to high interest rates. Pre-
sumably, the corollary of this view is that deficits in-
curred by the business sector are benign. One explana-
tion for this line of thought is that a federal deficit is
likely to be "monetized" — that is, financed by an ex-
pansion in the money supply.
If this were the case, we would expect to find that
money supply growth is positively related to changes in
the government deficit. That is, as the government sec-
tor moves toward deficit, the growth in the money supply
would accelerate. Conversely, as the government sector
moves toward surplus, money supply growth would
decline.
Chart 4 does not support this hypothesis. Instead, it
suggests that the growth in the money supply tends to
quicken as the government sector moves toward surplus,
and to moderate as a deficit emerges. In light of the
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Chart 5. Business Deficits and Inflation
Change in deficit
deficit. In contrast, the rate of inflation quickened from
1973 to 1974 while the business sector moved toward
surplus.
Conclusions
In no sense does this article purport to present a
fully integrated discussion of the role of government
deficits in the economy. Many strands of thought were
purposely left dangling. For example, no distinction has
been drawn between an "active" and a "passive" deficit
— or between an actual deficit or a full employment
deficit. The reader may wish to agonize over these omis-
sions. Or he (she) may wish to write a well-balanced
comment. In any event, enough has been said to raise
serious question about several popularly held views.
One, where is the evidence that— in contrast to the
behavior of the business sector— government tends to
cover its deficits by printing money? The facts point to
just the opposite conclusion. Namely, business deficits
tend to be financed by "monetizing" debt. Government
deficits are more nearly financed without accompanying
increased growth in the money supply.
Two, where is the evidence that government deficits
are inflationary while business deficits are not? The evi-
dence presented here suggests a closer relationship be-
tween business deficits and inflation than between gov-
ernment deficits and inflation.
What does all this add up to— assuming that the
evidence has been sensibly and fairly presented? Does it
mean that the Carter Administration should fight infla-
tion by designing measures to move the business sector
toward surplus (meaning a larger government deficit) ?
No. At least, not on the basis of this argument.
Rather, it means that the widely held views have
little basis in fact. Much of the talk about federal deficits
as a cause of problems is simply nonsense. For the most
part, a deficit is a result, not a cause. It is a result of a
weak economy; it is a result of a burdensome tax struc-
ture ; it is a result of wrongheaded monetary policy ; it is
a result of an oil embargo; it is a result of an energy
shortage; it is a result of poor business planning; it is a
result of ill-considered fiscal policy ; and so forth.
It is a separate question, however, whether the size
of or growth in government fosters an inflationary bias.
This article does not— repeat, does not— deal with
that issue. I do suggest, however, that the focus on
deficits is badly misplaced and can be misleading.
Debt Increases
Debt rose 10.8 percent in 1976, reaching $3.-1 tril-
lion at the end of the year. In 1975 debt rose 8.4
percent. In contrast to most other years since the end
of World War II, public debt rose more rapidly than
]5rivate debt.
Net public debt, at $833.4 billion at the end of last
year, was up 11.5 percent. This increase was slower
than the 15.3 percent in the preceding year. The
sharpest rise, 15.6 percent, occurred in the federal
debt. State and local debt rose 6.1 percent in 1976
and the debt of federally sponsored credit agencies
was up 3.2 percent. Notwithstanding these increases
public debt constituted a little less than one-fourth of
net debt in 1976. It accounted for nearly half of net
debt in 1950, following the huge increases in the fed-
eral debt which occurred as a result of spending for
the second World War.
Private debt rose 10.5 percent last year, compared
with 6.3 percent the previous year. Corporations,
which account for nearly three-fifths of private debt,
about doubled the rate of increase in their indebted-
ness, from 5 percent in 1975 to 10 percent in 1976.
Short-term debt rose more than long-term debt. Un-
incorporated business and farm debt was up 10.0 per-
cent in 1976, consumer credit 10.4 percent, and
mortgage debt 12.5 percent.
Multiple Jobholding
Nearly 4 million workers moonlighted in May
1976. Although the number of people holding two or
more jobs simultaneously was slightly higher than in
1975, the rate, 4.5 percent of all employed people, was
slightly lower. During the 1960s and early 1970s the
moonlighting rate was usually above 5 percent.
The multiple jobholding rate for men, at 5.8 per-
cent, was more than double the 2.6 percent rate for
women. The highest moonlighting rate was among
men of prime working age— 25 to 54. As in previous
years, men whose primary employment was teaching
(below the college level) had the highest rate of
moonlighting. Among women, teachers and farm la-
borers had the highest moonlighting rates. Men found
the largest percentages of their secondary jobs among
professional, technical, and kindred occupations; as
farmers or farm laborers; and as nonfarm managers
or administrators. Among women, the largest per-
centages of secondary jobs were found in professional,
technical, or kindred occupations; as clerical or kin-
dred workers; and as service workers.
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Although business activity continues to move forward
its momentum appears to have been broken as the econ^
omy has begun to emit mixed signals. While industrial
output continues to move up, home building has slowed
Emplo^-ment has continued to expand, but unemploy
ment has also moved higher. Despite a further rise in
household income, consumer spending has stabilized. Al
though the rate of inflation appears to have moderated
interest rates have again begun to move higher.
Growth of monetary aggregates has slowed. While the
narrowly defined money supply has continued to expand
at about the same pace as over the past year, savings
deposit growth has slowed. Even so, the banking system
has continued to expand credit at a rapid rate.
Output Increases
Real economic output rose at a 6.4 percent annual
rate in the second quarter, not markedly different from
the strong first-quarter increase. Output of the nation's
mines, factories, and utilities expanded rapidly through
the second quarter. Industrial production has risen at an
8.4 percent annual rate so far this year (see chart). In
terms of industrial output growth, the current expansion
is one of the strongest in the post-World War II period.
Since the beginning of the recoveiy in early 1975, indus-
trial output has grown at an a\erage annual rate of 10.2
percent and has achieved a rate about 5 percent above
its prerecession peak. Tliis expansion has been exceeded
by only one other recovery since 1949.
Recent increases in production have been led by an
expansion in automobile output and by a rise in produc-
tion of business equipment. In June there was a robust,
5.5 percent, increase in auto production, and output
of business equipment rose 1.5 percent. Administra-
tion economists were especially pleased by the renewed
strength in business equipment, as business investment is
a key to the second-half performance of the economy.
Housing starts, another measure of physical activity,
weakened at midyear. Even though starts are somewhat
lower than in May and substantially below their March
peak, it is possible that home building remains strong.
Housing starts statistics are very difficult to interpret in
that the series is extremely erratic. In any event, for 1977
housing forecasts to be achieved there must be marked
increases during the remaining months of the year.
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Labor Market Mixed
Employment has risen steadily and rapidly in 1977.
Since last December, the total number of people with
jobs has expanded at a 5.2 percent annual rate (see
chart). This increase is substantially more rapid than
the 3.3 percent average rate of gain since the economic
expansion began in March 1975. Emplov-ment growth in
the current recover)' has been more rapid than in any
recover)' since World War II.
Government economists predict a moderation in em-
ployment increases during the remainder of this year.
This prediction rests chiefly on the historical obsen-ation
that the rapid increases we have been experiencing are
difficult to .sustain for a period as long as a full year.
However, there is no economic principle asserting that
employment cannot rise rapidly for a prolonged period
of time.
Unemployment, which has drifted irregularly down-
ward for more than two years, has again blipped upward.
By the time this article is in the reader's hands we shall
know whether the June rise in unemployment— to 7.1
percent— was a one-month "quirk" in the statistics, or
a potentially serious interruption in the movement to-
ward reasonably full employment. There are difficult
problems in seasonally adjusting the unemplo)'ment sta-
tistics, and these problems are especially sticky in June
(as schools disgorge vacationing students onto the labor
market) and September (as students return to school).
In addition to seasonal problems, the labor force statistics
are subject to changing "participation" rates. In particu-
lar, adult women have moved heavily into the labor
market (see the July 1977 Illinois Business Review),
continuing a trend of more than two decades.
Consumers Cautious
Household incomes have shown meaningful gains,
reflecting both expanded employment and the effects of
the recent tax cut. After adjusting for inflation, after-tax
income rose at a 3.4 percent annual rate in June. The
June increase began to show the impact of revised with-
holding schedules — to accommodate the increased stan-
dard deduction. After-tax real income has risen 3.3 per-
cent over the past year.
Consumer spending has moderated in recent months,
raising fears that the steam is running out of the house-
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hold sector. Retail sales have declined at a 2 percent
annual rate since March (see chart). Notwithstanding
the three-month pause, retail sales in the second quarter
averaged 2.1 percent higher than in the first quarter. In
contrast, retail spending rose almost 12 percent in the
preceding year.
Automobile sales in June were 14 percent greater
than a year earlier. Sales in the first two-thirds of July
registered only a 2.2 percent gain. The auto industry has
begun moving into its annual model changeover period.
Corporate spending has not picked up the slack cre-
ated by the consumer sector. However, recent surveys
indicate that business spending is likely to rise in the
second half of 1977. Appropriations by the nation's
largest manufacturers in the first quarter exceeded those
a year ago by nearly one-third. New orders for nonde-
fense capital goods jimiped 5 percent in June. Orders
have been flat in the second quarter, but the pace is
above the first quarter and substantially higher than last
year. Machine tool orders are running more than 50
percent greater than in 1976.
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Wholesale prices experienced their steepest decline in
nearly four years. The fall in the overall price index
reflected a sharp drop in prices of farm products— the
most pronounced decline in three years. Although prices
of industrial products rose in June, the rate of increase
was less than half that of recent months. Prices of crude
materials actually declined. Such developments suggest
that upward pressure on industrial prices may have
moderated.
There is a presumption that price developments at
the wholesale level are, in time, passed on to the retail
level. However, recent developments at the wholesale
level have not yet had a substantial impact on consumer
prices. Although consumer price increases have backed
off from the double-digit pace reached earlier this year,
the rate of price increase so far in 1977 •— at 9.2 percent
— is nearly double the increase in the preceding year.
Financial Markets Tighten
Interest rates have moved generally higher since the
end of last year. Long-term interest rates rose from the
end of last year to early spring, but have since stabilized.
Short-term interest rates have moved upward in distinct
steps — the most pronounced increase occurring in the
period from April to May (see chart) . During July, in-
terest rates appear to have begun moving higher again.
The narrowly defined money supply (Mi) — demand
deposits plus currency— has continued to expand over
the past six months at about the same pace as over the
preceding year. However, the growth of the broadly
defined money supply— sometimes referred to as M2—
has slowed markedly since early this year. With increased
market interest rates and with interest rates paid on sav-
ings deposits and small denomination certificates of de-
posit at or close to their ceilings, these deposits have
become less attractive to depositors. As a result, there has
been a decline in the growth of time deposits available
to ordinary savers. Since March, net time deposits (that
is, time deposits other than certificates of deposit of
$100,000 or more) have expanded at a 9.6 percent an-
nual rate. In the preceding year, net time deposits rose
nearly 15 percent.
To counter the slower growth in savings accounts,
banks have stepped up their reliance on "purchased"
funds. The banking system has experienced a $3 billion
rise in large CDs since early May. In addition, member
bank borrowing from Federal Reserv^e Banks has moved
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moderately higher. It is currently less costly for a bank
to borrow from its Federal Reserve Bank than to borrow
in the federal funds market.
Bank loans have risen rapidly since the fall of last
year. Since last .Vugust, loans at commercial banks have
expanded at more than a 12 percent annual rate. In the
preceding year bank loans rose about 5 percent.
Prospects '{',
'
It is not unusual for economic activity to proceed in
fits and starts. As suggested, economic developments are
currently spotty— improvements in one area weighed
against disappointments elsewhere. The media attempt
to make as much as possible out of each statistic as it is
released. Although such efforts create interest, it is really
too early to identify any change in the trends that have
dominated the past two and one-half years. We are left
with the presumption that the economy will continue to
expand into the near-term future.
The Council of Economic Advisers has predicted that
real gross national product will expand 5 percent from
the fourth quarter of 1977 to the fourth quarter of 1978.
Such an increase \\ould mean that economic activity
next year would grow at about the same rate as this
year. The forecast of the Congressional Budget Office
is somewhat less optimistic— an increase of 3.6 percent
to 5.1 percent.
These forecasts, which in some sense represent official
positions of the Administration and the Congress, indi-
cate that the rate of inflation will diminish somewhat
next year. Unemployment is expected to decline mod-
erately— to about 6 percent by the end of 1978.
WILLIAM R. BRYAN
Local Illinois Developments
Housing Continues Recovery
Residential construction in Illinois, as measured by
building permits authorized, continued to show signs of
recovery (see chart). In the first five months of 1977
the total number of building permits issued in the State
exceeded the number issued in the same five months of
1976— 28,140 in 1977 compared with 21,030 in 1976,
an increase of nearly 34 percent. After falling heavily in
January because of the extremely cold weather, building
permits rose to a new high in April of this year.
For the 12-month period from May 1976 to May
1977, the number of residential building permits autho-
rized rose 40.9 percent in Illinois. Home constmction in
and around Chicago has been especially strong, as per-
mits issued in the Chicago metropolitan area increased
47.5 percent; the increase for the rest of the State in this
period was 30.8 percent. For the nation, authorized
building permits rose 34.6 percent from May 1976 to
May 1977. In the preceding 12-month period, residential
building permits issued rose 46.8 percent, 44.5 percent.
Illinois Business Indexes
Nursing Homes in Illinois
Among other problems, our society is facing the criti-
cal dilemma of how to support and care for a growing
number of aged individuals. Today, 1 in 10 people (over
23 million) in the US is 65 or older. This contrasts to
the year 1900 when the figure was only 1 in 25. By the
turn of the centur)', nearly 31 million people will be 65
or older (1 in 9) and in the three decades after that,
their number will swell to almost 52 million (1 in 6)
.
Faced with an increasing need to serve our growing
older population with its susceptibility to chronic illnesses
and their geriatric implications, the nursing home indus-
try has expanded sharply in the past two decades. "Nurs-
ing home" is a generic term covering a wide variety of
institutions providing health care of various levels to
people with problems requiring "skilled" or "nonskilled"
facilities. Skilled nursing care establishments are primar-
ily engaged in providing care and treatment for patients
who require continuous health care but not hospital ser-
vices. Such an establishment has an organized medical
staff, including a physician (not necessarily in residence)
and continuous nursing services. Nonskilled establish-
ments provide some nursing and health-related personal
care but not necessarily continuous nursing sen-ices.
Contrary' to widespread belief, only about 5 percent
of US citizens 65 years and older reside in nursing homes,
but the number of patients has increased steadily over
time. Seventy percent of nursing home residents are more
than 70 years old, and the average age is 82 years. The
average length of stay in a nursing institution is 2.4
years— only 20 percent of the patients ever return home.
The vast majority of those entering will die in the nurs-
ing home.
At least 55 percent of those living in nursing homes
are mentally impaired, 33 percent incontinent, and less
than 50 percent are ambulatory. About 38 percent of
nursing home residents lived in a private residence im-
mediately before entering the home; another 35 percent
were transferred from a general or short-stay hospital.
The percentage of persons coming to nursing homes from
mental hospitals or other long-term specialty hospitals is
considerably larger among persons under 65 years of age
than in the older age groups, although the differences in
absolute numbers are not quite so dramatic. Hardening
of the arteries is the most frequent primary diagnosis (23
percent) at last examination among residents of nursing
homes followed by senility, stroke, and mental disorders.
Illinois licenses its nursing homes under three cate-
gories according to ser\ices offered : skilled, intermediate,
and sheltered care facilities. There are currently 939
licensed homes in the State — 364 skilled, 400 interme-
diate, and 175 sheltered. For licensing and inspection
purposes, these establishments are divided geographically
by the Illinois Department of Public Health (IDPH)
into nine nursing home districts. The three Chicago dis-
tricts account for 50 percent of the state's licensed beds.
The state's licensed capacity (number of beds) is almost
98,000 and the average nursing home can care for ap-
proximately 100 patients. About 80 percent of the homes
are operated under private forms of ownership (475
corporations, 100 proprietorships, 97 partnerships, and 84
other) . The remaining 20 percent of the homes are op-
erated in the State by nonprofit organizations (including
79 church affiliated and 40 county homes)
.
Increasingly, state and federal programs pay for care
in nursing homes. In 1976 nearly 50,000 Illinois nursing
home patients (60 to 70 percent of the total patient pop-
ulation) were receiving medicaid payments from the
Illinois Department of Public Aid (IDPA). The IDPA
projects fiscal year 1977 costs at about $216 million—
almost 25 percent of the total Illinois medicaid bill and
a 125 percent increase over the past five years. In 1975,
the total per patient monthly medicaid reimbursement
averaged $475 for intermediate care facilities and $642
for skilled care facilities (the only two licensed classifica-
tions funded by medicaid) . Medicaid pays only a portion
of the total reimbursements which a facility received for
any patient; the balance comes from the patient's private
sources or other federal welfare programs such as medi-
care.
Reimbursements are made to nursing homes accord-
ing to a "point count" devised by the IDPA. A social
worker tallies points based on each patient's degree of
sickness and health care needs. Monetary values are then
assigned to the points and nursing homes are paid ac-
cordingly. Nursing home managers and industry critics
have pointed out disincentives, deficient monetary reim-
bursements, and the assignment of points by pereons with
little medical education. The federal government has re-
sponded by demanding that home managers be paid
according to costs of care. This cost-reimbursement plan
is to go into effect in Illinois next year and is expected
to add $40 million to the ever-growing medicaid bill.
The solution to the reimbursement problem seems to
lie in whether trust can be placed in private enterprise
to carry out our obligations to the aged— this will be
difl'icult in light of general public distrust of the industry
stemming from a high incidence of medicaid fraud and
inadequate care given by some facilities. The State and
the federal government are now paying for services pro-
vided by nursing homes for eligible welfare recipients at
an overall cost of about $8,000 per person each year.
Moreover, stricter safety regulations, escalating operating
costs, and low reimbursement rates have placed private
establishments in an unprofitable dilemma (even state
officials have determined that the average daily pa^Tnents
have not matched daily costs to the provider of care)
.
The State is now developing what could be an "arms-
length, purchase of services, reimbursement system." The
price for senices would be set on the basis of costs of an
average home giving good quality care, with the price of
services being adjusted to obtain the quality of services
deemed necessary by the public.
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Electric
power con-
sumption'
(000,000 kwh)
Postal
receipts'
(000)
Banlc
debits*
(000,000)
Percentage change from. /Apr. 1977.IMay 1976.
/Apr. 1977.
\Mayl976.
NORTHERN ILLINOIS
Chicago
Percentage cliange from.
Aurora
Percentage ciiange from j^PJy jg^g'
Elgin
Percentage change from jj/^'y jg^g
JoUet
Percentage change from j-j^P^y jgyg'
Kankakee
, , /Apr. 1977.
Percentage change from jj^^^^y jg^g
Rock Island-Moline
Percentage change from jjj'gy jg^g'
Rockford
/Apr. 1977.
\May 1976.Percentage change from.
CENTRAL ILLINOIS
Bloomington-Nomial
Percentage change from wF^.\ imc'
Champaign-Urbana
\May 1976.
Percentage change from jj^P^y jg^g'
Danville
Percentage change from jj^PJy jg^g'
Decatur
Percentage change from |J'^y jg^g'
Galesburg
Percentage change from.
Peoria
/Apr. 1977.
•\Mayl976.
Percentage change from j^P^'y jg^g'
Quincy.
Percentage change from jj^P
y jg^g'
Springfield
Percentage change from. /Apr. 1\May :
SOUTHERN ILLINOIS
East St. Louis
Percentage change from j^P^'y
^jg^g
Alton
Percentage change from.
BeUeville
Percentage change from.
Carbondale-Murphysboro.
.
Percentage change from.
/Apr. 1977.
\May 1976.
(Apr. 1
\May-
/Apr
$172,317'
+ 709.7
+240.2
$120,031
+ 316.4
+ 573.9
$ 2,597
+63.8
+ 88.3
$ 2,560
+ 161.4
+48.1
$ 4,476
-62.6
+ 131.6
$ 387
-30.2
+91.0
$ 3,854
+ 4.2
+ 85.3
$ 12,249
+98.2
+ 422.2
$ 4,232
-23.5
+ 72.1
$ 781
-2.9
+43.8
$ 3,095
-19.8
-31.3
$ 1,831
-2.2
+ 111.1
$ 5,210
-7.0
-27.7
$ 1,628
+21.5
+729.1
$ 6,382
-18.7
+ 101.6
\ 109
+ 8.7
+86.1
B 314
+ 86.6
-86.9
\ 1,192
+ 45.7
+33.6
B 1,389
+213.9
+55.5
1,555.6
-1.5
+4.0
104.2
-15.8
-20.9
74.8
-3.5
-15.0
354.2
-3.1
+23.8
61. 1«
-4.2
+3.2
110. 1''
+ 0.8
+ 8.8
131.5
-7.1
+ 22.6
+ 2.
34.
-5.
+8.
115.
+ 24.
+29.
24.2
+ 5.2
+ 4.3
78.5
+ 2.7
+ 1.3
12.
\
+ 16.3
n.a.
29.4
+5.8
+ 20.0
U,750»
-4.5
+5.0
$32,221
-5.4
+ 6.5
$ 507
+23.1
+ 11.2
$ 505
+ 11.2
+24.1
$ 287
-4.7
+36.0
$ 220
+4.3
-3.1
$ 1,090
+ 1.3
+ 17.5
$ 778
-3.8
-5.6
$ 776
-2.5
+4.2
$ 663
-2.1
-2.8
$ 349
+ 1.7
-17.1
$ 386
-9.8
-13.7
$ 150
+ 4.2
-8.0
$ 1,237
-3.8
+ 12.3
$ 213
+9.2
-3.2
$ 1,621
-7.3
-5.4
$ 150
-6.8
-10.2
$ 114
+ 2.7
+ 3.6
$ 233
-12.4
+ 7.9
$ 250
+2.9
-34.7
$2,467,629"
+5.4
+ 18.6
$2,366,668''
+5.5
+ 18.7
23,230''
+ 4.9
+ 42.8
11,502''
-0.3
+ 17.8
8,562''
-0.1
+ 8.3
7,530''
+9.6
+9.2
2,787
-8.5
+ 7.0
8,942''
+ 8.1
+ 19.4
18,380''
-0.0
+ 10.8
3,050
-11.7
+ 15.0
16,978''
+ 0.6
+ 14.5
Sources: ' Local sources; data include federal construction projects. ' Local power companies. » Local post office reports; accountmg
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• Total for cities listed. '' Data are for standard metropolitan statistical areas. " Includes immediately surrounding territory. ^ Includes
East Moline. " Labor market area. ' Madison and St. Clair counties, n.a. Not available.
Stock Market Activity
ROBERT W. MAYER, Professor of Finance, UIUC
In recent years the stock market has been the scene
of several paradoxical developments. Explanations that
satisfactorily reconcile them are not easy to find.
Most fundamental of these developments has been
the continuing institutionalization of stock investment.
Although individual investors (including personal trusts)
continue to own about three-fourths of all outstanding
corporate stock, for nearly 20 years they have not been
adding to their holdings by net acquisitions. There are
now more than four times as many individuals "in the
market" as there were 25 years ago — about 25 million
as compared with 6 million in 1952 — but their net ac-
quisitions of stock have been negative in every quarter
since the middle of 1958. That is, they have been taking
more money out of the stock market than they have been
putting into it— $12 billion more in 1969. It appears
that instead of using stock as a means of investing their
savings they have been using it as a vehicle of trading •
—
and successfully too, at least as a group.
Furthermore, the statistics of trading volume and the
general obser\'ation of brokers confirm the impression of
individuals' active trading. Their general attitude is char-
acterized by relatively short time horizons and by super-
ficial indications of popularity rather than by concern
for economic fundamentals. This is typified by the atti-
tude of Marc Howard, "one of the most successful in-
vestors on Wall Street," according to Time magazine,
which quotes him as saying, "I'm concerned more with
the market's perception of a stock than with the validity
of the stock itself. I can't afford to buy a stock because
I think it's going to have great earnings in 1982. I buy
on the basis of what other people are going to think of
that stock in six months." This modern version of John
Maynard Keynes's "parable of professional investment"
may explain why individuals as a group have been tak-
ing more out of the market than they have been putting
into it.
New Channels
Their savings are flowing into the stock market, in-
stead, through the indirect channel of financial institu-
tions: uninsured private pension funds (whose portfolios
are mostly managed by the trust departments of large
banks), insured private pension funds (mostly managed
by large life insurance companies), state and local gov-
ernment pension funds, nonlife (that is, propert\'-ca-
sualty) insurance companies, and, until the last five years,
mutual funds. Fed by millions of small individual con-
tributions, these institutions as a group have been acquir-
ing stock in amounts not only equal to the entire amount
of new issues each year but in addition, substantial
amounts of old issues relinquished by individual inves-
tors. (See Chart 1.)
With the shift— from individuals to institutions— in
the locus of much stock investment decision-making, it
might be supposed that there would be more conserva-
tism in stock selection and some slowdown in market
activity. Traditionally, institutions were always bond in-
vestors or, to the limited extent that they acquired stock
at all, high-grade income stock investors. The increase
in the level and in the steepness of graduation of income
tax rates during World War II, however, caused the
preferential treatment of capital gains (and the complete
exemption of unrealized appreciation) to give growth
stocks a special attraction, and in the 1950s the mutual
funds became full participants in the growth stock era.
But growth stocks were low-di\'idend payers, so the
gain in growth was offset by decline of dividend income.
In 1962 the Friend Report indicated that the overall
performance (dividend income plus growth) of mutual
funds— and of other institutional investors, too, for that
matter— was not significantly better than that of the
market as a whole as represented by random portfolios
constructed without any managerial discretion at all.
Stung by the implication that they were not earning their
large salaries, portfolio managers turned to the only other
means that seemed to be available to them to increase the
performance of their portfolios: active trading. By 1965-
66 the "Go-Go Era" was under wav, and bv 1969 the
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annual activity rates of institutional portfolios might al-
most be said to have skyrocketed (Chart 2)
.
The increased trading activity was successful in pro-
ducing increased trading gains. But in considerable part
these trading gains were achieved in volatile stocks,
which pay meager dividends and whose price behavior
includes little growth. So, perhaps not surprisingly, the
Farrar Report of 1971 indicated that the overall perfor-
mance (dividend income plus growth plus trading gains)
was still about the same as that of the market as a whole
as represented by random portfolios.
Incidentally, the inference drawn by some fund direc-
tors and investors that a portfolio manager has done
nothing to earn his salary if his portfolio does not "out-
perform the market" is based on a misconstruction of
probability theory. It assumes that a portfolio selected
randomly (that is, without the discretionaiy service of a
manager) will produce a return equal to that of the
market as a whole. As a statistician would say, however,
although the average return on a group of randomly
selected portfolios would approach the return on the
market as a whole, any particular random portfolio is
likely to produce a return either less or greater than the
market return. Or, as the layman would put it, a random
portfolio probably would produce a return about equal
to that on the market as a whole, but not necessarily;
there is also the possibility— less likely, to be sure, but
sdll a possibility— that any particular random portfolio
might produce a return very much lower, or very much
higher, than the market return. If the manager, by
judicious exploitation of market imperfections, constructs
a portfolio which is more likely than a random portfolio
to produce the market return and less likely to produce
a much smaller (or much larger) return, the beneficiaries
of the portfolio may consider that he has done something
worth a great deal to them.
To put the matter still another way, a random port-
folio produces the average market return at the cost of
bearing the average market risk. If the beneficiaries of
a portfolio wish to be spared some of this risk their de-
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sire can be accommodated by a random portfolio only at
the expense of a return lower than the market return—
in accordance with the principle that risk and return are
positively correlated in the market. Now if a manager is
able, by exploiting market imperfections, to construct a
nonrandom portfolio bearing less than the market risk
but still producing the market return, he has indeed ac-
complished something which may be worth a great deal
to the beneficiaries.
Trading activity of both individuals and institutions
has declined somewhat during the 1970s, but it is still
well above the level prior to the Go-Go Era. Also during
the 1970s there has been a decline in the growth of mu-
tual funds. Indeed, they have even suffered a net outflow
of funds— by an excess of share redemptions over new
share sales. (Some of the mutual fund "families" have
tried to staunch this hemorrhage by establishing "money
funds.") The cause of the heavy withdrawals from the
mutual (stock) funds is not entirely clear, but popular
disappointment with the performance of the funds—
even though it may be unwarranted— probably is an
important factor.
The Farrar Report also indicated that mutual funds
were engaged in a number of speculative activities for-
merly supposed to be out-of-bounds for them. They were
engaged in "temporary" borrowing on short term but
with repeated rollover so that the debt had become al-
most as fixed in the financial plan as if it were a part
of the capitalization. Other speculative activities included
acquisition of nonnegotiable "letter stock," margin pur-
chasing, short selling, trading in stock purchase warrants,
and trading in — and even writing— call options. None
of these is in violation of any provision of the Investment
Company .Act. But it had long been supposed that they
would be eschewed by an institution which had been rep-
resented to the investing public as a "safe" means of
putting the small investor's savings into stock. There
even appears to be some indication that the increasing
popularity of no-load mutual funds may be attributable
to their attractiveness to individuals who wish to trade
actively in fund shares, a practice which would be pro-
hibitively costly in load fund shares.
Other Market Changes
Several other stock market changes have attracted a
good deal of attention in recent years. Automation in
the processing of ordere has made it possible for broker-
age houses to avoid repetition of their near scandalous
inability to handle their volume of business in the latter
days of the Go-Go Era. The introduction of the consoli-
dated tape has prompted more rapid and complete dis-
semination of infomiation on transactions not only in
stocks listed on both New York and regional exchanges
but also in many over-the-counter stocks. Phasing out of
the traditional minimum commission system (completed
1 May 1975) has put commissions on a competitive basis,
although it is still too early to assess the long-rvm effects
on such things as the commissions paid by small non-
institutional traders and the fate of the small brokerage
house. Incidentally, a good deal of the increased volume
of reported exchange transactions in the last three or
four years results from a return to the exchange of trad-
ing in the Third and Fourth Markets that developed be-
fore the minimum commission system was phased out.
There is also talk of a truly national market system
in which not only the processing of orders and the dis-
semination of transactions information but also market-
making itself would be streamlined, possibly even replac-
ing the role of the specialist with some sort of computer
program ; but this has not yet gotten beyond the proposal
stage. And it should be noted that all these measures are
designed to facilitate trading rather than more funda-
mental investment decision-making. There still appears
to be a strong popular impression that stock is unique in
affording an effective hedge against general price infla-
don (despite recent research evidence to the contrary)
and also a considerable degree of secondai-y liquidity.
Still another striking feature of the 1970s has been the
development of organized trading in call options on the
Chicago Board Options Exchange, on the American Ex-
change (in New York), on the Philadelphia Exchange,
on the Pacific Exchange, and on the Midwest Exchange.
These markets accommodate organized trading in calls
of three maturities on several score relatively well-known
stocks, and it probably will not be long before they ac-
commodate trading in put options as well.
It might be expected that all this emphasis on trading
and other speculative activities in recent years would
have produced a strong upward push in stock prices and
perhaps wide fluctuations around the trend. As indicated
in Chart 3, however, this has not been the case. (The
Dow Jones Industrials are often criticized as being un-
representative of the market as a whole, but the price
movements here depicted are almost e.xactly paralleled
by the more representative Standard & Poor 500 and the
New York Stock Exchange Index. ) The post-World War
II upward trend petered out in 1965, the very beginning
of the Go-Go Era, and since then the market has fluctu-
ated around a level of about 850 within a range of ± 18
percent. For the past 16 months the range of fluctuation,
around a level of about 950, has been only ± 5 percent.
Any particular observer's perception of the severity
of fluctuations, of course, is largely a matter of his per-
spective. Popular commentators characterize the 1973-74
decline as a "crash." Anyone whose impression of the
market is obtained solely from the Dow Jones Industrials
chart in the Wall Street Journal probably thinks the mar-
ket gyrates wildly from day to day. To the trader short-
term fluctuations are significant; to the in\estor they are
not. Portfolio managers— especially the managers of
huge institutional portfolios— indignantly deny that they
have become traders; the shortening of their time hori-
zons, they insist, is the result of the increasing rapidity
of economic change. It may be questioned, however,
whether the changes which have brought about such an
increase in portfolio activity are really fundamental or
whether they attract each portfolio manager's attention
only because he thinks they will attract other portfolio
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managers' attention. In any case, the general trend of
the stock market during the last decade has paralleled
neither the real growth of the economy nor the course
of inflation.
The Outlook
And what of the future? Some observers will feel re-
assurance that trading and other speculative activities
seem not to have produced price instability. Profit-takers
in a rising market and bargain-hunters in a falling mar-
ket may keep stock price fluctuations within tolerable
limits. Although stock price fluctuations are widely re-
garded as a "leading" indicator (leading, or preceding,
a change in the economy) they are no more a cause of
prosperity or depression than the barometer is a cause of
good or bad weather.
Other observers (including this one) feel deeply con-
cerned, however, about the pervasiveness of speculative
attitudes. In the event of general price inflation or de-
flation, speculative behavior may get beyond society's
control and inflict severe damage. Financial historians
can point to many instances when feverish speculation
was followed by financial collapse. But nobody listens to
Cassandra. We might just as well sit back and watch the
drama unfold— even if it should turn out to be a Greek
tragedy. As Harry Truman used to say, "Maybe some-
tliing will turn up" to save us from the consequences of
our folly. If so, future historians will no doubt shake
their heads as they reflect upon the way human nature
demonstrated again in the 1970s that it is indeed an
enigma.
Fiscal Crisis in Illinois: Its Doing and Undoing
A. JAMES HEINS, Department of Economics and
Institute of Government and Public Affairs, UIUC
In this piece I try to explain the origins and resolu-
tion of the Illinois fiscal crisis of 1976-78. Before pro-
ceeding, however, I must note that the term "fiscal crisis"
grossly misleads. It was not a crisis ; and the problem was
not fiscal. The problem was political and of less than
crisis proportions.
The Problem and Its Resolution
The accompanying chart describes the problem. Be-
tween June 1974 and June 1977, the available balance
in the state's general funds declined from $453 million to
$52 million. The available balance is analogous to a
checkbook balance ; it is money in the bank. Bills can be
paid only if the balance is positive. The balance declined
because the State of Illinois spent more money than it
took in during fiscal years 1975, 1976, and 1977 to the
tune of $401 million. It had risen in earlier years because
tax revenue exceeded expenditures. Since the checkbook
balance must be positive (it should average at least $100
million if the state's bills are to be consistently paid on
time), this downward trend had to be reversed; revenues
would have to exceed expenditures in fiscal 1978.
The economics of the solution to the problem were
simple. The State had to do one of two things in fiscal
1978. It could either (1) increase tax rates; or (2) re-
strict expenditure growth.
I say the economics of the problem were simple be-
cause the State had it well within its capacity to follow
either route. Unlike a business fiim that depends on cus-
tomers not captive to its price and expenditure policies,
the State has a captive clientele. It can raise ta.xes aibi-
trarily. Within limits, it can lower expenditures. No im-
mediate economic "crisis" would result if the current
10
cash shortfall in Ilhnois had been resolved by either
route.
If there were a crisis, that crisis rested in the minds
of the politicians whose political future depended on the
making of the decision. A politician voting for a tax in-
crease takes his political life in his hands. On the other
hand, having to turn back the requests of state employ-
ees, welfare recipients, and educators makes no politician
happy. This year the tax increase was the "big no-no,"
and the State is following the path of expenditure re-
striction in fiscal 1978. Lest the grammatic tenses fool
the reader, I should point out that, as of this writing, we
are more than one month into fiscal 1978, which began
on 1 July 1977.
Origins of the Problem
The roots of the recent problem lay in economic and
political forces at work in the 1960s. Growing pressure
for the State to spend for education and welfare in the
mid-1960s exhausted the resources that could be gener-
ated under the structure of taxes existing at that time.
When the pressure was suflScient, Illinois adopted an in-
come tax of major proportions in 1969. That tax not only
paid the bills created by greatly increased spending by
the State, it made possible a buildup in the state's cash
balances. This buildup was reinforced by the unexpected
revenue efTcct of inflation in 1974. The result is shown
in the chart; the State of Illinois— I should say politi-
cians in Illinois — found diemselves with available cash
of $453 million at the beginning of 1975.
Excess cash to a politician is a godsend. It is money
that can be spent without having to be taxed ; and it was
spent. In all fairness, I must point out that it should
have been spent. The State has no business earning
around excess cash. It should turn that money back to
taxpayers either by tax relief or by spending for useful
purposes. After it was spent, it was gone and therein lay
the difficulty.
The problem with spending $400 million excess cash
in three years lay in the resulting anticipation for more
spending. Spending for government programs is akin to
a hurtling locomotive— difficult to stop once it gets
Stopping a Hurtling Locomotive
In fiscal 1977 Illinois spent $78 million more out of
its general funds than it took into those funds. In 1978
Illinois could not do that. That means that the first $74
million in increased revenue in 1978 could not be spent;
that money was needed to repair tlie 1977 deficit.
Accordingly, the governor had to recommend that
new ta.x revenues of $74 million be raised and not spent.
He had to induce the legislature to go along or be pre-
pared to veto some spending bills.
Revenues, Expenditures, and Balances
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Put another way, Illinois increased its spending out
of the general funds in each of fiscal 1975 and 1976 by
more than $600 million. Those increases created momen-
tum in state-financed programs. In 1977 spending growth
slowed to about $350 million, but the momentum in state
programs remained strong. State employees had already
had raises postponed for some time, and that grace pe-
riod had to end in 1978.
The political difficulties of having to tax without
spending are apparent. In preparing the budget for fiscal
1978 those difficulties were compounded by pent-up de-
mands for spending created by a greatly expanded pro-
gram during 1975-77 and postponed pay raises. Fortu-
nately, the landslide election of Governor Thompson in
1976 provided the political base needed to stop the
hurtling locomotive. However, accomplishing that has
undoubtedly cut into his political support. I presume he
hopes that his support is sufficiently broad to withstand
those political losses in the election ahead.
One aspect of the governor's approach deserves spe-
cial mention. The State negotiated a contract with its
employees' union that provided for a bare-bones raise,
one consistent with the general tightness in the 1978
budget; but it also provided for a special raise contingent
on the arrival of more tax revenues in 1978 than tlie gov-
ernor predicted. The effect of that contract is to leave
some of the 1975-77 momentum in a dormant stage. If
une.xjjected revenues turn up in 1978, that money will be
largely spent rather than being used to restore cash bal-
ances. The momentum in state programs would accord-
ingly be restored.
Looking Ahead
Fiscal crises of the type described here are reason-
ably unpleasant episodes in the history of a state; and it
is especially clear that politicians could do without them.
What then to do?
The obvious answer is not to let large cash balances
accumulate; but if they do, grant tax relief rather than
spending those balances rapidly as was done in fiscal
years 1975-77. However, that is not so easy, given the
current institutions of state finance.
The institution mainly responsible for recurring crises
of the recent type is the tax structure. By and large, state
ta.xes are fixed as to rate; and rates are only rarely
changed and then only in significant jumps. This prob-
lem does not arise at the local level where property tax
rates are adjusted frequently and in small amounts.
For example, the governor predicted that the Illinois
revenue structure would generate an increase of $360
million into the general funds in 1978 from state sources.
This increase would occur without any change in tax
rates, and purely because of increased economic activity.
The institutions of state finance are such that that money
will be used for some state purpose. It would not matter
if only $300 million were actually spent. The remaining
$60 million would find its way into the available balance
to begin the next year. In all likelihood, it would be spent
then. There is no easy way to grant $60 million in tax
relief across the board. At the local level, the city council
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might accomplish equivalent minor tax relief simply by
lowering the property tax rate from 9.762 mills to 9.648
mills. The property tax facilitates this approach to gov-
ernment finance ; state taxes do not.
A Suggestion
But wait! Why do state taxes not facilitate minor
adjustments to revenue? Apparently, the reason lay in
the magic of round numbers. Who ever heard of a state
sales tax rate of 4.765 percent? Or a flat income tax rate
of 2.431 percent? The fact is that modern accounting
methods and computers would make this approach to
state taxes relatively simple. The benefits of this approach
would be the undoing of fiscal crises of the 1976-78
brand.
On that basis, I suggest that Illinois move to a
method of finance used by local levels of government.
The legislature establishes the amount that the State
must spend to meet its legitimate needs. After deducting
other sources of money, federal grants and other state
sources, the income (or sales) tax rate could be set so as
to generate the required revenue. The formula for de-
termining the income tax rate would be as follows: in-
come tax rate = budgeted spending — federal sources
— other state sources) -i- estimated taxable income. The
sales tax could be used in similar fashion simply by sub-
stituting estimated taxable sales for estimated taxable
income.
Institution of this method of fLxing tax rates has the
potential to improve greatly the efficiency of state spend-
ing. Revenues would be raised only if spending is bud-
geted. Relatively minor tax relief could be accomplished
yearly rather than waiting for cash balances to build up.
Since the tax rate would have to be reestablished each
year, spending would have to be justified each year—
no more spending simply because current tax laws gen-
erate new money with no change in rates.
I note one special difficulty with using this method
with sales or income taxes. Property values for tax pur-
poses are essentially known; thus, a given property tax
rate generates almost certain revenue. Estimated income
and sales are just that— estimated. In any year the in-
come or sales tax rate set by formula would generate
either an excess or a shortfall in cash.
Although this difficulty exists, it is no greater than
the difficulty that currently exists in state finance. Fur-
thermore, any excess or shortfall can readily be remedied
in the following year by resetting the tax rate. Under
current procedures excess revenues result in piling up
cash for subsequent expenditure. A shortfall, if persistent,
may lead to a major tax increase.
In Illinois, a special constitutional problem exists
with the relationship between the individual and corpo-
rate income tax rates. The corporate tax rate can be no
higher than the individual rate by a factor of eight to
five. This problem could be resolved with a modest com-
plication of my proposed formula.
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Personal Income in Illinois, 1975
Total personal income for Illinois residents in 1975
has been estimated at $75.7 billion, an increase of 8.1
percent from 1974. That gain represented a slowing in
the rate of advance, from 8.8 percent in 1974 and 11.4
percent in 1973. It also showed that income growth in
Illinois continued to lag somewhat behind growth in the
nation as a whole. Recent increases in US personal in-
come were 8.5 percent in 1975 (to $1,257.5 billion), 9.4
percent in 1974, and 12.2 percent in 1973.
The slower growth rate notwithstanding, per capita
income in Illinois continued to exceed the national aver-
age by a large margin. Income of $6,792 per person in
1975 was 115 percent of the US figure of $5,903.
Illinois Compared with US
The smaller increases in the nation and in Illinois in
1975 reflected, of course, the sharp recession that began
in 1974 and continued through much of 1975. The slow-
down in manufacturing activity was especially obvious.
In the United States the rate of gain in labor and pro-
prietors income from manufacturing (by place of work)
fell to about one-sixth of the 1974 growth rate and
about one-eighth of the 1973 rate. In Illinois, income
from manufacturing dropped slightly in absolute terms,
whereas it had advanced by roughly a tenth in each of
the two preceding years.
Manufacturing income declined in 43 Illinois coun-
ties between 1974 and 1975, including Cook County and
several of the more important downstate manufacturing
counties. Kankakee, Winnebago, Macon, Adams, and
Madison all saw losses in income from manufacturing.
However, Lake, Boone, Rock Island, McLean, Peoria,
Tazewell, Champaign, and Will counties had increases.
In Peoria and Champaign counties, the gains exceeded
10 percent. As might be expected, localities fared well or
ill in the recession according to the composition of their
manufacturing sector. Winnebago County, for example,
has a large machine tool component, which has suffered
from the general business reluctance to increase outlays
on new equipment. On the other hand, the Peoria area
produces earthmoving equipment (among other things)
and Rock Island manufactures farm machineiy; both
these industries weathered the recession in good shape.
Another contrast between Illinois and the nation oc-
curred in farm income. In the United States, labor and
proprietors income originating in the farm sector dropped
for the second year in a row, though the decline in 1975
was considerably smaller in percentage terms than the
one in 1974. In Illinois, fann income fell in 1974 as it
did nationally, but then rose very sharply in 1975. The
22.3 percent increase in income from farm sources more
than offset the small decline in manufacturing. Farm in-
come rose in 94 Illinois counties from 1974 to 1975.
In the US as a whole, amounts of income from most
sectors continued to increase in 1975, as they had in the
earlier 1970s. The only nonfarm sectors to show declines
were contract construction and "other industries." In
Illinois, aside from manufacturing, only "other indus-
tries" showed a decrease in 1975.
Also of interest is the greater importance of transfer
payments, partly as a result of recession efTects. In 1970
such payments were equal to 9.8 percent of personal in-
come nationally and 8.3 percent in Illinois. In 1975 the
figure was up to 13.8 percent for the US and to 11.8
percent for Illinois. In 1970 the lowest figure for any of
the Illinois regions outlined in Chart 1 was 5.9 percent
in Region II; the highest was 18.2 percent in Region
XIV. In 1975 those percentages rose to 8.7 and 22.8.
The first of the accompanying tables (pages 4 and 5)
shows total personal income for the State, the standard
metropolitan statistical areas, and the 102 counties for
the years 1970 to 1975. The second table (pages 6-8)
presents for each county the breakdown of labor and
proprietors income by major industries in 1975.
Per Capita Income
A more meaningful measure of economic well-being
is offered by data on per capita personal income, which
takes account of population changes.
In the US as a whole, per capita personal income
rose 7.6 percent in 1975 to $5,903. In Illinois, the in-
crease was a somewhat larger 8.3 percent to $6,792. This
margin in favor of Illinois repeated the pattern of 1973
and 1974. To sec whether real income actually rose, how-
ever, the gains must be matched with price increases. The
following tabulation gives the comparison of US and
Illinois per capita personal income advances and the
increases in two price measures— the familiar consumer
price index (CPI) and the more broadly based implicit
price deflator (IPD) for the personal consumption ex-
penditure portion of the gross national product.
Year
Increase in per
capita personal
income
Increase in
price measures
US III. CPI IPD
1970 to 1971
1971 to 1972
1972 to 1973
1973 to 1974
1974 to 1975
5.8%
8.2
11.3
8.7
7.6
6.6%
6.9
12.1
9.0
8.3
4.3?
3.3
6.2
11.0
9.1
4.4%.
3.5
5.5
10.8
8.0
By either measure, income in the US and in Illinois
failed to keep up with price increases in 1974. In 1975
income fell behind in the US by both measures, and
either fell behind or barely kept pace in Illinois. Similar
comparisons can be made for SMSAs and individual
counties in the State by using the data in the third table
(pages 9-1 1 )
.
Taking into consideration the first three years of the
decade when per capita incomes rose faster than prices
(using the CPI), per capita personal income showed
gains in nearly all of the Illinois counties from 1970 to
1975. McHenry and Will were the exceptions. The array
of real increases for the five-year period was as follows
:
Less than 10 percent 17 counties
10.0— 19.9 percent 37
20.0— 29.9 percent 19
30.0— 39.9 percent 17
40.0— 49.9 percent 8
50 percent or more 2
Ford and Hamilton were the two counties with the in-
come gains of 50 percent or more.
Per Capita Income Relatives
In addition to examining changes in per capita per-
sonal income over time, it is possible to relate local levels
to the US and Illinois averages. The third table shows
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the per capita income relatives for the State, the SMSAs,
and the counties— that is, each area's per capita per-
sonal income as a percentage of the US average. The
relatives for Illinois show a slight gain from 1970 to 1975.
A tabulation of the county data shows that whereas 26
counties had per capita incomes equal to or greater than
the national average in 1970, that figure had risen to 57
by 1975. Only 11 counties had per capita incomes of less
than 80 percent of the US average in the later year, com-
pared with 26 at the beginning of the five-year period.
The most notable exceptions to the state trend oc-
curred in seven counties in the northeastern part of the
State— Cook, Du Page, Kane, Kendall, Lake, McHenry,
and Will— all of them urbanized and all except Will
with per capita incomes substantially above the national
average. Two other areas lost ground in the first half of
the 1970s: Clinton and Madison counties in the Illinois
portion of the St. Louis SMSA; and Johnson, Randolph,
and Williamson counties in southern Illinois.
Chart 1. Per Capita Personal Income,
15 Regions, 1975
Source; Derived from US Department of Commerce
Chart 2. County Incomes as Percentage
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In a comparison of 1970-75 changes in county per
capita incomes relative to the Illinois averages, Carroll
County in the northwest is added to the list of counties
losing ground. Three other counties— Macon, Calhoun,
and Hardin — just held their own. Chart 2 shows county
incomes relative to the Illinois average. Counties having
1975 per capita incomes of less than 80 percent of the
state average were concentrated in the southern portion
of the State. Only two of the counties in Regions XI
through XV had per capita incomes of at least 90 per-
cent of the Illinois level. However, 17 of the 39 counties
in those five regions improved their standing relative to
the state average by at least 10 percent between 1970 and
1975, and 10 made gains of at least 20 percent.
By either comparison, Henderson, Mercer, Hancock,
Stark, Logan, Ford, Douglas, Jasper, Greene, and Hamil-
ton counties made the largest advances, 30 percent or
more.
RUTH A. BIRDZELL
The Data
Each year the Bureau of Economic Analysis of
the US Department of Commerce makes available
to the University of Illinois Bureau of Economic
and Business Research its estimates of personal in-
come for the counties of the State. The reports give
data for the second year before and data for several
earlier years. Thus, the recently received 1977 re-
ports include the income data for 1970 through
1975. The table on page 12 presents the report for
one county.
The BEA bases its estimates primarily on ad-
ministrative records of federal and state govern-
ment programs, with additional information com-
ing from various censuses or from nongovernment
sources. The most important sources of administra-
tive record information are the state unemployment
insurance programs, the Social Security Adminis-
tration insurance programs, and the Treasury De-
partment's tax programs. Census data include sur-
veys that are part of the Censuses of Agriculture
and Population.
Personal income is defined as "the current in-
come of residents of an area from all sources. It is
measured after deduction of personal contributions
to social security, government retirement, and other
social insurance programs but before deduction of
income and other personal taxes. It includes income
received from business, Federal and State and local
governments, households and institutions, and for-
eign governments. It consists of wages and salaries
(in cash and in kind, including tips and bonuses as
well as contractual compensation) , various types of
supplementary earnings termed other labor income
(the largest item being employer contributions to
private pension, health and welfare funds), the net
incomes of owners of unincorporated businesses
(farm and nonfarm with the latter including the
incomes of independent professionals) , net rental
income, royalties, dividends, interest, and govern-
ment and business transfer payments (consisting in
general of disbursements to persons for which no
services are rendered currently, such as unemploy-
ment benefits, social security payments, medicare
benefits, retirement pay of governmental programs,
and welfare and relief payments) ."
The BEA also estimates employment for years
and for an industry breakdown corresponding to
those in the income reports. It also makes separate
estimates of farm income, which list sources of
income and detail the main categories of expenses.
These reports will be available from the Bureau
of Economic and Business Research for the regions
outlined in Chart 1. We have not yet received all
of the reports for 1975; a future issue of the Illinois
Business Review will report availability of the data
sets and list charges.
Total Personal Income, Illinois, SUSAs, and Counties,
(Millions of dollars)
SlISA or county
Total Personal Income, Illinois, StISAs,
(Millions of dollars)
id Counties, 1970-75
SMSA or county-
Lake
La Salle
Lawrence
Lee
Livingston
Logan
Mason
Massac
Menard
Mercer
Monroe
Montgomery
Morgan
Moultrie
Ogle
Peoria
Perry-
Piatt
Pike
Pope
Pulaski
Putnam
Randolph
Richland
Rock Island
St. Clair
Saline
Sangamon
Schuyler
Scott
Shelby
Stark
Stephenson
Tazewell
Union
Vermilion
Wabash
Warren
Washington
Wayne
White
Whiteside
Will
Williamson
Winnebago
Woodford
2,053.4
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Total labor and proprietor by place of work
By type
Wage and salary disbursements^
Other labor income
Proprietors income
Nonfarm
By Industry
Farm
Nonfarm
Private^
I^nufacturing
lllning
Contract construction
Wholesale and retail trade
Finance, insurance, and real estat
Transp., coram. & public utilities
Services
Other industries
Government
Federal, civilian
Federal, military
State and local
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Recent declines in the index of leading economic in-
dicators give increasing evidence of a slovk'down in the
economy. The leading economic indicators have fallen
for three consecutive months, a long enough period to
be regarded by some economists as a basis for predicting
future economic developments. Additional economic
statistics show weakness. Industrial output has fallen, as
new factory orders have registered a five-month decline.
Employment and income growth have moderated, and
consumer spending remains below the level reached in
the spring. Reflecting the pause in the economy, the rate
of inflation has slowed. Running contrary to the general
movement of the economy, interest rates have risen.
Economic Growth Has Stabilized
Industrial production has declined for the first time
since the first month of this year. However, just as the
January dip reflected a short-lived cause— extremely
cold weather— the August decline has been regarded by
government economists as a one-month aberration. The
fall in output centered in automobile production and
electric power generation— which had risen extremely
rapidly in July. The August decline may be regarded as
a return to a more normal production schedule, not un-
derlying weakness. August production of new cars was
down by 5.2 percent from the July level, chiefly because
of the new model changeover. New car sales were strong
in August, and analysts expect strong sales to continue
well into September. Continued strong demand may pro-
vide a good base for production increases during the re-
mainder of the year.
The housing market continued on its strong growth
path. Home building reached an annual rate of 2.1 mil-
lion units by the middle of the third quarter. Although
the August pace was down slightly from July, the general
upward trend appears to be unbroken. Even if the hous-
ing boom has passed its peak— as some market analysts
believe— completions in coming months will foster sales
in such related housewares as furniture and appliances.
While construction of single-family dwellings was
up 25 percent from the first half of 1976 to the first half
of 1977, multifamily units were up nearly 50 percent. It
is expected that multifamily housing will show further
strength in the coming months. Increased demand for
new multifamily units reflects the skyrocketing cost of
single-family dwellings, the short supply of existing mul-
tifamily units, and the continued attractiveness of con-
centrated urban living. The inner cities of large metro-
politan areas are experiencing marked increases in new
construction, rehabilitation of old units, and urban
homesteading. Such efforts are often aided by financial
consortiums set up specifically to upgrade decaying urban
regions.
Labor Market Has Loosened
The labor market rose by nearly 400,000 in August,
as employment expanded 210,000 (see chart, page 12)
and unemployment increased by 180,000. This particular
combination of increases resulted in a moderate shift in
the composition of the nation's labor force. As a result,
unemployment rose from 6.9 percent to 7.1 percent (see
chart). The unemployment rate for Illinois also inched
higher in August, from 5 percent to 5.1 percent.
The major cause of the increase in the overall unem-
ployment rate was a significant rise in unemployment
among blacks (14.5 percent in August). The level of un-
employment for blacks was up 1.3 percentage points
from July and matched a post-World War II high set in
September 1975. There are presently 2.4 unemployed
blacks for every unemployed white person.
Large increases in both total employment and the
labor force are a continuation of a trend persisting
through the past year of the recovery. During this period,
2.9 million people have been added to the ranks of the
Future of Illinois Banking and Thrift Industries By D. R. Hodgman / Page 6
Policy to Stabilize Prices and Reduce Unemployment By P. J. Wells / Page 10
employed. Even so, the unemployment rate has fallen
only 0.8 of a percentage point — as the total labor force
has risen by 2.3 million in the same period. The rise in
the labor force chiefly reflects the influx of women into
the job market.
Research by the San Francisco Federal Reserve Bank
has pointed to another reason for higher unemplo^Tnent
rates. In the early 1960s full emplovTnent was considered
to be about 4 percent. However, according to a recent
study by the San Francisco Fed increased unemployment
benefits have pushed full emplo)Tnent to an unemploy-
ment rate of 5.2 percent. Thus, the basic underlying un-
emplo^TTient rate for our economy is higher than gen-
erally assumed and — according to this study— is put
under further upward pressure by the very programs that
seek to alleviate the problems associated with unemploy-
ment. In short, the unemployment rate provides an un-
reliable indication of the strength of the recovery.
Expenditures Pattern Has Shifted
Consumer spending, which provided most of the
economy's first-half stimulus, has moderated in recent
months. Fortunately, however, capital spending by busi-
nesses has begun to show signs of upward movement.
This was good news to both private economists and the
Administration who expect capital spending to provide
the boost for second-half growth. Businesses have ex-
panded their capital spending plans for this year by 13.3
percent over the 1976 level. Adjusted for inflation, this
increase corresponds to an 8.1 percent real growth in
capital ex-penditure plans. However, such an increase is
below the Administration's real capital spending goal;
according to Administration economists, increases of 10
to 12 percent are necessary to achieve a 5 to 6 percent
real GNP growth for this year.
Although retail sales increased in July and August,
they have barely regained the pace reached in March
and April of this year. Some private analysts had re-
garded this pause as an indication that the consumer sec-
tor had run out of steam. However, a recent survey of
consumer confidence suggests that consumer spending is
likely to remain strong. Americans with incomes of over
$15,000— who account for two-thirds of all consump-
tion— are reasonably confident about the economy's
future. According to this survey, there is no persuasive
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evidence that higher income groups will reduce their
spending rates. Lower income groups have become more
pessimistic about the future.
The Rate of Inflation Has Slowed
Wholesale prices have drifted downward since May.
The wholesale price index crept up at an annual rate of
1.2 percent in August, reversing a two-month decline.
Sagging farm product prices have been the key factor in
the weakness in wholesale prices. Since April, farm
product prices have fallen 14 percent. Welcome as this
may be to housewives, continued declines in farm prices
may cause severe problems for farmers, thereby in-
creasing the price instability that has plagued the agri-
cultural sector.
Wholesale prices of consumer goods other than food
have also remained well below double-digit rates. Indus-
trial prices, which make up three-fourths of the whole-
sale price index, rose at an annual rate of 6 percent in
August. Price increases at the wholesale level may lead
to higher consumer prices in the coming months. Spe-
cifically, the prices of gasoline-powered cars and house-
hold durables are expected to begin to rise quickly in the
near-term future. Until now, these prices have remained
fairly stable, helping to moderate the overall rise in the
cost of living.
Minimum wage legislation is again before Congress.
The bill in the Senate would call for the basic wage floor
to be $2.65 per hour by 1 January 1978, with automatic
cost of living increases. The Administration is also con-
sidering voluntary wage and price standards. Though
these considerations are in a preliminary stage, negative
•
— even hostile— reactions to these guidelines are ex-
pected.
Governmental initiatives of this sort would adversely
affect prices in the service sector. The cost of services
has been rising at an annual rate of 9 percent so far this
year— a higher growth than for prices of food and
durable goods. Minimum wage increases would probably
worsen this price trend. Moreover, such a development
would be likely to reduce employment in the ser\ace
sector.
Interest Rates Have Risen
Interest rates have risen shaiply since spring. Short-
term interest rates have risen more than a full percentage
point since late April (see chart, page 12). Intermediate-
tenn interest rates— that is, debt with a maturity of 3
to 7 years— have risen about one-half a percentage
point. Over this same period, yields on long-teiTn debt
have remained virtually unchanged.
Economists often make a distinction between "nomi-
nal" and "real" interest rates. Nominal rates of interest
are the ones actually quoted in the market (and shown
in the chart). Real interest rates involve an adjustment
for inflation (or expected inflation). Presumably, there
is currently a smaller inflation adjustment than was the
case earlier in the recovery. Hence, real interest rates
have risen faster than nominal rates since April.
WILLIAM R. BRYAN
Local Illinois Developments
Retirement Budgets
The rate of inflation facing a retired couple has
slowed markedly. The cost of an "intermediate" stand-
ard of living rose 4.2 percent in 1976, down sharply
from the 11.2 percent increase in 1975. The estimated
annual cost of an intermediate budget for an urban re-
tired couple amounted to $6,738 in the fall of 1976. The
costs were $4,695 for a lower standard of living and
$10,048 at the higher standard.
The updated budget costs represented the costs at
autumn 1976 prices of three hypothetical lists of goods
and services that were specified in the mid-1960s to por-
tray three relative levels of living for a retired couple—
simply termed lower, intennediate, and higher. These
estimates exclude personal income taxes as an expendi-
ture.
These budget estimates are based on the costs of a
self-supporting retired couple (husband age 65 or over),
assuming they are in reasonably good health, living in an
urban area, and able to care for themselves. The US
Bureau of Labor Statistics estimated that retired cou-
ples spent 34 to 36 percent of their budget on housing,
Budget Costs for a Retired Couple
Intermediate Level, Fall 1973 and 1976
Illinois Business Inde>
Employment— manufacturing'. . .
Weekly earnings— manufacturing'
Consumer prices in Chicago^
Life insurance sales (ordinary)'. . . ,
Retail sales*
Farm prices'
Building permits— residential"". . .
Coal production*
Petroleum production'
July
1977
(1967
= 100)
201.2"
176.4
216.1
223. 7''-
192.0
124.9
68.4
43.5
Percentage
change from
June July
1977 1976
- 0.9
- 2.4
-t- 0.7
-16.1
-I- 0.0
- 4.5
-14.0
-23.2
+ 1.1
+ 7.7
-I- 6.5
-1-17.1
-1-11.0
-10.3
4-26.8
4- 1.4
$ 4,000
' 111. Dept. of Labor: ^ US Bureau of Labor Statistics; ' Life Ins. Agcy.
Manag. Assn.; * VS Dept. of Commerce; ' lU. Crop Rpts.; '111. Dept. of
Mines; ' 111. Geo!. Survey.
« Preliminary. >> Data for June 1977 compared with May 1977 and June
1976.
25 to 32 percent on food, and from 6 percent at the
higher level to 12 percent at the lower level on medical
care. Couples at the higher level spent about 3.6 times
as much on transportation as did couples at the lower
level.
Budget figures provided for 44 metropolitan areas
reflect regional variations in climate, consumption pat-
terns, and types of transportation facilities. During 1976,
costs in the Chicago-Northwestern Indiana area con-
tinued to mirror national averages for food, housing, and
medical care, but transportation costs were more than 16
percent below the national average, compared with 8
percent below in 1975. In Champaign-Urbana, food
costs continued slightly below the national average and
medical costs matched the national average; transporta-
tion costs were about 4.5 percent above the national
average, compared with 8 percent above in 1975. Costs
were highest in Anchorage and Honolulu and lowest in
Baton Rouge, Atlanta, and Dallas.
The increase in food prices from autumn 1975 to
autumn 1976 was approximately 1 percent at the lower
level and less than 1 percent at both the intermediate
and higher levels, compared with increases of 7 and 8
percent the year before. Transportation costs rose tlie
most— approximately 9 percent for each budget level
— as a result of large cost increases for both public and
private transportation. Housing costs rose at approxi-
mately the same rate — 6.5 percent— for all three
budget levels, but had a greater impact at the higher
level because the proportion of the total cost of consump-
tion accounted for by housing is larger at that level.
Amtrak in Illinois
The passenger train was the primary and virtually
only mode of intercity travel from the latter half of the
1800s until the late 1920s. Almost all railroads offered
some type of passenger service.
Passenger services have declined steadily since the
mid- 1920s. As a result of declining profits caused by
competition from alternative modes, the intercity rail
passenger business appeared on the verge of extinction
by the late 1960s. From a level of 39.9 billion revenue
passenger-miles in 1947, intercity train travel fell to just
over 6 billion revenue passenger miles in 1970. More-
over, half of the remaining intercity trains were the sub-
ject of discontinuance proceedings before the Interstate
Commerce Commission in 1970. Large numbers of pas-
senger trains were discontinued as a result of those pro-
ceedings and remaining service steadily deteriorated in
quality.
Congress enacted the Railway Passenger Service Act
of 1970 in an effort to forestall the demise of the remain-
ing passenger service. The act created a quasi-public
enterprise and set as its goal the rejuvenation of rail
travel on a profit-making basis.
"Railpax" (renamed Amtrak), formally the National
Railroad Passenger Corporation, was established to un-
dertake these objectives. The corporation is financed
both privately by the railroads that joined it and pub-
licly through direct subsidy and guaranteed loans.
Operations began on 1 May 1971 with 184 daily
trains providing 239 million train miles of service. Its
first year's operating expenses left the newly foirned cor-
poration a $150 million deficit. The total was about half
of what the passenger deficit was when the railroads ran
the trains themselves. In the interim, however, the car
fleet was cut 57 percent from about 3,000 to 1,295 so the
smaller deficit was not entirely an improvement.
Amtrak's operating deficits have grown each year
and large federal subsidies (more than $1.5 billion in the
first six years) have been the system's life support system.
The deficit for fiscal 1978 (which began October 1) is
projected to be $535 million.
Amtrak has been plagued with problems from the
start. Bad track on some roads and old equipment— the
average age of passenger cars is 22 years— have made
schedules on many runs unrealistic and have forced
Amtrak officials to stretch out schedules to allow for
delays. Moreover, critics assert that there is an incentive
for railroads to give right-of-way preferences to freight
trains rather than to passenger trains. But the major
criticism of the legislation that created Amtrak is that
the carriers actually lose money operating the trains—
for every $1 that Amtrak receives it spends $1.75 for
variable operating costs alone.
Illinois Intercity Travel Services
Illinois has quietly been developing what is probably
the country's best intercity railroad passenger network.
State-subsidized trains together with Amtrak service
give Illinois 28 daily intercity trains serving more than
40 towns from Cairo in the southern tip of the State
to East Dubuque in the northwest comer (see chart).
Illinois has the most extensive state-subsidized rail
passenger program in the country. The State appropri-
ates $3.5 million a year (about $13 per passenger) to
help subsidize six long-distance trains linking most Illi-
nois cities with Chicago. To improve service the State
is also spending $1.1 million to upgrade 21 stations in
conjunction with local agencies. Of the six trains subsi-
dized, four are operated by Amtrak. The remaining two
trains are operated in cooperation with the Rock Island
Railroad with Illinois paying two-thirds of the operating
deficits. The state's subsidized routes include the "Black
Hawk," which operates between Chicago and Dubuque,
Iowa (fiscal year 1976 ridership was 32,005) ; the "Illi-
nois Zephyr," which operates between West Quincy,
Missouri and Chicago (86,612) ; the "State House,"
operating between St. Louis and Chicago (66,072) ; and
the "Illini" between Chicago and Champaign (45,174).
The Peoria and Quad Cities "Rockets," operated by the
Rock Island Railroad, had riderships of 22,243 and
13,514, respectively, in 1976.
Chicago, being a major hub on the national Am-
trak system, is the connection point of trains which travel
to almost ever)' corner of the countn'.
Illinois Rail Passenger Routes
Slate subsidized route
Amtral( route
Route of both state
supported and Amtrolt tro
o Community served only by
Amtral( troins
® Community served by both stote and
Amtrok trains
Source: Illinois Department of Transportatic
Comparative Economic Data for Selected Illinois Cities, July 1977
Building
permits'
(OOOJ
Electric
power con-
sumption^
(000,000 kwh)
Postal
receipts'
(000)
Employment*
(000)
Estimated
work force
unemployed*
(percent)
Percentage change from.
/June 1977.
Ijuly 1976.
NORTHERN ILLINOIS
Chicago
Percentage change from.
Aurora
u r /June 1977.Percentage change from K^j^ jg^g
Elgin
/June 1977.
\July 1976.
, , /June 1977.
Percentage change from jj^ly ,gyg
JoUet
Percentage change from.
Kankakee
Percentage change from.
Rock Island-Moline
.
(June 1977.
\july 1976.
.
/June 1977.
tjuly 1976.
,
. f /June 1977.Percentage change from
j-J^jy jgyg
Rockford
, ,
/June 1977.
Percentage change from
j-J j jg^g
CENTRAL ILLINOIS
Bloomington-Normal
Percentage change from {jufy 1976.
.
'.
'.
'.
Champaign-Urbana
, , /June 1977. ...
Percentage change from (July 1976
Danville
u < /June 1977. ...Percentage change from |j^,y jg^g
Decatur
Percentage change from {ju"y 1976.
.
'.
'.
Galesbtirg
Percentage change from {jury^l976.
Peoria
, f /June 1977...Percentage change from jj^l^ jg^g
Quincy
, - /June 1977...
Percentage change from
^July 1976.
Springfield
, . /June 1977...
Percentage change from
1 lulv 1976
SOUTHERN ILLINOIS
East St. Louis
Percentage change from.
.
Alton
Percentage change from.
Belleville
Percentage change from.
.
Carbondale-Murphysboro.
.
Percentage change from.
/June 1977.
\july 1976.
[June 1977.
\July 1976..
(June 1977.
\julyl976..
/June 1977.
\july 1976.
$ 69,982*
n.a.
-6.1
$ 29,325
-0.7
-M.7
$ 3,258
-4.9
+ 103.4
$ 1,500
+ 17.4
-18.2
$ 2,742
-11.3
+ 81.3
$ 3,205
+627.
1
+ 1,433.4
$ 2,610
-28.5
+46.0
$ 1,875
-48.6
-48.1
-24.4
$ 1,850
-57.5
+32.6
$ 1,427
+37.7
+ 156.6
$ 6,237
+ 7.1
+32.8
$ 1 ,066
-33.5
+ 103.0
$ 6,334
-41.4
+ 73 1
$ 558
-14.2
+59.4
$ 3,841
-28.9
-25.5
72
n.a.
-70.9
89
-43 4
-36 4
337
-40.2
-95 7
440
-42 1
-41.9
3,682.5«
+ 8.3
+ 7.0
1,830.7
+ 7.6
+ 5.7
151.1
+27.3
+ 11.7
87.6
+ 16.2
+ 16.8
371.5
+ 4.3
+ 16.0
70 4=
+6.5
+ 12.4
136. S-*
+6.8
+3.5
160.7
+ 5.9
+ 10.5
58.0
+ 17.7
+ 12.8
58.0
+ 12.1
+ 10.2
44.
S
+3.6
+ 12.0
114.4
+3.3
+9.7
32.5=
-7.3
-13.7
184.8
-2.1
-2.0
47 5
+ 15.2
+ 7.2
154.0
+ 28.3
+ 6.3
27.9
+ 1.7
-1.7
82.1
+ 7.9
-4.7
32.9
+ 16.2
+ 15.8
37 1
+ 20
+ 10.4
$37,725"
-2.7
-4.3
$28,655
-0.4
-5.0
$ 435
-3.1
-1.1
$ 488
+9.4
+20.4
$ 278
+ 0.9
+6.1
+6.7
+8.3
711
$ 688
-9.2
-4.7
$ 556
-11.0
-9.5
S 383
+ 11.4
+3.5
$ 417
-50.3
+ 3.9
$ 137
-6.9
-3.5
$ 1,090
-5.1
+ 7.2
$ 167
-16.8
-11.6
$ 1,916
-15.1
-17.6
% 148
-17.4
-3.2
$ 106
-11.5
+ 0.0
$ 236
+ 5.0
+ 2.6
% 275
+ 12.7
+ 24.4
4,985
+ 0.2
+ 4.8
3,124
+ 0.3
+8.1
57
+ 0.4
+ 7.1
70
-0.2
+3.1
40
-0.4
n.a.
55
-0.4
+ 4.9
29
-0.4
n.a.
164
+ 0.1
+5.5
43
-0.3
-0 3
+ 5.5
240
-0 5
Sources: ' Local sources; data include federal construction projects. ' Local power companies. » Local post office reports; accounting
period ending 12 August 1977. * Illinois Department of Labor; preliminary.
' Total for cities listed, i" Data arc for standard metropolitan statistical areas. = Includes immediately surrounding territory. <" Includes
East Moline. ' Labor market area. ' Madison and St. Clair counties, n.a. Not available.
The Future of Banking and Thrift Industries in Illinois
DONALD R. HODGMAN
Banking and thrift industries are in a state of fer-
ment nationwide and in Illinois. Pressures for change in
the organization and activities of commercial banks,
savings and loan associations, and credit unions have
been building up from a variety of sources. Among the
portents of change are the recommendations of various
national commissions, congressional hearings and pro-
posed new legislation, and recent recommendations and
decisions by national and state regulatory authorities. In
Illinois there is the continuingcontroversy over unit versus
branch banking and the question of how this contro-
versy will be affected by expanded activities on the part
of savings and loan associations and credit unions and by
innovations in financial services made possible by de-
velopments in the technology of computers and tele-
communications.
The general thrust of legislative proposals and recent
regulatory decisions is to liberalize the degree of special-
ization in financial services imposed upon banks and
thrift institutions and to remove certain constraints upon
competition among these institutions. The consequences
of increased competition for the institutions themselves
and for their customers are not a simple matter to assess
and will vary with the particular legislative and regula-
tory measures adopted. The resulting uncertainty has
occasioned a good deal of lobbying effort at the national
and state levels by trade associations seeking to defend
perceived interests of the groups they represent. The di-
versity of interests being defended has thwarted the for-
mation of a majority coalition required to pass significant
Dr. Donald R. Hodgman is professor of eco-
nomics in the College of Commerce and Business
Administration, University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign, where he has recently served as direc-
tor of the Office of West European Studies. Pro-
fessor Hodgman has been a consultant to the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the
United States Trea.sury, and several banks and
banking groups. In addition to being an associate
editor of the Journal of Finance for four years he
has authored four books— Soviet Industrial Pro-
duction, 1928-51 ; Commercial Bank Loan and In-
vestment Policy; National Monetary Policies and
International Monetary Cooperation; and Selective
Credit Controls in Western Europe— and numer-
ous articles in professional journals.
reform legislation either in Washington or in Springfield.
However, the forces of change arising from competitive
market pressures, technological innovation, and the
capability for providing improved financial services ap-
pear to be too compelling for the status quo to continue
for long.
The issues involved in the prospective changes have
important public policy aspects. This article presents
background and interpretation of issues relevant to these
public policy aspects.
National Developments
Efforts toward comprehensive reform. In recent years
three attempts have been made to achieve a compre-
hensive and balanced reform of the nation's banking and
thrift industries. The first was that of the Commission
on Money and Credit established in 1957 as an inde-
pendent organization under the auspices of the Com-
mittee for Economic Development. This commission
produced a series of studies and a comprehensive set of
recommendations for reform which were never espoused
by the executive or legislative branches of the federal
government.
A second major effort to achieve a comprehensi\e re-
form was launched with the appointment by President
Nixon in April 1970 of a presidential Commission on
Financial Structure and Regulation (also known as the
Hunt Commission after its chairman) . This commission
undertook to study the problems of banks and thrift in-
stitutions as well as those of private pension plans and re-
serve life insurance companies. Its report in December
1972 carried a series of recommendations primarily focused
on banks and thrift institutions and dealing with such
matters as regulation of interest rates, deposit and loan
functions, reserve requirements, chartering and branch-
ing, taxation, and changes in the organization and func-
tions of regulatory agencies. This report, although it was
widely discussed, also did not result in any significant
legislation.
A third comprehensive review of the nation's fi-
nancial institutions and their regulation by the federal
government was begun in April 1975 under the auspices
of the House Banking, Currency, and Housing Commit-
tee together with the Subcommittee on Financial Institu-
tions, Super\'ision, Regulation, and Insurance. This
project, known as the Financial Institutions in the Na-
tion's Economy (FINE) Study, encompassed five areas:
the relationship between banks and thrift institutions and
desirable changes in their respective activities, the or-
ganization of federal regulation, the structure and opera-
tions of the Federal Reserve System, the operation of
US banks abroad and of foreign banks in the US, and
the operation of bank holding companies. This congres-
sional effort produced a variety of studies, hearings, and
bills but no enacted legislation during 1976.
Current congressional legislation. In 1977 congressional
proponents of reform have adopted a more selective
approach toward legislation. In extending the Interest
Rate Control Act, Congress amended the act to broaden
substantially the powers of credit unions in setting the
terms on share accounts and in making loans. A bill has
been introduced in the Senate (S.2055) to permit all
commercial and savings banks, savings and loan associ-
ations, and credit unions to offer individuals and non-
profit organizations interest-bearing checking accounts
(NOW accounts'). The same bill authorizes the federal
chartering of mutual savings banks and the establish-
ment of a central liquidity fund for credit unions. Other
bills seek to broaden the lending powers of savings and
loan associations. Related issues upon which legislative
proposals have been made are those of reserve require-
ments for NOW accounts, continuance or suspension of
ceilings on deposit account interest rates payable by fi-
nancial institutions, authorization for the Federal Re-
serve Board to pay interest on required reserves or to
reduce reserve requirements for smaller banks so as to
lighten the burden of membership, and proposals to re-
move differential interest rate ceilings on savings accounts
for any institution that elects to offer check-like accounts.
Passage of any substantial portion of these bills would
enable thrift institutions to offer loans and deposit ser-
vices of kinds that have in the past been the more or less
exclusive preserve of commercial banks. This movement
of thrifts in the direction of full-service financial institu-
tions is certain to increase the competition for customers
in local financial markets with effects I shall discuss later.
Technological Innovation: EFTS. The advent of elec-
tronic fund transfer systems (EFTS) is another develop-
ment that promises to alter competitive conditions for
banks, savings and loans, credit unions, and their cus-
tomers. A nationwide EFTS is technologically feasible
at the present time. A limited regional system is in opera-
tion in Iowa. Components of such a system are in opera-
tion in various banks, savings and loan associations, and
retail establishments throughout the United States and
in Europe. EFTS components include cash-dispensing
machines, automatic teller machines (ATMs), auto-
mated clearinghouses (ACHs), and regional switching
centers.
Despite the proven technological feasibility of EFTS
its widespread adoption has been delayed by a variety of
factors including uncertainty of cost savings for indi-
vidual adopters in the short run, and the actions of
legislatures and courts which have restrained the use of
off-premise ATMs and ACHs in many states. There are
also questions of public policy such as form of ownership
and control (e.g., proprietary, cooperative, or public
utility), the related question of accessibility for different
financial institutions, antitrust considerations bearing on
cooperative systems, standardization of components from
different suppliers, safety and reliability of the system,
and the design of adequate safeguards against intrusion
upon funds or information. All of these issues have con-
cerned the National Commission on Electronic Fund
Transfers, whose progress report, EFT and the Public
Interest, was published in February 1977. A parallel
study by the Illinois Electronic Funds Transfer Systems
Study Commission produced a Report and Recom-
mendations to the General Assembly pubUshed in De-
cember 1976.
The complexity of the various issues surrounding the
development of EFTS is sufficient to explain the de-
liberate pace at which this development has proceeded.
However, the steady increase in the volume of check
and credit card transactions in the US economy will
subject financial institutions and their customers to
steadily rising costs unless alternative, more efficient
transactions methods are adopted. One study by the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation estimates that
rising costs will become prohibitive within 25 years so
that EFTS will become essential. It is likely, however,
that competition among financial institutions in provid-
ing customers with greater convenience and more so-
phisticated financial services may occasion widespread
introduction of EFTS much sooner than that.
The State Level
Branching. In Illinois the competitive situation among
commercial banks, savings and loan associations, and
credit unions has been and will be influenced by national
and state legislative and regulatory developments, by
provision concerning ownership and access to EFTS, and
by the response of the industries to these changes. Cur-
rently all commercial banks, whether chartered na-
tionally or by the State, are subject to the strict limits
set by Illinois law concerning branching: no more than
two walk-up or drive-in facilities in addition to the
main office, these restricted to a narrow range of per-
missible functions related to handling of cash, checks,
and loan repayments, and located less than two miles
from the main office. The US Supreme Court has ruled
that automatic teller machines (ATMs) remote from
the main office are "branches" and thus subject under
the terms of the federal McFadden Act to limitations on
branching imposed by state law. Thus, current Illinois
law sharply limits branching and development of ATMs
by banks.
Federally chartered savings and loans may branch
in Illinois subject to approval by their regulatory au-
thority, the Home Loan Bank Board. Under terms of
the Illinois Savings and Loan Act, branching by state
chartered S&Ls is governed by the same provisions of
the Illinois Banking Act that apply to banks. However,
a recent revision of the state Savings and Loan Act em-
powers the commissioner to authorize the continuation
of the previous site of an S&L home office as a "facility"
in the event the home office is relocated. This provision
has resulted in successive home-office relocations ac-
companied by the appearance of branch-like facilities
in a growing number of state-chartered S&Ls throughout
the State. Credit unions, whether federally or state
chartered, have the legal right to branch but are limited
in their practical use of this power by membership re-
strictions. Thus, under present laws, S&Ls in Illinois
have an advantage in the establishment of branches.
Checking-account service and interest. In the competi-
tion for customer deposits or share accounts, depository
institutions rely on service, interest, and loan accom-
modation in addition to convenience of location. For
many years commercial banks have had a monopoly on
the provision of checking-account services for making
third-party payments. Recently this monopoly has been
breached in the New England states by federal legislation
authorizing S&Ls, credit unions, and mutual savings
banks as well as commercial banks to provide check-like
services in the form of negotiable orders of withdrawal
(NOWs) drawn on customers' interest-paying savings
accounts. Currently there is a bill in the US Senate to
authorize NOW accounts (in effect, interest-bearing
checking accounts) for all depository institutions through-
out the United States.
Pending such federal legislation the S&L commis-
sioner in Illinois recently sought and received from the
legislature power to authorize state-chartered S&Ls to
offer NOW accounts. These must be non-interest bear-
ing (hence, NINOWs), since federal legislation cur-
rently prohibits the payment of interest on check-type
accounts save in New England. However, telephone-
requested transfer of funds from savings to a NINOW
account is a service offered by S&Ls for those customers
who find it worth the trouble. Currently 57 of the 261
state-chartered S&Ls in Illinois offer NINOW accounts.
Moreover, check-like "share draft" accounts currently
are offered to members by 36 of the 3,350 credit unions
in the State on a pilot basis. Introduction of share draft
accounts by other credit unions in the State is in abey-
ance pending clarification of legislative and regulatory
decisions, both state and federal. Decisions favoring the
further spread of share draft accounts appear likely.
In consequence of these developments commercial
banks face a competitive challenge in the provision of
checking account services, long a commercial banking
monopoly. The position of the commercial banking in-
dustry on this issue is to resist vigorously legislation and
regulatory rulings that would authorize S&Ls and CUs
to offer check-like accounts. As a quid pro quo for such
authorization, should it come, the banking industry seeks
parity of interest rate ceilings (current ceilings provide a
differential in favor of S&Ls and CUs), uniform reserve
requirements, and equal tax treatment. The S&Ls and
CUs seek to maintain these current advantages. Thus,
both state and federal legislatures are subject to strong
lobbying efforts to influence pending legislation bearing
on these matters.
EFTS in Illinois. EFTS is a massive technological inno-
vation whose capabilities, once realized, can profoundly
effect competitive conditions and customer relations for
commercial banks and thrift institutions in Illinois. These
capabilities include the replacement of the paper flow
of check processing with the flow of electronic messages,
the provision of expanded financial services for cus-
tomers (for example, more complex financial records.
processing of payrolls, credit information), and the ex-
tension of the effective service area of a financial institu-
tion far beyond the local market area of its brick and
mortar locations. Recognition of these possibilities and
their implications for the banking and thrift industries,
for retailers, and for consumers has focused attention on
current and prospective legislation and regulator)' deci-
sions relating to EFTS. Investigations and recommenda-
tions of a national commission have been paralleled on
the state level by those of a study commission appointed
by and reporting to the General Assembly. Although
various bills have been introduced in the legislature, none
has been enacted other than one (S.1023) extending the
life of the study commission and enlarging its member-
ship.
The lead in developing EFT systems in Illinois has
been taken individually by the state's two largest banks
:
Continental Illinois Bank and the First National Bank of
Chicago. Each of these banks has placed electronic fa-
cilities in a few retail stores in the Chicago area. Court
decisions subsequent to the installation of these facilities
have classified them as "branches" with the result that
under the Illinois Banking Act the banks' own deposit
customers are barred from use of the facilities for other
than check guarantee purposes. Ironically, the service of
deposit and withdrawal of funds in addition to check
guarantee is available at these facilities to the deposit
customers of those few S&L associations that have con-
tracted with one or the other of the two banks to par-
ticipate in the network. This difference is due to the fact
that branching is legal in Illinois for the S&Ls. In a re-
lated move the Illinois Bankers Association has sponsored
the formation of a corporation, Electronic Funds Illinois
(EFI), to plan for a cooperatively owned EFTS within
the State as a solution more congenial to smaller banks
than the proprietary systems undertaken by the two large
banks. Some 650 banks currently are members of EFI,
whose activities have not yet reached the hardware stage.
Implications for Banks, Thrift Institutions,
and Consumers in Illinois
The forces of market competition are making them-
selves strongly felt in the banking and thrift industries
of the United States. To this trend Illinois is no excep-
tion. Market forces lie behind the current and proposed
changes in legislation and regulation at both national
and state levels. Market forces of competition provide
the stimulus to technological innovation in the form of
EFTS. The pace of change varies on different fronts.
Credit unions and S&Ls, whether national or state
chartered, have branching capability. State-chartered
S&Ls can offer check-type, NINOW accounts. Both
state and federally chartered CUs are experimenting
with check-type, share-draft accounts. Both lending and
deposit powers of CUs ha\'e been expanded by Congress
in its recent extension of the Interest Rate Control Act.
In the US Senate a floor vote is imminent on a bill
(S.2055) to authorize all depository institutions to offer
check-type NOW accounts to individuals and to pay in-
terest to holders of these accounts. This bill also provides
for much broader lending powers for federal S&Ls.
Illinois state banking law still prohibits full service
branches for commercial banks. But the expanding
powers and branching capabilities of S&Ls and CUs are
potent arguments that favor comparable treatment for
commercial banks. Unit banking no longer can shelter
smaller banks from increasing competition in their local
markets. Under the pressure of market competition the
S&Ls and CUs are seeking and acquiring powers that
make their functions less specialized. They are becoming
more like banks, whose functional distinction has always
been in their monopoly of checking accounts and the
variety of their lending powers.
The development of EFTS networks in Illinois is
likely to proceed somewhat gradually but inevitably.
Many legal problems must be resolved in the develop-
ment of EFTS in such areas of the law as the Uniform
Commercial Code governing commercial transactions,
security of information, antitrust, and the regulation of
financial institutions. Moreover, EFT technology is very
expensive to install and thus requires volume use to be-
come fully cost efficient. This raises the problems of
customer acceptance and of some form of cooperative
use (although not necessarily cooperative ownership).
These are the considerations that suggest a gradual
rather than a rapid development of EFT systems in
Illinois.
Increased competition in local markets for customers'
savings and check-type accounts appears inevitable. De-
posit and loan services offered by banks, S&Ls, and CUs
overlap more and more. Interest rate competition for
deposits will intensify with the spread of NOW accounts.
There is a possibility that regulated ceilings on deposit
interest may be removed or at least modified to end the
interest-rate differential enjoyed by S&Ls and CUs on
savings accounts. EFTS as it develops will be accom-
panied by capabilities for market area interpenetration
far greater than at present. Interstate retail banking
may become a reality. With competition increasing
through these channels the resistance to branch banking
in Illinois may become pointless and disappear. Even
though many bankers and thrift-institution officers might
prefer a return to "the good old days" of greater spe-
cialization of function and less competitive pressure, the
impersonal forces of market competition appear too
strong for the clock to be turned back.
Various effects of the increased competition will be
felt by banks and thrift institutions and their customers.
New England experience with NOW accounts reveals
a doubling of bank costs (including interest) for NOW
accounts as compared with demand deposit accounts of
individuals. A study of the Federal Reserve Board of
Governors predicts a 6 percent decline in bank profits
nationwide if NOW accounts are offered by all deposi-
tory institutions and a 20 percent decline should interest
be authorized for all demand deposits. Smaller banks and
those having a higher proportion of household deposits
will experience more severe pressure of rising costs and
falling profits. The Fed study states that 2.5 percent of
all US commercial banks may suffer severe difficulties,
especially banks with less than $25 million in deposits.
The New England experience suggests that banks should
meet rising costs by more careful and explicit pricing of
banking services for depositors. Bankers should be pre-
pared to accept some decline in market share of house-
hold accounts in those instances when such accounts can-
not be priced at a profitable basis. The ability of banks,
especially those with larger and more diversely special-
ized staffs, to offer a broad mix of financial services will
continue to be a strong selling point and may well
strengthen as the service capabilities of EFTS are
exploited.
S&Ls and CUs can reasonably aspire to a more am-
bitious role than they now perform in meeting the fi-
nancial service needs of households. Few, if any, of these
thrift institutions, however, have the internal organiza-
tion and experience to become competitive with well-run
commercial banks in many of the services performed by
banks for business firms and other organizations. In any
all-out competition between thrifts and banks in the
absence of protective legislation of the kind now in
force, banks, because of their broader past experience,
are almost certain to prove stronger.
The increasing competitive pressures facing banks in
Illinois— both from outside banking by the thrift insti-
tutions, and from inside banking as EFT expands and
matures— suggest that a fairly dramatic change in the
organizational structure of Illinois banking from unit to
branch form may soon occur. Unwelcome as this devel-
opment may be to the owners and officers of many inde-
pendent, smaller unit banks, and for understandable
reasons, they are well advised to consider carefully their
options should the cost of independent survival become
prohibitive.
Consumers of financial services performed by banks
and thrift institutions stand, as a group, to benefit from
increased competition. Small savers should earn higher
interest on their savings accounts. Heavy users of checks
may pay more for the sei-vice under more explicit charges
than at present, light users— less. This appears fair,
since there is no reason light users should subsidize heavy
users. It is sometimes argued that higher bank interest
costs will be passed through to higher loan interest
charges. Competitive pressures will determine the feasi-
bility of this action. A squeeze on bank interest differ-
entials may result in a reallocation of deposit and lend-
ing functions between banks and thrift institutions. In
any event there is no reason that savers should subsidize
borrowers.
Banking and thrift institutions in Illinois face a fu-
ture in which their legal, technological, and competitive
environments appear likely to undergo significant and
possibly rapid change. In the process the organizational
and market structure of the industries will alter and in-
dividual institutions will be challenged to adjust their
internal organization, the sei-vices tliey perform, tlieir
costing and pricing of services, and their marketing
strategies. The challenge for management and for pub-
lic policy is to accomplish the needed adjustments in
such a way that health of the industries will be pre-
served and the public interest sened in the form of im-
proved financial services efficiently performed and ra-
tionally priced.
A Policy to Stabilize Prices and Reduce Unemployment
PAUL J. WELLS
The across-the-board failure of Congress and the
several administrations of the past half-dozen years to
develop even the bare rudiments of a program to deal
both with the problem of unemployment and the prob-
lem of inflation is a national disgrace. This long-standing
failure of national policy, together with the equally long-
standing failure of the economics profession to formu-
late a cure for these two economic ills, has by now all but
obliterated the simple truth that society does have at
hand the means to reduce both the rate of inflation and
the level of unemployment. The means available are
straightforward, easy to grasp, and entirely consistent
with society's democratic values. The program begins by
acknowledging the startling fact that the US economy
currently is wasting on the order of $132 billion worth of
potential GNP a year. It concludes with a plan to utilize
what is being wasted to stabilize prices and to create
genuine jobs for the unemployed.
The Waste of Potential GNP
The billions of dollars worth of potential GNP now
being wasted by society is the result, of course, of this
country's long-standing but totally unnecessary high level
of involuntary unemployment. There are no laws of na-
ture, or of economics, or of man that require a sub-
stantial part of society's work force to be without jobs
and a sizable part of its capital stock to remain idle for
long periods of time. Unemployment serves no purpose
:
it simply imposes needless burdens on society. The Bu-
reau of Economic Analysis of the US Department of
Commerce has estimated that because of unemployment,
the potential or full employment GNP of the economy
exceeded the actual or produced GNP of the economy by
132 billions of current dollars in 1976. In 1975 the cur-
rent dollar gap between potential and actual GNP
amounted to $159 billion, and for 1974 the gap was a
smaller but still towering $67 billion (see chart). Un-
employed labor and idle capital equipment have cost
society the astounding total of 358 billion of current dol-
lar final product and 358 billion of current dollar in-
come over just the past three years of stagnation and in-
flation. Although the Bureau of Economic Analysis no
longer publishes its series on potential GNP and the
GNP gap, one can estimate that this gap is now running
at least $100 billion a year. This enormous waste of out-
put which could have been produced and income which
could have been earned is an especially grievous waste in
view of the many urgent individual wants and serious
social needs now being left unattended. The US is not
so wealthy, nor its needs so completely satisfied, that it
can afford to waste $100 billion worth of resources year
after year.
It is sad but true that no matter how wantonly so-
ciety has wasted its resources in the past, no part of this
waste can be recaptured to help solve our current eco-
nomic problems. What society can do is develop a pro-
gram to reduce future waste of potential GNP. To see
how society can avoid wasting large quantities of po-
tential GNP, we recall that under the more desirable
conditions of stable prices, an increase in spending, pri-
vate or public, would solve the problem of unemploy-
ment. Higher spending generates a greater volume of
sales, greater sales bring more production and hence
more employment. However, with a decade-long infla-
tion behind us, and still more to be expected in the
months and years ahead unless sensible economic mea-
sures are adopted, additional spending at this time would
be largely absorbed by rising prices and would thus
provide little in the way of additional jobs for the un-
employed. Furthermore, additional spending by itself
would do nothing to mitigate the rate of inflation.
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Needed: A Viable Economic Policy
What is needed today is an economic policy which
will restrain the upward spiral of money wages, costs of
production, and prices while providing the public with
more income to spend. With prices stabilized, additional
spending would then have the normal effect of increas-
ing output and employment instead of merely validating
still higher prices. To the extent that society can utilize
the $100 billion of wasted GNP which unemployment
now visits upon us, a successful war on inflation and
unemployment can be waged at precisely zero cost to
society.
A policy which would take advantage of the econ-
omy's gross waste of potential GNP to suppress inflation
and increase employment would consist of (1) a per-
manent tax reduction coupled with (2) a wage increase
provision. Specifically, a $30 billion reduction, say, in
the federal income tax liabilities of the families occupy-
ing the lower 80 percent of the income distribution, com-
bined with a provision or guideline that money wages
and salaries rise by no more than 3 percent a year for as
many years as the tax cut remains in effect, would both
reduce inflation and stimulate employment.
The main inflationai-y threat to the economy comes
from the dynamics of the well-known money wage-cost
of production-price spiral. Money wage increases have
for some years been nmning well ahead of economy-
wide labor productivity gains. The excess of wage in-
crements over productivity growth necessarily raises the
costs of producing every single good and service the
economy provides. As costs of production rise, businesses
find it necessary' to raise the prices they charge for their
output, both to cover their higher operating costs and
to preserve what they consider to be their necessaiy
profit margins. But as prices climb in response to higher
costs of production, the real take-home pay of labor
falls. The fall in take-home pay then establishes the con-
ditions for another healthy catch-up-on-inflation wage
hike. As wages rise once again, so also will costs of pro-
duction and prices rise again, and so also will wages rise
in response to rising prices. Once a wage-cost-price infla-
tion takes hold, for whatever reason— perhaps because
prices originally began to rise owing to excessive spend-
ing when the economy was op>erating at full employ-
ment— such an inflation if left untreated will live and
grow long after the initiating cause has died out.
It follows that to reduce the rate of inflation the
dynamic of the wage-cost-price spiral must be broken.
Howe\er, it should be broken in a way which does not
cause more unemplo^Tnent, more deprivation, and less
economic opportunity for those already living at the
bottom of the income distribution. Besides, the US ex-
perience has shown that sustained involuntary unem-
ployment has done little to slow the growth of wages,
Real GNP in 1972 Dollars
Billions of dollars
1,500
1,400
Illinois Business Review
Bureau of Economic and Business Research
University of Illinois
408 David Kinley Hall
Urbana, Illinois 61801
Second-class postage paid al Urbana, JUii
GIFTS £ EXCHANGE
220 A LIBRARY CAMPUS
economy is operating with over $100 billion of slack, this
relatively modest additional flow of spending would by
itself place little if any upward pressure on costs and
prices.
However, if businesses responded to the increased
spending by raising their prices as well as their rates of
production, then a price guideline to supplement the
wage guidehne would be in order. Businesses need not
take advantage of rising sales to raise prices and so fat-
ten their profit margins. But if they do, the cause of the
resulting climb in prices would not be excessive spend-
ing but simply rising profit margins. The danger of such
a profit margin inflation is that it could well set ofT
another wage-cost-price inflation. If we suppose that
businesses do not boost their profit margins, perhaps be-
cause they have agreed to observe price guidelines, then
the equal rise in the demand and supply of civilian goods
attendant upon a ta.x reduction will neither add to nor
subtract from inflation. What the extra spending will do
is pull the economy in the direction of higher levels of
employment and higher standards of living by providing
genuine jobs for the unemployed.
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Inflation: Some Causes and SQ|j^1[^artial Remedies
FRANKLIN R. SHUPP
Despite the adoption of a variety of anti-inflationary
policies, the rate of inflation in the United States has
exceeded 5 percent in seven of the past eight years. This
record contrasts sharply with that of the previous 40
years in which the 5 percent inflation figure was exceeded
only during World War II and the Korean War. This
extreme contrast ha^ led some economists to speculate
that a dramatic structural shift has taken place recendy
in the United States economy, and some noneconomists
to speculate that economists no longer understand the
inflationary process.
Although the structural shift hypothesis does not ap-
pear to be valid, it is nevertheless true that the forces
generating inflation in the 1970s appear to be more var-
ied and complex than the mechanisms outlined in the
standard textbook treatment of inflation. Some of these
additional forces are outlined in the next sections. It is
also true, as I demonstrate later, that the traditional
remedies which have been advanced bv some economists
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paign. He has also served as a senior economist with
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recent article, "An Evaluation of Wage-Price Con-
trols in a Fixprice-Flexprice Model," will appear
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recently are inappropriate to this new more complex in-
flation, and it is this fact which has strained the credi-
biUty of economists with the general public.
Traditional Inflation Models (I)
Traditional or orthodox inflation models all assume
that inflation is caused by "too much purchasing power
chasing too few goods," or put more formally, that die
general price level is driven up because aggregate de-
mand e.xceeds aggregate supply. In these models aggre-
gate supply is defined as the full employment output of
the economy. Full employment itself is defined in terms
of a targeted unemplo>Tnent level, A common definition
of targeted unemployment is that level of unemploy-
ment at which the number of unemployed persons equals
the number of job vacancies. In the United States this
unemployment-vacancy equilibrium obtains at an unem-
plo>-ment rate of approximately 4 percent. (These un-
employed are assumed to be frictionally or structurally
unemployed; that is, they are assumed to be simply
changing jobs or to lack marketable job skills.) In a
homogeneous labor market, this unemployed-vacancy
equilibrium is assumed to imply a constant wage level,
and the corresponding full employment output is as-
sumed to be consistent with a zero price increase.
There are at least three variants of the excess demand
inflation model. These are: (i) output e.xcess demand,
(ii) input excess demand, and (iii) money excess de-
mand.
Output excess demand. In this model inflation is in-
duced whenever aggregate demand exceeds full employ-
ment output. Since aggregate demand is typically financed
by income earned by those producing the output, on
average or in equilibrium, aggregate demand cannot
exceed the value of aggregate output. More particularly,
private consumption and investment demand must, on
average, equal disposable income, and government de-
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mand must, on average, equal tax receipts. In the short
run, if either the consumer or the investor is optimistic,
private demand can exceed disposable income. Similarly
the government can choose to run a deficit. Neither of
these situations is inflationary unless total aggregate de-
mand exceeds full emplo^Tnent output. It is important
to reiterate that consumer and/or investor optimism and
government deficits are inflationary only in the special
case when the economy is already producing at capacity,
i.e., is already producing the targeted full employment
output.
Input excess demand. Whenever there is aggregate
excess demand in the output market, there must be a
corresponding excess demand in the input or labor mar-
ket because output excess demand is defined in terms of
full or targeted employment output. If demand exceeds
supply in the labor market, then wages rise, and this im-
plies increased costs and therefore increased prices. Recall
that labor market equilibrium was defined by 4 percent
unemployment. Consequently, when unemployment falls
below 4 percent, wages should rise ; when unemployment
exceeds 4 percent, wages should fall. When the economy
is operating at full or targeted employment, that is, when
unemployment is approximately 4 percent, there is no
market pressure for a wage (or price) increase. This re-
lationship between unemplo^Tnent and wage or price in-
creases is called the Phillips Curve and it is given in
Chart 1. (See particularly the curve labeled case A.)
Because the labor market is not necessarily homoge-
neous certain complications are introduced. Consider a
labor market which contains only miners and auto work-
ers, and these in equal numbers, and consider further the
following three special cases.
Case A. The market for both miners and auto workers
is characterized by 4 percent unemployment, which im-
plies a zero wage rise in each submarket, and therefore a
zero wage increase for the aggregate labor market as
given by point A in Chart 1
.
Case B. The market for miners is characterized by 2
percent unemployment and a corresponding 6 percent
wage increase, and for auto workers by 6 percent unem-
ployment and a 1.5 percent wage decrease. The aggre-
gate labor market is then characterized by 4 percent un-
employment and a (6 percent + ( — 1.5 percent) )/2 or
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2.25 percent wage increase. This implies an upward shift
in the Phillips Curve so that it passes through point B in
Chart 1.
Case C. The market for miners is characterized by 2
percent unemployment and a 6 percent wage increase
and initially for auto workers by 5 percent unemployment
and a 1 percent wage decline. Now assume that the auto
workers are influenced by the wage settlement obtained
by the miners, and they refuse to accept a wage cut and
even insist on a 2 percent wage increase as they try to
maintain their relative wage position, or at least try to
minimize their relative loss. The auto firms can grant the
2 percent wage increase only by raising auto prices. Given
the slack demand for autos, which is responsible for the
hypothesized initial 5 percent unemployment figure in
the auto market, this price increase will cut auto demand
even more. We assume therefore that if the auto workers
insist on the 2 percent wage increase unemplo>'ment will
rise in that market from the initial 5 percent to 6 per-
cent. In this case, for the total labor market, unemploy-
ment equals (2 percent -f 6 percent )/2 or 4 percent and
the wage increase also equals (6 percent + 2 percent )/2
or 4 percent. This implies that the aggregate Phillips
Curve shifts up even further so that it passes through
point C in Chart 1. The Phillips Curve gi\en by case C
is roughly consistent with the US historical record of the
two decades prior to 1970.
Money excess demand. The third model of excess de-
mand inflation states that inflation is caused by an un-
warranted increase of the money stock by the Federal
Reserve System. There are two alternative theories of
how this causes inflation. Keyncsians maintain that this
extra money implies lower interest rates and cheaper
credit which induces more investment and consumption
demand. If this additional demand increases aggregate
demand beyond full employment output, inflation ensues.
Monetarists, on the other hand, claim that any increase
in money represents increased purchasing power which
raises aggregate demand. Again only if this higher de-
mand exceeds full employment output will prices neces-
sarily rise.
Since inflation in all three of these models is caused
by aggregate excess demand, the indicated remedy is
straightforward— reduce aggregate demand. This can
be achieved by restrictive fiscal policy or restrictive mone-
tary policy or both. Restrictive fiscal policy implies either
a tax increase which reduces disposable income and there-
fore private demand or a decrease in government de-
mand (spending) or both. Restrictive inonetaiy policy
typically results from the sale of US government securi-
ties. This action lowers bank reserves and contracts the
money supply. As outlined above this diminished money
stock reduces demand. While Keynesians are inclined to
emphasize fiscal measures and Monetarists monetary pol-
icy, there is little disagreement about the appropriate ac-
The Long-Lag Model (II)
A major problem with the traditional inflation model
outlined is that it cannot explain the observed coexistence
of high unemployment and high inflation. However, it is
possible to adapt the labor excess demand model to ac-
count for and explain stagflation. Many labor contracts
are negotiated for a three-year period. Thus, if an infla-
tionary wage increase is agreed to in a tight labor market,
it will remain in force two or diree years later even if
substantial unemployment obtains at that time. In this
way inflation can persist into periods of high unemploy-
ment. When modified to take into account this behavior,
the Phillips Cune of Chart 1 takes on the circular or
hysteresis form of Chart 2. Given this long lag model,
stagflation is necessarily a temporary phenomenon, which
cannot persist for more than two or three years, the
length of the standard labor contract.
The appropriate policy responses are again obvious.
Restrictive fiscal and monetaiy policies must be employed
to deliberately raise unemployment to the 5 to 6 percent
level for a period of approximately two years. If the
economy is already suffering substantial unemployment,
the .\dministration must resist all temptations to stimu-
late the economy. This sustained unemployment whether
deliberately induced or not is an extraordinarily high
price (both economically and politically) to pay for elim-
inating inflation. Until recently most administrations
have been very reluctant even to consider such restrictive
measures.
Sectoral Excess Demand Inflation (III)
In the traditional inflation models outlined earlier
price pressure arises when, because of an excessively op-
timistic outlook and/or excessively easy money, aggregate
demand is raised above its normal full employment level
and therefore exceeds full employment output. However,
excess demand can also occur if demand remains at the
normal full employment level, but for some reason there
is a contraction in normal full employment output or
supply. Recently such a contraction in output occurred
in two important sectors of the economy— agriculture
and petroleum. The agricultural shortfall was caused by
bad weather first in the Soviet Union and then in the
United States. The contraction in the supply of petro-
leum was manipulated first for political and then for eco-
nomic reasons. Price increases in these two sectors can be
transmitted to the rest of the economy in two ways. First,
agricultural and petroleum products are inputs and there-
fore costs for a wide variety of goods. Given the pricing
rules of many manufacturing and processing sectors,
which are typically formulated in terms of a fixed markup
on variable input costs, prices are raised accordingly.
Second, increases in food prices are particularly visible
and therefore are likely to generate compensatory wage
increases which in turn raise the cost and price of most
other products.
If inflation is induced in this way, that is, by a short-
fall in supply, the appropriate response is clear— stimu-
late more production. In the case of agricultural shortages
this implies opening up new acreage, imposing export
controls, and praying and hoping for better weather.
For petroleum and other raw material shortages, the in-
dicated response requires exerting political and economic
pressure to counteract the oligopolistic pricing and supply
tactics of the petroleum and other mineral cartels. Poli-
cies directed at noncompetitive inflationary markups in-
clude government jaw boning, consumer resistance, and
antitrust actions.
Chart 2. The Long-Lag Phillips Curve
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The Uneven Productivity Increase Model (IV)
In many sectors of the economy, particularly those
involving manufacturing, annual technological advances
make the individual worker more productive, enabling
the firm to increase wages without raising prices. In
other sectors of the economy, particularly labor intensive
services such as hospitals, restaurants, banking and fi-
nance, education and much retailing, technological prog-
ress has been much slower or possibly absent. Conse-
quently only limited wage increases can be made without
raising the price of these services. To the extent that the
relative wage hypothesis is operative and these service
employees obtain wage increases comparable with those
granted in manufacturing, inflationary pressures are in-
troduced.
While tliis source of inflation cannot amount to much
more than 1 percent per year, it is particularly difficult
to combat. Since the cause is the relatively low rate of
productivity gain in some ser\'ice sectors, the implied
remedy is to somehow increase productivity in these same
sectors. How this is best accomplished is an open ques-
tion. A competitive market economy exerts some pressure
on those sectors which are characterized by lagging pro-
ductivity and higher costs. However, where payments are
largely indirect as in education and health care services
this leverage is greatly diminished. The contraction in
real resources made available to education in recent years
may be viewed as an attempt to increase productivity in
this area. Similarly the Carter Administration's proposal
to limit increases in hospital charges can be viewed as
an attempt to stimulate productivity in the health care
sector.
The Inflationary Expectations Model (V)
If an excess demand inflation continues for an ex-
tended period of time during which prices and wages
both continue to rise at, for example, 6 percent per year,
it is quite possible that people will come to expect this
rate of inflation. If most of the population subscribes to
this view, then this level of inflation can be sustained
even in the absence of any excess demand in either the
output or input (labor) markets. In particular, if prices
are expected to rise by 6 percent next year, then wage
and salary increases amounting to 6 percent will be nego-
tiated in order to protect existing purchasing capability.
Given this wage increase, producer costs will rise by 6
percent and prices will in turn be raised by 6 percent. As
a consequence the expected 6 percent price increase is
automatically fulfilled. There is now no reason to alter
these expectations for the following year. Nor is there any
economic reason for the employer to resist the demand
for a 6 percent wage increase, since if all wages go up by
6 percent, money income rises by 6 percent and so raising
prices by 6 percent will not mean any loss in sales or
profits.
This line of argument which states that an expected
inflation rate of 6 percent leads to behavior which auto-
matically induces a 6 percent inflation holds equally well
for any level of expected price inflation, be it 3 percent,
6 percent, or 9 percent. It is also important to note that
Table 1. Some Macroeconomic Indexes
Inflation Unemploy- Growth Interest rate
Year rate (CPI) ment rate of money (commercial
stock paper)
1967 3.2 3.8 6.6 5.1
1968 4.0 3.6 7.8 5.9
1969 4.7 3.4 3.1 7.8
1970 5.5 4.9 5.4 7.9
1971 5.3 6.0 10.1 5.1
1972 3.3 5.6 4.5 4.7
1973 6.2 4.9 8.7 8.2
1974 11.0 5.6 5.8 10.1
1975 9.0 8.5 4.6 6.3
1976 5.8 7.7 4.2 5.3
1977* 6.6 7.2 6.3 4.9
* First half only.
Chart 3. The Shifting Phillips Curve
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fueled by inflationary price expectations is not restrictive
monetary or restrictive fiscal policy because these alter ag-
gregate demand, and excess aggregate demand is not the
posited cause of the inflation. Neither are export controls
on agricultural products nor tax concessions to oil pro-
ducers because sectoral supply shortages are not at issue.
Nor are schemes to increase productivity in the lagging
ser\'ice sectors appropriate. At best all of these have only
an indirect impact on price expectations. The only appro-
priate resjxinse to this type of inflation is a set of care-
fully designed wage and/or price controls because only
they are directed at changing wage and price expecta-
tions.
The Current Situation
Which of the models outlined is most germane to
the current situation and what policy recommendations
follow? Perhaps these questions can best be answered by
the process of elimination. Neither of the aggregate ex-
cess demand models ((I) and (If)) appears appropriate
because neither is capable of explaining the persistence
of inflation in the face of the extraordinarily high unem-
plo}Tnent rates of the past three years. Consequently, re-
strictive monetary and restrictive fiscal policies do not ap-
pear to be indicated.
Variant (I(iii) ) of these models which attributes ex-
cess demand inflation to an unwarranted growth of the
money stock has received considerable public attention.
Yet even a cursory examination of Table 1 reveals that
there has been virtually no correlation between the rate
of growth of the money stock and the rate of inflation
over the past decade. Consequently, this candidate too
must be excused along with the other excess demand in-
f.ation models.
The sectoral excess demand model (III) bears watch-
ing. However, the policies of the OPEC group have not
been excessively inflationary over the past two years.
Furthermore, the agricultural sector is currently charac-
terized by surpluses rather than shortages. These sur-
pluses have led to falling agricultural prices and a tem-
porary lowering of the general inflation rate below the
prevailing expected rate of inflation of 6 to 7 percent.
Because food expenditures constitute a very significant
fraction of total consumer expenditures, a continuing
moderation in food price movements could lead to lower
wage increases and a permanently lowered rate of infla-
tion and expected inflation.
Still there are other sectors wliich could become infla-
tionary and must be watched closely. Abroad there is
continuing agitation for the formation of worldwide car-
tels to raise the price of certain primary metals and min-
erals. .\nd at home the extraordinary rate of inflation in
the housing sector could be transmitted to the overall
economy unless it is moderated very shortly.
The uneven productivity gains model (IV) is, of
course, appropriate, and as the relative size of the service
sector grows it may become even more important. How-
ever, it is not capable of generating an overall annual in-
flation rate of much in excess of 1 percent. Furthermore
there are no obvious policy responses.
This leaves the inflationary expectations model (V)
as the only viable explanation of the current high (by
historical standards) level of inflation. Wage settlements
averaged approximately 8 percent during the first half of
this year and this suggests the persistence of an under-
lying expected inflation rate of 6 to 7 percent.
As noted earlier, the indicated response to this infla-
tion mechanism is the use of wage and/or price controls
of some sort. However, even temporary controls are ver>'
controversial, primarily because they interfere directly
with the normal allocative function of the market. Fur-
thermore, this induced misallocation can be very substan-
tial if the controls are not very carefully designed.
While it is clear from Chart 3 that the controls im-
posed in 1971-72 were effective in holding down infla-
tion in those years, there is less agreement about the effec-
tiveness of the controls in altering longer run inflationary
expectations. Opponents of wage and price controls
maintain that the controls of 1971-73 merely suppressed
inflationary pressures temporarily and that inflationary
expectations were not significantly altered. They cite as
evidence the very high rates of price increase which
followed the termination of controls in 1973. However,
most economists attribute more of the high rate of infla-
tion in 1973 and 1974 to the agricultural and petroleum
crises and less to the suspension of price controls.
In conclusion, then, the most effective means for
combating the current inflation appears to be the use of
either direct wage and/or price controls or a combina-
tion of tax rewards and penalties designed specifically to
induce noninflationary wage and price behavior. As
noted, measures of this sort are very unpopular and
whether they will actually be imposed depends in part on
the moderating impact of the 1977 agricultural sui-pluses,
but even more critically on the public's willingness to
accept a continuing 6 to 7 percent rate of inflation and/
or a long-term 6 to 7 percent rate of unemployment.
Local Illinois Developments
Agricultural News Roundup
The total labor force on US farms during July 1977
was down 7 percent from last year, according to the Crop
Reporting Board of the US Department of Agriculture.
Farm operators plus unpaid family members working 15
hours or more numbered 3,186,900, accounting for nearly
two-thirds of the 5,045,500 farm labor force. Hired labor
accounted for 1,858,600 workers, with field and livestock
workers constituting 75 percent of total hired workers.
The remaining hired workers consist of packinghouse
employees, machine operators, maintenance and book-
keeping, supervisors, and so on.
In Illinois the total labor force was estimated at
195,000, down one-half of 1 percent from a year ago.
Family workers numbered 128,000 (66 percent) and
hired workers numbered 67,000. Two states, Wisconsin
and Minnesota, large in dairy production, exceeded Illi-
nois in total labor in the Crop Reporting Board's Region
V (Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, and
Wisconsin). The only other midwestern state with a
US Crop Yields
Billions of bushels
Illinois Business Indexes
Comparative Economic Data for Selected Illinois Cities, August 1977
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Sources: ' Local sources; data include federal construction projects. ' Local power companies. ' Local post office reports; accounting
period ending 9 September 1977. * Illinois Department of Labor; preliminary.
• Total for cities listed. '' Data are for standard metropolitan statistical areas. ° Includes immediately surrounding territory. '^ Includes
East Moline. "^ Labor market area. ' Madison, St. Clair, Monroe, and Clinton counties, n.a. Not available.
The Economic Impact of the University of Illinois
on the State of Illinois
DIANE M. CHICOINE, GARY A. SILBERT, AND GEOFFREY J. D. HEWINGS
In an era of high unemployment and slowly rising
state revenues, the allocation of state funds to all forms
of activity is being subjected to close scrutiny. The
state-supported institutions of higher education have not
escaped the pressures of more demanding evaluative
processes, even though the nature of these institutions
precludes comprehensive measurements of the benefits
derived by the State from the expenditure of its dollars.
All too often, however, one perceives the notion of uni-
versities as "sinkholes" for precious state dollars. Ignored
in these evaluations are the substantial benefits of re-
search undertaken in these institutions and even the
obvious (yet often overlooked) impacts generated upon
the state's economy through purchases of goods and ser-
vices by the university and expenditures of wages and
salaries by academic and nonacademic staff.
In this analysis, the impact of the University of
Illinois system ( Urbana-Champaign, Chicago Circle, and
Medical Center) on the State is evaluated using data for
fiscal year 1975. The analysis does not include the impact
generated through the expenditures of students attending
the University; it is hoped that these additional impacts
can be evaluated in the near future.
Model Used
Impact analysis can be undertaken in a variety of
ways. The choice of model depends, to a large extent,
upon the nature of the problem and the resources avail-
able for data collection. Since an analysis of sector-by-
sector impacts was desired, an input-output model was
used in this study. In this way, direct, indirect, and in-
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duced impacts could be evaluated. The direct impacts
are simply the expenditures by the University system on
goods and services and on wages and salaries. The indi-
rect impacts may be thought of as the activity generated
by the direct expenditures. For example, a University
purchase of steel bookcases will result in a direct im-
pact upon the manufacturer of these cases and an indi-
rect impact on iron and steel producers (providing steel
for the bookcase manufacturer), on the coal industry
(providing coal to the iron and steel producers), and so
forth.
Tracing the indirect impacts could be tedious with-
out the use of the input-output model. This model details
transactions between two major sets of activities: inter-
mediate and final demand. The former is composed of a
set of industrial and commercial activities. The model
provides information on the sales and purchases rela-
tionships between industrial and commercial firms and
thus enables the analyst to examine the probable impacts
that changes in activity levels in one sector will have on
all other sectors. The model is driven by the second set
of activities, final demand. These sectors usually comprise
government activity, investment, and personal consump-
tion expenditures. Included in government would be the
University system. Hence, one is able to trace through the
model the impacts of University expenditures. Reference
to the accompanying diagram will assist the explanation.
University expenditures may be divided into two
major categories : ( 1 ) goods and services and ( 2 ) wages
and salaries. The division is important, since these two
categories will provide different statewide impacts. Con-
sider first the impacts generated by purchases of goods
and services (arrow 1). As in the example of the book-
case impact described earlier, the direct expenditures will
lead to increased demands upon those industries (arrow
2). To meet these demands, industrial output will have
to increase (arrow 3). The cumulative effect of several
rounds of spending will be for the University dollar of
direct purchases to have been multiplied as much as 1.5
to 2.5 times in aggregate. The impact upon specific in-
dustries will vary considerably. One of the most fascinat-
ing aspects of the input-output model is the fact that one
is able to identify industries indirectly linked to Univer-
sity expenditures. The impact upon the coal industry is
but one example. Another would be the impact upon tex-
tile firms producing upholstery for automobiles purchased
for use by the University car pool. Some of these indirect
impacts are very small; others yield impacts that are
often larger than the impacts on firms from which the
University makes direct purchases.
The second part of the University-generated impact
occurs in two ways. Most directly, the wages and salaries
paid to employees are spent, for the most part, within the
State and these expenditures create demands for goods
and services (arrows 4 and 5) in much the same way as
that generated by the direct purchases impact of the
University expenditures in goods and services. In addi-
tion, the direct and indirect output generated by the com-
bined University expenditures will generate wages and
salaries to employees of supplying fiiTns. The expenditures
of these wages and salaries will, in turn, generate a fur-
ther set of impacts (arrow 6). Hence, the "ripple" or
multiplier effects can work in many ways; a number of
them are provided in what follows.
Data
Since a survey-based input-output model for the State
of Illinois was not available, the 1967 US model was
used with suitable modification. First, the 368 sectors
were collapsed to 73 (shown in Table 1). Sector 74 rep-
resents households; by including this sector, we are able
to trace the impacts suggested by arrows 5 and 6 in the
diagram. The sectors are arranged as rows and columns
of a square matrix; each row shows the disposition of
industry sales to all other industries. Each column shows
the sectoral origin of purchases by each industry. For
the households row, each entry represents wages and in-
come value-added or payments to household by each in-
dustr)'. The household column is, in essence, a disaggre-
gated vector of average propensities to consume.
Since the Illinois economy is ver)' open (a large num-
ber of transactions are made between firms in the State
and firms outside the State), the national linkages be-
tween industries had to be adjusted to compensate for
these imports and exports. This was accomplished through
the development of a proportionality vector using loca-
tion ciuotlents. In effect, the relative importance of each
industry in the State was compared with the similar in-
dustry in the nation. As the proportions approached each
other, the greater was the similarity between Illinois and
US industries. For industries poorly represented in the
State, a high degree of importation of their products was
suggested.
University expenditures
\
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tors, the value may be 100 percent— for others, closer to
20 percent. In the absence of better information, a value
of 80 percent was used for all sectors.
Conclusions
It would be erroneous to make too liberal an inter-
pretation of these data. Given the nonsurvey nature of
the input-output model, the impact data are estimates
rather than actually observed values. However, the esti-
mates appear to conform, in an order of magnitude sense,
to estimates performed for other institutions. To provide
some basis for comparison, 1972 nonfarm employment
in Champaign County was estimated by BEA to be
65,000, of which approximately 10,000 were employed
on the Urbana-Champaign campus of the University.
The total employment generated by University expendi-
tures is estimated to be somewhat larger tlian total non-
farm employment for Champaign County and approxi-
mately 1 percent of total state employment.
While one has no wish to see institutions of higher
education judged on the basis of their contribution to
gross state income, product, and employment accounts,
it is clear that University expenditures do contribute sig-
nificantly to these aspects of the state's economy.
Publications Available
IBR Index
An index for volumes 1 through 32 of the Illinois
Business Review is available. The index includes (1)
a subject index to editorials and feature articles; (2)
an author/title index; (3) an author/editorial index;
(4) an index to the Know Your State articles; and
(5) an index of selected tables (with time span cov-
ered). It is available from the Bureau of Economic
and Business Research, 408 David Kinley Hall, Uni-
versity of Illinois, Urbana, Illinois 61801. Price: $2.00
prepaid.
Available for the first time . .
.
... an abstract of economic
and related data on Illinois— the composition of its
economy, how it compares with neighboring and other
industrialized states, and how it fits into the national
economy.
In 700-plus pages, the Illinois Economic Abstract pre-
sents information on area and climate, population, ed-
ucation, labor force, emplo>Tnent, income and earnings,
agriculture, mining and minerals, housing, manufac-
turing, transportation, communications, public utilities,
trade, services, finance and insurance, and government.
Business people, local government officials, planners,
educators, and students will find the Abstract useful as
a reference volume and as a guide to sources of addi-
tional and subsequent data they need for their activ-
ities.
You may now order the Illinois Economic Abstract at
$11.95 each. To receive your copy of this basic refer-
ence volume on the Illinois economy, mail your order
to the Bureau of Economic and Business Research,
University of Illinois, 408 David Kinley Hall, Urbana,
Illinois 61801.
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Employment in Illinois, 1970-75
RUTH A. BIRDZELL
Total employment in Illinois has increased only
slie;htly since 1970. Employment in 1975 has been esti-
mated at 5.038,518 by the US Department of Commerce
Bureau of Economic Analysis. The pattern of employ-
ment in the State in the first half of the 1970s indicated
decreases in 1971 and 1972, increases in 1973 and 1974.
and a reduction again in 1975. The 1975 level showed a
net advance of 1 percent over 1970. Emplo^Tnent in the
nation as a whole, in contrast, rose fairly steadily from
1970 to 1974, then dropped in 1975. With a 1.7 percent
decline in 1975 partly offsetting the 8.3 percent rise
From 1970 to 1974, the net growth for the five-year
period was 6.4 percent. Thus employment is plainly ex-
panding much more slowly in Illinois than in the US.
The biggest difference between Illinois and the US
:learly comes in wage and salary employment, especially
in the manufacturing sector of private nonfarm work,
rhe 1970-75 percentage changes were as follows:
US Illinois
^Vage and salary employment -f 6.7 -\- 0.6
Private nonfarm +5.6 — 1.1
Manufacturing —5.6 — 10.0
In the nation, the increase in jobs in the trade, fi-
lance-insurance-real estate, and services sectors was
nearly four times as great as the loss in manufacturing,
rhe e-xpansions in trade and services were particularly
strong. In Illinois, however, though all three sectors
Dr. Ruth A. Birdzell is research associate pro-
fessor in the Bureau of Economic and Business Re-
search at the University of Illinois, Urbana-
Champaign.
Data used for this article were compiled by the
US Department of Commerce Bureau of Eco-
nomic Analysis with the cooperation of the Illinois
Bureau of Employment Security.
added jobs, the total number of new jobs was still below
the number of job losses in manufacturing.
The public portion of nonfarm wage and salary em-
ployment grew substantially both in Illinois (8.9 per-
cent) and the US (10.9 percent) between 1970 and
1975. In both cases most of the additional jobs appeared
at the state and local levels. Federal employment dropped
in the State and in the nation as military cuts consider-
ably e.xceeded changes in civilian employment.
In the agricultural sector, wage and salary' employ-
ment rose in every region of the State between 1970 and
1975. Notwithstanding a 31.4 percent increase for the
State, paid agricultural employment (at 33,873) ac-
counted for less than 1 percent of total wage and salary
employment. In contrast, the number of farm proprie-
tors fell in every region over the five-year period, de-
clining 3.5 percent in the State. The opposite shifts in the
two components left farm employment at 3.4 percent of
total emplov-ment. Farm employment declined slightly in
the nation between 1970 and 1975 to 4.7 percent of
total emplo^TTient.
Farm labor as a share of total employment varied
from 0.1 percent in Region I (Chicago) to 17.6 percent
in Region XIV (Harrisburg) . Farm employment also
accounted for 16 or 17 percent of total employment in
Regions X (Quincy), XI (Effingham), and XII (Jer-
seyville-Mt. Vernon).
Employment in Illinois Regions
The two regions in Illinois which suffered most in
the drop in total employment in the early 1970s were
Regions I and XIII (Alton-East St. Louis). (See tJie
accompanying chart.) Our Region I includes only Cook
and Du Page counties, and a look at the two counties
shows that the employment decline occurred wholly in
Cook County. In Du Page there was an increase of 31.5
percent. The contrast within Region I and a comparison
of that area with its satellite area. Region II (Aurora),
indicates a shift of emplo^Tnent from the central area to
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the suburban areas. This is in keeping with the wide-
spread view that job locations and the population shift
from the central cities to the suburbs are related.
In the Alton-East St. Louis region the pattern was
not so clear cut. Of the two central counties, Madison
lost ground between 1970 and 1975 but St. Clair gained.
Of the "suburban" counties, Bond gained but Clinton,
Monroe, and Washington lost a little.
The pattern of changes in wage and salary employ-
ment very closely follows that of total employment. When
private nonfarm employment is considered, however, the
picture is less favorable. Regions I and XIII showed
losses of 3.7 percent and 3.5 percent, respectively; Re-
gion XV (Carbondale) had a loss of 4.5 percent; and
Regions III, IV (Rockford), and XIV also suffered
small declines of less than 1 percent in wage and salary
employment.
Regional Comparisons
With 53 percent of the estimated Illinois population
in 1975, the two-county Chicago area accounted for
56.3 percent of total employment and 59.1 percent of
nonfarm wage and salary employment in the State. In
private nonfarm wage and salar)- employment (that is,
excluding such employment by government units), Re-
gion I accounted for percentages ranging from 58.5 for
manufacturing to 73.2 for the finance-insurance-real
estate sector. The Aurora region was usually second, fol-
lowed by the Peoria-Bloomington region (VI) and the
Joliet-Kankakee region.
For government employment, the Chicago region's
share of the total was about 45 percent. Region II's
share was noticeably larger than in other cases, mostly
because of a one-fourth share of federal government em-
ployment. The third rank was held by the Champaign-
Urbana region (VII) for the total and for federal em-
ployment and by the Joliet-Kankakee region for state-
local government employment.
Wage and salary emplo^Tnent constituted consider-
ably different percentages of total employment in the
various regions— ranging from a low of 70.4 percent
in the Harrisburg region to 94.4 percent in the Chicago
region. This means that in the Harrisburg region, pro-
prietors accounted for almost 30 percent of total em-
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Employment in Illinois Regions, 1975,
and Percentage Changes, 1970 to 1975
ployment, compared with less than 6 percent in the
Chicago region. Comparing 1975 with 1970, wage and
salary jobs had increased in importance in 10 regions,
decreased in 3, and remained unchanged in 2 regions.
Nonfarm wage and salary employment had a smaller
share of the total in seven regions in 1975, a larger share
in eight regions. Most of the shifts amounted to less than
1 percentage point, but in the Effingham region the
change was from 69.5 percent of the total in 1970 to
72.1 percent in 1975.
Private nonfarm employment accounted for a smaller
portion of the total in 1975 in all but two regions
(Aurora and Effingham). The largest share drop was
from 56.5 percent to 52.7 percent in the Carbondale re-
gion, but five other regions had sizable declines in the
share of such employment. Manufacturing jobs fell in
importance in all but two regions. Trade was more im-
portant in nearly all regions as a source of jobs, as were
the service industries and to a lesser extent the finance-
insurance-real estate group. In most areas, manufactur-
ing ranks as the largest source of private nonfarm em-
ployment, followed by trade and services.
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Local Illinois Developments
Strikes, Unemployment Down in 1976
Working time lost because of strikes and the unem-
ployment rate both dropped in Illinois in 1976 as com-
pared with 1975.
Man-days idle because of strikes totaled 1,891,000 in
the State last year, nearly a fifth less than the year before,
according to the US Bureau of Labor Statistics. Shorter
strikes reduced the total even though the number of
strikes rose (from 382 to 421) and the number of work-
ers involved remained about the same (roughly 151,500)
.
Strikes in the Chicago SMSA represented about one-
third of the total for the State, and more than 40 percent
of the total days idled. The Chicago area contains slightly
more than 60 percent of the Illinois labor force. Down-
state strikes included one more than a month long
against John Deere at Moline.
In contrast to Illinois, both work stoppages and man-
days idle increased in 1976 in Region V (which includes
Workers Idled Through Strikes
and Workers Uiiemployed, Region V
Thousands of workers
Illinois Business Indexes
Workers unemployed
Workers idled
1972 1973 1974
Bureau of Economic and Business Research
Percentage
change from
Aug. Sept.
1977 1976
Employment— manufacturing'
Weekly earnings— manufacturing'
Consumer prices in Chicago^.
.
.
Life insurance sales (ordinary)'.
Retail sales*
Farm prices'
Building permits— residential*.
Coal production'
Petroleum production'
linary. •> Data for August 1977 compared with July 1977
Indiana, Ohio, Michigan, Minnesota, and Wisconsin as
well as Illinois). The number of work stoppages rose
from 1,312 in 1975 to 1,561 in 1976. Days away from
the job because of strikes totaled 12.6 million, more
than 5 million over the year before. The sharpest in-
creases occurred in Ohio and Michigan, where man-days
idle exceeded the number in any other year since 1970.
In Ohio the prolonged rubber industry strike was an
important factor and in Michigan the Ford strike con-
tributed substantially to strike idleness. The Chicago area
had more strikes than any other Region V metropolitan
area. Strikes in the Chicago SMSA numbered 129.
Although more man-days were lost through strikes in
1976 in Region V, unemployment rates declined in six of
the seven largest metropolitan areas of the North Central
Region. At the same time, the percentage of the popula-
tion with jobs increased in five of these areas, but em-
ployment gains for black workers occurred in only diree.
In the seven Region V metropolitan areas reported
on by the Chicago office of the Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics, overall unemployment rates in 1976 varied from
6.3 percent in Milwaukee to 9.1 percent in Detroit, com-
pared with a national metropolitan rate of 8.0 percent,
down from 8.7 percent in 1975. Chicago's rate declined
from 7.2 percent to 6.7 percent. However, central city
figures showed higher levels. Chicago remained at 9.0
percent in both 1975 and 1976. The annual average un-
employment rate for lUinois as a whole was 6.5 percent
in 1976, down from 7.1 percent in 1975. The lower state-
wide figure reflects a lower unemployment rate outside
the Chicago metropolitan area and the central city.
Comparative Economic Data for Selected Illinois Cities, September 1977
Electric
power con-
sumption*
(000,000 kwh)
Postal
receipts'
(000)
Employment*
(000)
\Sept. 1976.
/Aug. 1977.
\Sept. 1976.
/Aug. 1977.
\Sept. 1976.
Percentage change from
{seift. 1976 .
NORTHERN ILLINOIS
Chicago
Percentage change from (^."K; \^JZ'
Atirora
Percentage change from.
Elgin
Percentage change from.
Joliet
Percentage change from.
Kankakee
Percentage change from
{se"ift. 1976
.
Rock Island-Moline
Percentage change from
{'s "rft. 1976
Rockford
Percentage change from
{serft. 1976
CENTRAL ILLINOIS
Bloomington-Normal
Percentage change from \^pt. 'l 976
Champaign-Urbana
.
/Aug. 1977.
\.Sept. 1976.
Percentage change from {^^"^^^ ^^^^^
Aug. 1977.
Sept. 1976.
Danville
Percentage change from
Decattir
Percentage change from {sc\ 'l976
Galesburg
Percentage change from j^^^pS^- 1^977
Peoria
Percentage change from \^epi ^1976
Quincy
Percentage change from
ISe ^t 1976
Springfield .
.
Aug. 1977.
Sept. 1976.
Percentage change from
ise'^t 1976
SOUTHERN ILLINOIS
East St. Louis
Percentage change from. .
.
Alton
Percentage change from |^^"^^- ^^|^^-
Belleville
Percentage change from {%epl 'l976
Carbondale-Murphysboro
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$81, 574"
-0.5
-12.4
$31,275
-15.3
+8.2
$ 2,504
-53.9
-12.5
$ 2,962
-6.2
+ 177.8
$ 2,636
+5.6
+29.9
$ 373
+ 5.9
-57.8
$ 2,016
-57.8
-17.8
$ 3,458
-2.9
+ 146.5
$ 4,065
-13 8
-66.4
$ 1,434
-9 7
-52.4
$ 643
-29.0
+ 6.5
$ 4,900
+ 3.2
+ 86.4
$ 1,168
+ 8 8
-16.3
$ 7,904
+ 1.8
-10.1
$ 5,596
+523.8
+ 341.7
$ 4,887
-10.8
+ 96.2
$ 175
-23.6
-99.2
$ 3,605
+ 1,869 9
+ 3,901.1
$ 1,225
+ 54.3
+ 1,259 6
$ 748
+ 126.6
-7.8
3,506.3'
-6.0
+3.1
,738,8
-8.7
+ 1.4
121.4
+ 1.5
+ 1.7
82.2
-7.2
+ 1.7
378.3
+ /.-'
+ 7.4
72.3"
-1.4
+4.7
123. S-i
-3.1
-4.5
154.7
-3.2
-0.5
55 6
+ 0.0
+ 7.1
57.8
-0.6
+9.9
45.2
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+ 11.1
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+ 239.3
$ 1,142
+29.8
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$ 825
+ 13.8
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+ 4.9
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+ 15.1
-3.8
$ 388
+ 0.3
-13.0
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+ 31.5
+3.9
$ 161
+ 18.4
-4.7
$ 1,157
+ 4.4
-12.6
S 212
+ 11.0
+ 1.9
$ 1,793
+ 6.3
+ 23.6
$ 153
+5.5
-14.0
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+ 13 6
+ 17.6
$ 241
+5.7
+ 4.8
$ 261
+ 1.9
-5.4
4,943
-0.6
+ 3.2
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11.3
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+ 0.5
+ 0.5
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+ 0.3
-2.6
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+ 2.7
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71
+ 2.4
+ 0.7
40
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55
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+ 0.2
28
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+ 0.3
+0.2
41
+0.7
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+ 0.0
26
+ 1.7
Sources: ' Local sources; data include federal construction projects. ' Local power companies
period ending 7 October 1977. ' Illinois Department of Labor: preliminary.
* Total for cities listed. '' Includes immediately surrounding territory. ° Data arc for standard metropolitan statistical areas
East Moline. » Labor market area. n.a. Not available.
Local post office reports; accounting
Includes
Changing Environment for Gasoline Marketing
Gasoline consumers became painfully aware of a gas
marketing crisis with the onset of the Arab oil embargo
in October 1973. Lines formed at gasoline stations and
prices soared in a very short period. Pump prices for
regular gasoline rose from an average of 38.8 cents to
52.4 cents in one year. The fear of gas rationing and
even higher prices alarmed consumers and marketers
alike.
After the embargo, however, the American public
soon resumed buying gasoline in increasing quantities.
Prior to 1973, highway motor gasoline consumption was
increasing at an annual rate of 5.4 percent. After a 1.3
percent decline between 1973 and 1974, consumption
climbed 2.5 percent in 1975 and 5 percent in 1976. The
1977 outlook is for another 5 to 6 percent rise. Mean-
while gasoline prices have inched upward to the current
average price of 63 cents per gallon for regular gas.
Gasoline accounts for about 45 percent of US oil
consumption and is used almost entirely for highway
transportation (94 percent). Nearly 112 million privately
owned automobiles consume 70 percent of this total:
trucks and buses account for 20 percent and 10 percent,
respectively. Gasoline and oil expenditures in 1976 ac-
counted for nearly 3.8 percent of total personal con-
sumption expenditures and approximately 7.3 percent of
all retail sales.
About 130 companies operating 260 refineries in the
United States distribute gasoline through more than
15,000 wholesalers (knouTi as jobbers) to approximately
189,000 retail service stations. Less than 8 percent of the
retail outlets supplied by the large oil companies are
owned and operated by such companies. Ninety percent
of the branded gasoline sales by these companies are to
wholesale or retail resellers who control their own prices
and operating practices. The branded sales of the top
four motor gasoline marketers (Texaco, Shell, Amoco,
and Exxon) accounted for 29 percent of the market in
1976. The top firm (Texaco) had 7.5 percent of the
market.
Companies have different distribution strategies de-
pending upon the regional market and relative cost of
each type. For instance, Amoco Oil Company (the lead-
ing gasoline marketer in Illinois) operates about 24,300
branded retail outlets in 48 states. Approximately 40 per-
cent of these stations are supplied directly and 60 per-
cent through branded jobbers or commission agents.
Nearly all of the stations are lessee/dealer operated. On
the other hand, Clark Oil Company (which operates
two refineries in Illinois) distributes in 13 states and
operates about 1,800 branded retail outlets. All of its
service stations are supplied directly, and 60 percent of
these outlets are operated by company-paid dealers.
The most obvious trend in gasoline marketing has
been increasing prices. Jobber prices— the price at
which a petroleum jobber purchases the refined product
from a refiner or terminal operator— jumped almost 35
percent in the first few months of 1974 (see graph).
Pump prices followed suit and as gasoline supplies tight-
ened, motorists were generally happy to find gasoline
under any name. High prices and supply availability
forced a cut in the number of stations in the US from an
estimated 226.000 in 1973 to 189,000 in 1976.
Independent jobbers assert that they were the hardest
hit among gasoline marketers. Major refiners cut back on
sales to unbranded customers in favor of selling through
their own branded outlets; and independents, relying on
higher priced imported oil, frequently priced notably
above the major brand station. The majors in turn
priced frequently at disparate levels depending on their
mix of domestic and foreign oil.
"The Majors"
Vertically integrated oil companies— those whose
operations span the line of economic activity from pro-
duction of crude oil to retail distribution of refined
products— have come under heav^' attack since the em-
bargo. Each of the major refiners has managed to ac-
quire and support a network of retail outlets dealing
exclusively in its gasoline. But only a fraction of these
stations are actually owned and operated by the majors.
The more typical arrangement is that the refiner exer-
Average Gasoline Prices and Dealer Margins
cises considerable control over its numerous retail dealers
through various contractual devices including agree-
ments and leasing airangements covering both land and
physical facilities. Additionally, the majors have been
relatively successful in their attempt to differentiate
their product from the rest of the market, thereby com-
manding slightly higher prices and margins.
These companies have historically made their big
profits "upstream" — that is, in the production of crude
oil. But now cnide oil profits are being battered by gov-
ernment price controls and there is some evidence that
the majors have been interested in securing larger profits
at the pump. Some of these companies have been ac-
cused of squeezing independents through lease arrange-
ments into adopting high volume-low overhead outlets
emphasizing self-service. But many individual proprietors
gain a substantial proportion of their income from ga-
rage-service sales and they have been reluctant to coop-
erate. Some independent dealers have taken court action
over lease terminations and a few states (including Illi-
nois) have introduced legislation that would limit the
extent to which a major could control the activities of
retail outlets.
Illinois
Industry' sources estimate that 8,300 seiA-ice stations
are currently operating in Illinois. This number repre-
sents a 19 percent decline from the 1972 total of 10,200
stations. One Census publication indicates that nearly
8,000 jobs were lost temporarily between 1973 and 1974
and that the smaller stations were the ones that dropped
from the market. A small dealer who depended upon
gasoline sales alone to support his business during critical
gasoline shortages could not absorb constant price hikes
— he was typically already selling gas at a lower price as
a result of cutting his profit margins to attract customers.
Illinois service stations distributed more than 5.3
billion gallons of gasoline and 506 million gallons of
diesel fuel to highway consumers in 1976. The typical
Illinois station pumped about 33,300 gallons of gas per
month in 1976. Additionally, the average station in the
State accumulates nearly $185 in sales for each 1,000
gallons of gasoline pumped. These sales include tires,
batteries, tune-ups, and other accessories.
In 1976 Illinois collected $390 million in state motor
fuel tax revenues which account for approximately 8
percent of the state's total tax revenues. The current tax
rate per gallon (excluding local taxes) is 11.5 cents—
this includes the federal tax of 4 cents per gallon. The
US average now totals 12.03 cents a gallon. In Illinois
these taxes are equivalent to about 23.2 percent of the
pretax retail price.
There are 1 7 major companies with refinery resources
marketing wholesale and retail in Illinois. In 1976 they
accounted for 47 percent of the total gasoline gallonage
distributed in the State. The so-called independents, in-
cluding co-op company distribution, accounted for the
remaining 53 percent (these totals include those inde-
pendents that may purchase surplus gasoline from the
majors). Of the total 5.6 billion gallons distributed,
about 97 percent was consumed on public highways.
The 17 major companies distributing in Illinois have
lost ground to independents with regard to the percent-
age of total state distribution. In 1964 the majors sup-
plied 59.4 percent of the state's gasoline needs compared
with a new low of 47.1 percent in 1976. When gasoline
sales to independent nonbranded outlets were included,
Amoco Oil Company was the leading supplier of gasoline
to the Illinois market in 1976— about 17 percent of the
state's total gallonage. Shell was the second largest sup-
plier with 10.1 percent of the market. Other market
shares for major operators in Illinois include Texaco,
5.9 percent; Clark, 5.1 percent; Marathon, 5.1 percent;
Mobil, 4.8 percent; Arco, 4.5 percent; Phillips, 4.2 per-
cent; Gulf, 3.4 percent; and Sun, 3.1 percent. These
market shares have held quite steady over the past five
years with the exception of Amoco, which has dropped
from 19.3 percent of the market in 1972.
Pump It Yourself
The most drastic change in gasoline marketing has
been the mushrooming growth of self-service operations.
Although self-service has been around for some time, its
popularity has spread widely in recent years. Only 6.2
percent of the nation's gasoline stations offered some
form of self-service in December 1974. By July 1975 the
figure had increased to 14.1 percent. A recent sur\ey
indicated that 31 percent of the nation's gasoline volume
is now being dispersed at the do-it-yourself pumps. Self-
service sales have grown to nearly 75 percent of the
market in some states.
The average national price of gasoline at self-serve
stations is 2 to 5 cents lower than at conventional sta-
tions. These lower prices reflect lower fixed costs, lower
labor costs, and an emphasis on volume— all character-
istics of the new marketing technique.
On 1 May 1977 Illinois became the 48th state to al-
low self-service (Oregon and North Dakota have yet to
follow). Allowance was provided by changing the safety
regulations originating from the state fire marshal. Ear-
lier requests for repeal of the fire regulations met stifT
political opposition from independent dealer associations
across the State who were worried about the emplo)TTient
effects of such allowance.
The enactment of self-sei-vice is expected to save
Illinois consumers nearly $60 million a year. In addition,
state tax revenues are expected to rise by $4 million to
$6 million a year as motorists near state borders will no
longer have an incentive to cross over to obtain less ex-
pensive gas. It has been predicted that some of the mar-
ginal stations which left the market over the past several
years will return and become competitive.
The Chicago market has been slow to react to the
repeal of the safety regulations because of a rule set by
Cook County's Department of Consumer Sales, Weights,
and Measures. The rule requires that full service pumps
be offered whenever self-service is offered and that there
must be a 10 percent price differential between the two.
In some cases full-service prices have been raised in order
to meet the "10 percent" rule. The commission has re-
cently lowered the differential to 5 percent.
MICHAEL TREBING
The Leading Indicators: Abused or Overused?
CHARLES W. WILEY
The general public, through expanded media cov-
erage of economic analysis, is becoming increasingly
aware of the index of leading economic indicators. At
the same time, however, many economic analysts have
recognized the limitations of the index as a precursor of
business activity. Other analysts suggest that the index
may have value if used with other indicators. Leading
economic indicators, along with trends in other aspects
of the economy— especially business and consumer ex-
pectations and public policy plans, can give indications
of short-range business activity.
The Commerce Department's Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA) has been calculating the composite in-
dexes of cyclical indicators since 1938. From 1972 to
1975, the BEA conducted a comprehensive study of
cyclical indicators and the results of that analysis are
now present in the indicators pubhshed monthly in
Business Conditions Digest.
Construction of the Leading Indicators Index
About 150 time series have been found to conform
well to wide fluctuations in aggregate measures of eco-
nomic activity. These series are classified further as
tending to lead, coincide with, or lag behind trends in
aggregate economic activity. Sixty-two of these series
are classified as leading indicators when timed at busi-
ness cycle peaks. Forty-seven of the series are classified
as leading indicators when timing at business cycle
troughs is considered. However, only 12 of the cyclical
time series make up the composite index of leading eco-
nomic indicators.
These 12 indicators are evaluated and chosen on the
basis of six criteria: economic significance, statistical
adequacy, consistency of timing at both business cycle
fjeaks and troughs, conformity to business expansions
and contractions, smoothness, and prompt availability.
A detailed weighting scheme is used to assess and score
each series on the basis of these criteria. Timing is given
the largest weight and availability is given the smallest
weight.
The series included in the index of leading economic
indicators are (1) the length of the average workweek
of production workers; (2) an index of net business
formation; (3) Standard and Poor's index of 500 com-
mon stock prices; (4) new building permits (private
housing units)
; (5) the layoff rate among manufactur-
ing workers; (6) new orders, consumer goods and ma-
terials industries; (7) contracts and orders for plant and
Urbana-Champaign.
equipment; (8) net change in inventories on hand and
on order; (9) the change in sensitive prices (wholesale
price index of crude materials excluding foods and
feeds); (10) the percentage of companies reporting
slower deliveries; (11) money balances (M-1) (1967
dollars)
; (12) percent change in total liquid assets.
The composite index is constructed in five steps.
First, monthly percentage changes are computed for each
component series. Next, each series of changes obtained
in the first step is standardized. That is, it is divided by
the long-run average of those changes. Standardization
puts all the components on an equal basis and prevents
the most volatile series from dominating the index.
Third, a weighted average of these standardized changes
is computed. The weights are derived from the series'
scores as cyclical indicators. Fourth, these average stan-
dardized changes are again standardized (divided by
their long-run averages.) Finally, the standardized aver-
age changes are cumulated into a monthly index which
is based on 1967 = 100. These procedures smooth out
independent measurement errors and other "noise." It
is believed that as a result of all these transformations,
the composite index gives more reliable signals than the
individual component series.
The Record of the Index
Analysis of the leading economic indicators has
shown that the index varies more in percentage terms
than does real GNP. The accompanying chart of leading
indicators and absolute changes in real GNP (both plot-
ted on a quarterly basis) shows this unstable nature of
the index of leading indicators. BEA analysis also sug-
gests that the leading indicators tend to precede changes
in real GNP by about one quarter (three months) . How-
ever, a decline in the leading indicators, even for a three-
month period, does not necessarily imply a future reces-
sion, although it may signal a slowdown in economic
activity.
During the period from 1948 to the third quarter of
this year, there were 15 periods in which the index of
leading indicators declined for three or more consecu-
tive months. A three-month decline in the index is often
used as a "signal" of an impending recession. The re-
sponse of real GNP in these periods was more equivocal,
however. Only in four of these same time periods did real
GNP decline for two or more consecutive quarters.
These four jieriods were associated with the recessions
in 1953-54, 1960-61, 1969-70, and 1974-75. The reac-
tion of real GNP to the economic conditions which pre-
cipitated the fall in the index of leading indicators was
mixed during the recessions of 1948-49 and 1957-58.
In other words, real GNP never declined in consecutive
quarters during these periods aUhough the general trend
was downward. Moreover, in 5 of these 15 periods, real
GNP actually rose on a quarterly basis even though there
were quarterly declines in the index of leading indicators.
Thus, the index has provided a "signal" for an im-
pending recession 15 times since 1948: however, only
6 such contractions actually occurred. This low predic-
tion record means that real GNP does not respond to
business conditions as does the index of leading indica-
tors. The low prediction rate also reflects the use of a
rule of thumb which has little empirical foundation for
forecasting future economic activity.
Even when the index has accurately "called" a slow-
down, it has sometimes given very misleading signals
about the severity of the impending business decline. For
example, there was a three-quarter decline in the index
beginning in the middle of 1966 which was not followed
by an actual recession, although the pace of economic
expansion did moderate. At the other extreme, from
June to November 1973, the index fell 2.4 percent—
the smallest of any of the signals of the index prior to
post-World War II recessions. But the following contrac-
tion turned out to be the longest and most severe of any
recession since 1945.
Events surrounding economic conditions in the sec-
ond and third quarters of this year illustrate the limita-
tions of the index. The modest slowdown in economic
activity this past surrmier was accompanied by consecu-
tive declines in the index in May and June. When
July's index was down also, some commentators began
to warn of an impending recession. Behind their warn-
ing was the rule of thumb cited earlier which some
economists use in their forecasts of future business trends.
As it turned out, the index turned upward in August
and, at the same time, July's index was revised upward
— from a 2 jiercent decline to a 2 percent increase.
What was first perceived by many as an important signal
turned out to be nothing more than a two-month dip.
Shortcomings of the Leading Indicators Index
The index is published in the middle of each month,
and is based on business activity in the previous month.
This one-month publication lag prevents any subsequent
economic activity from being included in the analysis of
ongoing trends in the economy. The publication lag also
contributes to what may be the most imp)ortant problem
with the index in terms of this discussion— the fact that
it is subject to considerable revision. Those economists
who predicted a recession this past summer based on the
early trends in this index were undercut by subsequent
revisions.
The index is subject to revision on two counts. First,
the index does not include all of its components when it
is initially reported each month. The absence of impor-
tant indicatoi-s makes the use of the initial index even
less meaningful than the final revised index. Second,
Leading Indicators Index and Change in Real GNP
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the components themselves are subject to revision as
final data become available in later months. The initially
reported index may be revised as many as four times as
all components become available and as other compo-
nents are revised to final form. Economists who analyze
the initial index as if it were the final revised index
totally disregard these factors which reduce the value of
the index of leading indicators.
Conclusion
In summary, it may be misleading to rely on the
index of leading economic indicators itself as a harbinger
of business activity. The index can aid in the evaluation
of the present economy and in forecasting future short-
range trends, but only if it is used in conjunction with
measures of many other key factors in the economy.
"Calling" a recession after a quarterly decline in the in-
dex of leading economic indicators is somewhat akin to
calling a baseball batter out even though the catcher
drops the third strike. If the batter makes it to first base
before the ball does, the catcher becomes a goat. In
the same way, if the economy is stimulated, or if the
index is revised upward after this three-month decline,
the "bearish" analyst becomes little more than a false
prophet of economic doom. Short of a recession itself,
this is the last thing the economy needs, or can afford.
Data Available
Data for the counties of one region (see map,
page 2) may be obtained for $12.00, except Region
I which is $8.00. The following items are included
:
(1) Personal income by major sources 1965-
75 and selected years 1929-62;
(2) Analytic tables for personal income;
(3) Farm income and ex-penditures 1965-75:
(4) Employment by type and broad industrial
sources 1970-75;
(5) Analytic tables for employment;
(6) Commuting flows 1960 and 1970.
A separate set of data includes the above items
for the United States and for the State of Illinois
and the items listed below. This may be obtained
for $20.00. Data for SMSAs and counties for the
following items
:
(1) Total personal income 1965-75 and se-
lected years 1929-62;
(2) Population (for the same years) ;
(3) Per capita personal income (same years) :
(4) Per capita income relatives (same years) ;
(5) Total personal income relatives (same
years)
.
In addition, the following items are included
for SMSAs:
( 1
)
Personal income by major sources;
( 2 Analytic tables for personal income
;
( 3 Employment.
Please address your requests to the Bureau of
Economic and Business Research, 408 David Kin-
lev Hall, Urban:!, Illinois 61801.
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1978— Another Year of Expansion
The economy will continue to expand through the
remainder of the year, the fourth successive year of ex-
pansion. Economic growth will be sufficient to bring
about further modest reductions in unemployment. How-
ever, it is likely that there will be some increase in the
rate of inflation accompanied by further upward move-
ment in interest rates. The demand for housing will be
strong, but the availability of mortgage funds may di-
minish.
Government economic policy is not likely to retard
developments in the private economy. With continuing
strong credit demands, the Federal Reserve would find it
difficult to achieve a slower growth in the money supply.
Fiscal policy is expected to move toward ease on balance.
Output Will Expand
The growth in real output during 1978 is not ex-
pected to depart from the pace of the past several years.
We anticipate about a 5 percent growth in real gross na-
tional product— that is, GNP adjusted for the effects of
inflation. Last year, real GNP rose 4.9 percent according
to preliminary estimates, somewhat slower than the 6.1
percent increase in 1976. Industrial output scored impres-
sive gains (see chart) , rising 5 percent for the year.
What does it mean to say that real GNP will grow by
about 5 percent? By year's end, growth may be closer to
6 percent or 4 percent. This is not to suggest that small
changes do not make any difference. A single percentage
point of real GNP represents roughly two days' output.
To the individual, it means about two days' pay. To the
unemployed, it may mean a job. Notwithstanding the
importance of small deviations, there is simply no way
of slicing the forecast any thinner. Moreover, economic
policy makers do not know how to "fine tune" moderate
changes in the economy.
Consvmier spending will grow rapidly in 1978. Retail
sales will rise about 10 percent in 1978, although auto-
mobile sales may weaken somewhat. Last year auto sales
reached 11.3 million units (including 2.1 million im-
ports). In 1978 auto sales will edge downward to about
1 1 million units.
Capital spending is not expected to provide a major
thrust to business activity. According to Administration
economists, real plant and equipment investment must
rise about 10 percent per year in order for the economy
to achieve sufficient growth to reach full employment and
Industrial Production
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for the federal government to balance its budget. The
Administration's business investment hopes will not be
achieved in 1978, as capital outlays will be only about
4.5 percent greater than in 1977.
Home construction is unlikely to maintain the pace
achieved in 1977. Last year, housing starts averaged
nearly 2 million units, almost one-third greater than in
1976 and just below the 1973 record year. If interest rates
continue to move higher (as suggested below), the flow
of funds into savings institutions is likely to shrink. In-
deed, disintermediation — a movement of funds from in-
termediaries into market instruments— becomes a strong
possibility. That is, mortgage funds may be "crowded
out" to alternative uses. As a consequence, home con-
struction may be restrained despite continued strong
housing demands.
Labor Markets Will Improve
Employment will grow enough this year to achieve a
further reduction in unemployment. Employment ex-
panded 4.7 percent in 1977. Reflecting the increase in
jobs, the unemployment rate drifted downward during
the year to 6.4 percent in December, more than a full
percentage point below its level in December 1976.
Even if employment growth moderates, there is a
good chance that unemployment can decline to about
5.5 percent by the end of the year. The labor force grew
very rapidly last year, as the overall participation rate—
the portion of the population entering the work force—
rose dramatically. In December a record 58 percent of
the working age population was employed.
Inflation and Interest Rates Will Move Up
Price increases are e.xpected to quicken this year.
Consumer prices in 1977 were about 6.7 percent above
their year-earlier level, and wholesale prices averaged 5.9
percent higher. Accelerating inflation in the recent past
reinforces the belief that inflation rates are likely to con-
tinue to move higher. There is no presumption, however,
that inflation will return to a "double digit" rate. There
is substantial unused capacity, as utilization rates are be-
low 85 percent. Indications received thus far from OPEC
countries suggest that oil price increases may be held to
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5 percent. If so, this cost-push element will be less in 1978
than in the past several years. Food prices are subject
to an additional element of uncertainty this year. Crop
supplies— always subject to the vagaries of weather—
are threatened by a farmers' strike.
Interest rates will move higher, reflecting continued
expansion in the economy and inflation. The prime rate
reached 8 percent in mid-January, compared with 6.25
percent in Januar)' 1977. A prime rate of 9 percent by
late this year is likely. Mortgage interest rates, which
moved above 9 percent in late 1977, will edge higher
this year.
Economic Policy Will Accommodate Growth
Government economic policies are likely to remain
passive during 1978. Although interest rates will move
higher, monetary expansion is often accompanied by ris-
ing interest rates. For example, the money supply rose
more than 7 percent in 1977 (see chart), while interest
rates jumped sharply.
Although the supply of money is likely to register an-
other strong increase this year, bank credit may tighten.
After several years of slack, banks are likely to feel the
forces of disintermediation and find it increasingly diffi-
cult to meet their customers' credit needs.
Fiscal actions can be expected to stimulate the econ-
omy on balance. To counter the restrictive effects of the
increase in social security taxes, the Administration has
proposed a net ta.x cut for fiscal 1979 of about $25 bil-
lion— with a tax reduction of $35 billion partly offset
by revenue-increasing tax changes of roughly $10 billion.
WILUAM R. BRYAN
Local Illinois Developments
Ilhanges in Farm Structure
Changes in the structure of Illinois farming since the
950s have reflected US changes. Farms in Illinois, as in
he US, range from small family farms to large-scale cash
iperations. The most obvious change in the postwar pe-
iod is the continuing decline in the number of farms,
rhe number of farms in the nation shrank by slightly
nore than 50 percent between 1950 and 1975, from
1,648,000 farms to 2,786,000. The Illinois number has
;one from 192,268 in 1950 to 111,049 in 1974, a decline
)f about 43 percent. Nationally the number of farms lost
vas highest in 1950 at 220,000. Since then, the shrinkage
las decreased nearly every year, reaching 22,000 in 1976.
^ similar development appears in Illinois figures. The
teady, regular decrease in the rate of decline suggests
he approach of an end to the merger of farms.
The decline in the number of farms has been accom-
janied by a decline in the total acreage, both nationally
md in Illinois. In the State, acreage fell by 6 percent
rom 1950 to 1974; in the US, acreage was reduced by
ilmost 10 percent. Gross physical production, however,
las not fallen over this period, as shown, for example,
3y the recent record sizes of three crops important na-
;ionally and in Illinois: corn for grain, soybeans, and
A'heat.
The changing farm picture acquires another dimen-
Distribution of Farm Sales in Illinois
Percent of total value of soles
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The Illinois State Lottery
There is perhaps a gambling instinct in all of us and
possibly no state-operated system has taken advantage of
this perennial urge as has the letter)-. State governments,
battered by inflation and a rising demand for public ac-
tivities, have turned to the lottery as an alternative to
traditional revenue sources.
The history of government-sanctioned lotteries in the
US can be traced to colonial times. These games of
chance were the source of part of the financing of the
Jamestown expedition and, later, of both Rutgers and
Princeton universities. In 1819 the first General Assembly
of Illinois authorized two lottery projects— a two-year
grant to raise $10,000 for navigation of the Big Wabash
River and $50,000 to improve health in the "American
Bottoms" by draining its lakes and ponds. However, with
the termination of the scandal-ridden Louisiana State
Lottery in 1893, lotteries passed temporarily into oblivion.
The reemergence of the lotteiy came about in 1963
when the New Hampshire Sweepstakes appeared. New
York followed in 1967 but in both states results were
rather disappointing. Players were required to register,
tickets were several dollars apiece, and the drawings were
held only once a year. Profiting from the experience of
its neighbors, New Jersey in 1970 established a somewhat
different lottery. Low ticket prices, many winners, easy
rules, and attractive large prizes marked the success of
this lottery and the others to follow. Connecticut, Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and
Rhode Island soon legalized lotteries.
Illinois became the 11th state to legalize a lottery
when it approved the Illinois Lottery Law in 1974 (14
states currently have them). The Illinois lottery began
operations on 1 July 1975 with the expectation of selling
about $150 million of tickets in its first operating year.
A new division of the Department of Revenue was added
to administer the program. The division currently em-
ploys about 180 men and women in Springfield and nine
district offices. A superintendent and a five-person Lot-
tery Control Board, all appointed by the governor, are
the decision-making body for the lottery.
From the first ticket sale in 1974 through fiscal 1977,
the Lottery Board introduced 16 different games and sold
more than 786 million tickets. About 23 million of these
tickets have been claimed as winners and over $188 mil-
lion in prizes have been awarded. Twenty pensons have
become "millionaires"— each wins taxable income of
$50,000 annually for 20 years. Additionally, the lottery
has furnished a profitable business for licensed ticket sales
agents. In 1977 almost $6.9 million in commissions and
fees went to 680 banks and 5,500 ticket agents. These
agents receive a commission of 5 percent of ticket sales
and a bonus commission if they sell tickets winning prizes
of $5,000 or more.
The Illinois Lottery Law requires that at least 40
percent of total ticket and license revenues be contributed
to the state's general revenue fund. Of the $110 million
yield from ticket sales in 1977, 45 percent was allocated
for prizes, 6.2 percent for commissions and fees to agents
and banks, and 7.5 percent for operating expenses (sal-
aries, game de\elopment, printing, advertising, and so
on) and 41.3 percent to the State. The general revenue
fund was allocated in the following manner: 34.6 per-
cent for education; 19.5 percent for health and social ser-
vice programs; 20.3 percent for environmental and na-
tural resource protection; 13.4 percent for public aid;
and 12.2 percent for debt, income tax refunds, and to
legislative agencies.
Gross sales for fiscal years 1975 and 1976 were $129
million and $163 million respectively. The 1977 total
($110 million) represented almost a 33 percent decHne
from the 1976 total. Ticket sales peaked in 1976 when
the lottery's first "instant" game was introduced. Sales
in one month alone reached $34 million.
Although the lottery contributes a small share of total
state revenue yields (currently about 1 percent), it has
become a marginally important one for the general fund.
Officials are optimistically e.xpecting the lottery to yield
annual state revenues of about $60 million in the future
— the State received $58 million, $76 million, and $48
million in the first three years. Other states have experi-
enced similar declines in the third year of operation but
then experienced a general "plateauing" of revenue.
The Moral Issue and Regressivity
Any discussion of the fiscal aspects of the lottery does
not begin to uncover the most controversial public policy
issue that surrounds it. Many have objected to it on a
moral basis— gambling in any form is evil and should
be prohibited. But it is interesting to note that almost
every church group, with the exception of the Methodists
and Quakers, have used lotteries in one fomi or another.
Besides the moralistic argument against such publicly
sponsored activities is a debate concerning the regres-
sivity of the lottery (whether it takes a larger "tax" per-
centage of income from the poor). State officials assert
that the working urban middle class provides the best
customers for its lotteries. A 1976 lottery sur\-ey indicates
that the "average" Illinois ticket buyer appears to be
"44 years of age with a high school education and a fam-
ily income of $12,500." The lower income, upper income,
and rural population are buying tickets sporadically.
The long-run prospects of the lottery are uncertain.
Two things are known for certain though : by no means
will the lottery end or reduce the present levels of taxes,
nor will it be appreciably detrimental to the illegal games,
which are still thriving. Nevertheless, the growing popu-
larity of lotteries is clear evidence that states are pursu-
ing new revenue sources that the public is willing to
provide. Simultaneously, the State is providing a new
"good" which the public eagerly wants. However, a di-
lemma remains in that lotteries may constitute a rela-
tively inequitable revenue base.
MICHAEL TREEING
Comparative Economic Data for Selected Illinois Cities, November 1977
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What Great Britain Has Done to Balance Its Budget
ROLAND W. BARTLETT
Many municipalities, states, and nations throughout
the world during recent years have overexpanded the
public sector of their economies and are finding it diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to increase taxes enough to pay
increased costs. Excessive costs as related to income in
New York City were outlined in the May issue of the
Illinois Business Review together with methods being
used for meeting their financial crisis.
When James Callaghan became prime minister of
Great Britain in 1976, he was faced with expenditures
of $3.6 billion a year more than income, a situation simi-
lar to that of Mayor Abraham Beame in New York City
a year earlier. Mayor Beame obtained loans from the US
government of up to $2.3 billion a year with specific pro-
visions for their repayment with interest. Prime Minister
Callaghan has met his costs with the following loans (in
biUions) :
International Monetary Fund $3.9
Bank for International Settlement 3.0
International Banking Syndicate 1.5
Sale of 66.5 million shares of British Petroleum .56
It is expected that income for repayment of these
loans will be forthcoming, in substantial part, from oil
ofifshore Scotland, which is just coming into production.
These loans, extending to 1982 and beyond, stopped the
downward trend in the value of the British pound, which
had fallen to a low of $1.56 in October 1976. In 1977,
the value of the pound had been stabilized at $1.72 to
$1.74.
In June 1977, the Bank of England set terms for the
sale of 66.5 million shares of British Petroleum to pro-
vide $560 million toward the nation's 1977 budget deficit.
In this, as in some of its earlier actions, Britain, like New
York City, was using capital to pay current operating
expenses.
In Britain as in New York City, an underlying cause
of excessive expenditures has been the ever increasing
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number of workers in welfare and other government
agencies. In addition, Britain has excessive employees
in defunct industries nationalized by the British govern-
ment. In 1975, a total of 1,608,000 people were employed
by the British government in public administration and
defense. This was double the number (813,000) em-
ployed by such agencies in 1951.
Another basic cause of Britain's financial crisis has
been its failure to keep up with the rest of the vs'orld in
efficiency of production and distribution. This is evi-
denced by (1) its relative decline in GNP per person;
(2) its relative increase in imports as compared with
exports: (3) its low production per worker for specific
products; (4) curtailment of productivity by its labor
unions; and (5) its declining share of the world's steel
production.
A third cause of Britain's financial crisis in 1976 has
been the excessive taxation of profits and personal in-
come. Under British law, profits of corporations may be
taxed up to 52 percent. This law has discouraged both
the investment needed to modernize plants and equip-
ment of the older industries and the entry of new in-
dustries.
The personal income tax in Britain is graduated up
to 83 percent of a person's income and is much higher
than that of many other countries. Because of this, many
high-income individuals have left Britain.
GNP per Person Lowest
of Six Industrial Nations
When James Callaghan became prime minister of
Britain in 1976, he inherited a sluggish economy. This is
evidenced by the relative decline in its consumer income
and its slow growth rate.
In 1959, Britain ranked third in GNP per person for
six industrial countries (see Table 1). By 1976, it had
fallen to sixth place. From 1959 to 1976, the growth
rate of GNP per person in Britain was roughly one-fourth
of that in Sweden, Switzerland, and West Germany.
Britain has failed to keep up in productivity with other
industrial countries during the past two decades.
Britain's Failure to Meet World Competition
Over a long period of time Britain has failed to meet
world competition in the production of basic commodi-
ties necessary for an expanding economy. Britain's declin-
ing share of the world production of steel furnishes a
classic example of its failure to meet world competition.
In 1965, for example, Britain's share of the world's
steel production was 6.2 percent. By 1974, its share had
fallen to 3.2 percent, one-fifth as large as Japan's pro-
portion (see Table 2). As late as 1914, Japan's steel
production was too low to be listed. Like Britain, most
of the iron ore used in Japan's steel production was im-
ported. In recent years, Japan has been a rigorous com-
petitor in the steel industry.
The major part of the steel industr)' in Britain was
taken over by the government in 1970 as a result of
losses being sustained by private steel firms. Up to the
present (1977) the government, which now produces 80
percent of the steel in Britain, has had no marked success
in improving efficiency in the industry. In 1974, British
steel production was 21 percent below that of 1970. Since
1970, the steel industry in Britain has been plagued with
numerous strikes, further thwarting attempts to increase
efficiency.
Britain's Low Productivity per Person
Productivity in Britain's steel industry for a long time
has been below that of some other countries. The Paris
Conference of 1947-48 showed a wide difference in effi-
ciency in industrial production among countries. That
conference showed that a steel worker in the United
States turned out about four times as much steel as a
steel worker in Britain; a coal miner in the United States
mined four times as much coal as a British miner, 25
carloads as compared with 6Vi carloads. The same con-
ference showed an auto worker in the United States pro-
duced about four times as much as a British auto worker;
and a United States textile worker turned out about 2Vi
times as much as a worker in Britain.
Labor Unions Have Curtailed Productivity
For over a century following the defeat of Napoleon
at Waterloo in 1815, conservatives dominated the politi-
cal and economic structure of Great Britain. In their
greed for wealth and power, they e.xploited labor and
retained most of the benefits of increased productivity
for themselves. Several writers including Frederick Har-
rison, Thomas Huxley, and Jack London have drama-
tized conditions at the beginning of the 20th century,
when 90 percent of people in Britain died in poverty.
The book, "The Miners' Years of Struggle," published
in 1953 by R. Page Arnot, depicts the struggle of the
miners' labor union in Britain up to the middle of the
20th century. According to Amot, its leaders fought to
Table 1 . Gross National Product per Person,
Six Industrial Countries, 1959 and 1976
Percentage
Country 1959 1976 increase.
1959 to 1 976
United States $2,698 $5,500 104
Sweden 1,512 5,600 270
Britain 1,495 2,500 67
Switzerland 1 ,486 6,000 304
West Germany 1,418 5,000 253
France 1,395 3,400 144
S<)uicci; 1959. Illrwi, AgmuUural Etunomui. January 1962 (Vol. 2, No. I), p 18. 1976.
Chainfiaign .\eu'i-Ga:ttu.2l April 1976
Table 2. Steel Production: Selected Countries
and Years, Percentage of World Productioyi
1865 1914 1935 1965 1970 1974
United States 33.3 29.0 26.2 26.9 20.0 19.0
USSR 9.5 7.7 16.9 20.5 19.5 19.3
West Germany 23.3 25.5 20.0 8.3 7.6 7.5
Japan 5.9 9.3 15.7 16.6
United Kingdom 53.5 12.9 9.6 6.2 4.8 3.2
improve living standards of their members and to obtain
justice for them in British courts.
When the labor government came to power in 1945
following the close of World War II, labor unions in
Britain began to attempt to bring about a more equitable
distribution of income to worker members and to stop
injustices to workers initiated over many decades by con-
servative vested interests. While they have brought about
many needed changes, labor unions have initiated some
policies that are proving harmful not only to Britain
generally but also to union members themselves. Among
these are the following
:
(1) The overtaxation of profits already mentioned,
with its discouragement of investment.
(2) Excessive wage demands accompanied by indus-
try-wide and nationwide strikes as well as innumerable
wildcat strikes. An example of this is British Leyland.
This auto company, 95 percent owned by the British
government, has had many strikes which have seriously
curtailed its productivity. On 21 March 1977, the 120,000
workers in this company were told that closings are a
possibility unless productivity increases soon.
(3) Labor resistance to improved productivity. In
some situations, labor unions have perpetuated ineffi-
ciencies by refusing to adopt innovations that would
lower unit labor costs.
One example of this was at Tilbury, a port for ex-
ports to Australia. Australia had found that unit labor
costs could be greatly reduced by shipping products in
containers. Container berths were needed at Tilbury. .At
first the labor union agreed to modern berths in return
for higher wages. Later they reneged on this agreement
and banned work on new docks until the same wage
promised to Tilbury workers was given to all other docks,
including the least efficient. Ship owners of the less effi-
cient docks could not afford to pay the high rates prom-
ised at Tilbury so the whole deal was turned dovm.
As a result of failure of Tilbury to provide container
berths, ship owners using containers diverted their vessels
to Antwerp with an extra cost of $240,000 per voyage.
With this diversion, Tilbury lost most of its exports to
Australia and labor unions lost dock jobs of those for-
merly working at Tilbury'.
Partial Loss of the Export Colonial Market
A basic factor causing the relati\e decrease in con-
sumer income and a slow growth rate in Britain has been
the partial loss of its export colonial market. Since 1960,
imports to Britain have exceeded exports. The average
annual amounts that British imports exceeded British
exports for specific periods were as follows (in millions
of pounds sterling) :
1960-64 76
1965-69 23
1970-74 518
1974 3,668
1975 1,657
1976 811
By 1972, the British Empire had shrunk from 12,960,-
000 square miles to 94,000 square miles. This was 0.7 of 1
percent of its size 60 years earlier. In 1912, the empire had
a population of 439 million people, of which about 400
million were in the colonies. India, which with its 350
million people had been the largest colony, became an
independent republic in 1950. In 1972, Britain had a
population of 56 million people, or one-eighth that of
the 1912 empire.
Historically, British policy had been to secure raw
products from its colonies and sell manufactured prod-
ucts back to them at monopoly prices. Loss of its colonial
market has forced Britain to compete on a world basis.
Added to Britain's loss of part of its export colonial
market was the oil embargo of 1973, which caused a
sharp increase in the cost of oil. By 1974, imports to
Britain including oil exceeded exports by £3.7 billion.
In 1976, imports were £811 million above exports.
Balance of Payments Related to Devaluations
For over a century prior to World War II the foun-
dation for money values throughout the world had been
the Bank of England and the pound sterling. Hence the
decline in the value of the pound during the past three
decades is striking evidence of the decline of the British
economy. As stated earlier, the value of the pound ster-
ling in Britain was stabilized in 1977 at $1.72-$1.74 in
US dollars, or at about one-third of its value before
World War II.
The decline in the value of the British pound in US
dollars has been as follows
:
Pre-World War II $4.80
December 1946 4.03 (Devalued)
September 1949 2.80 (Devalued)
November 1967 2.40 (Devalued)
December 1971 2.61
June 1972 2.57
28 Oct. 1976 1.56
5 Sept. 1977 1.74
Devaluation of the pound in Britain has been closely
associated with an excess of imports over exports. During
the war years from 1940 to 1944, imports exceeded ex-
ports an average £728 million annually. In 1945, imports
to Britain were £870 million more than e.xports. This
situation led to the December 1946 devaluation.
Following this, Britain continued to be plagued by an
unfavorable balance of trade. From 1945 to 1949, British
imports exceeded exports an a\erage of £291 million a
year. On 18 September 1949, the pound was again de-
valued, to $2.80.
Following that devaluation, Britain enjoyed a brief
respite from balance of payments problems. From 1950
to 1959, British exports exceeded imports by an average
of £105 million a year. Unfortunately this period of fi-
nancial relaxation was brief. From 1960 to 1966, imports
exceeded exports by an average of £61 million a year.
In November 1967, Britain devalued the pound to $2.40.
As observed earlier, the oil embargo and subsequent
higher prices for oil put the finishing touches on the
British balance of trade. In 1974, Britain suffered the
worst trade deficit in its histor)' w-ith imports exceeding
exports by £3.7 billion. The market value of the poimd,
which had increased to $2.61 in December 1971, fell to
an all-time low of $1 .56 in October 1976.
Loans to Britain negotiated by Prime Minister Cal-
laghan stopped the downward spiral, at least temporarily,
and resulted in a slight increase in the value of the pound
to the recently relatively stable $1.72 to $1.74.
Some Future Possibilities for Great Britain
In the preceding discussion, Britain has been por-
trayed as a sick country. In reviewing these historical
developments, one may well raise the question: What is
the probable future of Britain as an industrial nation?
Despite the current gloomy outlook for Britain, there are
some bright spots in its industrial horizon. These include
( 1
)
Oil production now flowing from offshore Scot-
land;
(2) The outstanding success of Imperial Chemical
Industries, an efficient worldwide company with its head-
quarters in Britain;
(3) Increased foreign investment in Britain, exem-
plified by a new $313 million engine plant being built
by the Ford Motor Company in southern Wales; and
(4) Major emphasis on research and development.
New Oil. Unquestionably, potential income from off-
shore oil is an optimistic factor in the future of Britain.
As the flow of oil increases, oil imports can be decreased,
thereby bringing British imports more nearly into line
with its exports. Furthermore, potential income from oil
will buy time in which industrial and labor leaders will
have an opportunity to adopt policies which may enable
Britain to compete in world markets. During this period
of grace, government leaders will also have time to re-
view priorities in Britain's overexpanded public sector
and, it is to be hoped, discard programs where perfor-
mance fails to justify costs.
Imperial Chemical Industries. Bowed down with tra-
dition, obsolescence, and high unit costs for many of
its manufactured goods. Imperial Chemical Industries
(ICI) has achieved a turnabout in Britain which de-
serves to rank as one of the most important management
accomplishments of this century. The performance of
the company, which has capital assets of $7.9 billion and
annual sales of over $7 billion, may point the way for a
new industrial re\olution in Britain.
Engine Plant of Ford Motor Company. In September
1977, southern Wales landed a $313 million engine plant
from the Ford Motor Company. This was based upon a
good labor record in Britain and London's industrial in-
centives. The plant will employ 2,500 and generate jobs
for 5,000 in related fields. Heni7 Ford II, the company
chairman, said the decision was "an important vote of
confidence in Britain's ability to improve its industrial
performance."
Potential Industrial Expansion Through Research
and Development. Fundamental and applied research is
building a solid foundation for bringing about increased
productivity and lower unit costs for British industries.
Basic or fundamental research has moved almost com-
pletely into the colleges and universities, largely financed
by government. Applied research is carried on chiefly
by the faster-growing industries such as Imperial Chem-
ical Industries.
A study made in 1963 showed that Britain has 285,000
trained researchers, or about a third of some 900,000
trained research people in Europe. This same study
showed that research and development in 13 countries
had brought Western Europe far ahead of the Soviet
Union in science and technology and only a step behind
the United States in many fields. Britain and France led
the European countries in spending for fundamental re-
search, a shift from the traditional centers of scientific
expertise from such countries as Germany and Switzer-
land.
Developments such as these suggest that despite its
current sickness, it is not impossible that Britain may be
able to regain its place among the industrial nations of
the world.
Agricultural and Food Policy— Issues and Decisions
R. G. F. SPITZE
The President signed the Food and Agriculture Act
of 1977 in September of last year. It is expected that this
legislation will have a significant impact on US farm
producers, food and fiber consumers, traders, taxpayers,
and other nations. This article presents a conceptional
and historical backdrop against which the policy provi-
sions in the Food and Agriculture Act of 1977 can be
considered.
The Policy Model
Current policy developments can be viewed within a
system of concepts through which we can understand pol-
icy classification, formation processes, and implications
(Chart 1). Given a problem situation, policy may be
viewed as an identifiable decision and action to achieve
a desired end. Thus conceived, it encompasses most of
what people and their institutions do. When policy arises
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tural economics. University of Illinois, Urbana-
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policy at the University of London and at the US
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Alternative Directions for the United States and
Implications for Research. He has a forthcoming
invited article in the American Journal of Agri-
t ultural Economics, "The Food and Agricultural
.\ct of 1977 — Economic Analysis."
from individuals and interest groups, it can be seen as
private policy.
However, not all problems of society seem to be
solved by private policy. Conflicts persist; community
goals remain unattained ; and socioeconomic externalities
exist. When policy emerges from many individual and
group interests through compromise in representative
governments, it can be seen as public policy. A major
responsibility of public agricultural research and educa-
tion institutions is the creation and dissemination of de-
pendable knowledge to help citizens fashion their own
policy.
Public agricultural and food policy as an area seems
to be evolving as a merger of early farm policy, then
agricultural policy, and recently food policy. The con-
cerns in the first century of our nation's history were fo-
cused on developing a productive agriculture. But in the
past quarter-century, the focus of public interest has
shifted toward food. In particular, consumers have called
attention to their apprehensions regarding the quality,
availability, and cost of food. Public price and income
policy represents yet another evolution within agricul-
tural and food policy. That is, early public interest in
issues of land and conservation, education and research,
credit, and marketing gave way in the 1920s to concerns
about prices, incomes, consumers, trade, and Treasury
transfers.
Why Continued Public Price
and Income Policy
The 1977 act adds to a succession of public price and
income policies. The .\gricultural Marketing Act of 1929
(Federal Farm Board) represented our first attempt in
this area. It was followed by, among others, the 1933
Agricultural Adjustment Act, and most recently the Ag-
ricultural and Consumer Protection Act of 1973. Ap-
Table 1 . Percentage Changes in US Farm Output
and Productivity with Comparisons^
1950-55 12.2
1955-«0 9.6
1960-65 7.7
1965-70 3.1
1970-75 12.9
' Total change during l
Sources: Derived from
parently, this policy stream has continued because prob-
lems have persisted.
Importance. The agricultural and food sector remains
important economically notwithstanding our increasingly
urbanized, industrialized economy. It is true that some
measures suggest that agriculture has become less impor-
tant. Farm production has dropped from 11 percent of
gross national product in 1950 to 6 percent in 1976, and
food and clothing has declined from 39 percent of con-
sumption to 28 percent. During the same period the farm
population has fallen from 15 percent of the total to 4
percent. Even so, this sector essentially supplies the na-
tion's population with raw food, plus an additional net
agricultural export of $12 billion for 1976. The agricul-
tural surplus wiped out a nonagricultural trade deficit
and left a $3.5 billion net balance.
Productivity. Farm production continues a favorable
record of productivity (Table 1) . Aggregate farm output
has increased between 10 percent and 13 percent over
the five-year intervals since 1950 with the exception of
the 1960s during which a public policy of production
control set aside 55-65 milUon acres of cropland (from
a total of 350 million) annually to relieve excess supply.
There was a much higher pace of output growth in our
expanding nonfarm economy. Farm productivity and
worker productivity has also been impressive, the latter
consistently higher than nonfarm.
Price and Income Levels. The price instability and
income level problems that have underlain public pohcy
for over a quarter-century continue to plague the sector
(Chart 2). Product prices received by farmers reveal
greater variability than wholesale prices generally; total
farm per capita incomes var)' from 58 percent to 109
percent of the nonfarm; consumer food prices are slightly
more unstable than consumer prices generally (CPI).
The terms of trade between prices received and prices
paid turned adversely from 1960 to 1971 and from 1974
to the present. For two years, 1973-74, the terms of
trade and income were at record favorable levels.
Are the recent lush years the vanguard of the future
or will depressed prices and incomes of the past return
with a vengeance? The future price and income levels
are related to the balance between US agricultural sup-
ply and demand. For 1976, the increase in agricultural
output was 2.6 percent. To balance this, population in-
creased 0.7 percent and the income effect is estimated to
be 0.4 percent, leaving 1.5 percent of the additional sup-
ply to be met by new net exports and acquisition. Yet net
exports showed no real increase. Price elasticity concepts
suggest that such a margin would likely result in more
than a 5 percent erosion of prices. In fact, by the fourth
quarter, farm prices had declined 6 percent over the
year and total net income had also dropped. The pres-
ence of the price and income problem is vivid.
The stage is set for a further integration of agricul-
tural and food issues. Concern over food was dramatized
internationally in the World Food Conference and has
been intensified domestically by nutritional deficiencies
highlighted by investigations of the Senate Committee on
Chart 1. Classification of Policy
POLICY
(Decision and/or Action)
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food
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Nutrition. As a final impetus to policy development, the
1973 act was due to expire on 31 December 1977. This
meant that P.L. 480 was facing termination, and that
grains, cotton, dairy, and wool programs would revert to
an earlier policy of higher price supports and no effec-
tive production control, which few people wanted.
Processes and Alternatives
The complex public policy formation process gained
speed soon after the national election in November 1976.
Proposals, positions, and studies were issued by general
Chart 2. Price and Income Trends
Prices (1960 = 100)
Bureau of Economic and Business Research
farm and commodity organizations, consumer, labor,
business and citizen groups, the farm press, political can-
didates and parties, community meetings, professional
workers, and congressional staffs. The alternatives com-
monly considered were ( 1 ) simple extension of the rela-
tively minimal impact 1973 act; (2) a dismantling of
essentially all public price and income policy; or (3) even
greater expansion of public involvement.
By the time the new 95th Congress was organized in
early 1977, 37 specific bills had been introduced, includ-
ing a pivotal bipartisan proposal by Senators Talmadge
(D) and Dole (R). The Senate Committee on Agricul-
ture, Nutrition and Forestry took the lead by launching
public hearings in February. These continued for 17
days with additional in-the-field sessions. Secretary Berg-
land presented Administration views. The committee
then met 19 April-4 May in mark-up sessions to work
out its compromise. The full Senate adopted its version
of the new policy (S. 275) on 24 May 1977. The House
committee followed similcirly, with a total of 72 days on
a bill (H.R. 7171) which was adopted by the House on
28 July 1977.
After days of negotiation, a conference version was
agreed to on 5 August 1977. The Senate approved on 9
September 1977, by a vote of 63 to 8, followed by a 283-
107 favorable House vote on 16 September. Cast in the
middle ground, this final version embodied less assistance
than originally sought by the Congress, but with higher
Treasury cost than desired by the President. It was truly
a compromise. President Carter signed the Food and
Agriculture Act of 1977, to set the course of public price
and income policy in the agricultural and food sector for
the next four years.
Provisions and Implications of New Policy
The Food and Agriculture Act of 1977 proceeds
along a path charted in the early 1960s, involving price
supports, direct payments, voluntary production control,
and food subsidization (both domestic and foreign). Its
chief purposes may be capsuled as ( 1 ) price stabilization
and income assistance to farm producers; (2) food avail-
ability to domestic consumers through an assisted and a
stabilized market; and (3) agricultural export availabil-
ity through price stabilization, reserves, and assistance
(Table 2).
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Economic Activity Moderates
A sense of deja vu accompanies an investigation of
recent economic statistics. As was the case last year, un-
usually bad weather has had a pronounced, short-run
impact on the economy. As was the case last year, energy
shortages have played a prominent role in cutting back
activity. Thus it is still important to distinguish between
short-run, transitory', and quickly reversible developments
on the one hand, and longer-term, persistent, underlying
trends on the other hand.
Notwithstanding recent shortfalls, I believe that the
economy will continue to register strong gains. Despite
reductions in output, employment has moved higher and
unemployment has declined. Also in evidence are some
unwanted symptoms of continued strength in the econ-
omy: the rate of inflation has cjuickened and interest
rates have edged upward. Monetary developments con-
tinue to provide a background for economic expansion.
Output Has Slowed
Winter weather conditions, cutbacks in auto produc-
tion, and the coal strike pushed industrial output down
sharply at the start of 1978 (see chart). January's 8.4
percent annual rate of decrease was the most severe since
March 1975. Slower sales of domestic automobiles led to
a reduction in auto production.
I e.xpect industrial output to reboimd sharply, but
available statistics offer no comfort. Durable goods orders
were down sharply in January. The decline, led by a
huge decrease in new orders for defense equipment, was
the steepest in three years. Orders for nondefense capital
goods also decreased significantly. Fortunately, both of
these areas showed large gains in December.
Home building dropped sharply in January, reflect-
ing adverse weather. Although the January pace was 1
1
percent above the year-earlier rate, housing starts were
down nearly one-third from December. The seasonal ad-
justment process is so important with the housing starts
statistics that small changes in actual starts introduce
wide swings in the seasonally adjusted series. Hence,
there is little reason to believe that there is a serious
weakness in this industry.
Labor Market Has Improved
The nation's unemployment rate dropped at the be-
ginning of 1978 to its lowest level since October 1974.
Industrial Production
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This strong improvement came on the heels of Decem-
ber's significant decrease in the jobless rate. With the un-
employment rate now at 6.3 percent of the work force,
the continuing decline gives further credence to the Ad-
ministration's projection of a year-end jobless rate below
6 percent. The jobless rate for adult women registered a
decline from 6.6 percent to 6.1 percent, cajjping the im-
pressive gains women made in the labor market in 1977.
Accompanying the welcome fall in unemployment was
another record for the number of persons employed. Em-
ployment rose to nearly 93 million in mid-January, up
272,000 from December.
The Department of Labor relies on a national survey
of 56,000 persons to estimate the jobless rate. Prior to
January, this poll covered only 47,000 persons. The larger
survey is part of government's ongoing effort to provide
improved economic indicators.
Spending Has Moderated
Retail spending dropped precipitously in January.
Severe weather was blamed for the decline. But, in any
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event, this series is extremely erratic, and one month's
data must be interpreted with care. Industry officials
blamed the decline in auto sales on the winter storms.
However, import sales jumped sharply during the same
period.
A recent Commerce Department survey pointed to
sluggish business spending on plant and equipment in
1978. Businesses expect expenditures to increase 4.5 per-
cent this year, only about half the increase needed to
fuel GNP growth of 4 percent. Although other sur-
ve)'s point to slightly greater investment increases, none
matches the 1977 increase (8.7 percent).
Inflation Has Accelerated
The newly developed finished goods price index is
stressed by the Labor Department because it avoids the
double counting of price increases that plagues the
wholesale price index. In January, the overall wholesale
price index rose at nearly an 11 percent annual rate (see
chart)
.
The finished goods index rose at a 7.2 percent
annual rate. The chief push to higher wholesale prices
came from cost increases in the early stages of produc-
tion, with higher prices for unprocessed crude materials
and intermediate goods accounting for most of the infla-
tionary pressure. Consumer prices rose at an 8.4 percent
annual rate in January.
Price increases at the wholesale level began accelerat-
ing in the fall. There is a view that some time is required
before price increases at early stages in the production
process are transmitted through to the retail level. If
Continued on page 12
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Local Illinois Developments
Illinois Gross State Product
Though many Illinois residents are familiar with the
concept of gross national product (GNP) and its esti-
mates, fewer are aware of the Illinois state equivalent,
the gross state product (GSP), and its magnitudes. GSP
is the value of all goods and services produced in Illinois
during one year. The Illinois Department of Business
and Economic Development has recently released second
quarter 1977 figures and revised 1976 calendar year
estimates.
Illinois gross state product is estimated to have in-
creased to a seasonally adjusted annual rate of $107.2
billion in the second quarter of 1977, a gain of nearly
$3.1 billion over the first quarter. Manufacturing, ser-
vices, and retail and wholesale trade accounted for most
of the increase. Only agriculture suffered a decline.
In real (constant dollar) terms, GSP increased by
$900 million, an annual rate of increase of 5.1 percent.
This rate of increase was below the 5.8 percent recorded
in the first quarter.
Estimates for the most recent year show GSP for 1976
to have been 10.4 percent above the figure for 1975. In
constant dollars, the 1976 figure was 4.9 percent above
that for 1975. For the 1966-76 decade, the current dollar
GNP and GSP: Percentage
Change from Preceding Period
(Constant dollar basis)
Percent
Illinois Business Indexes
Dec. Percentage
1977 change from
(1967 Nov. Dec.
^ 100) 1977 1976
Employment— manufacturing' . . . n.a.
Weekly earnings — manufacturing' n.a.
Consumer prices in Chicago^ 180.0 + 0.3 + 6.4
Life insurance sales (ordinary)^ ... . 298.5 +11.5 +11.1
Retail sales^ 259.4» +17.1 +19.8
Farm prices'^ 192.0 + 4.3 + 0.0
Building permits— ^esidential^.. 58.8 -49.1 +2.5
Coal production^ 14.5 -85.1 -84.3
Petroleum production' 43.4 + 3.3 - 2.8
' III Dcpl. of Labor; ' US Bureau of Ijbor Sutistics; Life Ins. Agcy. Manag. Assn
• US Depl. of Commerce; > 111. Crop Rpls.; • III. Dept. of Mines: ' Iir Geol. Survey.
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 I97G
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rate of gain in 1976 was second only to 1973's 12.2 per-
cent. These are considerably higher than the rates indi-
cated in the previous report and are due to increases in
the personal income figures pubHshed by the US Depart-
ment of Commerce.
Over the 1961-76 period the average annual rate of
real growth in Illinois GSP was 2.7 percent. The reces-
sion of 1970 had the effect of reducing long-term growth
rates below the 4 percent level of the latter 1960s, and
the 1974-75 recession further reduced the rates to less
than 3 percent.
GSP estimates are also broken down by industry. The
three major categories are private nonfarm, government,
and agriculture. Fourth-quarter 1976 figures show the
percentages of total GSP represented by these three cate-
gories to be about 88 percent, 9 percent, and 3 percent
respectively. Private nonfarm includes seven subcatego-
ries which, in order of decreasing dollar magnitudes are
manufacturing; wholesale and retail trade; finance, in-
surance, and real estate; services; transportation, com-
munication, and public utilities; contract construction;
and mining. Manufacturing, including durable and non-
durable goods, is nearly twice the size of the next
category and nearly 30 percent of the GSP. Govern-
ment makes a contribution comparable with transporta-
tion, communication, and utilities. Agriculture weighs in
slightly behind contract construction and is three to four
times greater than mining.
Quarterly reports of the GSP are available on re-
quest from the Oflfice of Research, Illinois Department of
Business and Economic Development, 222 South College
Street, Springfield, Illinois 62704.
The Alton Locks and Dam 26 Controversy
National attention has focused upon a debate con-
cerning the replacement of a set of locks and a dam near
Alton, Illinois. The controversy has become a symbolic
battleground between economic and environmental in-
terests. In fact, the debate now encompasses a more im-
portant question of national transportation policy.
The Alton Locks and Dam 26 are strategically lo-
cated between the points where the Illinois and the Mis-
souri rivers pour their traffic into the Mississippi. The
structure, which is located 15 river miles north of St.
Louis, is a vital link in the Midwest's river transport sys-
tem. River traffic along 19 miles of St. Louis shoreline
has spawned a regional economy which boasts a wide
spectrum of manufacturing activity. Additionally, the
many railroads and truck companies that operate there
have made the area the second largest transportation
center in the US.
The government entered the canal building business
on a massive scale in the 1930s with the aim of both
creating jobs and boosting competition against thriving
railroad companies. Completed in 1938, Locks and Dam
26 were part of a nine-foot channel stretching along the
Mississippi from the Ohio River to Minneapolis.
The Anny Corps of Engineers cites two major prob-
lems with the Alton comple.x: inadequate locking capac-
ity and structural deterioration. Between 1969 and 1974
the Corps was preparing plans for replacement of the
structure with a new and larger 12-foot channel. The
action was strongly opposed by the railroads and environ-
mentalists, and in 1974 the Isaac Walton League, Sierra
Club, and 21 western railroads obtained an injunction
stopping construction bids. The plaintiffs claimed that
the replacement was an initial step in a scheme to replace
a whole series of locks and to extend a 12-foot channel
stretching northward. In addition, the Corps did not file
adequate environmental and economic impact state-
ments, and there was some doubt whether the structure
needed replacement.
The environmental groups assert that the Corps has
emphasized commercial navigation at the expense of the
environment— wing dike construction and dredging ac-
tivity harm backwater areas which provide a habitat for
wildlife. Additional traffic resulting from the 12-foot
channel would also bring about increased turbidity of
the water and contribute to pollution. The Corps con-
sistently denies any plan for a 12-foot channel.
The railroads which compete along river routes com-
plain that generous subsidies reduce barge operating
costs, thereby giving the waterways an "unfair" competi-
tive advantage. In general, subsidies to transport indus-
tries have been common. Computing 1976 subsidies as
a percentage of revenues, the barge industry got 41 per-
cent, compared with 3 percent or less for other modes.
Meanwhile, Locks and Dam 26 has become a costly
bottleneck through which the traffic on the upper Mis-
sissippi and the Illinois rivers must pass. Because of its
small size, barges in 1976 were forced to wait an average
of nine hours for passage. During busy months, the delays
can be several days in length. The Army Corps of Engi-
neers asserts that the facility has critically deteriorated
because of overuse.
Several studies have disagreed with the Corps's con-
clusion regarding a need for replacement of Locks and
Dam 26. Some state that changes in locking efficiency
would reduce costly delays. Several engineering studies
have also concluded that the present facility can be re-
paired with minimum cost to the taxpayer.
Over 80 percent of the cargo shipped through Locks
and Dam 26 is agriculture and energy related. About 56
percent of export grain moving from the upper Missis-
sippi basin, approximately 28 percent of all refined pe-
troleum products, and 31 percent of all fertilizers move
by barge. Also, six power utility systems along the upper
Mississippi— none having rail facilities — depend com-
pletely on the waterway for coal and oil transport.
The User Charge Debate
Congress is currently on the verge of enacting the
first waterway user charge in the nation's history. Despite
the fact that the past eight presidents have advocated
some form of user fees, Congress has insisted on the
o])eration and maintenance of 25,000 miles of channels
without assessing the users. But public awareness of the
fast-growing barge industiy's free use and the growing
expenditure of government for waterways coupled with
the competitive impact of waterway subsidies on the
railroads have led to a reevaluation of federal policy.
The Locks and Dam 26 project has become a symbol
for the whole stnaggle o\er whether new vvaterway proj-
ects are necessary and whether government should pick
up the bill. President Carter has threatened to veto any
measure to replace the locks or dam which does not in-
clude user fees. What has emerged is a House-passed bill
that approves a new $432 million lock and dam near
Alton along with a nationwide fuel tax on commercial
barges using the inland waterways. Starting 1 October
1979, diesel fuel used by commercial barges would be
taxed 4 cents a gallon, with an increase in 1981 to 6
cents a gallon. This would raise about $50 million, or
less than 10 percent of the federal government's annual
watenvay costs. A Senate bill favors a tax, phased in over
a 10-year period, which would recover 100 percent of
waterway operation and maintenance costs.
Estimates suggest that a 4-cent tax would increase
diesel fuel costs by 10 percent and overall barging costs
by 4 percent. Nevertheless, the National Watenvays Con-
ference, a broad-based watenvays interest group, has
endorsed the House plan, since beneficiaries are now "in
a position stable enough to make a reasonable tax con-
tribution to help maintain the public waterways." The
Conference opposes the Senate plan.
The railroads, naturally, are firmly backing the plan
for full cost recovery. michael treeing
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Economic Implications of Slowing
Population Growth in Illinois
LARRY NEAL
What do you think has happened to the absolute
number of babies bom annually in this country since
1970? If you answered that the absolute number of
babies bom each year has dropped, you are among the
few people \vho have remained immune to the scares of
population explosion in this country. Even so, you may
be unaware of the extent to which births have fallen.
Table 1 shows the number of births annually in the
United States and in the state of Illinois from 1967
through 1976.
The absolute number of births has been trending
down since 1957 for the United States as a whole, and
since 1959 for the state of Illinois. This downward trend
was interrupted for two years, 1969 and 1970, for rea-
sons which are still not clear. Since 1970, however, the
trend has been resumed with a vengeance, finally bot-
toming out in 1973 at a level where it has remained for
over four years. (The 1977 figures will show about 3.2
million births for the United States and about 170,000
for Illinois.)
Gradually, public awareness is spreading that the
fears of runaway population growth which motivated the
cult of zero population growth at the end of the 1960s
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Survey of the Effects of Slowing Population Growth
on Investment Demand" (T. Espenshade and W.
Serow, eds., The Economic Consequences of Slow-
ing Population Growth). The last-named article
was originally presented at a conference dealing
with the economic problems arising from the recent
slowdown in population growth. The conference
papers formed the basis for a feature article "Amer-
icans Change" in Bu.'^ness Week, 20 February 1978.
were wildly misplaced. Even so, few people outside the
limited circle of professional demographers perceive just
how misplaced were the fears of another baby boom in
the 1970s, one that would echo one generation later the
baby boom of the late 1940s. Within that charmed circle
of cognoscenti, moreover, there are all too many individ-
uals who stated confidently, publicly, and frequently that
Americans were having too many babies. They argued
that special steps in the form of economic disincentives,
social castigation, and outright persecution were needed
to reduce the birth rate. For these people, the slightest
remission in the sharply downward course of total births
which has occurred since 1970 is cause to ring out the
old alarms and to raise another scare about excess babies.
On the other side of the ring, those who were profes-
sionally cautious about projecting mnaway population
growth in the 1960s remain even more cautious today
about mentioning the rapid population decline which
will occur if recent fertility changes continue for a few
more years.
Economic Causes of Declining Fertility
The decline in fertility during the 1970s came as a
great surprise to nearly all demographers. Since the lead-
ing edge of the postwar baby boom reached the prime
childbearing ages of 20-24 during the years 1966-70,
most demographers anticipated a reversal of the decline
in births during the late 1960s. Moreover, since the post-
war baby boom in absolute numbers had not peaked until
1957, they expected the uptum in births to continue
Table 1. Number of Live Births Annually,
United States and Illinois, 1967-76
(Thousands)
United
States
1967
Table 2. Female Participation Rates^
and General Fertility Rates,^
United States, 1966-75
Year
below the lowest projection figure for that date as well.
In July 1976, the Bureau of the Budget revised its pro-
jections once more, since these projections are used by all
the state agencies as the basis for planning future budget
needs. For 1980, a slightly higher population of 11,448,-
832 was projected while by the year 2000 the population
was projected to be 13,927,528. In December 1977, the
projections were again altered, this time to a much re-
duced figure of 12,713,000 in the year 2000. These wild
fluctuations in the estimates of population for the year
2000, from a high of over 21 million to a low of well
under 13 million, have all occurred in the past decade.
Migration Patterns
Most of the fluctuations in the projections of Illinois
population have arisen from the same source of variabil-
ity in nationwide projections — the failure of the baby
boom children to reproduce themselves as expected. For
the state of Illinois, however, an additional source of
variability arises which does not afTect the national esti-
mates. This is the change which occurs in the patterns
of internal migration. In the 1970s, in contrast with the
1960s, metropolitan areas in the country have lost popu-
lation as a result of internal migration. Overall, their
absolute population levels have continued to rise because
their natural increase is still greater than the loss of popu-
lation from outmigration. In the period 1970-75, a net
movement of nearly 1.6 million people occurred from
the nation's metropolitan areas to its nonmetropolitan
areas. In 1975-76, metropolitan areas lost another 400,-
000 via internal migration. Within the metropolitan
areas, the central cities have continued to lose popula-
tion in absolute levels, just as they did in the 1960s.
Illinois showed very similar patterns during the period
1970-75, with absolute population in its metropolitan
areas rising slightly in spite of greatly increased outmi-
gration to nonmetropolitan areas. For the State as a
whole, this new pattern of internal migration meant that
every year thus far in the 1970s has seen a substantial
loss of population due to migration whereas in the 1960s
most years saw a net inmigration to the State. The net
movement of people out of the State from 1970 through
1975 has been estimated as high as 342,000. This has
kept the absolute rise in population of the State to only
1 7,000 during this period.
Only sample studies are available at this point to
analyze more accurately the migration flows which have
occurred in the 1970s from Illinois. The best such study
to date used unpublished data from a 10 percent sample
of participants in the federal social security program who
have continuous work histories (C. L. Jusenius and L. C.
Ledebur, A Myth in the Making [Washington: US De-
partment of Commerce, November 1976].) These data
omit the self-employed and agricultural, railroad, and
public employees who do not participate in federal social
security. In this sample, 43,300 people left Illinois for one
of the states in tiie Sunbelt-South during the period
1973-74. This was a year of exceptionally large migratory
movements. On the other hand, 37,900 people left one of
the Sunbelt-South states to come to Illinois in this same
period. The outmigrants from Illinois went primarily to
Florida, Texas, and Tennessee. The inmigrants to Illinois
came from the same three states for the most part. The
experience of Illinois wth respect to the Sunbelt-South
is similar to that of the other states in the so-called
Northern Industrial Tier. The much slower growth of
population in Illinois and the northern industrial tier
relative to the South and the Sunbelt has been due not
so much to people actually moving from the North to
the South in large numbers but more to the much higher
rates of natural increase which exist in the South. The
South generally has a population characterized by lower
levels of education, less urbanization, and lower partici-
pation rates of women in the labor force— all conditions
which have always been associated with higher fertility
rates.
Nevertheless, these recent migration patterns appear
historically unprecedented. There has been speculation
that a new historical epoch is upon us during which the
South shall rise again. All this ignores a very important
historical precedent for the current movement of people
out of the metropolitan areas and back to the country-
side. This was the Great Depression of the 1930s. The
migration patterns of the 1970s, in other words, may be
nothing more than yet another piece of evidence that
the depression of the 1970s has been the worst in this
country since the 1930s and in many respects has been
equally damaging. Loss of jobs in Illinois as a result of
the depression may have caused many of the recent ar-
rivals from other states who came during the 1960s to
return to their rural origins. It is very likely, then, that
short-run economic conditions explain much of the un-
usual migration patterns of the 1970s.
An interesting sidelight which helps confirm the im-
portant role of the economic depression rather than the
allure of the sun is that the Illinois population aged 55
and above has actually been growing a bit faster than the
national average during the 1970s. Rather than heading
immediately for Florida or Texas upon retirement, most
Illinoisans remain in the State with their family and
friends (and medical services). This is also true for the
overwhelming majority of retirees nationally.
Implications
What are the economic implications for the state of
Illinois of these demographic changes? The answer has to
be broken down into t\\'o parts— one corresponding to
the long-run decline in fertility rates which Illinois is
sharing with the rest of the nation, the odier to the loss
by migration of population to other states. Of the two
aspects, the first is the more important for Illinois. The
fall in births is a phenomenon with long-run implications -
for the nation as a whole. Any individual state can avoid
these implications only if it is a state with much higher
than average rates of inmigration or outmigration. Illi-
nois has changed from a state with net inmigration to
one with net outmigration. Since migrants are heavily
concentrated in a relatively narrow age span among the
young adults and their very young children, a state with
high rates of net migration, either inward or outward,
will find the age structure of its population becoming
different from the national average. Compared with the
states with high migration rates, Illinois is not a large-
scale exporter of people in the 1970s just as it was not
a really important importer in the 1960s. The age struc-
ture of the Illinois population in 1975 was virtually iden-
tical with that of the nation as a whole, as it was in 1970.
The implications of the decline in birth rates are very
encouraging for the Illinois economy during the next de-
cade, just as they are for the national economy. Fewer
babies, combined with the higher participation rates of
women in the labor force, mean further increases in per
capita income and consumption. Increases in per capita
income have always been more important for creating
new markets and consumer demands than increases in
numbers of people. The pattern of consumption demands
will be changed, of course, but the decline in demand for
baby and children's goods, for example, will be more
than offset by the rise in demand for convenience items
for the working woman. Even in children's items, the
dampening effects of fewer numbers will likely be more
than offset by a rise in the quality of children's goods
demanded.
Increases in consumption will likely induce a rapid
expansion in capital stock once the effects have worn off
of the sudden, sharp increases in the price of capital
goods in the mid-1970s. These price increases were due
mainly to the successive shocks of the en\-ironmental
crisis and the energy crisis. It is unlikely these kinds of
shocks will be repeated for some time, but one cannot
blame business for maintaining a "wait and see" attitude
for a while longer. In the meantime, there are so many
new entrants to the labor force each year, thanks both
to the maturing of the postwar baby boom and the much
increased participation rate of younger women, it is more
profitable to expand production by increasing labor in-
puts rather than capital inputs.
If this analysis is correct, the economic prospects in
the next decade are quite bright. The demographic im-
plications, however, are much different. The key to the
economic prosperity of the 1980s is further increases in
both the productivity and the participation rates of
women in the labor force. If these increases do take place
they will likely be at the expense of further drops in the
fertility rates of American women. In other words, the
fertility drop of the 1970s is not merely a short-run phe-
nomenon which will be reversed very soon. It is likely
to continue through the 1980s as well.
To conclude, the failure of the population of Illinois
to grow more rapidly during the 1970s has been due to
two factors: (1) the sharp drop in fertility in the State;
and (2) the change from net inmigration to net outmi-
gration. Both factors have economic causes. The drop
in fertility is nationwide and is associated with a long-
term economic change— the rising importance of women
in the labor force. In Illinois, as in the nation, the eco-
nomically depressing effects of a reduction in population
growth from natural causes will be offset by the increased
incomes which women will earn. Businessmen and public
ser\ants alike will have to adjust rapidly to the changes
in the structure of economic and social demands which
are now occurring. The loss of population from migra-
tion, on the other hand, is true of the northern industrial
tier as a whole, but it is not large in scale and it is very'
likely short run in duration. It will be reversed when the
national economy begins to grow rapidly again.
Alternative Mortgage Instruments— Who Wins ?
CARROLL R. MELTON
Volatile home mortgage rates in recent years have
induced both lenders and borrowers to seek relief in the
form of reduced capital value risk for lenders and more
manageable monthly payments for borrowers. One ap-
proach that has been employed is the use of mortgage
instruments other than a loan with a fixed rate and an
equal monthly pa\Tnent amortization schedule. This
paper examines three different types of alternative mort-
gage instruments (AMIs) in terms of their impact on
both mortgage lenders and home owners.
The greater risk in mortgage lending in recent years
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nomics from the University of Illinois, Urbana-
Champaign.
has been, and will continue to be, that of capital value
risk rather than default risk. (Foreclosures are typically
less than 1 percent of the total number of mortgages out-
standing.) Once funds have been committed, the finan-
cial position of the lender can be severely affected by a
general price rise. Not only do the dollars that are repaid
in subsequent years purchase less real goods and services,
but persistent inflation drives up all interest rates, which
depreciates the market value of the mortgage as well as
reducing net flows of funds to mortgage lenders. It is
not hard to see how the supply of funds for home mort-
gages could very quickly diminish in a period of rising
prices.
The financial intermediaries that specialize in mort-
gage lending, savings and loan associations and mutual
savings banks, by prudent portfolio management could
be expected to shorten the average maturity of their
assets. As deposit inflows decline, this may be accom-
plished only by rejecting more applications or by liqui-
dating existing assets on the secondary market. In the
past few years, the federally sponsored credit agencies—
Government National Mortgage Association, Farmers
Home Administration, and Federal Home Loan Mort-
gage Corporation— ha\e not been aggressive participants
in the secondary mortgage market. Agency purchases
have averaged 12 percent of new mortgages o\er the
past seven years, and some years have seen net reductions
in their holdings. The response of lenders to these con-
ditions has been to raise mortgage rates, increase down
payment requirements, and effectively turn off the flow
of mortgage funds. This became particularly acute in
1974 when conventional loan rates exceeded 9.5 percent
and FHA loans were priced at over 10 percent.
Since almost all single-family houses are financed by
selling a mortgage on the property, home buyers are hit
in two ways by rising prices; not only do mortgage rates
rise, but constmction costs also rise. The major determi-
nant in a decision to purchase a house is, of course, the
amount of the monthly payment, not the purchase price
or the interest rate. Even the term of the loan has a small
impact on the monthly payment. On a $40,000 mortgage
at 9 percent, increasing the term from 30 to 35 years will
decrease the monthly pa)Tnent by $8.27, a reduction of
2 percent. A 4 percent reduction can be achieved by ex-
tending the term from 30 to 40 years.
Types of Alternatives
It seems likely then that a mortgage transaction could
be achieved which would be advantageous to both parties.
The types of alternative mortgage instruments that are
examined here are the variable-rate mortgage (VRM),
the Canadian rollover mortgage (CR), and the gradu-
ated-pa>Tnent mortgage (GPM). While all three types
have specific advantages and disadvantages for both bor-
rowers and lenders, their most important feature is that
they provide more flexibility in mortgage financing and
thereby facilitate the flow of funds in capital markets.
In the VRM, the interest rate is allowed to vary at
the end of every six-month period on the basis of the
change in an index of the cost of funds to the lender,
which in effect indexes the yield on the loan. The choice
of the index is crucial to the yield to maturity, since the
differential between the loan rate and the cost of funds
is assumed constant over the life of the mortgage in the
case of one commonly used VRM. The cost of funds is
typically some short-term interest rate, and as the spread
between short- and long-term rates varies, the risk to
the lender varies over the business cycle.
The monthly payment, of course, varies every six
months as interest rates change. The borrower is being
charged a rate that more fully reflects the cost of funds
over the life of the loan and is not locked into one rate
of interest. Neither the borrower nor the lender has a
unilateral advantage in a variable-rate mortgage.
The Canadian rollover mortgage, so called because
of its predominance in Canada, is renegotiated after a
set period of time but is amortized over a longer period.
A typical loan is amortized as if it were a 30-year loan
with a balloon payment at the end of five years equal to
the outstanding balance. In principle, the loan could be
called at this point, but the usual practice is to refinance
the balance as a 25-year loan at the then-current rate
with anotlier balloon payment in five years, and so forth.
The most significant difference betvveen the Canadian
rollover and the VRM is that the new interest rate is
determined purely by market forces at the rollover date
rather than being rigidly linked to an index of funds. The
element of risk arising from movements in interest rates
is clearly reduced for the lender, who is able to make a
new loan every five years at the current mortgage rate.
The position of the mortgagor in comparison to a VRM
is essentially unchanged— the time period between rate
adjustments is simply longer.
The graduated-pa>Tiient mortgage produces the most
ambiguity for both the borrower and lender in terms of
advantages and disadvantages. The monthly payment on
a GPM is initially much lower than a standard mortgage
but rises continuously over the life of the loan. The eco-
nomic rationale for financing a house with a GPM is
that the buyer's income is expected to rise over his life-
time and that it will be easier to purchase a house if the
early pa^-ments are lower. The main disadvantage to
the borrower is that the monthly payment is less than the
interest payment. Unless the term of the mortgage is
extended, the outstanding principal rises each month
that the payment falls short of the interest charge. Prin-
cipal repayment will not commence for several years.
Should the buyer sell at any time before amortization of
the principal occurs, he would face the unusual situation
of having to repay in a lump sum more money tlian he
borrowed.
The lender on a GPM is faced with a borrower who
increases his debt for many years, thereby increasing the
risk of defaulting. The lender must continuously extend
more credit at a fi.xed interest rate over the same period,
a distinct disadvantage when rates rise. A variant of the
GPM, the graduated-pa)'ment mortgage with a variable
rate, may be contracted. This type of mortgage would
reduce the lender's interest-rate risk. As interest rates
rise, however, the default risk would increase, since the
unpaid interest which is added to the principal would
rise faster on a variable-rate loan than on a fixed-rate
loan.
A Comparison of Payments
The accompanying table shows the stream of monthly
pa)Tnents for six types of mortgage loans: fixed-rate
(FRM), VRM, three-year Canadian rollover (3-yr.
CR) , five-year Canadian rollover (5-yr. CR) , graduated-
payment with a fixed rate (GPM-FR) and variable
rate (GPM-VR). All of the mortgages are for a prin-
cipal of $30,000 and a term of 30 years. The initial
interest rate was the effective mortgage rate on new
single-family homes in January 1970 of 8.34 percent.
The monthly payment on the FRM is $227.28, which
is constant over all payments. All of the other types re-
sult in unequal monthly payments.
In the variable-rate mortgage (VRM) and the GPM-
VR, the interest rate is allowed to var)' at the end of
eveiy six-month period on the basis of the change in the
cost of funds to savings and loan associations published
by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board. The initial rate
of 8.34 percent is 351 basis points above the cost of funds
index, 4.83 percent in Januar)' 1970, and subsequent ef-
fective rates are also pegged at the same differential. The
payment stream is calculated under the assumptions that
the rate charged the borrower increases or decreases by
the full amount of the change in the cost of funds and
that the term of the mortgage loan is not lengthened at
any point.
The payment streams show that excluding graduated
payments, over this time period the three-year Canadian
rollover results in the lowest average payrnent, $216.37
as compared with $227.28 for the FRM and $233.71 for
the five-year Canadian rollover. The average payment
on the VRM was $245.67, 8 percent and 13.5 percent
higher than the FRM and the three-year Canadian roll-
over, respectively. Over the period January 1970 to June
1977, the mortgage rate ranged from a low of 7.47 per-
cent in May 1971 to a high of 9.37 percent in December
1974.
A different time series of interest rates and cost of
funds index would of course lead to different sequences
of monthly payments, but the table does give some indi-
cation of the relative impacts of rate changes on the
payment stream of alternative mortgage instruments.
Because of the different features of the three main types
of mortgages and their various ramifications for both the
mortgagor and mortgagee, no one type of instrument is
dominant. It is clearly in the best interests of the lender
to make a loan with as much flexibility as possible to
adjust rates to the current market rate and for the bor-
rower to achieve a payment schedule consistent with his
income and goal of increasing his equity in the property.
Although these goals may at times be polar opposites, it
seems likely that with the new types of mortgages that
are being written some set of terms could be agreed upon
which would be satisfactory to both parties. Something
other than simply shutting off funds for mortgages should
be fMDSsible.
The Future of AMIs
Despite the obvious advantages of these alternative
mortgage instruments, they are not in widespread use.
Current laws prohibit federally chartered savings and
loan associations from offering them. Some states, though
not banning them outright, do so de facto because of
possible usury laws violations, especially with VRMs. The
California experience with VRMs has shown a degree
of consumer acceptance of AMIs. State-chartered S&Ls
have bought approximately 200,000 AMIs worth about
$8.5 billion, about 20 percent of all residential mortgages
originated over the past two and one-half years.
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Recent legislative moves may make the availability of
AMIs more widespread. The Housing and Community
Development Act of 1977 (P.L.95-128) passed 12 Octo-
ber 1977 amended the National Housing Act to allow
unlimited amounts of graduated-payment mortgages to
be insured by the FHA. Further provisions exempted
those mortgages so insured from state usury laws. Recent
hearings of the Senate Subcommittee on Financial Insti-
tutions considered proposals to extend VRM authority
to federally chartered savings and loan associations. Al-
though no specific legislation is being considered, the
Congress at least appears to be interested in the pos-
sibility of widening the availability of alternative mort-
gages.
More extensive use of alternative mortgage instru-
ments should be of benefit to both parties in residential
mortgage financing. To answer the question posed in
the title, it seems that everybody wins.
Economic Activity Moderates
Continued from page 2
such a relationship holds, we can expect little relief from
inflationary pressures in the near-term future.
Monetary Developments Are Expansive
Monetary aggregates continue to expand rapidly. The
money supply rose about 7.5 percent during the past year,
somewhat more rapidly than during the two preceding
years. The money supply plus time deposits— sometimes
referred to as M2— rose nearly 9 percent over the past
year. This increase was little changed from growth rates
in the first two years of the current economic expansion.
Interest rates have moved higher since late last year
(see chart). However, such developments do not result
from a tightening in monetary policy. Instead, rising in-
terest rates reflect the acceleration in inflation, and con-
tinual strong credit demands. Business loans rose more
than 8 percent over the past year, and have expanded
at a 14 percent rate since last October.
WILLIAM R. BRYAN
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Economic Lull Continues
There has been a lull in economic activity so far
this year, continuing the slowdown that characterized
the final three months of last year. Production has stabil-
ized; employment and income growth has moderated;
and retail purchases have weakened. Although the rate
of inflation has quickened, interest rates have leveled off.
Government economic actions have shifted toward
less stimulation in the past several months. Monetary
aggregates have declined on balance since early January.
At the same time, federal expenditures have failed to
keep pace with projections.
Output Growth Has Slowed
Physical output of the economy has slipped since the
end of last year. Although industrial production rose at
a 6 ])ercent annual rate in February, the gain was insuffi-
cient to erase the previous month's shortfall (see chart).
Production has been hampered by the unusually severe
weather and the coal strike — both direct and second-
ary, or "ripple," effects. Even so, the February data
show widespread, though modest, output gains— with
increases in production of consumer goods, business
equipment, and materials.
Home building statistics continue to present a bleak
picture. Februar>' housing starts, at nearly a 1.6 million
annual rate, were slightly above the January pace. Al-
though recent home construction rates are more than 20
percent below the pace achieved during much of last
year, it is premature to regard housing as a depressed
industry. Recent changes are likely to reverse themselves
fully in the next few months.
Labor Market Developments Are Mixed
Employment growth has slowed so far this year, but
otherwise the labor market has registered improvement.
Since December, employment has risen at a 2.6 percent
annual rate. In the preceding year employment rose 4.7
percent. Changes in employment tend to be related to
changes in physical output.
Unemployment has continued to drift downward
even though employment growth has slowed. In mid-
February, the unemployment rate reached 6.1 percent,
down from 6.3 percent in January. The household sur-
vey (from which the employment-unemployment data
are generated) was taken prior to the major impact of
Industrial Production
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the coal strike. The survey showed improvement among
nearly all labor market groups. Interest Rates
Aggregate Demand Has Weakened
Household spending has moderated since the end of
last year. Retail sales have expanded slightly since Janu-
ary, but have declined at a 17 percent annual rate since
December. In February, retail sales were 4.9 percent
above their year-earlier pace. During the preceding year
sales rose 9.3 percent. After removing the rise in dollar
volume resulting from inflation, real purchases at the
retail level have actually declined over the past year.
Business plans for plant and equipment expenditures
are lackluster. According to the Commerce Department's
survey taken in January and Februaiy, businesses plan
to spend 10.8 percent more in 1978 than during 1977.
However, prices of capital goods are expected to show a
5.3 percent rise. Thus, real capital e.xpenditures will be
up only 5.5 percent.
Capital spending plans have been adversely affected
by bleak sales prospects— especially after adjustments
for inflation. Also, utilization rates indicate that there is
substantial excess capacity. Factories operated at 82 per-
cent of capacity in February, down from 83 percent in
December. Finally, business profits have been disappoint-
ing, although fourth-cjuarter after-tax profits were 1.3
percent greater than in the third quarter. Adjusted for
inflation and for inventories at replacement costs, profits
probably fell in the fourth quarter.
Demand for domestically produced goods and ser-
vices by foreigners has been substantially less than do-
mestic demand for foreign-produced goods and services.
The trade deficit in 1977 reached $20.2 billion, more
than twice the previous record in 1972, and 14 times
greater than in 1976.
Inflation and Interest Rates
Show Diverse Movements
The rate of inflation has risen rapidly since the end of
last year. Since December, wholesale prices have jumped
upward at more than a 10 percent annual rate, and con-
sumer price increases have been near that rate. In the
preceding eight months, consumer prices rose at a 5.1
percent rate and wholesale prices increased at a 3.2 per-
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cent rate, .\lthough prices of farm products and pro-
cessed foods have remained virtually unchanged on bal-
ance for more than three years, there have been episodes
during which these prices have moved shai-ply upward —
followed by declines. Recently, food price increases have
accelerated. Since September, food prices have risen at
more than a 15 percent annual rate.
Interest rates have remained remarkably stable thus
far in 1978, as they did during the early months of last
year (see chart) . However, it is likely that interest rates
will edge higher during the remainder of the year. Such
a view is based on the belief that the recent lull in busi-
ness activity is temporary, and that the economy will
strengthen.
Monetary and Fiscal Actions Have Tightened
Monetaiy expansion has been stalled since the end
of last year. The money supply (Ml) has drifted down-
ward since the first \veek in January, and has actually
declined shghtly since October. During the preceding
half-year, money rose at nearly an 8 percent annual rate.
These developments may be viewed as a tightening in
monetary policy. However, unless money supply growtli,
is limited for a substantially longer period, economic ac-
tix'ity will not be adversely affected.
Fiscal actions have also tightened. Federal expendi-
tures are running well behind the pace that had been
anticipated. As a result, the forecasted budget deficit for
fiscal 1978 is $53 billion, $8.8 billion below earlier pro-
jections. These developments do not result from an ex-
plicit policy decision. Instead, they reflect administrative
difficulties in hewing to a budget plan.
WILLIAM R. BRYAN
Local Illinois Developments
Illinois Coal Situation
In terms of normal productive capacity, Illinois stands
fourth in US coal production (after Kentucky, West Vir-
ginia, and Pennsylvania) with a capacity of 278,757 tons
per day. The United Mine Workers (UMW) account
for 96 percent of output, compared with about 57 per-
cent in the US as a whole. Since the start of the UMW
strike on 6 December, production in the US has generally
been cut about 50 percent; for the week of 25 February
coal mined was about 49 percent of what it was in the
same week last year. In Illinois, however, production was
down in January' to less than 1/20 of 1 percent of the
level in November, the last month of full production.
Illinois is not only fourth in normal productive ca-
pacity, but it is also fourth in number of miners working,
again after Kentucky, West Virginia, and Pennsylvania.
In number of mines, on the other hand, while Kentucky,
West \^irginia, and Pennsylvania still are the top three
states, Illinois is only ninth. Thus the number of men
working in each mine is higher in Illinois than in any
other leading coal-producing state. Illinois averages 205
men per mine, Kentucky 26, West Virginia 50, and
Pennsylvania 40. UMW unionization is also lower in
those three states; West Virginia approaches the Illinois
percentage with 88 percent unionized, Pennsylvania fol-
lows with 60 percent, and Kentucky has the lowest per-
centage, 39.
The potential of Illinois is indicated by its place just
Coal Production Growth Trend Statistics
Illinois Business Indexes
Jan. Percentage
,,p„ 1978 change from
"^'" (1967 Dec. Jan.
= 100) 1977 1977
Employment— manufacturing' . . . n.a.
Weekly earnings — manufacturing' 208.8 - 3.4 + 5.6
Consumer prices in Chicago' 182.5 +1.4 +7.7
Life insurance sales (ordinary)^ .... n.a.
Retail sales^ .' 182.0' -29.8 -26.4
Farm prices* 195.0 + 1 .5 - 1 .0
Building permits— residential^.. 35.0 -40.4 +90.2
Coal production" 0.0 -82.2 -99.9
Petroleum production' 39.9 - 2.5 +16.3
' 111 Dcpt. oi Labor. = L'S Bureau of Labor Slatjslics; ' Life Ins. .\ec\. Manag. .Assn
' L S Depi. of Commerce; ' 111. Crop Rpls,. • III. Dept. of Mines; ' IIL Geol. Sunev.
State Geological Survey, FEA, and US Bureau of Mil
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behind Montana in recoverable resources. Though there
are important differences between heating values of coals,
the Btu value of Illinois coal is also only slightly inferior
to that of Montana. These facts combined with the fact
that about 80 percent of US coal consumption occurs
east of the Mississippi River (and 35 percent in the five
midwestem states of Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, Illinois,
and Wisconsin) leave Illinois in a good position for
future growth.
Following the Clean Air Act of 1970, the sulfur con-
tent of coal has become an increasingly significant factor
in the evaluation of coal resources. Most of the low sulfur
coal in the US is found west of the Mississippi River, and
even though there is low sulfur coal in Illinois, it repre-
sents less than 3 percent of the total reserves which un-
derlie the State.
Electric utilities are the principal market served by
Illinois coal. In 1966, prior to the Clean Air Act, only
small amounts of western coal was consumed by Illinois
and midwestem utilities. However, by 1975 imported
amounts were significant: Iowa with 41 percent, Illinois
33 percent, Wisconsin 26 percent, and Indiana 14 per-
cent. Similar changes occurred with respect to industrial
and manufacturing uses. Further, desulfurization tech-
nology does not seem to be reversing this trend. One con-
sequence for the utilities has been increasing attractive-
ness of nuclear power.
Thus, though Illinois occupies a potentially impor-
tant place in future US coal production, the Federal
Energy Administration predicts that Illinois growth will
not keep pace with the national projected trends (see
chart) . Unless this pattern is reversed, markets are likely
to shift increasingly to western low-sulfur coal.
Petroleum Refining in Illinois
The demand for petroleum products has grown enor-
mously in the past 25 years. In fact, per capita consump-
tion has more than doubled since World War II. The
most spectacular growth has been in the use of aviation
fuels. Likewise, the demand for gasoline and industrial
heating oils has risen in order to meet the energy needs
of an increasingly mobile labor force and a growing
economy.
It is only through the refining process that crude oil
can be transformed into the many products which supply
this country with one-half of its energy needs. In meeting
these needs oil refining has become the nation's most
capital-intensive industry with an investment of more
than $108,000 for each employee. Moreover, refining
technology has been developed to meet the needs for
more efficient and clean-burning fuels.
About 46.5 percent of total US refinery output is
gasoline; distillate and residual fuel oil account for 31.2
percent, and jet fuel 7 percent. Smaller quantities of a
broad array of other products are also produced (asphalt,
lubricants, kerosene, coke, and wax, for example) . The
product mix of any individual refinery depends upon its
market area, competition, and many other economic
considerations.
About 130 companies operate 270 refineries in the
United States with a total capacity of 16 million barrels
a day. The average refinery is, in general, significantly
larger in terms of volume than the average facility in
exploration and in gasoline retailing. In 1977 the average
refinery processed about 60,000 barrels of crude a day.
The following table gives the average size distribution
(in thousands of barrels a day) of US refineries in 1976.
Percent
Average of total Percent of
Size capacity capacity refiners
Less than 50 20 19.6 67.4
50-99 71 23.1 17.0
100-149 96 13.3 5.7
150-200 175 13.1 4.2
More than 200 305 30.9 5.7
A small number of very large refiners account for a
disproportionate share of total capacity. However, these
large refineries are owned by different firms within the
industry. The top four companies account for about 32
percent of refining capacity and no one company has
more than 9 percent of the total. Over the past five years,
the share of the 10 largest oil companies has dropped
from 65.6 percent to 59.5 percent. From 1973 through
1975, refiners of less than 10,000 barrels a day more than
doubled their total capacity while capacity for the entire
industry was growing by 11 percent. The accompanying
map of major refinery locations and refined product
pipelines shows current figures for Illinois.
Illinois Refineries
In 1975, 24 refineries were operating in Illinois. The
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nine largest of these (see map) are able to refine about
1 .2 million barrels of crude oil a day — about 7.5 percent
of total US capacity. Illinois ranks fourth among states
in terms of total output. Current state employment is
about 6,500.
The nine major plants comprise almost the entire re-
fining capacity in the State. Most of the small refineries
are run by fewer than 25 individuals and operations are
limited to small distilling units. Several of the smaller
refineries receive large subsidies through controversial
provisions (called "small refiner^' bias") in the US De-
partment of Energy's complicated oil entitlements pro-
gram.
The major refiners are located in three distinct geo-
graphical areas in the State. Three refineries (owned by
Shell Oil Company, Amoco Oil Company, and Clark Oil
and Refinery Corporation) which are located together in
Madison County near St. Louis account for about 37 per-
cent of the state's capacity. Shell employs 1,700 persons;
Standard 630; and Clark 300. The proximity of these
three plants to navigable waters (the Mississippi River)
enables crude oil and product shipments by barge, as well
as by rail, truck, and pipeline. For instance, 35 percent
of Amoco's total product is shipped by barge. Clark,
which refines "sour crude" (high sulfur content) , receives
most of its oil from the Middle East and 'Venezuela via
the Gulf of Mexico and pipelines.
Located near the Indiana border in the south-central
section of the State are two more refineries which are
owned by Texaco Incorporated and Marathon Oil Com-
pany. The Marathon refinery, which is located in Robin-
son and is the state's second largest refiner^', employs 650
workers. The Texaco refinery is situated in Lawrenceville
and employs 600 workers.
Four more refineries are located in the northern part
of the State at Lockport, Blue Island, Lemont, and Joliet.
These four plants are owned by Texaco, Clark, Union
Oil Company of California, and Mobil Oil Corporation.
Together they comprise about 40 percent of total state
capacity. The Texaco refinery in Lockport employs ap-
proximately 800 workers; Clark 330; Union Oil 650;
and Mobil 550.
Although some crude oil for Illinois refineries comes
from the historic fields of southern Indiana and Illinois,
most of it arrives through a sophisticated pipeline system
which extends southward to Louisiana and westward to
Wyoming. The Mississippi River and the Illinois Water-
way enable barges to bring foreign crude from Vene-
zuela, Africa, and the Middle East via ports on the Gulf
of Mexico.
Illinois Crude
Illinois crude oil production contributes only a minor
fraction of the total input of refineries located in the
State. In fact, total Illinois production during an entire
year is barely adequate to meet the annual crude petro-
leum needs of any one of the major refineries in the
State.
Crude oil originating from lUinois wells (about 25.7
million barrels in 1977) accounts for just under 1 percent
of total US production. In 1940 an all-time peak of 148
million barrels was reached. Output then declined but
rallied to reach a postwar high of 82 million barrels in
1956. The state's petroleum production declined steadily
between 1963 and 1975. In the period from 1969 to 1974
production fell at an average rate of 11.5 percent a year.
In more recent years the total has stayed near 26 million
barrels.
The number of drill-holes has more than doubled
since 1973. This increase can most likely be attributed to
the higher prices of crude oil. Additionally, in 1976 the
Department of Energy (formerly the Federal Energ)'
Administration) exempted stripper wells (those that pro-
duce less than 10 barrels a day) from federal price ceil-
Major Refineries and Pipelines
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Comparative Economic Data for Selected Illinois Cities, January 1978
Building
Electric
„„,™,..? power con-
P^'Z\' sumption'(000) (ooO.ObO kwh)
Postal
receipts'
(000)
Estimated
Emplovmenf* work force
'"'^""
unemployed*
(percerit)
(000)
ILLINOIS
Percentage change from (Dec. 1977.
llan. 1977 .
(Dec. 1977.
llan. 1977 .
NORTHERN ILLINOIS
Chicago $24,931
Percentage change from
Ilan^ 1977
Aurora
p , r (Dec. 1977Percentage change from U^ jg^^
Elgin
Percentage change from
Joliet
„ , f (Dec. 1977Percentage change trom j 1077
Kankakee
Percentage change from
llan'^ 1977
Rock Island-Moline
(Dec 1977
Ian 1977
Rockford
n u f /Dec. 1977Percentage change irom j. 1977
70.1
+82.2
$ 511
-77.5
-22.3
$ 825
-76.4
-2J.
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$ 451
-75.4
-49.6
$ 97
-71.3
-47.5
$ 1,212
-41.1
-60.2
$ 1,724
-59.3
+78.6
CENTR.AL ILLINOIS
Bloomington-Normal $ 695
p , . . (Dec. 1977 -78.4Percentage change from {j^^ ig„ _^^^
Champaign-Urbana $ 2,241
-
• +477.5(Dec 1977
Percentage change from jjan.' 1977 :::::; +566!
If
Danville
Percentage change from
Decatur
Percentage change from
Galesburg
(Dec 1977
Ian 1977
Peoria
Percentage change from
(Dec. 1977.
Ijan. 1977 .
$ 332
-41.1
+207.4
$ 966
-53.0
+38.0
$ 197
+25.4
-97.6
$ 1,200
-82.7
-30.3
(Dec. 1977...,
Ijan. 1977 ....
Quincy $ 371
(Dec 1977 +17 4
]an. \97T '.'.'.'.'.'. +95.2
Springfield $ 1,975
(Dec. 1977 -69.2
Percentage change from .
Ijan. 197
3,746.7"
+ 10.2
+5.U
1,832.3
+10.7
+2.5
145.0
-3.6
-13.0
95.2
+10.5
+3.3
425.6
+35.2
+12.9
122.7"
+61.0
+62.3
120.4-^
-1.2
+2.9
167.2
+3.4
+2.9
48.1
+6.4
+3.6
49.1
+1.0
+9.8
47.0
+14.6
+46.8
115.5
+1.5
+10.5
30.8"
+4.0
-0.6
199.3
+8.1
+8.0
44.5
+3.0
+0.2
133.6
+8.3
+3.0
$30,950
-18.3
+2.3
$ 471
-11.4
+6.8
$ 506
-21.5
+3.2
$ 309
-26.7
+9.5
$ 185
-23.8
+0.0
$ 1,278
+8.3
+2.3
$ 840
-21.1
-1.9
$ 891
+9.3
+11.3
$ 695
+1.3
+9.7
$ 294
-13.5
-20.7
$ 433
-17.3
+6.9
$ 166
-16.5
+7.0
$ 1,175
-8.4
+2.8
$ 199
-30.6
$ 1,687
-7.6
-2.7
SOUTHERN ILLINOIS
East St. Louis
Percentage change from
Alton
Percentage change from
Belleville
Percentage change from
(Dec. 1977.
llan. 1977 .
(Dec. 1977.
Han. 1977 .
$ 28
-28.2
-76.0
$ 372
+40.3
+481.3
$ 128
(Dec. 1977 -69.5
Ijan. 1977 +23.0
Carbondale-Murphysboro $ 698
p , , . (Dec. 1977 n.a.Percentage change from jj^^ ,g„ _^(^^
28.1
+4.4
+4.4
78.3
+17.2
+6.8
26.5
+8.1
+2.3
37.5
+14.6
+3.3
$ 178
-19.8
-0.5
$ 141
-12.9
+18.4
$ 394
-21.0
+62.8
$ 222
-18.6
-8.6
Sources: ' Local sources; data include federal construction projects. ' Local power companies. " Local post office reports; accounting
period ending 27 January 1978. ' Illinois Department of Labor; prelii
' Total for cities listed. '' Includes immediatcfv surrounding territory. * Includes East Moline.
Unemployment and Employment Statistics—
What Do They Really Mean?
JOHN B. PARRISH
Unemplo^inent statistics, at least in the United States,
are one of the most misunderstood of all economic data.
It is often stated that US unemployment is "shock-
ingly" high when compared with other advanced in-
dustrial countries. Some assert that US teenage unem-
ployment is "frightening," "disgraceful," "alarming," a
"seething time bomb ready to explode." Going further,
some argue that "high and sticky" overall domestic un-
employment reflects the deteriorating ability of the free
enterprise system to create enough jobs for all who seek
them.
President Carter repeatedly stated during his 1976
campaign that US unemployment was "distressing" and
"much too high." It was the nation's No. 1 economic and
social problem. It represented the failure of the economic
system in general and the policies of the previous admin-
istration in particular.
I submit that all these claims are simply not true and
shall endeavor to explain why they are not true. I shall
concentrate on five aspects : ( 1 ) international unemploy-
ment comparisons as reported in official statistics; (2) the
real meaning of these international comparisons; (3) the
special problem of US youth unemployment; (4) the un-
usual beha\ior of employment and unemployment in
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at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign.
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recession and recovery, 1975-76; and (5) some institu-
tional factors tending to raise long-run unemployment
rates in this country.
Unemployment : US vs. Other
Industrial Countries
Measured by officially reported statistics, and ad-
justed to US concepts, the data indicate that unemploy-
ment has been very much higher in the US than in other
countries since the end of World War II. For example,
over the years 1959-75, unemplo^Tnent averaged under 2
percent in Sweden, Australia, Japan, and West Germany.
It averaged 2.4 percent in France, 3.1 percent in the
United Kingdom, and about 4 percent in Italy. But in
the US, the overall rate averaged 5.2 percent, exceeded
only by Canada's 5.4 percent. Thus the relatively inferior
performance of the US (and Canada) appears confirmed
by the official statistics.
However, a careful examination of the statistical de-
tails reveals that the use of overall unemployment rates
for comparative purposes is misleading. In the primary
working years, 25 to 54 years of age, the unemployment
rate over the years 1968-74 averaged 3.2 percent in the
US. By any standard this is a very satisfactory and ac-
ceptable rate. The rates for this same age group in eight
other industrial countries ranged from a low of 1.0 per-
cent in Japan to a high of 3.9 percent in Canada.
Similarly a comparison of unemployment among se-
nior workers, 55 years of age and over, reveals the US
compares favorably with the other countries. The rate
for this age group was 2.6 percent for the US, consider-
ably lower than the 7.3 percent in Australia, 4.3 percent
in Canada, 3.6 percent in Great Britain, and very little
above the rates of 2.4 percent for France and 1.9 percent
for Sweden.
It is evident that the reason for the elevated overall
US unemployment rate, relative to other countries, is
primarily the high unemployment among US teenagers
and young adults. US teenage unemployment averaged
15 percent during the 1968-74 period. This contrasts
with 5.0 percent in Australia, 7.3 percent in France, 2.5
percent in West Germany, 2.3 percent in Japan, and 5.6
percent in Sweden. The same wide differentials are re-
ported for young adults 20 to 24 years of age. The aver-
age rate for the US for this age group was 7.7 percent in
contrast to 2.2 percent in .Australia, 3.7 percent in France,
1 .0 percent in West Germany, 2.0 percent in Japan, and
2.9 percent in Sweden.
International Differentials Explained
There are two possible explanations for the high un-
employment among young workers in the US, compared
with experience in other nations. One potential explana-
tion relates to differences in concepts and methods of
measurement; the other involves differences in institu-
tional settings.
Differences in concepts and measurements can, in
general, be ruled out. It is fair to conclude that the US
Bureau of Labor Statistics has done a competent profes-
sional job in adjusting the data of other countries to US
methodology and concepts. Whatever methodological dif-
ferences remain may be considered minor. The explana-
tion for the differences in the incidence of unemployment
must therefore be sought in the institutional settings and
labor market dynamics.
There are at least seven major factors which account
for the relatively high US unemployment rates compared
with rates in other industrial countries.
First is the sharp difference in the length of transi-
tion from school to job. In the US the transition is long.
In all other countries it comes early in life and is very
short. In fact, school to job may be coterminous.
In 1970, nearly 40 percent of US youth were still in
school. The percentages for other countries were Japan,
14 percent; United Kingdom, 9; Italy, 5; Sweden, 20;
France, 15; Canada, 24; West Germany, 8. During the
long US transition, youths make frequent moves in and
out of the labor force. When they seek jobs, they usually
seek part-time jobs that will fit into school schedules.
This makes for relatively high unemployment rates. In
other countries youth leave school much earlier, around
15 or 16 years of age. They move into the labor force,
full time and for life. This makes for very low unem-
ployment rates.
Although the US transition pattern results in elevated
unemployment rates compared with other countries, it
reflects positive conditions as well. It reflects greater edu-
cational opportunities, greater opportunities for job try-
out, and greater opportunities to mature and to make
better final career choices. To this extent, high US youth
unemployment rates are favorable, not unfavorable ; con-
structive over time, not wasteful. They represent a high
degree of freedom of choice, not tightly restricted choice.
Second, there are sharp differences between the US
and other countries in the attitude of youth, parents, and
employers toward youth employment. In other countries,
the early departure from school for full-time, full-life
employment involves strong loyalty to the original em-
ployer. In turn, the employer agrees to train youth with
the expectation of a lifetime of employment, regardless
of whether a youth's employment is currently needed.
This early employer-youth apprenticeship arrangement
is backed up, not only by strong social custom, but often
by youth-parent-employer contracts, legally enforceable
in the courts. The result: much disguised unemployment,
but very low reported turnover rates and unemployment.
No such social arrangements exist in the US. Youths
take jobs and readily leave them. Employers expect high
turnover rates among teenagers. The result: relatively
high youth unemployment in this country. Once again.
however, it must be noted that even though there is con-
siderable lost time and wastage in the US process, there
is also much that is positive.
Third, these two differences are reinforced by sharp
differences in the entry wages of youth in the US com-
pared with other countries. In all the other eight indus-
trial countries, youths enter industry at wages far below
prevailing adult rates. Foreign employers are willing to
hire youths because it costs them so little. No such "youth
rates" exist in the US. Here, employers must pay the
federal minimum of $2.30 an hour, which, when fringe
benefits are added, comes to over $3.00 an hour. Indeed,
when high turnover rates are added, the cost to the em-
ployer probably reaches $3.25 to $3.50 an hour. The
result: the high entr)' wage rates for youth in the US
discourages the employment of teenagers. Or, to put the
matter differently, much youth unemplo>Tnent in this
country is created by a federal wage minimum, which
the AFL-CIO now wishes to push up to $3.00 an hour.
Fourth, there are very important differences in lay-
off policy in the US as contrasted to other countries.
Foreign employers are under social and governmental
pressure to retain workers even in slack times when they
are not needed. Such practices further disguise unem-
ployment abroad, eliminating it from the official unem-
ployment statistics. US employers are under no such
pressure. When workers are not needed they are laid off
and counted among the unemployed. In the great auto
slump in Detroit in 1975-76, thousands of senior workers
exercised their seniority to be laid off and let the junior
workers continue on the job. Why? Because they could
obtain about 90 percent of regular income for not work-
ing. The State of Michigan reported sending thousands
of unemployment compensation checks to Florida every
month during the massive slump in automobile pro-
duction.
Fifth, teenagers are a larger proportion of the popu-
lation in the US than in other countries. Since youths
have higher unemployment rates in this country than do
adults, this fact tends to elevate our overall unemploy-
ment rate. In 1970, 29 percent of the US population was
under 15 years of age. The percentages for the other in-
dustrial countries (Canada excepted) ranged from 25
percent in France down to 21 in Sweden.
Sixth, there are differences in labor force growth
rates. Other things equal, it is evident that a country
with a rapidly growing labor force will have higher rates
of unemployment than countries with very slow rates of
growth or declining labor forces. During the years 1959-
74 the annual US labor force growth rate was relatively
rapid, a little over 2 percent, exceeded only by Canada
and Australia. The growth rate was 1.0 percent in
France, 0.5 percent in Great Britain, 1.3 percent in Ja-
pan, and 0.8 percent in Sweden. The labor force actually
declined 0.3 percent annually in West Germany and 0.4
percent in Italy.
One of the major factors holding down unemploy-
ment in the US, despite the rapid growth in the labor
force, has been the outstanding performance of the US
economy in creating new jobs. In the difficult years
1970-74, employment grew faster in the US than in any
of nine other industrial countries, Canada excepted. Us-
ing 1970 as 100, the employment index for the US in
1974 was 109 in contrast to 101 for Japan, 103 for Swe-
den, 102 for the United Kingdom, and a decline to 98
for West Germany.
Seventh are differences in government policies, which
tend to expose unemployment in the US and to hide it
in many other industrial countries. Total job security is
woven into the employer-employee relationship in most
other industrial countries. A Swedish employer who
wants to cut back on his work force must justify his
decision before a labor market board, two months in
advance. In France an employer who wishes to cut back
his work force must, by law, consult with a workers'
council in advance. He can count on vigorous opposi-
tion. In Italy, an employer is discouraged by law from
dismissing a worker, or even remaining neutral if the
worker voluntarily quits, by a requirement that he must
pay a worker a stiff "seniority indemnity." In Belgium,
the government has mandated the creation of jobs by
large employers specifically for workers under 30, regard-
less of the employers' labor needs. Part of the job crea-
tion is tied to provisions for early retirement of older
workers. In Sweden, in the 1973 cyclical downturn
98,000 workers were officially counted as unemployed;
80.000 workers were enrolled in training programs or
employed on public work projects. The 80,000 were con-
sidered employed, not unemployed. Thus 45 percent of
the Swedish unemplo)Tnent was hidden. In West Ger-
many, foreign workers have made up 10 percent of the
civilian labor force in recent years. In slack times they
do not become Germany's unemployed. They are sent
home. All these, and many other forms of government
actions abroad, make for low unemployment rates, com-
pared with the US.
To summarize this section briefly, it appears that in-
ternational comparisons, which report US unemploy-
ment rates to be much higher than in most other in-
dustrial countries, are inappropriate. The labor market
conditions are so different from country to country that
comparisons are misleading. If one could place US mar-
ket conditions into the other countries, it is a reasonable
guess that unemployment rates would be higher abroad
than in the US.
Special Problem of US Youth Unemployment
In 1975 the annual unemployment rate for adults 35
years of age and over was around 5 percent. The rate
for teenagers 16 to 17 years of age was reported as 22
percent. Among black teenagers in this age class the rate
was around 40 percent. Clearly, these high youth unem-
ployment rates elevate the overall national unemploy-
ment rate. Although teenagers are only about 10 percent
of the labor force, they account for about 25 percent of
the unemployed.
It is important to keep two facts in mind. First, most
US unemployed youths are not job losers. For example,
of 1.6 million teenagers reported as unemployed in Oc-
tober 1976, 10 percent were voluntary job leavers, 30
percent were reentrants, 40 percent were new entrants,
and only 20 percent had lost their jobs.
Second, abundant research evidence supports the con-
clusion that despite the barrier which may be imposed
by mandated minimum wages, youth who complete
schooling and who seek full-time jobs are successful in
finding work. Moreover, they find reasonably good jobs,
not dead-end jobs. They find jobs with relatively high
entry pay and in job families with a clear-cut line of
upward progression.
Despite this, voluntaiy turnover rates among youth
workers remain high. The widespread reports of discrimi-
nation, "floundering around," and the inability of youth
to find jobs "because of the decline in low skill jobs usu-
ally filled by youth" are all, as one able scholar has put
it, "part of the folk lore about youth unemployment."
Or as another scholar puts it, the high unemployment
rate of teenagers is "not due to inability to find jobs—
it is due to their inability to stay on the jobs."
If these explanations are approximately correct, then
current proposals to spend billions to provide youth jobs
in public services, or more training programs, may well
turn out to be ineffective in reducing youth unemploy-
ment. In fact they could prove wasteful and counterpro-
ductive if youths take the easy "welfare" jobs and post-
pone serious job search and training. This conclusion is
supported by observation of 15 years' experience with
massive federal expenditures on youth programs — with
minimal results. In fact, as federal expenditures have
risen, so has teenaged unemployment.
Unemployment Statistics and
the 1975-76 Recovery
The 1975-76 cyclical recovery was, in some respects,
the most unusual in our history and deserves special
comment in any interpretation of recent unemployment
trends.
Employment began to decline after October 1974
when it was 86.5 million and declined for six months to
83.8 million in March 1975, for a loss of 2.7 million jobs.
Then employment began a slow but steady rise, recover-
ing all the previous loss in jobs by February' of 1976. Re-
covery and expansion continued impressively in 1976,
reaching nearly 88 million employed in August. Thus,
from the low point of the downturn there was an un-
precedented gain of 4.2 million jobs. This meant that
the economy had recovered all the jobs lost in the down-
turn and had created 1.5 million new jobs.
IIowe\er, rather suddenly the unemployment rate,
which had declined steadily from 8.3 percent in Decem-
ber 1975 to 7.3 percent in May 1976, suddenly reversed
itself and began to rise. In the next five months it rose
to 7.9 percent (October 1976)
.
With the employment recovery looking good, the
only reason for a sudden climb in unemployment was a
sudden change in the behavior of the labor force. In the
years 1965-70 the US labor force grew approximately
1.5 million annually. During the years 1970-75 the an-
nual growth in numbers was about 1.9 million. In 1976
one would not have expected any growth at all, or at
least very little, because a slowdown in growth had char-
acterized every single cyclical downturn since the end of
World War II.
For reasons still not entirely understood, instead of
leveling off or declining, the US labor force exploded in
the first six months of 1976. It went from 93.5 million
in February to 96.6 million in June 1976, an unprece-
dented jump of 3.2 million in five months— an annual
growth rate of more than 6 million a year, three times
anything ever obsened before. Although employment
continued to rise impressively in 1976, it did not grow
fast enough to absorb the sudden influx of women and
teenagers into the labor force. As a result, unemployment
rose from May to October 1976.
After its remarkable expansion in mid-1976, the labor
force declined from 95.9 million in November 1976 to
95.5 million in January 1977. During this period the un-
employment rate fell from 8.1 percent to 7.3 percent.
Factors Tending to Raise Unemployment Rates
An increasing proportion of US unemployment is
voluntary as a result of the steady rise in the holdout
power of workers. This holdout power arises from a num-
ber of factors. ( 1 ) Unemployment compensation benefits
have been liberalized to the point that some workers can
get 75 to 100 percent of normal wages for not working.
This has tended to lengthen the job search and encourage
some employers to lay ofT workers. (2) The liberalization
of welfare benefits (AFDC) has reached a point in some
big cities such that welfare income is substantially higher
and much more certain than income from working.
(3) The rapid rise in families wath two or more earners
has increased holdout power. In 1950, just over one-third
of the nation's families included two or more workers;
by 1975 nearly half our families included multiple wage
earners. Among husband-wife families, 55 percent were
in the multi-earner category in 1975.
The implications are considerable. For example, of
the 7.2 million unemployed in tlie first quarter of 1976,
6.9 million or 95.8 percent were family members. More
than two-thirds of the 6.9 million had at least one other
relative in the family who was employed. This obviously
cushions the blow of unemployment. Or to put it dif-
ferently, most recent US jobless persons have working
relatives.
Table 1. Unemployment Among Relatives
in Husband-Wife and Female-Headed Families,
Third Quarter 1977
Age of relatives
By comparison, in January 1976, 7.0 million persons were
officially counted as unemployed in this country. This
suggests that the real US unemployment rate, if the
illegal alien workers were removed, might well be down
to around 4 million workers, or 4 percent. Since there
are no immediate prospects for stopping, or even slowing,
the inundation of illegal aliens into this country, pri-
marily from Mexico, one can only conclude this illegal
labor force will continue to raise US unemployment rates,
perhaps by as much as 20 to 40 percent annually.
A fourth factor tending to raise reported unemploy-
ment has been the decline in the proportion of the em-
ployed who are self-employed or unpaid family members.
As a percentage of all employed they have declined from
21.5 in 1948 to 9.7 in 1975. Both groups typically report
very low unemployment presumably because their earn-
ings are residual and not contractual. For example, in
1975 the unemployment rate for these two groups was
about 1.0 percent and the rate for all experienced work-
ers 8.5 percent.
A fifth factor contributing to higher unemployment
rates is the high and rising cost of hiring new workers
because of increased fringe benefits. These include em-
ployer contributions to social security, private pension
plans, insurance, paid vacations, paid rest and lunch
periods, paid holidays, workmen's compensation, paid
sick leave, profit sharing, unemployment compensation,
and other benefits. In 1975 average pay for time worked
in industry' was $9,709. The cost of fringe benefits was,
$3,984, for a total of $13,693, with the fringe benefits
accounting for 30 percent of the total. In many indus-
tries the fringes account for over 35 percent of employee
costs. As a consequence, private concerns are finding it
more economical to work e.xisting labor forces overtime
than to hire new workers, thus adding to unemployment
levels.
A sixth factor tending to elevate US unemployment
rates is the rising divorce and separation rates. This
countr\' has the highest divorce rate in the world. It
reached 4.8 per 1,000 population in 1975, double the
rate of a decade ago. That rate contrasts with rates of
3.1 for Sweden, 2.4 in the United Kingdom, about 1 in
West Germany, Australia, Japan, and France, and 0.3
in Italy.
In March 1975, 12.3 percent of the US female labor
force was either divorced or separated, up from 10.7
percent in 1970. This rise ele\atcs overall unemployment
Table 2. Estimated Number of Aliens
Entcrins the United States, 1976
Classification
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industrial countries, the statistics mean very little without
careful interpretation. I suggest that US unemployment
is probably no higher than unemployment abroad and,
if one could equate labor market conditions, might v^fcll
be lower.
Relatively high US youth unemployment rates are
one of the most misinterpreted of all labor market data.
The description of US youth unemployment as "grim,"
"disgraceful," and "horrendous" by many labor econo-
mists, some in high places, is open to serious question.
Much US youth unemployment serves a useful purpose
and reflects the advantages of a free labor market. The
youth market needs greater efficiency and information
but is no "time bomb waiting to explode."
The recovery of employment accompanied by an even
greater rise in the labor force in 1975 and 1976 brought
confusion about, and mistrust of, employment and unem-
ployment statistics. The latter are quite sound. It was the
unusual behavior of the labor force that remains un-
explained.
Because of certain underlying institutional changes,
some created by federal policies, unemployment is not
likely to return very soon to the levels of the mid-1960s.
Federal manpower policy is currently in a state of
confusion. It is working at cross-purposes. The Depart-
ment of Labor promotes unemployment compensation
policy that creates unemployment. The Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare promises welfare pay-
ments so liberal as to create unemployment. The EPA,
OSHA, and others issue regulations, or hold up construc-
tion projects, and create unemplo^onent. Then the White
House announces that Congress must rush through new
public service jobs to reduce unemployment: we must
create a new youth employment program because youth
cannot find jobs when the federal government's own re-
search reports show youth can and do find jobs. It is
job-leaving that creates high youth unemployment. Just
how a new youth corps will deal with the problem re-
mains unexplained.
The present administration is supporting a new in-
vestigation of employment and unemplo)Tnent statistics,
the first since the report in 1962. The new committee will
undoubtedly do an excellent technical job of telling us
once again how good the federal government is at gather-
ing and publishing statistics on employment and unem-
ployment— and just what these statistics really mean.
Unfortunately what we will not get from the committee
will be a realistic appraisal of how the welfare state phi-
losophy of the past 10 years has gotten the nation into a
situation in which the federal government itself has been
a major factor in creating the very unemployment it so
deplores. Until realism returns to Washington it is only
possible to observe the turn of events and hope the spec-
tacle does not cost all of us too much.
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Economy Rebounds
Economic activity has quickened even though sum-
mary statistics for the first quarter show a decline. Real
output drifted lower for the first quarter as a whole,
reflecting weakness in the first tv^'o months of the year.
However, indicators since then have registered strong
increases. Industrial production, home-building, employ-
ment, income, and consumer spending have moved
higher.
Growth of monetary aggregates has slowed during
the past several months, and interest rates have generally
stabilized. The Federal Reserve asserts that they have
edged toward a more restrictive monetary- policy, but
their posture is far from clear.
Real GNP Declines ... But Other
Indicators Improve
Output of the economy declined, on average, during
the first three months of the year. Real gross national
product— that is, spending on currently produced goods
and ser\ices measured in 1972 prices— edged downward
at a 0.6 percent annual rate. The recent decline was the
first in three years. Administration economists attribute
the decline to the coal strike and the abnormal winter.
Output has risen sharply since Januaiy. Industrial
production— which includes output of mines, factories,
and utilities— has rebounded impressively (see chart).
Since the precipitous one-month decline in January, in-
dustrial output has expanded at an 11.3 percent annual
rate. The March production rate was 4.2 percent above
its year-earlier pace, but first-quarter production was vir-
tually unchanged from the fourth quarter.
Home-building has almost recovered from its weather-
induced plunge. March housing starts jumped by more
than 30 percent from their depressed January-February
pace. Even so, at an annual rate of 2.1 million units, the
March rate was below the average of the last half of
1977.
Employment and Income Expand
Reflecting the recovery in economic activity, employ-
ment and income have moved higher. Employment,
which edged upward at a 2.6 percent annual rate from
December to February, has since risen at a 3.9 percent
rate.
Even though labor markets have improved, the rise
in employment has been insufficient to provide jobs as
rapidly as people have entered the work force. The un-
Industrial Production
1967=100
employment rate moved to 6.2 percent of the labor force
in mid-March, chiefly reflecting an increase in the unem-
ployment rate for adult women.
Income growth has surged since February. From De-
cember to February, personal income expanded a total
of only $10.1 billion. However, the increase of $19.4
billion in March was nearly double the increase of the
two preceding months. The income gain centered in
private wages and salaries— reflecting the rise in em-
ployment and hours worked.
Spending Picks Up
Households have expanded their purchases in re-
sponse to improvements in employment opportunities
and increases in personal incomes. Retail sales have
bounded upward since January, increasing at nearly a
20 percent annual rate. Notwithstanding these gains,
first-quarter retail sales averaged lower than in last year's
final quarter. Householder pm-chases of nondurable goods
led the Februar^-to-March increases. Lagging automobile
sales in March continued to depress the spending in-
creases. In early April, automobile sales rose 27 percent.
It is important to recognize that retail sales figures
include increases due to inflation. Retail sales in March
were 8.4 percent above their year-ago pace. Prices have
risen about 6.5 percent over the past year; hence, the
physical volume of retail spending has advanced only
about 2 percent.
Inflation Rates Remain Rapid
The rate of inflation has stayed at a very high level.
Consumer prices rose at a 9.6 percent annual rate in
March, matching or exceeding the rates in the first two
months of the year. Wholesale prices of finished goods
rose at a 7.2 percent annual rate in March, down from
February's 13.2 percent rate of increase. Prices of inter-
mediate goods jumped upward at a 9.6 percent annual
rate. Prices of crude goods rose at nearly a 20 percent
rate in March. This pattern suggests that price-increase
impulses are continuing to be transmitted through the
price structure.
Economists often refer to the "underlying" rate of
inflation. Such a term purports to abstract from the
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month-to-month, irregular or random shifts in prices,
and to concentrate on the stable, persistent, long-term
or secular movement in prices. A recent government re-
port asserts that the rmderlying rate of inflation "seems
hopelessly stuck in the 6 percent to 7 percent range."
Monetary Policy at Crossroads
Growth in monetary aggregates has slowed since
January (see chart). The money supply (Ml) has risen
at roughly a 4 percent annual rate since Januar)', only
about half the rate of growth over the past year. The
money supply defined to include consumer-type time
deposits (M2) has also grown more slowly in 1978. Some
analysts regard such a development as an indication that
monetaiy policy has tightened.
Although it may be true that monetary actions have
turned restrictive, it is unlikely that policy has changed.
Instead, it is probable that the recent slowdown in
growth rates of monetary aggregates is a product of
Federal Reser\e attention to day-to-day forces affecting
short-term interest rates. Interest rate stability was prob-
ably a result of the no-growth economy; supply and de-
mand factors were approximately in balance. The Fed-
eral Reser\e had no occasion to become a major market
participant. Its moderating influence was not needed.
However, if I am correct in believing that the econ-
omy is characterized by a renewed \igor, we can antici-
pate both higher interest rates and a quickened money
supply growth. Interest rate increases will reflect a
strengthening in credit demand. Money supply increases
will result from Federal Reserve efforts to limit the day-
to-day swings in interest rates. william r. brvan
Local Illinois Developments
Chicago Prices and the New CPI
Chicago continues to experience rapid inflation. The
consumer price index for the Chicago standard consoH-
dated area registered a 7.6 percent advance from Febru-
ary 1977 to Februan- 1978, somewhat greater than the
6.4 percent rise in 1976 (see chart) . Increases for the na-
tion during those years were 6.4 percent and 6.5 percent,
respectively. Rates of increase in prices at the retail level
have turned upward again in recent months. The rate
of inflation in Chicago has picked up substantially in the
past two months, with an annual rate of increase of 16.8
percent in January and 10.8 percent in Februar>'.
Since the beginning of 1977 food prices have risen
far more rapidly than the overall index. Moreover, they
have advanced at a faster pace in Chicago than in the
nation. Food costs rose 10.5 percent during 1977 in the
Chicago area; thus far in 1978 they have risen at more
than a 23 percent annual rate. These increases may be
compared with increases for the nation of 8.2 percent for
1977 and at nearly a 17 percent rate for the past two
months.
Chicago Consumer Price Index
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Feb. Percentage
1978 change from
(1967 Jan. Feb.
= 100) 1978 1977
Employment— manufacturing' . . . n.a.
Weekly earnings — manufacturing' 211.6 + 1.0 +11.2
Consumer prices in Chicago^ 184.2 + 0.9 + 7.6
Life insurance sales (ordinary)' .... 240.2 + 1 1.8 + 10.3
Retail sales^ 181.4= - 0.3 + 4.5
Farm prices'^ 202.0 + 3.0 + 1.5
Building permits— residentiaI^ . . 42.7 + 22.1 - 4.8
Coal pr5duction« 0.0 -100.0 -100.0
Petroleum production' 35.9 + 3.2 - 7.0
' 111 Depl. of Ubor; ' US Bureau of Ijbor Slatisucs; ' Life Ins. Agcv. Manag. Assn :
' US Depl of Commerce; ' 111 Crop Rpls,; ' III Dcpl of Mines; ' 111. Ceol. Survey
Prelimtnarv. n.a- Not available.
Other categories posting above-average price rises
were housing and medical care; but apparel commodities
and transportation were up less than the overall rate.
Housing in Chicago was 9.0 percent higher than a year
earlier (7.5 percent nationally) and medical care was
8.4 percent higher (8.8 percent nationally). Apparel
prices in Chicago were up only 1.2 percent (2.5 percent
nationally) and transportation costs increased 2.9 per-
cent (3.6 percent nationally).
Since the last major revision of the CPI in 1964,
there have been substantial changes in what Americans
buy and in the way they live. The index has been updated
to reflect these changes. The increasing proportion of
two-worker families, for instance, has both raised the in-
come levels of many families and changed the way those
incomes are spent. To take account of these changes, this
fifth major revision of the content and coverage of the
index— the most complex and comprehensive ever un-
dertaken— has been underway for the past eight years.
The revision, including the Consumer Expenditure and
Point-of-Purchase Surveys, cost about $50 million.
With the completion of the revision in Januar}' 1978,
the US Bureau of Labor Statistics is publishing two con-
sumer price indexes. One is a revised index reflecting the
buying habits of urban wage earners and clerical workers.
It represents the items purchased and the prices paid by
about half of the urban population. The second is a new
and more comprehensive index reflecting the buying hab-
its of all urban households, including professional workers,
the self-employed, the poor, tlie unemployed, and retired
persons. Not included in the index are persons living
outside urban areas, farm families, persons in the military
services, and those in institutions.
Declining Milk Production in Illinois
About $5 of every $100 spent in US supermarkets is
on dairy products. In fact, the "typical" consumer spends
more for packaged fluid milk than for any other product
except fresh meat. In 1976 per capita consumption of
dairy products totaled 244 pounds of fluid milk, 17.8
pounds of ice cream, 15.9 pounds of cheese, 4.9 pounds
of condensed and evaporated milk, 4.4 pounds of butter,
and 3.8 pounds of nonfat dr)' milk. In 1976 these dair)'
products accounted for about 11.2 percent of the total
food energ)' received from all sources.
The fluid milk industry includes those establishments
primarily engaged in processing (pasteurizing, homoge-
nizing, bottling) and distributing fluid milk and cream
and related products, including cottage cheese, butter-
milk, whipped cream, and yogurt. In 1973 there were
2,300 firms producing fluid milk in the US and total em-
ployment for the industry was 125,000. The estimated
value of shipments in 1976 was about $13.1 billion.
At the turn of the century-, the fluid milk industry'
was characterized by small-scale production and very
personal marketing. The high perishability of the product
coupled with a limited transportation system, a lack of
refrigeration equipment, and restrictive ordinances in
many towns requiring milk to be processed in the town
in which it was sold contributed to the local nature of
the industry. Over the years, however, the increasing use
of pasteurization and other safety measures broadened
the market and contributed to the growth of the industry.
Declining Per Capita Consumption
The general character of the milk industry over the
past 25 years has been one of adjustment to shifting de-
mands for milk. Up to the 1950s both total and per
capita consumption of processed fluid milk advanced
rapidly. Population growth, higher incomes, and improv-
ing milk distribution methods ( especially truck refrigera-
tion) explain the sustained growth of this period. In the
late 1950s, however, two major forces slowed the growth
of milk production. First, other beverages, such as frozen
juice concentrates, vending machine soft drinks, pow-
dered milks, and a whole host of prepared foods in which
milk had been replaced as an ingredient, were marketed
and purchased in great volume. Second, the US birth
rate, which had been high during and immediately fol-
lowing World War II, began to drop. This caused a par-
ticularly large decline in the proportion of young chil-
dren— a change unfavorable to milk suppliers. In 1960
per capita milk consumption was about 325 pounds. In
1976 this number had dropped to 244 pounds— about
a 26 percent decline.
Total US milk production declined only slightly from
123 billion pounds in 1960 to about 120 billion pounds in
1976. Of the current total of milk supplied by domestic
milk cows, about 42 percent is utilized for fluid milk and
54 percent for manufactured products (cheese, ice cream,
canned milk) and the remainder is used on farms— fed
to calves or consumed on the farm.
The most striking change in the utilization of milk
has been the growing use for cheese and a declining use
in the production of butter. In 1962 about 27 percent of
all milk was utilized in the production of butter; in 1976
this percentage had dropped to 18. In that same period
the percentage used for cheese grew from 8.5 to 17. The
percentage utilized in the production of fluid milk has
stayed close to 42 percent.
Illinois Production Falling
Producing milk has become a less important enter-
prise on Illinois farms over the past 50 years. In 1930,
15 to 18 percent of total Illinois farm income was derived
from the sale of dair>' products. In 1976 cash receipts
from their sale totaled over $230 million— approxi-
mately 4 percent of Illinois farm income. Many farmers
have quit the business in fa\or of easier ways to make a
living and others have turned to producing com and soy-
beans. In 1976 these two crops accounted for 38 percent
and 25 percent, respectively, of total state farm income.
Total milk production in the State reached its peak
in 1945— about 5.8 billion pounds. In more recent years
production has declined by about 2 percent a year. Out-
put in 1976 was estimated at 2.5 billion pounds— about
2.2 percent of total US production.
The total number of dairy cows in Illinois has been
steadily falling while the average production per cow
has been increasing dramatically. In 1976 there were
approximately 241,000 milk cows on farms in the State.
This total compares with 925,000 cows in 1950. Produc-
tion per cow per year over the period increased from
5,630 pounds to 10,400 pounds.
Most Illinois dairy farms are in the northern part of
the State, especially in the several contiguous counties
along the ^Visconsin border. The most concentrated area
of milk production is Stephenson County, near the north-
west comer of the State. Stephenson County led the
State in number of milk cows in 1977 with 30,800 and
produced 320 million pounds of milk. Jo Daviess County
was second with 19,800 and 206 million pounds of milk.
About 37 percent of the state's total production origi-
nates from a 12-county area located in the northwest
portion. .Xbout 16 percent is produced in an 11-county
area in the northeast portion. Production in the rest of
the State is more or less unifomily distributed.
The number of firms engaged in fluid milk processing
in Illinois has steadily dechned. In 1964 there were 169
establishments; in 1975 the number had dropped to 64.
Employment over that same period dropped from 7,700
to 4,200 workers.
Besides the fluid milk producers in Illinois, there are
4 firms that manufacture creamery butter, 33 firms which
produce cheese, 22 invoKed in the production of con-
densed and evaporated milk, and 34 companies produc-
ing ice cream and frozen desserts, .\nother 5,000 indi-
viduals are employed in the making of these products.
MICHAEL TREEING
Comparative Economic Data for Selected Illinois Cities, February 1978
Electric
power con-
sumption^
(000,000 kwh)
Einpl'
(OOO)
Estimated
work force
unemployed'
(percent)
Percentage change from jj?"^- '|y^ •
NORTHERN ILLINOIS
Chicago
Percentage change from
IF h
Aurora
Percentage change from j|i"?'
Elgin
Percentage change from U??'
Joliet
Kankakee .
$ 1,119
+ //A\9
+24.-t
$ 1,392
+65.7
+29.0
$ 816
+80.9
-89.2
$ 746
Percentage change from {^-- ',|78
; ; ; ; ; ;
^^^^f^O^
Rock Island-Moline $ 498
Percentage change from [l^^ \ ^^^ ; ; ; ; ;
;
Z^fj
Rockford $ 1,270
Percentage change from j|^^^; ',|^^
'
' ' ;
Zfi'^y
CENTRAL ILLINOIS
Bloomington-Normal $ 1,076
Percentage change from j{^^"^; \^^^^^ ;;;;;; +^^;*
Champaign-Urbana $ 1,245
-44.4Percentage change from (j^ \%^^
;
[an. 1978
.
Feb. 1977
.
Danville
Percenuge change from
.
Decatur
Percentage change from j^"^'
',|^^
Galesburg
Percentage change from jj.^^"^,; ',1'^^
Peoria $ 5,958
Percentage change from {j- \%^^ y tj^^^^
Quincy $ 271
Percentage change from [j?;^- ',978
;;;;;; ^'^^-^
SpringTield $ 1,568
Percentage change from fc' '^^8 -20-6
+67.1
$ 953
+ 187.0
+319.8
$ 722
-25.2
-61.4
$ 295
+49.7
-83.2
SOUTHERN ILLINOIS
East St, Louis
Percentage change from
Percentage change from
BellevUle
Percentage change from
Carbondale-Murphysboro
.
Percentage change from Ban. 1978 .
eb. 1977
,
$ 67
+139.2
-15.1
$ 261
-29.8
+200.0
$ 113
-11.7
-52.1
n.a.
$42,650'
+3.9
-2.1
,856.2
Participation and Expenditures by
Illinois Fishermen and Hunters
JOHN F. DWYER AND MICHAEL L. HATMAKER
A recent survey of Illinois residents indicates that they
engage in a large amount of fishing and hunting activity
and make substantial expenditures in conjunction with
these activities. The survey, part of the national survey
of fishing and hunting activities conducted by the US
Fish and Wildlife Sen,'ice every fifth year since 1955, con-
cerned activities in 1975. The Illinois Department of
Conservation provided supplemental funding to intensify
the sampling of Illinois residents to provide for state-
level estimates. The basic sur\'ey data file was recently
made available to the Department of Forestry at the
University of Illinois for subsequent analysis. This report
presents some of the initial results of that analysis.
The survey included a telephone sample and a fol-
low-up mail questionnaire. The telephone sample con-
sisted of 51 different Illinois residential exchanges, se-
lected on a 1 to 2 metropolitan/nonmetropolitan ratio.
Interviews were completed with 4,447 telephone house-
holds. In the mail phase, 2,064 individual questionnaires
were sent out and 701 usable returns received. Because
of disproportionate sampling in both phases of the survey,
the results were weighted to bring them back into bal-
ance with the Illinois population.
Participation
In 1975 some 2.5 million Illinois residents nine years
of age or older (more than one-fourth of the population
in that age category) engaged in hunting or fishing ac-
tivities. They spent a total of 67 million days engaged
in these activities (Table 1). Fishing had four times as
many participants and participant-days of activity as
Dr. John F. Dwyer is assistant professor of for-
est resource economics at the University of Illinois,
Urbana-Champaign. He was formerly an economist
with the Bureau of Land Management of the US
Department of the Interior and has also worked for
the US Forest Service. He is the author of nu-
merous articles and monographs on such topics as
forest resources management, policies for providing
outdoor recreation opportunities, wilderness preser-
vation, reforestation of retired farmlands, and the
local impacts of reservoir recreation.
Michael L. Hatmaker is a research assistant in
resource economics, UIUC, and a Ph.D. candidate
in transportation planning.
hunting, with warm water fishing being the most popular
type of fishing. Small game hunting was the most popu-
lar type of hunting.
Expenditures
In addition to significant allocations of time, Illinois
residents spent more than $1 billion on hunting and fish-
ing. This included $856 million spent in conjunction with
fishing and $155 million spent with hunting (Table 2).
These expenditures included outlays for equipment, food,
lodging, transportation, and related charges and fees.
Nearly three-fourths of the expenditures by hunters
and fisheiTnen went for transportation, food, and lodging.
Transportation looms as a particularly important e.xpen-
diture, being larger than food and lodging combined.
The remaining expenditures were divided between fees
and equipment.
The amount of expenditures and their distribution
among the cost categories varies somewhat with the types
of activities. Subsequent analysis looks at average ex-
penditures per participant-day of activity (Tables 3 and
4) . There is likely to be significant variation in expendi-
tures depending on the individual, group, and length of
trip. Fishermen tended to spend more per participant-
day than hunters, with saltwater fishing having the
highest average expenditure per participant-day. The
high expenditure for saltwater fishing is due in large
Table 1. Participation in US Hunting and Fishing
Activity by Illinois Residents, 1975
Number of Panicipanl-
Aclivity participants days
flhousands) (Thousands)
Fishing 2,418 54.354
Warmwater* 2.322 46.510
Cbldwatcr" 525 4.973
Sea-run' 256 1,817
Saltwater" 225 1 .054
Hunting 564 13,625
Smallgame' 522 6,741
Migratory birds' 239 2,788
Biggame' 179 1.259
Othcrhunung" 149 2,837
Hunting or fishing 2,.548 67,190
• Black bass, walleye, sauger, pike, pickerel, muskie, bluegill. crappie. catfish, perch, etc.
^ Freshwater trout, landlocked salmon, grayling, kokanee. whiletish, char, etc.
* Sea-run or Great Lakes salmon, steelhead'. sea-run trout, striped bass, American shad,
sturgeon, herring, etc.. that go from saltwater to fresh water to spawn.
'' Blueftsh. cod, croaker, drum, flounder, porgy, snapper, mackerel, tuna, weakfish.
MM lr<ml,j,«ks, etc.
' R.ihbils, squirrels, pheasant. Quail, partridge, etc.
' Ducks, geese, doves, woodcock, etc.
Deer, elk, turkey, etc.
'(.lows, woodchuck. fox, and ttther aiiini,ds often considered pests and usually not
Table 2. Expenditures by Illinois Residents
for Hunting and Fishing in the US, 1975
(Dollars in millions; percentages in parentheses)
Lodcine 1 19
Equrpmcnl 102"'
Food, drink, refreshment 190
856 (100)
' Includes public (ransportation and use o
costs are based on $0.14 per mile.
* Purchase and repair of items such as lines, artificial lures, l;
holders, rods and reels, landing nets, creels, fish bags, rod ;
ipikes: boat eouipment especially for fishing
;ear used in fishing that rou
" '
"
tomobiles. Private automobile
kle. tackle boxes, bait
natural bait.
equipment or recreation vehicles.
' Purchase and repair of guns, rifles.
and components, expenditures on
roultl be used for other things, such a:
bought primarily for target shooting
public and privi
pic sigl decoys or game
ding equipment
ulars. and etiuipmctil
barter boat, boat lau
Fees for use of and acci
ncnt rental, license, tags.
guide
public and private
package trips. eaui[
;s. stamps, and other
ind. guides, package
part to significant transportation and lodging costs tliat
are incurred because saltwater fishing necessarily talces
place out of state. Big-game hunters had the second
highest average expenditure per day, once again due
primarily to large expenditures for transportation and
equipment.
Equipment expenditures tend to be higher for hunters
than fishermen. Big-game hunters ha\e the highest aver-
age expenditures for equipment. These expenditures are
also high for sea-run fishing. Expenditures for food tend
to be highest for those acti\ities with high transportation
and lodging costs, since daily outlays for food are likely
to increase with length of trip and time away from home.
Activities with high transportation, food, and lodging
costs include saltwater fishing, cold water fishing, and
big-game hunting. These are most often engaged in out
of state (Table 5) and have the largest number of miles
traveled per participant-day (Table 6)
.
Fees for access to public or private areas or package
trips do not loom large on a per participant-day basis;
but are highest for big-game hunting and migratory-bird
hunting. Equipment rental expenses were higher for fish-
ing than hunting, probably a reflection of boat rental
charges and specialized equipment for saltwater and sea-
run fishing. These fishing equipment rental expenses are
often tied to charter boat expenditures. Natural bait was
a relatively large fee item for fishermen, particularly for
saltwater fishing.
Spatial Distribution of Expenditures
Expenditures by hunters and fishermen are made in
a number of locations, including near their residences,
along the route to and from the hunting and fishing ac-
tivities, and in the vicinity of the areas where the activi-
ties take place. Illinois residents often travel considerable
distances to engage in hunting and fishing activity. This
tends to disperse their expenditures over wide areas.
However, Illinois residents found nine-tenths of their
hunting opportunities and more than two-thirds of their
fishing activity in their home state (Table 5) . They were
most inclined to travel outside the State for saltwater
fishing, cold water fishing, and big-game hunting; but
they found at least a portion of the opportunity for all
activities outside the State.
Expenditures in Illinois
Although specific information about the location of
expenditures by Illinois hunters and fishennen was not
gathered, estimates of expenditures made within the state
were developed. Average expenditures were calculated
for individuals who engaged only in a particular t)'pe of
hunting or fishing inside Illinois (Tables 3 and 4) . These
expenditures were taken as representative of those for all
days spent in that activity in Illinois, regardless of the
amount out of state in which a participant also engaged.
Consequently, these average ex-penditures were multiplied
by the number of days of that activity reported for Illi-
nois to derive estimates of expenditures by Illinois resi-
dents for hunting and fishing in the State (Table 7).
Illinois residents spent an estimated $415 million for
hunting and fishing in Illinois, including $306 million
for fishing and $109 million for hunting (Table 3) . This
represents 36 percent of fishing expenditures and 70 per-
cent of hunting expenditures by Illinois residents. Note
that Illinois residents spent a smaller portion of their
hunting and fishing expenditures in their home state than
was the case with their participation. This is because they
tended to spend more per day for activities outside the
Table 3. Expenditures per Participant-day
in the US and Illinois by Illinois Residents,
by Type of Fishing, 1975^
Expenditure
category
Table 4. Expenditures per Participant-day
in the US and Illinois by Illinois Residents,
by Type of Hunting, 1975^
Expenditure
The Dollar Game; Heads They
Win, Tails We Lose
CHARLES W. WILEY
Many Americans remain relatively unaware of the
economic and political ramifications of the fall in the
value of the dollar, despite increased media attention to
the recent developments in the foreign exchange market.
However, developments in the international monetary
system portend potentially drastic alterations in the
United States' role in world trade and finance. Among
these potential changes could be a move toward denomi-
nating oil pa^Tnents in currencies other than the dollar.
Similar changes involving other traded commodities
could reduce the use of the dollar as the world's major
vehicle currency. The end result of these types of changes
could even be a reduced role for the US in world trade,
such as Britain experienced earlier in this century.
More important at present, however, is the fact that
the current slide in the value of the dollar vis-a-vis other
major world currencies is already causing important
changes in some domestic economic variables. The
changes in these variables, especially the inflation rate,
are putting the US into a situation in which the effects
of the dollar's devaluation actually induce further de-
valuation. At the same time, the dollar's depreciation
reduces the cost of imports for the appreciating coun-
tries, especially in terms of imported oil. This reduction
of inflationary pressures abroad, as will be shown, places
further pressure on the dollar's value.
This article will identify some of the causes of the
dollar's depreciation and discuss their implications. In
the process, it will be argued that from the viewpoint of
the market traders, correction of the major cause of the
dollar's devaluation has taken a back seat to more tradi-
tional and theoretical prescriptions. Thus, despite at-
tempts to prop up the dollar, it remains under intense
pressure. Until the trader's major concern, inflation, is
addressed in a more meaningful way by the Administra-
tion, the strength of the dollar in world monetary mar-
kets will continue to decline.
Devaluation— Theory and Reality
As one European banker recently noted, "The dollar
was the downhill champion of 1977." Indeed, the dollar
fell nearly 8 percent against the German mark, almost
12 percent against the Swiss franc, and more than 19
percent against the Japanese yen in 1977. Even usually
weak currencies such as the French franc, Italian lira,
and the British pound cost more dollars in 1977 (see
chart). For most of these currencies, 1978 has brought
even greater appreciation against the dollar. Only be-
cause the dollar appreciated by nearly 10 percent against
the currency of our major trading partner, Canada, was
the fall of the dollar on a trade-weighted basis slight.
Theoretically, under the assumption of fle.xible ex-
change rates, we should expect downward pressure on
the price of a countr)''s currency when that country is
importing more goods and services than it is exporting.
Because payTnents in world trade are most often made in
the exporting country's currency, an excess of imports
over exports will mean that the deficit country will be
selling more of its own currency than is being demanded,
and demanding more of other currencies than is being
supplied. The result will be, as in any market for goods
or services, downward pressure on the price of the deficit
country's currency and upward pressure on the price, or
appreciation, of the currencies of those countries whose
products are in high demand.
When the US nans a balance of trade deficit against
Japan, we expect to see downward pressure on the price
of the dollar and upward pressure on the price of the
yen. Consistent with these expectations, the cost of one
yen rose from .0035 to .0041 dollars in 1977. Put dif-
ferently, by year's end 1977, one dollar could buy 241
yen whereas at the beginning of the year, that same dol-
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lar could buy 285 yen. As of April 1978, a dollar could
be exchanged for only 218 yen and its value is expected
to fall even further against the yen in 1978.
The next step in the process of currency revaluation
is one in which the currency made less expensive by de-
valuation will at length induce greater exports from the
deficit countr)'. Conversely, a currency made more ex-
pensive by appreciation will at length induce a dimin-
ished flow of exports from the surplus country. As the
dollar price of US exports falls, Japan and others will
import more of the US products. Furthermore, since the
dollar price of yen went up, Japanese exports become
more expensive and Japan exports less to the US. The
end result, it is hoped, will be a reversal of America's
trade deficit and Japan's surplus. Revaluation of these
two currencies will take place, in theory, until the prices
of them are such that there is no excess of imports over
exports in the US or of exports over imports in Japan.
As long as either of these conditions prevail, however,
there will be downward pressure on the dollar and up-
ward pressure on the price of yen.
This concise theoretical plan does not always work
so neatly in practice because of what economists call the
secondary effects of devaluation. The two most impor-
tant of these effects of devaluation are the automatic in-
flationary tendencies and the positive national income
effect. The latter tends to increase imports in the deficit
country. Each of these secondary effects works to offset
the initial success of devaluation.
Higher priced imports often have two effects on do-
mestic price levels. First, since many imports are raw
materials, input costs, and most likely final prices, go up
for some domestically produced finished goods. If any of
these goods are then exported, the initial export price
cut due to devaluation is at least partly offset. Second,
higher import costs often reduce competitive price re-
straints on domestic producers, allowing them to raise
prices. This has happened in the first and second quar-
ters of 1978 when Ford has raised the prices of some of
its compacts after Datsun and Toyota prices had risen
because of the yen's appreciation. Thus, both of these
cost-push pressures work to raise the domestic price level,
and often force up export prices also. This inflationary
impact of devaluation will be discussed in greater detail
in a later section.
Successful devaluation will also raise national income
as exports begin to exceed imports. However, because
imports tend to rise as national income ex-pands, the ini-
tial success of devaluation will be counteracted. The ex-
tent to which imports rise depends on many factors, as
was noticeable in Febnaary. The record trade deficit in
that month indicated a broad-based growth in imports,
reflecting increased national income and America's con-
tinued reliance on imported oil. Furthermore, exports
actually declined in February despite the dollar's depre-
ciation. However, the Administration blamed this mainly
on the coal strike and foul weather rather than on any
quirks in the balance of payments adjustment mechanism.
Thus, what appears in theory to be a quick and fairly
trouble-free mechanism for adjusting balance of pay-
ments disequilibriums in reality can end up exacerbating
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the existing problems. This may be the reason many
small and open economies (high export/GNP ratio)
disavow the use of devaluation in favor of import and
foreign exchange controls to keep a close rein on their
balance of pa^-ments. More importantly, though, these
side effects of devaluation should be a strong incentive
for the Administration to concentrate on the real causes
of the dollar's fall. It is to these I now turn.
The Real Causes of the Dollar's Decline
Because the foreign exchange market participants are
human and do not always act like someone possessed by
Adam Smith's Invisible Hand, they sometimes do not
react to economic events in the manner suggested by
theory. Moreover, because market psychology, rather
than pure economic forces, often rules foreign exchange
trading, market participants often see ver)' different
causes for changes in a currency's value than do the
politicians who have the means to control the value of
that currency. It seems as if events within and between
the international monetary system and the Carter Ad-
ministration illustrate this idea well.
Even before the dollar started its dramatic fall last
year, the lack of an effective national energy policy was
a major concern of the new Carter Administration. The
past year has brought more problems on the international
scene, and even more people to blame for these problems.
Thus the Administration's next scapegoats (after Con-
gress) were the German and Japanese politicians who
refused to fuel their economies so as to bring in more
US exports. A not-irrational fear of inflation formed the
basis for foreign reluctance toward expansionary mone-
tary and fiscal policies.
It has also become apparent that the dollar's prob-
lems are not totally due to the high level of oil imports.
For instance, the deficit induced in the balance of trade
from 1975 to 1977 was more due to drastic cutbacks in
exports by manufacturers and the agricultural sector
than to increased imports of oil. Higher imports of oil
accounted for 40 percent of the decline in balance of
trade during those years. However, even had oil imports
remained constant during that period, given the level of
growth in GNP here compared with the rest of the
world's industrial countries, our balance of trade would
have gone into deficit by about $10 billion.
Februaiy's record trade deficit indicated that the
trade balance is now as much a consequence of a lax or
even anti-export policy as it is of higher imports of oil.
Even though the US is the world's largest exporter, many
firms consider exporting to be of little or no profitable
value. Also, the bureaucratic rules and regulations which
exporters have to deal with further impede any incen-
tives to export. Rather than calling for greater export
incentives so as to reduce the balance of trade deficit,
most Americans— especially labor and the business sec-
tor— usually argue for greater protection from imports.
This happens despite the estimate that $1 billion extra
in exports will provide jobs for 40,000 more Americans.
The foreign exchange market responded to the record
US trade deficit in Februar)' by further pushing the value
of the dollar down against the mark and the yen. How-
ever, throughout most of 1977's and early 1978's slide in
the value of the dollar, the market has placed more em-
phasis on the domestic value of the dollar as reflected
in the inflation rate. Because the domestic inflation rate
is the key indicator of the purchasing power of a cur-
rency, the market for foreign exchange uses this index
as a major sign of the strength of that currency in the
world economic order.
When the inflation rate in one coimtr)- during a spe-
cific period is greater than that of another nation, the
traders in the foreign exchange market often react by
selling the former currency and buying the latter form
of money. For example, because the inflation rate in the
US in 1977 was more than double those of Germany and
Switzerland, market reactions put severe downward pres-
sure on the dollar's value and upward pressure on the
mark and the franc.
Expectations of further inflation also place pressures
on traders to sell a currency in the foreign exchange mar-
ket. Traders assert that these expectations are often based
on the growth in the money stock of a country in a given
time period. Comparisons of the relative rates of mone-
tary^ growth thus provides another measure of dilTerent
currencies' values in the foreign exchange market. Partly
because the growth in the money supply of the US has
been higher than the growth in the monetan- stocks of
Switzerland and Japan in 1977 the foreign exchange
market has forced depreciation of the dollar and appre-
ciation of the Swiss franc and the yen over the past sev-
eral months.
It appears, then, that the monetarist sentiment is
strong in the foreign exchange market, as indicated by
this emphasis on monetary stocks and inflation rates as
keys to the foreign exchange value of a currency. How-
ever, analysis of data from the major industrial countries
in 1977 indicates that this reliance on monetary indica-
tors may be somewhat imfounded.
Inflation in the world as a whole in 1977, on the
basis of the consumer price indexes (CPI) of all nations,
grew by more than 1 1 percent. For the world's industrial
countries, prices rose at an annual rate of 7.9 percent in
1977. Among these nations, only Switzerland, Germany,
and Austria reported lower rates of inflation than the
US's CPI growth of 6.5 percent. In terms of money sup-
ply growth, among the world's major industrial nations
only Japan and Switzerland had lower rates of growth
than did the US during 1977.
It seems then, that on the whole, the US did not fare
too badly in 1977 in terms of inflation and growth in the
money supply as compared with its major trading part-
ners. The slight fall in the trade-weighted value of the
dollar for 1977 may be a more realistic indicator of the
dollar's true value than the large decreases in the dollar's
exchange rates for marks, yen, and Swiss francs. Cer-
tainly, figures for inflation are still higher here than nor-
mal, but compared with the experience for the US's
major trading partners, inflation rates here were less of
a problem in 1977. Furthermore, money supply figures
should not have given rise to much greater inflationary-
expectations here than they did abroad in 1977, accord-
ing to the available data.
Two considerations must be taken account of when
analyzing traders' preoccupations with monetary aggre-
gates then. First, much of the decline in the value of the
dollar has come during the latter half of 1977 and the
first part of 1978. Since the beginning of 1978, inflation
rates here have started toward double digit annual rates,
while the inflation rates in Germany and Switzerland
have fallen. In Japan, inflation rates in five of the last
six months of 1977 were lower than in the US even
though the o\erall rate in Japan was greater than that
of the US. Thus the real worsening of the dollar's value
has come when inflation here has been greater than in
the three appreciating countries.
Second, it appears that speculation, more often than
pure economic forces, is causing a major part of the de-
crease in the dollar's value. Such speculative activity is
often based on ephemeral indicators, such as the growth
in a nation's money supply. As with many government
figures, however, the numbers for the money supply are
subject to considerable revision. But the announcement
of specific growth rates, whether or not they are the cor-
rect final figures, may induce speculators to change their
portfolio of currencies. Indeed, several times in 1977,
high yet unrevised figures for the growth rate in the
money supply induced selling of dollars in the foreign
exchange market. Again the reason, whether or not it
had a basis in fact, was that the high growth rate caused
expectations of higher inflation in the US.
Offhand remarks by government officials concerned
with the dollar's value can also trigger such speculation.
This is especially true when the currency is in a state
of continual fluctuation. Ever)' little indicator or com-
ment seems to induce new speculative flows. By the same
token, however, nonsubstantive remarks by the Admin-
istration about inflation may work to reduce specula-
tion while not really ofTering concrete solutions to the
problem.
How long this speculation forces the dollar's value
downward is a matter of opinion. Usually speculation is
a short-run manifestation of a long-i-un problem. If so,
correction of high inflation rates here should do much to
curb the fall in the dollar's value, at least from the view-
point of foreign exchange traders. In the long run, how-
ever, more fundamental changes— especially in terms of
better incentives for exporting— may be called for if
the US is to get rid of its long-run balance of trade prob-
lem and the concomitant dollar crisis.
Consequences of the Dollar's Devaluation
One unfortunate consecjuence of the decline in the
value of the dollar has been the loss of purchasing power
for American individuals and firms abroad. This has
especially hurt militan- personnel in Germany. T*Iany arc
said to be living below tlie povert)' level because of the
high cost of marks they must pay.
A more threatening consequence of the dollar's de-
preciation has been the loss of purchasing power for the
OPEC nations. Because payments for oil are denomi-
nated in US dollars, as the value of the dollar falls,
OPEC loses revenues. A cheaper dollar means cheaper
prices for oil in other countries, thus a loss of income for
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OPEC. Along with the increased price of non-US goods
which the cartel nations buy, this loss of revenue is caus-
ing some of the more militant OPEC countries to de-
mand higher oil prices. Also under consideration is a
change in the pricing of oil from the dollar to another
stronger currency or a group of currencies. Any of these
moves would increase US import prices, push the balance
of trade into further deficit, and place more pressure on
the troubled dollar.
This Catch-22 situation illustrates only one of the
"no win" consequences of the dollar's depreciation for
the US. The most obvious example of this phenomenon
again involves inflation. As was described earlier, infla-
tion in the US induces foreign exchange traders to sell
dollars and buy currencies of countries which have lower
inflation rates. However, this depreciation of the dollar
pushes US import prices up, and as a result, domestic
inflation rises even more. One estimate of this effect is
that for every cent of the dollar's overall value that is
lost in world trade, the consumer price index (CPI) in
the US rises by 0.02 percent. Since the beginning of
1977, then, imported inflation— because of the dollar's
depreciation— has accounted for about a 1 percentage
point rise of the CPI in the US. Ostensibly, this will
force greater depreciation and the cycle will start again,
unless actions against inflation are undertaken.
The eff'ect of this imported inflation would have been
much greater if the US were not such a closed economy
(export/GNP ratio = 7 percent). This should not dis-
count its significance, however. In fact, the eff'ect is
heightened when one considers that many of the appre-
ciating countries are being put in a sort of "no lose"
situation. That is, as their oil costs go down because of
the dollar's fall, and as other import costs decline for
the same reason, inflation tendencies deflate for these
countries. Because many of these nations have ver)' open
economies, the effect is even more pronounced. And
again, as inflation abates in the appreciating countries
while it increases here, more pressure is put on the dollar.
Conclusions
Since the end of World War II, the US has been obli-
gated to supply the international economic S)^tem with
the liquidity that was necessary to facilitate increasing
world trade. For the most part, this was done through
unilateral foreign aid and continual balance of trade
deficits. The latter method was acceptable to the rest of
the world until 1971 when it became clear that the US
could no longer honor its obligation to redeem all the
dollars outstanding in the world for an amount of gold
equivalent in value to those dollars.
That dollar crisis precipitated major changes in the
rules of the international economic order. One of those
changes was the move to a managed floating system for
exchange rates. We ha\e seen how this system has facili-
tated the depreciation of the dollar. Prior to the present
system, only official governmental measures could change
a currency's value, and these changes were fairly infre-
quent. Now, private decisions continually act along with
official measures to affect the value of a currency. But
it is inevitably official actions, or the absence of them,
which influence those private decisions about a currency's
worth in the world market.
Whether the present dollar crisis causes major changes
in the rules of the international economic system \vill also
ultimately depend on official actions, especially those of
the US government. Despite the ability of private traders
to affect the value of a currency, the government still has
both direct and indirect control over a currency's inter-
national purchasing power. In a time when the other two
major economic powers of the world are forcing the US
into a sort of "no win" situation, the use of these official
measures will be a major determinant of the strength of
the world economy. As this article has indicated, though,
it may be the lack of use of these governmental controls,
especially where inflation is involved, that will create
even more of an effect on the value of the dollar and the
health of the world's economic system.
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Economy Surges— Money Supply Balloons
The economy has bolted forward and the money
supply has expanded to accommodate the increased ac-
tivity. Even though there is a great deal of talk about a
tightening in nionetaiy policy, money supply growth has.
in fact, accelerated. Reflecting the strengthening in the
economy, interest rates have moved higher.
It is now clear that business activity has recovered
fully from the winter-induced lull. Production has risen
sharply; the labor market has tightened; and consumer
spending ha.s picked up. Unfortunately, as the economy
improved the rate of inflation rose sharply.
[ncrcased Monetary Ease
Since mid-March, the money supply has expanded at
more than a 12 percent annual rate (see chart). During
the January to March period, while the economy was
stalled, the money supply was virtually stable. In the
preceding year, the stock of money grew almost 8 percent.
It is not unusual for the money supply to move in
fits and starts. The Federal Reserve gears its operations
toward achieving or maintaining an appropriate "tone"
in the money market. Put differently, the Fed seeks to
avoid abrupt changes in credit markets. More specifi-
cally, its ver\- short-run operations are directed toward
monitoring the federal funds rate (the rate charged by
banks for lending reserves to one another)
.
Federal Reserve concern for the stability of sensitive
credit markets introduces changes in important monetaiy
aggregates (such as bank reserves and the money sup-
ply) . During periods when the federal funds rate is
tending to move higher, the Fed often moderates, or
cushions, the increase. To do this, it takes actions to in-
crease the availability of reserves. Conversely, when the
federal funds rate is tending to move lower, the Fed
often softens its decline. To do this, it takes actions to
reduce the availability of reserves.
Interest rates of virtually all maturities have risen
since mid-March. For example, the federal funds rate
has risen more than half a percentage point (see chart)
.
The Fed increased the discount rate— the rate charged
by Federal Reserve Banks for loans to member banks—
in early May from 6.5 to 7 percent.
It comes as no surprise, therefore, that the money
supply is expanding rapidly (suggesting monetary ease)
at the same time that interest rates are moving higher
(suggesting monetary tightening). An important eco-
nomic policy issue is whether, on balance, current mone-
tary actions are expansive or restrictive. Unfortunately,
Money Supply
Billions of dollars
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this is one of the quagmires of economics. Monetarists
assert that current monetan,- growth is excessive and will
lead to an intensification of inflation. Most other econo-
mists would probably assert that recent and current in-
creases in interest rates will tend to limit the pace of
future economic expansion.
Renewed Economic Expansion
Output has expanded sharply since the depth of
winter. Industrial production, after declining in January,
has since risen at an 11.7 percent rate per annum (see
chart). Output rose at a 15.6 percent annual rate in
April. Increases were broadly based, but were especially
strong in autos and primary metals. The April rate was
up 4.7 percent from April 1977, and the capacity utiliza-
tion rate reached 83.2 percent— the highest in several
years.
Home-building has also recovered. April housing
starts were at a 2.2 million unit annual rate, virtually
the same as in December. Notwithstanding the strong
improvement since Januar)', housing starts so far this
year have averaged more than 10 percent lower than
during the second half of last year.
The labor market has registered impressive gains thus
far in 1978. Employment jumped upward at a 7.1 per-
cent rate in April, and has risen at a 4 percent rate
since January. Increases in jobs have been more rapid
than the growth in the labor force. As a result, unem-
ployment has declined, reaching 6 percent in mid-April.
Consumer spending has picked up, reflecting im-
provements in jobs and household incomes. Retail sales
spurted upward at a 24 percent annual rate in April,
with chief gains in auto sales. On a year-over-year basis,
retail sales were up 9.3 percent. However, most of the
increase resulted from inflation. The physical volume of
sales rose less than 3 percent.
Inflation has moved sharply higher. Wholesale prices
have risen at more than a "double-digit" rate since Oc-
tober. Consumer prices have increased at more than a
10 percent rate since February. As a result, inflation fore-
casts for 1978 have been revised upward. Earlier, the
Administration forecasted a rate of 6 percent to 6.25
percent; currently, the forecast is for a rate of 6.75 per-
cent to 7 percent.
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it is my \iew that, given recent rates of money supply
growth, both inflation and interest rates are' subject to
further upward pressure. A moderation in inflation is
unlikely until money supply growth is brought more
closely into alignment with the growth in real output.
WILLIAM R. BRYAN
Local Illinois Developments
Poverty in Illinois
The Bureau of the Census recently released the re-
sults of the Survey of Income and Education taken in
April through July 1976, which provides estimates of
families, unrelated individuals, and persons by money
income and poverty status in 1975. The survey updates
the 1970 Census money income and poverty estimates.
The concept and definition of poverty is complex and
has been the subject of a number of studies by govern-
ment agencies. The poverty statistics presented in this
report are based on a definition developed by the Social
Security Administration in 1964 and revised by a Federal
Interagency Committee in 1969. Annual revisions of the
SSA poverty thresholds were originally based only on
the average per capita cost of the foods in the economy
food budget, but now reflect changes in the consumer
price index. The thresholds are computed on a national
basis only.
In Illinois in 1975, 577,000 people in families with
female head, no husband present, were below the poverty
Percentage of Three Racial Groups
Below Poverty Level, 1975
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Illinois Business Indexes
Chemicals and Allied Products
The chemicals and allied products industry includes
"those establishments producing basic chemicals, and
establishments manufacturing products by predominantly
chemical processes." Included are producers of basic
chemicals, synthetic fibers and plastics, drugs, paints,
soaps, and agricultural chemicals.
The value of shipments of these establishments
reached an estimated $112 billion in 1977. US employ-
ment in the industry averaged about 885,000 workers
last year. In foreign trade the chemicals industry has
long been a major contributor toward a favorable trade
balance. In 1977 the value of total exports of the chemi-
cals industry exceeded imports by $5.2 billion.
Several factors have clouded the growth potential
for the chemicals industiy. A significant proportion of
capital outlays has recently gone toward meeting envi-
ronmental and safety regulations. It has been estimated
that about 12 percent of the industrial organic chemical
industry's annual production costs are for meeting worker
safety, health, and environmental standards. In addition,
a new and controversial Toxic Substance Control .-\ct
(1977) may also have an important impact on the in-
dustry's long-run growth. But the predominant problem
facing the industry has been the adjustment to a chang-
ing energy/economic environment. The industry' is the
largest manufacturing consumer of energy and also has
the highest level of cost dependence on energy, since it
is important both as a fuel and as a feedstock. This is
especially reflected in the fact that between 1973 and
1977 the wholesale price index for the chemicals industry
as a whole rose more than 1 75 percent.
Much of the chemicals and allied products industry
is frequently referred to as the petrochemical industry.
At present the petrochemical industry requires about 7
percent of the energy resources used annually in the US
— 3 percent as feedstocks for plastics and fertilizer and
4 percent for fuel. The mix of fuel resources used is
uneven— the industry takes 10 percent of the natural
gas consumed in a year, 21 percent of the natural gas
liquids, 4 percent of the crude oil, 6 percent of coal, and
8 percent of electricity. In the longer run, coal offers a
substantial source of feedstock but for the time being
economics does not permit its exploitation.
Industry Divisions
The production of industrial organic chemicals ac-
counts for about 23 percent of the output of the chemical
and allied products industry. These firms provide the
basic building block chemicals needed as feedstock for
other processes. Industrial organic chemicals include
both cyclic compounds (intermediate chemicals, dyes,
pigments, and coal tar crudes) and acyclic compounds
(solvents, flavor and perfume materials, plasticizers,
leather agents, rubber processing chemicals, and other
specialty products). Over 80 percent of the industry's
raw materials are derived from petroleum and natural
gas. Illinois is a major producer of cyclic crudes and
intermediates. In 1975, 12 firms employing 2,500 workers
were making these products. An additional 2,250 were
employed in the manufacturing of miscellaneous other
organic chemicals. The value of the state's shipments of
industrial organic chemicals (more than $610 million in
1975) accounts for approximately 3 percent of the US
total.
The second largest group includes manufactures of
drugs •— pharmaceutical preparations, biological prod-
ucts, medicinals, and botanicals. In 1975 the value of
shipments from firms operating in Illinois totaled nearly
$880 million— about 7.8 percent of the US total. Almost
14,000 are employed at 72 plants in Illinois producing
drugs. Included in this group of firms are several large
nationally known manufacturers. Abbott Laboratories is
the state's largest employer in the industry— about 7,000
people are employed at its North Chicago plant.
Another important group manufactures plastic ma-
terials and resins. In 1975, 28 firms were engaged in
producing plastic materials and synthetics valued at ap-
proximately $530 million. Total state employment num-
bered over 2,600 that year.
Illinois is also a primary producer of a host of other
products which come under the chemicals and allied
products heading. It is a major manufacturer of soap
and toilet goods; in 1975 more than 11,500 individuals
were employed in 180 firms across the State. Illinois ac-
counts for about 12 percent of the US total emplo\Tnent
in this industr)'. Approximately 2,400 workers in 22 firms
produce agricultural chemicals (including nitrogenous,
phosphatic, and mixed fertilizers) . Another 260 firms
produce industrial inorganic chemicals and a broad spec-
trum of "miscellaneous" chemicals such as adhesives,
explosives, printing ink, and carbon black. About 9,800
workers are employed in the manufacture of these
products.
Taken together, more than 52,600 are employed in
the chemicals and allied products industry in Illinois—
about 6 percent of the US total. The value of all prod-
ucts in the industry surpassed $5.7 billion in 1975. In-
cluded among the state's manufacturers are many of the
nation's leading chemical concerns.
Pollution Abatement Expenses
Firms in the industry have spent enormous sums for
pollution abatement in recent years. In 1976 abatement
expenditures of chemical manufacturers operating in Illi-
nois totaled $20.5 million. Another $36 million went for
operating costs and payments to government units (for
public sewage treatment and solid waste collection and
disposal). The chemical industry as a whole has spent
an average of more than 10 percent of its total capital
expenditures each year for pollution abatement; this com-
pares with a 5.5 percent average for all industries. Only
the primar)' metal industries spend larger sums for pollu-
tion control.
MICHAEL TREEING
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Changes in the Inter-American Economic System
WERNER BAER AND DONALD V. GOES
Economists view the "Inter-American Economic Sys-
tem" as a network of trade, investment, and financial
relationships Unking the United States and Latin Amer-
ica. Our central focus here is on the change in the
United States-Latin American economic relationships
since the early part of this century and on the distribu-
tion of the benefits of these economic interactions.
When viewed from the United States, the degree of
economic interrelationship with Latin America in the
19th century was small on both the export and the in-
vestment side. Latin America accounted for less than 8
percent of US exports in 1880 and still less than 10 per-
cent by 1900. Until the last two decades of the 19th
century US foreign investments were negligible, as might
have been expected of a young economy with ample in-
ternal uses for its capital. There was a stronger link on
the import side, however. In 1880 almost 27 percent of
US imports originated in Latin America and until World
War II Latin America's share in US imports hovered
around 25 percent. Latin American trade ties with the
US were closer. In 1900, more than 28 percent of its
exports were shipped to the US and about 25 percent of
its imports originated in the US.
Although US capital began to move into Latin Amer-
ica late in the 19th century, it was still a small proportion
of total investment in the region. In 1900 almost 70 per-
cent of foreign investments were o^\^led by British capital
and only 10 percent by US enterprises. This was to
change rapidly in the first decades of the 20th century'.
As the US was more dependent on Latin America
for imports than as an export market, early US invest-
ments were made principally in primary agricultural and
extractive production (for example, sugar in the Carib-
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bean, bananas in Central America, and copper mining
in the Andean countries). These initial in\estments were
followed by investments in transportation, power genera-
tion, and the economic infrastructure necessary to make
the primary investments more productive.
Between 1900 and 1930, the US increasingly rivaled
Great Britain in the area and gradually became the
principal supplier of the region's manufactured goods
and the principal buyer of its primary' products. By the
end of the 1920s the share of the Latin American market
in US exports had grown to about 19 percent, and im-
ports from Latin America still represented 25 percent of
the US total. The US market accounted for 32 percent
of Latin American exports in the late 1920s and almost
40 percent of its imports.
The destruction and disruption of trade and invest-
ment in the Old World as a consequence of World War
II reinforced US dominance of economic relationships
in this hemisphere. The relative importance of Latin
America to the US also increased: in 1950, 28 percent
of US exports went to Latin .\merica and 35 percent
of its imports originated there (Table 1). From Latin
America's point of view, 35 percent of its exports went
to the US in 1948 and almost 63 percent of its imports
originated there. The US represented 51 percent of
foreign investments in the region by 1950.
The Import-Substitution Era
From this brief description, it can be seen that the
Inter-American Economic System which prevailed until
the early post-^Vorld War II period can be characterized
as a "center-periphery" relationship. The LTS increasingly
replaced Great Britain as the "center" countiy. Since
most Latin American economies were totally geared to
the export sector, specializing in a small number of pri-
mary goods, they were totally dependent on the rate of
Table 1.
economic activity at the "center." A decline in US eco-
nomic activity would be reflected in a decline, often
magnified, of economic activity in the Latin American
economies, which liad few independent means to engage
in countercyclical programs.
The Great Depression convinced many Latin Ameri-
cans in the larger countries that there might be an escape
from dependence on the world's industrial centers. The
drastic decline of their foreign exchange earnings in the
early 1930s with the fall in center countries' incomes
forced them to curtail imports. The resulting shortages
of manufactured goods and their increased relative prices
provided the necessary incentives for a rapid growth of
import-substitutive industries. This, in part, enabled such
countries as Argentina, Brazil, and others to recover from
the shock of the depression in a relatively short time.
These circumstances continued into the early post-
World War II period. Import substitutive industrial-
ization (ISI) was felt to be an essential strategy for
development and as a way to change the dependency
relationship. The ISI drive of many Latin American
countries in the 1950s and early 1960s was aimed prin-
cipally at the reduction of the import coefficient— the
ratio of imports to national income. Most of the major
countries emphasized industrialization on an across-the-
board basis, with little effort made to identify areas in
which scarce resources such as capital and skilled labor
would be used most efficiently. Little was done to en-
courage their customary exports or develop new ones,
since the aim was to insulate Latin American economies
from the vagaries of the world economy by making them
as autarkic as possible.
Po.st-ISI Dependency
By the mid-1960s it had become clear that ISI had
not increased the economic independence of Latin Amer-
ican countries, but had only changed the nature of the
link with the United States and a few other industrial
countries. ISI had led to a drastic change in the com-
modity composition of imports. The share of finished
manufactured products declined while the import of
raw materials (oil, coal, minerals) and capital goods
increased.
As the industrial sectors of Latin American economies
grew both absolutely and relatively, essential industrial
inputs and capital goods imports could not be com-
pressed and the import coefficient actually began to rise
again. Thus the major economies were paradoxically
more vulnerable to balance of payments difficulties than
they had been before ISI. Any reduction in essential im-
ports, unlike interruptions in the supply of imports of
consumer goods, was likely to result in severe industrial
disruption and stagnation. As most Latin American econ-
omies had not changed their export commodity structure
along with changes in their internal structure (they still
relied for their export earnings on their usual primar)'
products) , the risk of facing industrial stagnation because
of import constraints had become ver)- high.
By the mid-1960s most of the large countries were
responding to this problem with export diversification
programs. These consisted of combinations of exchange
rate readjustments in the face of inflation (that is, estab-
hshing policies to avoid the overvaluation of their cur-
rencies, thus keeping their exports from being priced out
of world markets) , tax and credit incentives for exporters,
and various types of administrative and institutional re-
forms designed to facilitate exporters' penetration of new
markets.
With the industrialization of the major countries
there also occurred major changes in the structure of
foreign investments. For a number of reasons investments
in primary production and public utilities declined. As
a result, new foreign investment after World War II was
concentrated in the growing manufacturing sector, where
the rewards for foreign technology were higher. It is
ironic that despite the fact that one of the goals of indus-
trialization was to increase the economic independence
of Latin American countries, the achievement of indus-
trial growth was in large part based on the attraction of
foreign (at first mainly US) capital, which made those
countries dependent in a new way.
Current Ties with the US : A Summary
Trade. In the last two decades Latin America's
exports have become increasingly diversified in both
their commodity composition and geographic destina-
tion (Tables 2 and 3). One of the most striking trends
has been the rise of manufactures. By the mid-1970s
there was also a greater geographical balance of exports,
the US share having declined from 48 percent in 1950
to 32 percent in 1975. On the import side one notes the
dominance of industrial raw materials and machinery
(imported inputs) and an increased diversification of
the sources of imports, although the US still accounted
for almost 36 percent of imports.
The tendency toward greater geographical diversifi-
cation in Latin American exports arises from a number
of causes. Among them is the more rapid growth of in-
comes in developed countries other than the United
States, notably in Japan and West Germany. Many Latin
American countries have tended to keep their currencies
linked in real terms to the dollar, so that as the dollar
has declined against the yen, the deutsche mark, and
some other major currencies, Latin American exports
have become relatively less expensive in Japan and
Western Europe. Still another factor is the potentially
greater trade complementarity between .some Latin Amer-
ican economies and developed nations other than the US.
Foreign Capital. Geographical diversification is also
notable in the origin of foreign investments for some of
the larger countries. The share of the US investment in
Brazil declined from 48 percent in 1950 to 32 percent in
1976; the US share declined from 73 percent to 54 per-
cent in Mexico between 1950 and 1969 (Table 4). From
a US perspective, moreover, Latin America became rela-
tively less important as a destination for US direct in-
vestment, despite its rise in absolute terms, falling from
almost 47 percent of total US investment flows in 1929
to about 13 percent in the mid-1950s. Latin America is
still, however, the principal investment outlet of the US
in the Third World. Examining the sectoral composition
of US investments in Latin America, one notes a sub-
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tem of production. The level of production of the sub-
sidiaries of multinationals, especially those which are
vertically integrated on an international level, thus de-
pends on decisions of multinationals concerning their
world production objectives, such as the international
division of their activities.
International bargaining for shares in the interna-
tional production scheme of multinationals is still in its
infancy. On the Latin American side, the multinationals
increasingly are feeling the pressure of governments
which are interested in pushing their export diversifica-
tion programs. They are feeling both the political pres-
sure of the governments and are also attracted by tax
incentive schemes designed to increase exports. In the
United States, on the other hand, there has been a
mounting pressure by labor unions and other interest
groups to limit the expansion of overseas production fa-
cilities of US-based multinationals, on the ground that
such operations in effect "export" American jobs.
It has become increasingly clear in the 1970s that
one cannot view US-Latin American economic relations
as consisting of one group of US interests versus another
group of united Latin American interests. On each side
one can identify conflicting interests. For instance, pres-
sured by labor unions and some multinationals, the US
government in 1977 demanded the abandonment of ex-
port incentive arrangements by Brazil on the ground that
these incentives violate GATT rules. It also demanded
the reduction of import barriers which have hindered
the import of capital goods, replacement parts, and other
production inputs used by US multinationals. In 1977
Brazil managed to eliminate its trade deficit, reducing its
large current account deficit, partly as a result of its ex-
port incentives and import restrictions. Abandonment of
these measures would once again open up a substantial
trade gap. Given Brazil's large debt, this would work to
the detriment of the countr)''s creditworthiness and, be-
cause of Brazil's size, jeopardize the portfolios of its
creditors, many of whom are US banks. This is an exam-
ple of the type of split in US economic interests— labor
unions and some multinationals versus banks— which
make contemporary relations most complex.
.\nother aspect of the presence of multinationals in
complicating economic and political relations can be
found in the conflicting goals of multinationals and host
governments, on the one hand, and groups which are
dissatisfied with the current functioning of Latin Amer-
ican society and the distribution of the benefits of
economic growth, on the other. The presence of multi-
nationals in some of Latin America's most important
industries, for instance, may give them a vested interest
in the existing production profile of the region. They
will either resist efforts to redistribute income, which
could threaten their markets, or they will use advertising,
credit arrangements, and other sales tools to "distort" the
demand profiles of lower income groups, persuading them
to buy products (consumer durables) which are not nec-
essarily in the interest of those groups. Although North
Americans might reject this argument on the basis of
"consumer sovereignty," in Latin America the relative
unfamiliarity of large sectors of the population with both
Table 4. US Direct I
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with host governments, they are reluctant to carry out
basic research away from home. This is in direct conflict
with the desire of Latin American countries to increase
their share of frontier research in technological develop-
ment.
Related to the issue of pa>Tnents for technology
transfers by multinationals is the larger question of the
net balance of payments effect of the multinationals'
presence. Although the abstract, static models of eco-
nomic theory tend to present investment and other factor
movements as a substitute for trade flows, a growing,
increasingly interdependent world economy appears to
offer little empirical support for this argument. Indeed,
it is ironic to note that US-based multinationals have
defended themselves against the charges by American
labor and allied groups that they "export jobs" by argu-
ing that they in fact increase the demand for American
exports by the countries in which they invest. Despite the
lack of conclusive empirical evidence for or against this
arg^ument, if it is true, it is small consolation for Latin
American countries with balance of pa^inents problems
to hear they are stimulating developed countries' exports.
Implications of Latin American Indebtedness. Ac-
companying the rise in direct foreign investment since
World War II has been an equally massive, nonequity
financial capital flow of both private and public lending.
This trend has accelerated in the past decade as the
larger Latin American nations, led by Brazil and Mexico,
have gained increasing access to world capital markets.
Such capital flows, from the receiving countries' point of
view, have the advantage of permitting them to retain
management control of the investment, especially when
it is undertaken by a public or government-backed enter-
prise. In addition, such borrowing may actually be
cheaper. Larger countries like Brazil have paid up to 2
percent above the London Inter Bank Official Rate
(analogous to a world prime rate), giving a net rate of
between 9 and 12 percent. Rates of return on equity
capital, however, have been estimated to range between
12 and 20 percent. Although its validity is compromised
by the elements of greater risk inherent in equity invest-
ments, as well as their implicit payments for potential
technology transfers and management services, such a
comparison suggests that loans may be preferable from
the receiving countries' points of view.
Whatever its merits, however, there is little question
that the large debts of Brazil, Mexico, Peru, and Argen-
tina have a number of costs. Substantial proportions of
the foreign exchange earned by these countries must be
used to finance the debt. The price of any new financing
required is higher because of the large amount of debt
already outstanding. The debt places these countries at
a bargaining disadvantage with the major creditor coun-
tries and with institutions dominated by those countries,
such as the IMF and the World Bank. This disadvantage
may be translated into a certain degree of foreign inter-
ference in domestic policymaking, such as the tying of
new loans to specific internal credit or exchange rate
poUcies. Finally, the increased indebtedness may make
the borrowing countries more vulnerable to pressure by
creditor nations. This might take the form of requests
for more lenient treatment of multinationals operating
in the borrowing countries or even in pressure for an
increasing share of foreign capital in indebted local firms.
One might argue, however, that the indebtedness of
a country as large and important as Brazil (debt in early
1978, US$32 billion), Mexico (debt in early 1978, more
than US$25 billion), or even Peru (debt in late 1977,
about US$6 billion) gives their governments some bar-
gaining strength. The large stake of both multinationals
and the larger banks in the United States and other
developed country financial centers in the economic
growth and balance of payinents strength of the bor-
rowers is an obvious consequence of their past financial
commitments. It is probably no exaggeration to state that
the continuing ability of the larger Latin American na-
tions, notably Brazil and Mexico, to service their external
debt is essential to the solvency of many of the principal
members of the international financial community. For
this reason, their past borrowing and receptivity to for-
eign direct investment has given the major Latin Ameri-
can nations a group of allies in their effort to obtain fa-
\-orable trade policies and expanded credits from the
developed world.
The Impact of the "Energy Crisis." Even without the
quadrupling of petroleum prices in 1973-74, the eco-
nomic growth of the major Latin American economies
would have been aff'ected by limitations in energy' avail-
ability. With the exceptions of Latin America's two
members of OPEC, Venezuela and Ecuador, and pos-
sibly Mexico, which may benefit from recently discovered
reser\-es of petroleum, the radical changes in the world
petroleum market have had a severe impact on Latin
American economies. In two of the leading petroleum
importers, Argentina and Brazil, nationalistic traditions
in the petroleum sector have been broken, as the state
oil companies have been joined by foreign companies
allowed to explore for oil under "risk contracts." Under
these arrangements a foreign company finding petroleum
in its designated area would share the proceeds with the
state company.
On the demand side, the developing automobile in-
dustries of Brazil and Argentina have been dealt a severe
blow by higher gasoline prices. In addition to rationing,
attempts are under way in Brazil to supplement the
meager gasoline supply with alcohol produced from Bra-
zilian sugar cane.
Concern for access to energy and raw materials is
also creating new subregional dependency relationships.
Brazil's drive to increase ties with Paraguay and Bolivia,
for instance, is motiv'ated primarily by such considera-
tions. The building of the world's largest hydroelectric
dam between Brazil and Paraguay on the Parana River
at Itaipu as a joint venture of these two nations will
make Paraguay the world's largest exporter of electricity
and contribute substantially to the energ)' needs of Bra-
zil's Center-South. There can be little doubt that it will
make Paraguay's economic system extremely dependent
on Brazil, as well as making Paraguayan political sta-
bility and cooperation a major national security concern
of Brazil. Argentina has also worked out plans with
Paraguay to build one or possibly two joint hydroelectric
10
projects. Similarly, Brazil's large-scale investments in
Bolivia are designed to bring that country's abundant
natural gas and other raw materials to the industrial
center of Brazil.
To assure itself of petroleum supplies, a subsidian- of
Brazil's state oil company has made technical assistance
and prospecting contracts with Middle Eastern, African,
and South American countries. There has been an in-
crease in bilateral trade with socialist countries for the
same reason.
Concern with energy has also been a motive for
nuclear development in both Brazil and Argentina.
American worries that the t)-pe of nuclear technology
chosen by Brazil could be used for weapons production
as well as energy- production led to opposition to Brazil's
agreement with West Germany, the supplier of the tech-
nology, and precipitated one of the most se\ere crises in
US-Brazilian relations in this century'.
Policies for Industrial Export Expansion
We have argued that the ISI strategy for the de\'elop-
ment of the major Latin American economies was both
a success and a failure. It did succeed in inducing a sub-
stantial degree of industrialization, although this was
sometimes accomplished with scant concern for economic
efficiency. The ISI policy failed, however, in the sense
that it did not reduce external dependency, but only
changed its nature. Viewed in retrospect, this outcome
was perhaps inevitable, given the lack of certain basic
raw materials. Reliance on certain key sectors, however,
notably the automobile industry, in the ISI process in
Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, and Chile made these coun-
tries unnecessarily vulnerable and dependent in a world
of high petroleum prices.
This dependency has been heightened by the vertical
integration of Latin .\merican industry, especially those
enterprises which are subsidiaries of multinationals, into
a larger international system. In this sense it is more
accurate to speak of "interdependence" rather than de-
pendence, since the degree to which this development
can benefit the Latin American economies depends
largely on the skills of its policyTnakers and economic
diplomats. Trade diversification, both in the variety of
exports and geographically, and diversification of invest-
ment sources have expanded the room in which policy-
makers may maneuver.
The objectives of Latin American trade policies in
today's post-ISI era vary with the size of the economy
and the degree to which it is industrialized and export-
oriented. There is a common concern, however, with the
possibility that the markets for their manufactured ex-
ports will be limited by what is perceived as increasing
protectionism in the developed countries. Brazil has al-
ready faced this type of response to its export drive in
the United States, where it has been accused of "dump-
ing," or unfairly subsidizing footwear, and in Western
Europe, where similar charges have been leveled against
its exports of pig iron.
The question of developing country "dumping" in
American and European markets is likely to continue to
be a major irritant in the relations of Latin America with
the United States. Existing international trade agree-
ments, as embodied in the GATT (General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade), leave much room for argument.
Strictly and customarily defined as selling the export
product below its cost of production, "dumping" by
Latin American producers is rare. The fact that a pair
of Brazilian shoes may sell for less in Chicago than in
Sao Paulo is due principally to the high internal sales
and value added taxes which are not assessed on export
sales. The policies which have aroused the ire of US
producer groups, in other words, are more the result of
tax and subsidy policies designed to stimulate exports
than they are the decisions of individual producers to
drive out domestic American competition. There is ample
precedent in the gradual extension and relaxation of
G.\TT rules to accommodate "border tax adjustments"
and other policies used in the European Com:non Mar-
ket to ofTset the price effects of domestic taxes. US
critics of the Latin American export pjolicies, however,
have argued that these policies go beyond a simple ofTset.
From an economist's point of view, much of the de-
bate is of questionable value, since it ignores the effects
of the adjustments and subsidies, as well as the retaliatory
"countervailing duties" which may be imposed by the
importing countries, on the consumer. Both critics and
proponents of the export incentive policies have concen-
trated their attention on the effects of these policies on
producers. It is clear, however, that the American con-
sumer can benefit from lower prices of imports, and if
domestic American workers in the affected industry can
obtain more productive emplo^Tnent in other activities,
US welfare may actually be raised by Latin American
manufactured export incentives. From a national welfare
point of view, rather than a producer's perspective, it
is the Latin American nations themselves that might
benefit most from an examination of the allocative effi-
ciency effects of their export policies.
Primary Commodity Agreements
Accompanying their efforts to enlarge markets for
their growing industrial exports, most Latin American
nations have attempted to secure and extend the capacity
to import generated by their more usual exports of pri-
mary commodities. Included in this group of countries
are a number of the smaller ones with few prospects for
any significant export of industrial products and often
highly dependent on one or two primary commodities.
Regional efforts to fashion common policies affecting
primar)' product trade, however, are comjjlicated by
many countries' ambivalent roles as both producers and
consumers. The Central American countries, for example,
have had a common interest with other coffee producers
in the International Coffee Agreement, yet as consumers
of oil have been severely affected by OPEC, which was
founded in part through Venezuelan efforts. Brazil is
the dominant force in the world coffee market and the
second largest exporter of soybeans, with a vital interest
in maintaining high prices for these products. As a net
importer of copper, wheat, and several other important
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Latin American primar)' products, however, it would
look with disfavor on cartelization efforts in these areas.
For this reason, it is unlikely that any common Latin
American policy in primary commodities will emerge,
owing to the disparity of national interests. Worldwide
associations organized along product lines, however, are
attractive in a number of cases: Peru and Chile with
Zaire and Zambia in the copper market, or Bolivia and
Malaysia in tin.
Prospects for the successful negotiation of commodity
agreements are further diminished by ambiguities in the
objectives of potential participants. Price "stabilization"
is a rallying point for both producers and consumers, an
objective endorsed by many European nations and at
least paid lip service by the US. Beneath the apparent
unanimity, however, is a fundamental divergence. Pro-
ducers have naturally viewed possible agreements as a
means of providing some security against temporary but
potentially disastrous declines in price, but they have
understandably shown little interest in agreements as a
defense against cjuick price run-ups. The support of con-
suming nations, however, is contingent on their expecta-
tion that commodity agreements will provide some pro-
tection against sudden increases in price, which, to the
extent that they enter the downwardly rigid general price
level in the consuming countries, may tend to "ratchet
up" the cost of living.
Although there is some theoretical and empirical sup-
port for the argument that reduced price variation about
the same average is desirable, this feature of a commodity
agreement alone is unlikely to satisfy either producers
or consumers. Even if agreement on the objectives of
stabilization arrangements were attained, however, a
number of problems remain. First, the costs of manag-
ing a buffer stock, production quota system, or price
support and price limiting system may be considerably
greater than potential benefits. Second, temporary' suc-
cess in the short run may lead to long-run imbalances.
The International Coffee Agreement created conditions
favorable to the entrance of many new producers, result-
ing in an oversupply which induced Brazil to make uni-
lateral production cutbacks, thus reducing its market
share. Finally, the competence and administrative ability
of those responsible for a marketing agreement must be
considered as well as the political power of participants
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to deal with nonparticipant attempts to exploit opportu-
nities which the agreement may present.
Is There a Basis for Cooperation?
The emergence of the major Latin American econo-
mies from a period of relative economic isolation and
their reintegration into the world economy as industrial
economies as well as primaiy producers have profoundly
altered their former economic ties to the United States.
The increase in diversity of both their exports and the
markets in which they are sold as well as the growth of
capital inflows from other sources besides the US might
be interpreted by some as a decline in the Inter-American
System. As should be clear from the first part of this
article, however, this fall in the relative importance of
Latin America and the US to each other is more appar-
ent than real, because of the rapid and sustained growth
of the Western European and Japanese economies in the
post-World War II period. Latin America is today more
than ever dependent on the growth of the world economy
as both a source of essential imports and a market for
the region's exports. Latin American stakes in open, in-
ternationally efficient world trade have thus brought their
national interests closer to those of the US and other
major trading and investing countries.
We have identified a number of areas in which con-
tention exists and may grow: the role of multinationals,
the effects of export promotion policies, primary- com-
modity agreements, energy policies, and the role of ex-
ternal debt in Latin American development. What is
striking, and perhaps encouraging from either a North
American or Latin American perspective, however, is
the complexity of interests and objectives. Older views
of a monolithic America facing a group of weak, de-
pendent economies on the periphery of the world econ-
omy are obsolete and misleading. It would today be
presumptuous and certainly naive to attempt to identify
an American interest in this complexity. The interests of
American labor, multinationals, US consumers, or New
York banks are separate, and if not in conflict, certainly
not identical. In a similar sense, it would be ingenuous
to seek a "Latin -American" position on many of the
issues which dominate economic discussions in the Inter-
American Economic System.
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More Inflation, More Uncertainty university of iluno!;
same rate as in April, with nondurables up enough to
balance the reduction in durables.
Inventories were also up in the latest report, but
grew more slowly than sales and were only 140 percent of
sales. That was the lowest stock/sales ratio reported
since the early 1950s. It encouraged a hope that inven-
tory growth can be kept in check so as not to contribute
to any potential instability in the economy. Certainly
businesses are reported as keeping a very sharp watch on
their stocks to prevent, if possible, any unwanted buildup.
In the early spring months it appeared that the
economy was snapping back nicely from the effects of the
severe winter and the coal strike. The mixed bag of indi-
cators in more recent months has raised caution flags and
prompted worried questions. After months, indeed years,
of more or less vigorous debate over the relative impor-
tance of combating unemployment or inflation, there is
a rapidly growing consensus, if not total agreement, that
inflation is ihe No. 1 problem of the country.
In part, the consensus rests on a fairly widespread
conclusion that the unemployment problem is largely
structural and not amenable to solution through manipu-
lation of the overall economy. In greater part, it is a
response to a renewed upsurge in prices.
Production Growth Continues
So far, physical output has given no cause for con-
cern. Industrial production in May rose from the pre-
vious month at an annual rate of 7.2 percent, about half
the rates of March and April (see chart). The slower
rate was not unexpected and was even welcomed in some
quarters as being more sustainable than the earlier rates,
which reflected the rebound from the winter- and strike-
induced cuts. The May level of production was 4.9 per-
cent above the year earlier and represented a gain of 14
percent over the prerecession high.
The major industry contributing to the return to
more-usual rates of advance was automobiles. Car and
truck manufacturers dropped their production 4 percent
to a level more in keeping with their sales. After the re-
duction from the earlier catch-up schedules, automotive
output was running at 9.4 million units (annualized
rate), still a high level.
A particularly welcome part of the output news was
the hefty 7.2 percent rate of growth in business equip-
ment production. Output of intermediate goods rose at a
similar rate. Consumption goods were turned out at the
Industrial Production
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Homebuilding constitutes a less hopeful part of the
output picture. Housing starts dropped 4.9 percent from
April to May. Permits issued fell even more sharply, by
8.8 percent, indicating further decreases in starts as the
year progresses. The May level of starts stood at 2.1
million units on an annual basis, but the permit level was
1.6 million units. Cutbacks have especially affected multi-
unit structures, which are hurt more severely by money
market strains than are one-family units.
Employment Also Rises
If the unemployment situation is not improving, it is
at least not getting worse. The jobless rate ticked upward
in May from 6.0 percent to 6. 1 percent of the labor force.
The rise was too small to be considered statistically
significant.
More important was the fact that employment gained
by another 3 11,000 (see chart) . As measured by the num-
ber of people with jobs, the economy has done very well
since the 1974-75 downturn. Since the bottom of that re-
cession, nearly 10 million people have been added to
employment rolls. This has carried the total 7.8 million
above the prerecession peak. In the past year 3.7 million
people have been added. Of these, 600,000 have been
drawn from the ranks of the unemployed and 3.1 million
have been workers entering or reentering the labor force.
The chief difficulty has been that the labor force has
grown even more rapidly than have employment oppor-
tunities. Thus unemployment, which has declined to
roughly 6 million workers, has stuck stubbornly at that
level.
Retail Sales Tip Down
After rising sharply at an annual rate of more than
20 percent in March and April, retail sales declined in
May at a rate of 2.4 percent. The drop came in durables,
especially cars. If cars are excluded, sales in May rose at
a rate of 8.4 percent compared with a rate of 13.2 per-
cent the month before.
A longer-term look at retail sales in current dollars
would indicate that consumers have been able to main-
tain purchases. That series shows a growth of 38 percent
since the present economic upswing began (see chart).
Employment and Unemployment
Millions of workers
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Eliminating price increases (using the commodities part
of the CPI) shows, however, a much more modest gain
of 17 percent. Price changes alone have accounted for
well over half of the "growth" in retail sales.
Consumers have resorted increasingly to credit to sup-
port their spending. Installment credit hit $222.7 billion
at the end of April, 17.4 percent over the year before.
The net additions in March and April were the highest
on record and were half again as large as the average
monthly advances in 1977.
Whither Prices?
The part of the economic scene that is causing in-
creasing concern is the resumption of sizable advances
in prices— prices of goods, prices of services, and prices
of money.
The rate of increase in wholesale prices did moderate
somewhat in May. The index rose at an annual rate of
8.4 percent, slightly more than half of April's 15.6 per-
cent rate, but still ahead of March's 7.2 percent and the
rates of most other recent months (see chart). Since
December, the prices of finished goods at the wholesale
level have swung upward at a rate of roughly 10 percent,
half again as much as in 1977. The increases in prices of
cmde goods have been even sharper. Much of the run-up
has been in foods and feedstuffs. a relatively volatile part
of the index. However, prices of finished goods excluding
foods, which generally pursue a steadier course, rose at a
rate of 9.6 percent last month.
That figure was not likely to encourage hope for the
future of the consumer price index. The CPI for all
urban consumers rose at an annual rate of approximately
1 1 percent in May, somewhat faster than the rates of the
early months of 1978. The largest increase was for food
and beverages, but housing costs and medical care were
also up at a rate of nearly 10 percent.
The litany of price hikes has included interest rates
— the prices of money— as the Federal Reserve Board
has sought to moderate inflationary pressures. By mid-
June the prime rate was up to 8.75 percent after the
fourth quarter-point hike since the first of the year. That
rate was the highest in more than three years. In the
past two months the rate on commercial paper has risen
0.8 of a percentage point to 7.63 percent and the federal
funds rate has gone up more than 0.6 of a point to 7.49
percent. It is widely expected that these rates will go
higher still. The fear is that the Fed will brake too hard,
as it has in the past, and help tip the economy into a
recession without achieving much in moderating the
underlying inflation rate.
Wholesale and Consumer Prices
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Local Illinois Developments
Autumn 1977 Family Budgets
According to the US Bureau of Labor Statistics, it
costs more to eat in New York City and northeastern
New Jersey ($387 per month for an intermediate budget
for a family of four) than anywhere else in the country,
excluding Honolulu and Anchorage. Austin, Texas, and
Green Bay, Wisconsin, where families spend approxi-
mately $305 per month at the inteiTnediate budget level,
compete for the lowest urban family food budget. (A
family is defined by the BLS to include a 38-year-old
male, a nonworking spouse, and two children aged 8 and
13.) These findings represent updated estimates for three
hypothetical annual total family budgets for the 1976-77
fiscal year, based on hypothetical lists of goods and
services specified in the mid-1960s to portray three rela-
tive standards of living.
Illinois Business Indexes
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The Changing Structure of Food Marketing
Eating out now commands approximately one-third
of the American family's food dollar. That compares
with one-fourth of food spending only a decade ago.
There is some evidence that groceiy stores are beginning
to feel the effect of these changing habits. In learning to
cope, stores have been desperately experimenting with
new marketing techniques in order to maintain their
competitive positions. These changing conditions have
forced stores to rely on the addition of nonfood lines to
bolster profits, to intensify promotions, and to introduce
automated checkout systems to increase productivity.
Among the latest ideas is the introduction of generic
foods — goods sold without brand names and at lower
prices.
Postwar Growth
The major postwar developments in food retailing
and wholesaling have included massive shifts from
counter service to more efficient self-service retailing, in-
creasing numbers of large "supermarkets" but disap-
pearance of thousands of small family-owned "Mom and
Pop" stores, and spectacular growth of large corporate
food chains, voluntary chains, and retailer cooperatives.
These developments can be attributed in particular to a
growing urban population — due in part to the expanded
reliance on the automobile — and growing incomes.
The higher level of incomes attributable to postwar
economic growth has enabled consumers to buy higher
quality and more expensive kinds of food, to demand
greater variety, to experiment with new products, and to
enjoy the luxury of laborsaving conveniences provided by
processed foods and efficient shopping facilities. Like-
wise, the desire for convenience has been increased by
the growing number of gainfully employed women.
The figures for Illinois clearly reflect these trends.
Between 1951 and 1975 the number of grocery stores
dropped from 7,627 to 4,063. In that same time period,
however, employment increased by 52 percent— from
approximately 52.300 to 79,500 persons. Thus the typical
store has grown in size. For example, in 1951 about 71
percent of the stores employed 1 to 3 persons. Most of
them were family-operated stores. In 1975 only about 39
percent of the stores employed 1 to 4 persons.
The basic economic structure of the Illinois grocery
industry can be classified according to types of stores. A
chain is usually referred to as a company which operates
four or more stores. The major chain operators in the
State include Jewel Food, Fisher Foods, A & P, Kroger,
and National. The other major class of stores is made up
of the independents — finns which operate from one to
three stores. These indejjendent stores are further classi-
fied according to their relationships with food whole-
salers: unaffiliated independents buy from wholesalers
or suppliers on an independent basis; cooperatives are
independent grocere who jointly own and operate their
own wholesale organization ; and "voluntary" groups are
independent grocers who are jointly sponsored by an
independent wholesaler. Voluntary and/or cooperative
groups include such stores as IGA, Certified Grocere of
Illinois, Central Grocers, and Grocerland.
About 70 percent of the state's grocery stores are
located in Cook County. The largest operating chain in
the Chicago area is Jewel Companies, whose stores ac-
count for approximately 46 percent of supermarket sales
there. The company's largest food division. Jewel Food
Stores, operates 174 stores in the Chicago area. Another
division, Eisner Food and Agency Stores, operates 32
stores in the Midwest. Jewel's other important divisions
include Osco Drug, Incorporated (about 40 percent of
the company's food stores are combined with or along-
side an Osco drugstore). Star Market Company, Buttrey
Food Stores, and White Hen Pantiy stores. Fisher Foods
(which owns Dominick's Finer Foods and which runs 67
stores in the Chicago area) and A & P (whose Chicago
division runs 135 stores) are other major chains operating
in Chicago. National Tea was the largest food retailer in
Chicago only two decades ago, but by 1976 it had fallen
to third place with about 13 percent of the market. Fi-
nancial troubles forced the closing of all of its 159
Chicago stores in that same year.
Aggressive Independents
Only a decade ago the Commerce Department con-
cluded that large supermarket food chains would be sell-
ing close to 75 percent of the foods sold in the country
by 1980; at that time they accounted for less than 50 per-
cent of food sold. But for several years now the number
of chain stores has declined while the number of inde-
pendents has risen, and the two have been splitting the
country's food business down the middle. Independents,
who frequently purchase troubled chain stores, have been
able to run on lower margins than the typical larger new
chain supermarkets. Smaller stores and lower energy
costs, less unionization, and the ability to adjust quickly
to local market conditions have been critical factors
working in the independents' favor.
An interesting development in the past several years
has been the growth of so-called "convenience stores" —
small self-service outlets providing extended hours in con-
venient locations with parking facilities. These stores, in
return for prompt service and extended hours, are able
to command higher selling prices and higher returns on
sales than those recorded by major supermarket chains.
Industry forecasters say convenience stores will outnum-
ber supermarkets within the next few years. Currently
they account for about 5 percent of all food store sales.
Another innovation, the introduction of cost-saving
computer checkout systems, has progressed much more
slowly than analysts expected ; at present only about 300
supermarkets use them. A local ordinance in Chicago
which requires unit prices to be stamped on food prod-
ucus has slowed the introduction of computerized systems
in that market.
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What Tennessee and Massachusetts Have Done
to Guarantee Employee Pensions
ROLAND W. BARTLETT
Upon retirement most workers in the United States
receive a pension, social security, or both. For most of
them the monthly check or checks become their principal
source of income after they retire. Many workers have
contributed to their retirement income during their en-
tire working careers. Hence, it is of vital importance
when they retire that funds be available to pay the pen-
sions earned during their active careers.
Pensions to government workers may be paid from
money paid into the pension fund by workers and the
government plus interest, from current taxes, or some
combination of these sources.
Evidence is now available which shows that many
state and local governments are failing to meet their
funded public worker pension liabilities. Unfunded pen-
sion liabilities for specific states in 1977 are given in the
following tabulation. (Data for states except Tennessee
were reported by Mr. Carmen \V. Elio, chairman of the
Massachusetts Retirement Commission and published in
the Champaign-Urbana Courier, 21 September 1977.
The Tennessee data were reported from Mr. John
Bragg's office in the Tennessee legislature on 12 May
1978.)
In 1977, the pension fund in Tennessee totaled about
$1 billion. During the next 40 years, this fund will
gradually increase and its pension fund liability will
gradually decrease. Tennessee has demonstrated in a
practical way how a state can restore the paying of pen-
sions on a sound actuarial basis. Si.xty-eight percent of
pension funds in Tennessee are invested in bonds, 31
percent in common stocks, and 1 percent in mortgages.
In 1974, the Tennessee legislature initiated a cost-of-
living increase of 1.5 percent of salaries and wages paid.
This was increased to 3 percent in 1975. If the consumer
price index (CPI) increased less than 3 percent in any
year, the cost-of-living increase would be reduced to the
actual increase in the CPI index.
When Tennessee was asked to institute a 3 percent
annual cost-of-living allowance for its pensions, advo-
cates said it would cost less than $500,000 a year. Bragg's
committee found that this allowance would escalate to
$100 million a year by the year 2000. They insisted that
this allowance be funded immediately at an actuarially
computed level of $20 million annually. When any new
benefit is added this will be funded immediately on an
actuarial basis in the same way the cost-of-living allow-
ance has been funded. Tennessee will contribute $33
million toward funding the cost-of-living provision during
197&-79.
In 1976, the Tennessee Supreme Court said that if
paying full pensions ever threatened the state's fiscal
stability, the state might renege on its commitments. By
stopping the ever-increasing pension fund liability and
steadily increasing its pension fund on an actuarial basis,
Tennessee has materially improved the chances of ful-
filling its pension obligations both currently and in the
future.
As chairman of the National Conference of the State
Legislatures' task force, Mr. Bragg has listed several steps
any state legislature can undertake to pull its state and
local pension plans out of the depths of poor manage-
ment, poor funding, and political expediency.
(1) "Appoint a committee or council made up of
hard-headed thick-skinned legislators who are willing to
work and learn about pensions, and get some control of
these programs." Every proposed pension change would
then run the gantlet of the committee so that it could be
exposed to full actuarial analysis and the true costs
revealed.
(2) "Eliminate pension hopping." Under this loop-
hole, an employee may work years as a ditchdigger, then
get appointed to a higher-paying job just before he re-
tires and get all his years at ditchdigging credited at the
high salary to give him an inflated pension benefit. The
most notorious example is New York's practice of using
only an employee's last year of work— including over-
time — to determine his pension base.
(3) "Eliminate double-dipping." The most notorious
examples are federal laws which permit a person re-
ceiving a full military pension to go back to work for the
federal government and then draw a full civilian salary
at the same time. There are currently 150,000 double-
dippers on federal payrolls drawing $1 billion annually
in pensions plus current salaries.
(4) "Require examination of disabled government
workers every five years by two physicians." A favorite
gambit of government administrators who want to reduce
work forces or to get rid of an employee that they do
not like is to discover that he or she has some kind of
disability and must be pensioned immediately. While
drawing government pensions, "disabled" workers often
go off and get other jobs so that society pays for them
twice.
(5) "Insist on front-end funding." This means that
when any new benefit is added, it is funded immediately
on an actuarial basis. As stated, when Tennessee was
asked to institute a 3 percent annual cost-of-living allow-
ance on its pensions, advocates said it would cost less
than $500,000. But Bragg's committee insisted it be
funded immediately at an actuarially computed amount
of $20 million annually.
The Massachusetts 40-Year Plan
In 1977, Massachusetts had an unfunded pension
liability of $7.6 billion or an average of $1,306 per person
for everyone in the state. For over 30 years many state
employees have paid part of their salaries or wages into
the pension funds while year-by-year the state and local
governments have failed to come through with their full
share of such funds. In 1975, pensions in Massachusetts
were paid from employee contributions of 7 percent of
their salaries and wages, plus current taxes under what
is known as the pay-as-you-go plan. Carmen W. Elio,
chairman of the Massachusetts Retirement Law Commis-
sion, has warned that if pension plans are not properly
financed, bankruptcy will be the inevitable result.
In this situation, Mr. Elio proposed a reform plan
Projected Annual
which would put the 102 pension plans of the state and
local governments in Massachusetts on a sound basis. The
principal features of the reform plan are as follows
:
( 1
)
Continuation of the 7 percent deduction of em-
ployee payrolls;
(2) After a 5-year phase-in period under the re-
form plan, state and local governments in Massachusetts
would each pay 27.2 percent of their payrolls into the
pension funds for the next 40 years. The governments'
payments of 27.2 percent would provide for
(a) Full funding of pensions for all new em-
ployees;
(b) An average annual increase of 4.5 percent
for inflation during the 40-year period
;
(c) A gradual decrease in the unfunded pension
liability so that it would be zero at the end of the 40-year
period
;
(d) A continuation of the pay-as-you-go plan
during the 40-year period to pay the difference between
total pension and that received from the pension fund.
At the end of the 40-year period each worker would get
a pension based exclusively on the money he paid into
the fund plus the matching contribution of the state or
local governments to the pension fund.
Studies by the Massachusetts Law Commission showed
that after a period of years annual costs for pensions
would be greater under the pay-as-you-go plan than
under the reform plan. Thus, as shown in the accom-
panying table, the pay-as-you-go plan in 1991 would take
28.1 percent of payrolls as compared with 27.2 percent
by the reform plan. By 1993, pay-as-you-go would in-
crease to 31.9 percent but the payments to the funding
plan would remain at 27.2 percent. Between 1993 and
2016, the pay-as-you-go plan each year would require a
higher percentage of payrolls but the rate under the re-
form plan would remain the same.
Under the reform plan, the assets of the pension fund
exclusive of employee contributions would steadily in-
crease, going from $58 million in 1978 to $6.9 billion in
1993. Continuation of the pay-as-you-go plan would
simply add the $6.9 billion to the unfunded liability and
to the insecurity of the whole pension system.
Oil Multinationals and the National Interest
FRED GOTTHEIL
There are numerous important oil-related issues con-
cerning U.S-Middle East economic relations. However,
this article concentrates on but one aspect of the "oil
problem," the relationship between the US-based oil
multinationals operating in the Middle East and US
national policy in that region. I argue that on questions
of oil price determination and balance of payments, the
dominant role played by the multinationals has compro-
mised the national interest.
Oil Prices
Perhaps because of oil's prominence in this country's
economy, it is important to note at the outset the critical
distinction between tlie nation's interest in the Middle
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East and the interest of US-based multinational oil cor-
porations. Traditionally, among public policy decision-
makers, private oil interests and national interests were
assumed to converge. In fact, for a long time, govern-
ment policy has been formulated on the basis of such a
convergence. Federal legislation on oil imports, prices,
production controls, investments, and ta.xes has been
designed in concert with the oil multinationals. The
multinationals have structured the rules and regulations
by which they and we have lived. I do not suggest that
there was a conspiracy. Rather, the private interests of
Exxon, Mobil, Texaco, Gulf, and Socal have been openly
regarded by those in Washington as properly representing
the nation's long-run interest.
Even so, the identification of public with priv^ate in-
terest has not gone unchallenged. Almost every text-
book on economics has demonstrated— in the most
eloquent prose, geometry, and mathematics— that mo-
nopoly distorts rather than promotes the public good. In
the pursuit of private interest, that is, the maximization
of profit, monopolies produce less than would be pro-
duced under competitive conditions. Monopolies are able
to charge higher prices and absorb considerable unused
capacity. A classic example of monopoly abuse cited in
these textbooks was the oil industry.
In short, students of economics knew that as early
as 1900, trustbusting President Theodore Roosevelt de-
fended the national interest against the unfettered opera-
tions of Standard Oil. The Sherman Antitrust Act was
enacted 10 years earlier with Standard in mind. But they
learned as well that this and subsequent legislation to
curb the power of the oil monopolies were, at best, sym-
bolic. In the political and corporate arenas, that is,
among "practical men," what was good for private oil
was thought to be good for the nation. In view of this,
it would seem reasonable to assert that a primary eco-
nomic interest to millions of US consumers and producers
would be to secure a steady, reliable supply of inexpen-
sive oil. The less expensive the oil, the higher is the real
income of US consumers.
Did US consumers and producers secure inexpensive
oil? The price of Persian Gulf crude oil on 1 January
1973 was $2.59 a barrel. At that time, few consumers or
producers considered $2.59 to be inexpensive. On the
contrary, $2.59 seemed outrageously high relative to the
knowTi production costs of Middle East oil. Persian Gulf
crude cost 10 cents a barrel to produce, and no matter
how one views the relationship between costs and price,
this differential was substantial.
The price-cost differential emerged because the price
of oil has little to do with costs. Rather than reflecting
forces of supply and demand, the $2.59 price was an
arbitrary one which reflected the political clout of do-
mestic oil producers and politicians. US consumers paid
$2.59 regardless of the quantities of oil available and re-
gardless of actual costs of production. Whether produc-
tion costs of Middle East oil were 10 cents or 50 cents or
$2.00 a barrel had no bearing whatever on what consum-
ers paid. However, production costs do affect the profit
margins of the multinationals. The price-cost spread of
the Middle East oil afforded cheap oil for the oil multi-
nationals, but not for the US consumer.
Moreover, given this politically engineered price-
cost spread, it would have been irrational for the oil
multinationals to look elsewhere for new oil. This is not
to say that other sources would have been difficult to
locate. Non-Middle East "cheap" oil was indeed available
to the multinationals. The Middle East was the most ad-
vantageous location for the multinationals simply because
it provided them with the cheapest oil.
As a result, over the course of years, the multination-
als produced a system of oil production and distribution
that virtually locked the Western world into the Middle
East. What appeared as rational strategy for the multi-
nationals, however, produced little benefit to the US
consumer. That is, with posted prices totally unrelated to
actual production costs, US consumers were deprived
of inexpensive oil. So far as national policy legitimized
this strategy, we see the confusion of private multina-
tional interest and national interest.
The sequence of events that followed October 1973
did not introduce a fundamental structural change in the
determination of oil prices. To the contrary, price in-
creases were simply passed forward within the existing
structure. By 1 January 1974, the posted price of Persian
Gulf crude was $11.65. This increase reflected a political
rather than an economic change in the industry. There
continues to be abundant, low-cost oil, but there has been
a dramatic shift in political power within the industry.
The decision-making powers of the multinationals and
OPEC were reversed. Whereas before 1973, the multi-
nationals dictated price and output policy while OPEC
acquiesced, since 1973, OPEC has assumed the dominant
role. Prior to 1973 the $2.59 posted price was already ab-
normally high from a cost of production position. The
new $11.65 OPEC-determined price merely serves to
indicate how far off the mark the earlier price had been
in terms of obtaining maximum monopoly profits.
Nevertheless, it is to the advantage of the multination-
als to stay in the Middle East. The US-based oil multi-
nationals will center their activities in the Middle East
as long as its price-cost spread remains greater than the
spread of any other oil— whatever the level of posted
prices. In other words, there is no more reason to expect
them to look elsewhere for oil now than there was prior
to 1973.
Not only are the multinationals out of step vrith US
national interest, but they are very much in step, as they
have always been, with the interests of the OPEC na-
tions. Because oil companies are integrated from the well-
head to the consumer, they serve as the mechanism by
which producer countries have augmented their revenues.
That the multinationals have been well served by this
"marriage of convenience" is clear from Table 1. The
victim, of course, was the US consimier.
Table 1. Net Co
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An Economy with Problems flw Ubfary of the
The economy is riding the crest of one of the longest
peacetime expansions on record. Even so, it is interesting
to note that this period of growth has failed to be ac-
companied by a widespread feehng of "prosperity."
Public attention has been distracted by problems. In
terms of their generally visible impact the most serious
problems facing the nation are rapid inflation and high
unemployment. A troubling irritant to the public is the
persistence of large foreign trade deficits coupled with
"creeping" devaluation. To many the chief culprit is the
federal government— for running continuing huge defi-
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cits. However, central to these problems ot most ap-
parent concern is the economy/'8r^laIrtfli«a'=accelerate —
or even maintain— its rate of profflicmfity gains.
Economic Expansion
Real output of the economy has expanded rapidly
since early this year. Gross national product rose at a
7.4 percent annual rate in the second quarter, after ad-
justing for the efTects of inflation. Increases in the econ-
omy have been widespread. Industrial production —
which includes the output of mines, factories, and utili-
ties— has risen at a 9.8 percent annual rate since Janu-
ary (see chart). Housing starts have risen by about one-
third since January, but the increase has merely restored
the pace achieved prior to the onset of the unusually
severe winter.
Employment has expanded strongly in conjunction
with the rise in output (see chart). Since January, jobs
have grovm at a 5 percent annual rate. Indeed, employ-
ment growth has been impressive throughout the eco-
nomic expansion. Since the trough of the 1973-75 re-
cession, 10.5 million jobs have been added. Of these,
about 8.5 million jobs have been newly created — that is,
in excess of the number prior to the recession.
Income has moved up, reflecting rising employment,
nominal wage increases, and other factors. Thus far
during the economic expansion, personal income has
grown at an annual rate of 11.5 percent but prices and
taxes have risen also. Adjusting for these, disposable per
capita real income, an important measure of the indi-
vidual's economic well-being, has risen at only a 3.6
percent annual rate since mid- 1975. Even this increase is
an overstatement because income fell during the pre-
ceding recession. Since 1973 disposable per capita real
income has edged upward at less than a 2 percent an-
nual rate.
The economic expansion has been powered by con-
sumer spending. Retail sales have exploded at a 16.3
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percent annual rate since January (see chart). Parallel-
ing the expansion in personal income, over the recover^'
as a whole retail sales have risen at more than an 1 1 per-
cent annual rate. Consumer spending in the recent sec-
ond quarter was up $47.3 billion (at an annual rate)
from the first-quarter pace. The first-quarter gain was
only $21.5 billion. The largest quarter-to-quarter shift
was in consumer purchases of durables. During the sec-
ond quarter, spending on durables rose $13.8 billion;
such spending had declined $3.3 billion in the first quar-
ter. To accommodate their increased spending, house-
holds reduced their savings rate from 5.9 percent to 5.3
percent of disposable income.
Inflation and Unemployment
The rate of inflation has accelerated in recent months
(see chart), and has been rapid by historical standards
throughout the expansion and preceding recession. The
general price level— as measured by the GNP deflator
— rose at more than a 10 percent annual rate during the
recent second quarter. In the preceding three years of ex-
pansion, the general level of prices has risen at about a
6 percent annual rate. In the five years prior to the 1975
recovery, prices rose at nearly a 7 percent rate— with
much of the inflation occurring in 1973 and 1974.
Food price increases have led the recent surge in in-
flation. Since last October prices of farm products have
risen at well above a 20 percent annual rate. A major
portion of these increases has been passed on to the con-
sumer, whose food prices have risen at about a 15 per-
cent annual rate. Considering the expansion as a whole,
the farmer has fared poorly. Whereas his prices have
moved up at less than a 3 percent rate, consumer food
prices have risen at about a 5 percent rate. On average,
the overall consumer price index has risen at about a
6 percent rate since 1975.
Unemployment has remained high notwithstanding
the extended economic expansion. At 5.7 percent in mid-
June, the unemployment rate has fallen more than 3 full
percentage points since the depths of the 1973-75
recession. Even so the unemployment rate is more than
a full percentage point above its level prior to the 1973-
75 recession, and more than 2 percentage points abo\e
its level in 1969.
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High unemployment is unusual in the light of the
strong and prolonged rise in employment. It is also re-
garded as an anomaly to find high unemployment asso-
ciated with rapid inflation, but these are unusual times.
The population of working age has grown rapidly over
the past half-decade as a continuing consequence of the
"baby boom" following World War II. Moreover, a
much greater portion of the potential labor force has de-
cided to join the actual labor force. In particular, the
movement of women into the labor force is nothing short
of a fundamental economic change.
Foreign Trade and Federal Deficits
The US has remained in a heavy deficit position in
its international trade accounts. Although 1978 will
mark the second successive year during which the value
of the nation's imports of goods and services will exceed
its exports, such deficits are unusual in post-World War
II US history. Even as recently as the decade prior to
1977, in only one year did the US incur a balance of
trade deficit.
Foreign nations acquire dollars by virtue of achieving
surpluses in their trade with the US (the counterpart of
our deficits). The excess supply of dollars in the hands
of foreigners and the US's excess demand for foreign
currencies sei-ve to drive down the price of dollars. Since
early 1977 the value of the dollar has fallen by more than
10 percent generally, but has dropped much more than
that against certain currencies— most notably the
Japanese yen.
Exchange rate adjustments such as those over the
past year are thought to exercise an impact over future
trade patterns. These devaluations have made foreign
goods more expensive to US citizens, tending to dis-
courage imports. At the same time, they have made US
goods less expensive to foreigners, tending to encourage
exports. To the extent that the theory works in practice,
the US foreign trade deficit is expected to be self-
correcting.
Balance of trade deficits are generally thought to act
as a limitation to an expanding economy. Similar to a
tax, expenditures on foreign goods are a "leakage" from
the domestic spending stream. It has been argued that
the restrictive effects of the foreign trade deficit must be
offset by stimulative monetary and fiscal policies. In fact,
a major share of federal deficits have been financed by
foreigners. They have used their surplus dollars to pur-
chase debt of the US Treasury.
It should be pointed out that there is a contrary
view. Some argue that the inflationary impact of fed-
eral deficits along with an expansive monetary policy
have contributed to the US's foreign trade deficit. They
argue that less domestic inflation would make home
markets more attractive to both US citizens and foreign-
ers. As a consequence, imports would be discouraged
and exports encouraged.
Productivity
Productivity gains in the US economy have been
meager since 1973. From 1973 to 1976 there was an
actual decline in the growth of income per person em-
ployed. In contrast, from the end of World War II to
1969 the growth rate per employed person averaged 2.6
percent per annum. The slowdown in productivity has
had an adverse impact on living standards, business
costs, inflation, and government revenues. It is not clear
whether the productivity slowdown is a fundamental
cause of the more visible symptoms of economic malaise,
or is, itself, just one more result. It is clear, however,
that whatever the nature of the underlying disease, the
adverse effects of the deterioration in productivity are
both widespread and long term in their impact. The
fruits of productivity require an extended ripening
period. They emerge from a long chain of research and
development, adaptation, and investment. Once that
chain has been broken, years may be required before it
can be forged anew.
It is my view that any federal initiative to restore
vigor to the economy must be evaluated in terms of its
prospective long-term impact on productivity. Similarly,
regulatory efforts to improve working conditions, pro-
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Local Illinois Developments
I
Financing Community Colleges
In 1975 the State promised to fund the difference
between total (systemwide) educational costs of the
community college system and the revenue generated
from local property taxes and tuition. The state's share
of direct funding (see chart) is divided among three
types of grants. Credit-hour grants constitute the major
share of state support ($102,195,000 recommended for
fiscal 1979) and are derived by subtracting all other
sources of revenue from the projected total educational
budget. Disadvantaged student grants ($3,800,000) are
also provided to enable colleges to offer special counsel-
ing, tutoring, and remedial-development courses. Since
the community college system relies on local property
taxes as a major source of funding, state provision of
equalization grants ($10,355,800) necessarily arose from
efforts to offset the tremendous variation in resources
among communities. Indirect state funds are also pro-
vided by such state agencies as the Division of Adult
Vocational-Technical Education and the Illinois Office
of Education ($9,800,000 and $9,036,000 respectively).
Revenue Sources for Community Colleges^
Percent
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Rising Prices for Hospital Services
Health care is one element of the cost of living that
is rising faster than the general rate of inflation. Last
year medical care prices increased at an average annual
rate of 9.6 percent. This compares with a 6.5 percent
increase in the overall consumer price index. Between
1973 and 1977 the index for medical care increased at
an average rate of 10 percent while the index for all
consumer prices rose an average 8 percent (see chart).
Health expenditures currently account for about 8.6
percent of gross national product— up from 7.2 percent
in the early 1970s and 4.5 percent in 1950.
Comparative Price Indexes
Bureau of Economic and Busi
The fastest growing component of health care ex-
penditures is hospital services ; currently they account for
40 percent of the nation's health bill. (The next largest
portion, about 19 percent, is spent on physician services.)
In the past five years the cost has soared upward at an
average rate of 13.3 percent. The Health Insurance In-
stitute reports that between 1970 and 1975 the average
cost to a community hospital per patient-day rose from
$81 to $150. In 1976 the "average" Illinois hospital re-
ceived $183 in gross revenue per inpatient-day for hos-
pital care. In the Chicago area the average reached
$209 per day.
In the 1950s hospital costs grew only slightly faster
than the rest of the economy. Most of the increases were
attributable to labor costs, which were steadily catching
up with manufacturing wage advances. In the early
1960s, however, nonlabor costs started to rise more rap-
idly tlian labor costs and the average length of stay in
hospitals started to climb. From 1960 to 1965 nonlabor
costs per admission grew 7 percent annually compared
with 3 percent in the previous decade. The explosion of
hospital costs after 1965 is partly attributable to the be-
ginning of the medicaid and medicare programs and
the expansion of coverage by private programs. In gen-
eral, reimbursement methods offer very little incentive to
control rising costs that are boosted by general inflation,
inefficiency, and other root causes.
Hospitals do not normally face the checks and
balances of a competitive marketplace as do other ser-
vice or manufacturing industries, so it is not surprising
that the price of hospital care is rising faster than other
items. In many hospital situations there are no market
forces which hinder higher costs from being passed on to
consumers. Little consumer resistance is met, since pre-
payment health plans pay for the higher medical costs.
In addition, consumers seldom shop around for hospital
services or have the chance to do so in emergency situ-
ations. More frequently it is the patient's doctor who
orders the ty^pe of care, orders the tests and operations,
and determines when the patient will be discharged.
Although there are budding government and nongovern-
ment endeavors to publicize physicians' fees and apply
antitrust strictures to the medical profession, to date
legislatore have found this route undesirable.
Third-Party Financing
Who pays for the increasing costs of medical care,
and why has there been so little consumer resistance to
higher prices? According to recent polls a substantial
majority of Americans agree that "we could afford to
spend [even] more to improve the quality of health care."
Part of the answer appears to be that our health care de-
liveiy system has developed into what is characterized
as a third-party-payment system, with the government
picking up an increasing share of the annual bill. The
largest portion of personal health care expenditures is
now financed by these third-party groups (private health
insurance companies, government, and philanthropic
sources) . Together they paid 67 percent of all health
costs in 1975, a substantial increase over 1960 (before
medicare and medicaid), when they financed only 48
percent. For persons under 65, private health insurance
paid 35 percent, government 29 percent, and philan-
thropic sources 2 percent. The remainder (34 percent)
represented out-of-pocket payments.
The third-party-pa)'Tnent system is overwhelmingly
the principal means of financing hospital bills. In 1975,
178 million Americans were protected by one or more
forms of private health insurance covering hospital ex-
penses. Included were 12.6 million older persons— 6 out
of 1 of the 65 and older population— who hold private
policies to supplement benefits available through medi-
care.
Medicare entitled more than 24.2 million people to
hospital insurance in 1975. This total included 2.1 mil-
lion disabled persons who were entitled to benefits.
Under medicaid legislation the federal government
matches state funds for programs that assist persons
whose income and resources are regarded as insufficient
to pay for health care regardless of their age. Illinois
medicaid payments rose from $200 million in 1970 to
$770 million in 1976, making medicaid one of the fastest
growing public programs in Illinois. Hospital payments
accounted for 40 percent of those expenditures.
Table 1. Percentage Occupancy Rates
Size (beds) Illinois US
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physicians and dentists, 31,500 registered nurses, 10,200
licensed practical nurses, and 137,000 other salaried per-
sonnel. An additional 86,000 individuals belonging to
hospital auxiliaries donated approximately 4.5 million
hours of service to Illinois hospitals last year.
There were only eight private for-profit hospitals in
the State in 1976 and they accounted for only one-half
of 1 percent of the state's total number of beds. Com-
munity hospitals are predominantly organized on a not-
for-profit basis (three-fourths of the community hospi-
tals). State and locally run hospitals numbered 44 in
1976.
A profile of the "average" Illinois hospital can be
constructed from the American Hospital Association's
1976 survey of hospitals. The "average" Illinois com-
munity hospital has 229 beds; 24 percent of these are
not in use. Each bed will be used 34 times in a year. The
average patient will stay in the hospital eight days and
will accumulate $1,332 in expenses. About 53 percent of
the hospital bill will go for paying the salary of hospital
personnel. The average salary per full-time employee in
1976 for Illinois was $9,939.
Chicago Profile
The city of Chicago ranks number two nationally in
total hospitals, beds, and patient-days for a metropolitan
area. There were 104 short-term nonfederal community
hospitals located in the Chicago area in 1976. These
hospitals operated 33,500 beds and provided 9.8 million
patient-days of care (64 percent of the state total). Al-
most three-fourths of these patient-days were recorded
at hospitals averaging occupancies in excess of 80
percent.
More than 72 percent of total 1976 expenses for all
Illinois community hospitals were incurred by hospitals
in Chicago. Payroll expenses constituted 53 percent of
this total. On average, three full-time people were em-
ployed per bed in Chicago area hospitals, which com-
pares with the national average of 2.5 full-time person-
nel per bed. Slightly more than 67 percent of all the
state's hospital employees work in community hospitals
in Chicago, where 61 percent of all Illinois community
hospital beds are located.
A common prescription for the economic ills of the
hospital industry calls for the reduction of duplicate fa-
cilities through mergers and sharing of services. The
Chicago Hospital Council, chartered in 1935, is one such
efTort. The council, whose membership includes 98 hos-
pitals throughout the Chicago metropolitan area, func-
tions as an integrated representative body as well as a
support unit for research and regional hospital stan-
dardization. Shared computer terminal, courier, and
laundry services are also cost-saving activities offered to
member hospitals. In addition, a group purchasing ser-
vice— the largest in the US— works to minimize hos-
pital costs through bulk purchasing of high-volume hos-
pital supplies. MICHAEL TREEING
When Is Monetary Policy Tight?
THOMAS B. BRYAN AND WILLIAM R. BRYAN
A casual review of popular discussions of current busi-
ness conditions reveals numerous references to Federal
Reserve "tightening" of monetary policy. This is not
unusual. Indeed, periods of rising interest rates are fre-
quently attributed to "tight money," and falling interest
rates are characterized as "easy money" periods. In light
of these popular descriptive terms, it is reasonable to ex-
pect increases in interest rates during periods of slow
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money supply growth and decreases in rates when the
money supply is expanding rapidly.
However, experience over the past 10 years has been
inconsistent with this expectation. That is, rising interest
rates have been associated with an increase in the rate of
growth in the money supply, and decreasing interest rates
have been associated with declines in the pace of mone-
tary growth.
In part, the apparent contradiction between expecta-
tions and experience simply reflects the ambiguous use of
the word "money." Beyond the semantic confusion, how-
ever, there are problems in substance. It appears that the
implemrntation of monetary policy is systematically at
variance with the intentions of policymakers. Thus, policy
and practice appear to contribute to procyclical insta-
bility rather than to the moderation of the business cycle.
It is inviting to wonder about the extent to which a seem-
ingly innocent semantic difficulty may contribute to
longer-term economic instability.
After exploring the alternative uses of the word
"money," this article examines selected strands of US
economic exijerience over the past decade. First, there is
a discussion of credit developments, including related
movements in prices and interest rates. Next, there is
a review of changes in the monetary base over the past
decade, including a discussion of Federal Reserve operat-
ing procedures. Finally, the strands of experience are
pulled together and evaluated.
Uses of the Word "Money"
The word "money" is used in more than one sense.
For example, periods of rising interest rates are frequently
referred to as p)eriods of "tight money." Typically, such
periods are characterized by economic expansion— when
demands for credit exceed supply. Interest rates, the price
(or cost) of credit, move upward to balance the quan-
tities demanded with the quantities supplied (see Table
1). During recessions, interest rates typically decline as
demands for credit fall relative to supplies. Frequently,
this condition is characterized as "easy money."
Table 1. Money Definitions and
Underlying Supply/Demand Relations
in the Business Cycle^
Money as State of the economy
Expansion
Two periods of declining interest rates are shown on
the accompanying chart and summarized in Table 2.
These were also periods that included, in each instance, a
general weakening in economic activity. Episodes such as
these are generally characterized as periods of "easy
money."
It will be noted that the growth in bank loans moder-
ated during these periods. It is probable that loan de-
mands fell relative to readily available supplies. Inflation
rates were also more moderate; indeed, as indicated
Selected Economic Indicators
earlier, there is a view that declines in interest rates
merely reflect reductions in inflation premiums.
Changes in the Monetary Base
The word "money" also refers to a quantity of selec-
ted liquid assets. Expansionary periods, according to
"monetarists," are characterized by "easy money" — a
situation in which actual money balances exceed desired
balances. Recessions are characterized by "tight" money
— a situation in which desired money balances exceed
actual balances.
In light of these theoretical considerations, it is
reasonable to expect that countercyclical monetary actions
will help the public bridge the gap between their desired
and their actual money supply positions. If business ex-
pansions are periods when the public acts as if there is
too much money, monetary poHcy might appropriately
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be geared toward slowing money supply growth. This
would especially be the case if the business expansion
were accompanied by accelerated inflation.
If during periods of recession the public behaves as
if it holds too little money, households and business firms
will attempt to build up their money balances by re-
ducing their rate of spending. During such a period,
countercyclical monetary policy would be geared toward
helping the public satisfy its demand for money.
To summarize, it is reasonable to believe that counter-
cyclical monetary policy actions will produce a slowdown
in money supply growth during periods of business ex-
pansion and an accelerated growth during recessionary
periods. That is, countercyclical actions would produce a
money supply pattern running counter to that suggested
in Table 1.
Monetary policy actions regarding money supply de-
velopments are depicted in the chart and summarized in
Table 2. Rather than to aim at a specific money supply.
Federal Reserve actions are depicted in terms of rates of
change in the monetary base. The monetary base, the
major determinant of the money supply, is composed
chiefly of currency in circulation and member bank re-
serves at Federal Reserv^e banks. Open market operations
of the Federal Reserve— that is, purchases and sales of
government securities— result directly in changes in
the base.
This monetary aggregate has moved with interest rate
changes over the past decade (see chart) . What this has
created is expansionary periods in our economy being
marked by "tight" credit conditions, but with "easy"
money— viewed in terms of liquidity. During recession-
ary periods there has been "easy" credit but "tight"
money— in terms of liquidity. These results are also
summarized in Table 2.
Such a pattern of developments is procyclical. It adds
further stimulation to the factors pushing the economy in
either an expansionary or a recessionary direction.
Notwithstanding the summary of actions presented
here, the Federal Reserve does not intend to be pro-
cyclical. How can it be that their implementation differs
from their intentions? It is our view that the Federal
Reserve has an operating predilection toward moderating
day-to-day movements in interest rates. In periods of
rising interest rates the Federal Reser\e tends to resist
excessively rapid increases. In periods of falling interest
rates, the Federal Reserve tends to resist abrupt declines.
In the case of rising interest rates the Federal Reser\e
purchases US government securities in the open market.
By doing so the Federal Reserve increases demand pres-
sures in the market, thereby moderating the decline in
security prices. The main intention of this operation is to
moderate the upward movement in the rate of interest.
That is, interest rates will rise but their upward climb will
be less rapid than would otherwise be the case.
When the Federal Reserve buys securities it simply
writes a check. This expands the monetary base and there-
by fuels the money supply expansion process, giving rise
to further inflation, further upward pressures on interest
rates, and further Federal Reser\'e intervention.
To the extent that open market operations of the
Federal Resen'e are induced by shifts in the demand for
credit, the monetary authority no longer exercises an in-
dependent control over the money supply. Instead, the
money supply becomes the "tail" — "wagged" by the
vagaries of shifting conditions in credit markets. Rather
than determining movements in the economy, short-run
changes in the money supply are determined by changes
in the economy. Only later, through the pernicious effects
of inflation, will the money supply exercise an effect on
the course of economic activity.
Summary and Conclusions
It is our contention that Federal Reserve operating
procedures produce procyclical results. We argue that
their day-to-day operations serve to cushion the interest
rate impact of changing credit conditions. Thus, during
"tight" credit conditions interest rates do not rise as
rapidly as would otherwise be the case, nor do they fall
as rapidly during periods of "easy" credit. Instead, the
Federal Resene tends to buy more heavily during periods
of economic expansion and to buy less heavily (or even
sell) during periods of economic recession.
An unwanted side effect of their short-term operating
habit is to produce, or reinforce, "easy" money during
periods of "tight" credit— that is, periods of business ex-
pansion. It also produces, or reinforces, "tight" money
during periods of "easy" credit — that is, during re-
cessions.
There is a view that the short-term emphasis of the
Federal Reser\'e on softening day-to-day movements in
the federal funds rate serves to widen interest rate move-
ments over the longer run. It is argued that procyclicTJ
Federal Reserve actions tend to increase the variance in
rates of inflation. To the extent that changes in inflation
"feed" into interest rate changes through alterations in
the inflation premium, such an argument is of con-
sequence.
An undertone of this article may just as well be made
explicit. It is our view that the economy would be better
ser\ed by Federal Reserve operations designed to achieve
well understood money supply growth targets. While we
recognize that a menu of monetary growth targets is an-
nounced from time to time, the choice of targets is so
\aried and the acceptable range for any given target is
so great that the Federal Reserve need not really take
aim. It could not fail to hit something. As a result, day-
to-day operations of the Fed are left es.sentially undis-
turbed.
If Federal Reserve actions were geared toward achiev-
ing a more stable rate of growth in, for example, the
monetary base, it is feared by some that there would be
increased day-to-day instability in short-term interest
rates. We do not share this fear. A market economy has a
strong capacity for generating devices to overcome un-
wanted events. Even if there were an increase in short-
run interest rate instability, such a state of affairs would
be only temporary'. It would create irresistible profit op-
portunities. As those opportunities were exploited, the
short-run interest rate instability would be moderated.
In any event, it is our view that longer-term interest
rate movements would be limited by a more stable growth
in monetary' aggregates. Another way of stating this con-
clusion is to assert that a reduced and stable growth in
money would foster a more moderate and less volatile
rate of inflation.
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The Economy— More of the Same
Real output of the economy has moved upward at a
brisk rate. Even so, prices of a wide range of goods and
services have moved higher. Monetary actions continue
to be expansive, and interest rates have stabilized tem-
porarily at a high level.
The recent surge of "double-digit" inflation cannot
easily be traced to special factors. There has not been a
dramatic surge in energy prices ; there have not been ma-
jor crop failures; the nation is not at war; the economy
is not in the grips of major labor-management disloca-
tions. Instead, the current inflation probably results from
excessive aggregate demand.
Industrial Production
1967=100
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Growth in Industrial Output
Industrial output has expanded rapidly since late last
year (see chart) . Since December, the index of industrial
production has risen at a 7 percent annual rate. By com-
parison, output grew at only a 2.8 percent rate during
the preceding half-year. Rising output of business equip-
ment in recent months has fostered hope that business
investment may make an increasing contribution to the
economy.
Housing has not been a factor in the expansion since
the spring of 1977. Instead, it has remained virtually un-
changed on balance for well over a year, as housing starts
have fluctuated around the 2.1 million annual rate. When
home-building stabilizes— even without an actual de-
cline— current production may well drop in other in-
dustries previously geared toward supporting an expan-
sion in housing, for example, building materials, home
furnishings, and major appliances.
Strength in Labor Markets
Jobs have expanded rapidly since early this year, con-
tinuing the experience of much of the current economic
expansion. Since February, employment has risen at a
3.6 percent annual rate, little changed from the pace of
increase since April 1975; 58.6 percent of the population
of working age were employed in mid-July. On average,
since World War II the economy has provided jobs for
about 55 percent of the working age population. Hence,
if judged in terms of its abihty to provide jobs, today's
economy is very strong.
The unemployment rate has fluctuated near the 6
percent level since early this year. In mid-July it jumped
to 6.2 percent, after falling to 5.7 percent in mid-June.
Then it dipped to 5.9 percent in mid-August. Fluctua-
tions such as these probably have little to do with under-
lying developments in the economy. Instead, they are
likely to reflect statistical problems in handling teenager
movements into and out of the labor force.
National Demographic Trends By Peter A. Morrison / Page 6
Expansion in Income and Spending
Income expanded rapidly in recent months and over
the year, continuing a surge that has persisted over the
past six years. Since mid-1977, personal income has risen
nearly 1 2 percent, and after-tax income has gained nearly
11 percent. Since 1972 these income measures have reg-
istered average rates of increase in excess of 10 percent.
Only in part do these advances in income reflect higher
employment and productivity. Since 1972, employment
has risen 2.4 percent per annum, and productivity is esti-
mated to have increased just over 1 percent per annum.
In recent months, gains in consumer spending have
moderated. Retail sales have edged upward at a 2.1
percent annual rate since April. The Conference Board's
measure of consumer confidence has declined in five of
the past six months. In addition, its index of consumer
buying plans— a measure of intentions to purchase
homes, new and used cars, and major appliances-— has
dropped to its lowest level since the spring of 1975. Con-
sidering a longer time frame, however, spending has
registered strong gains— reflecting increases in income.
Consumer spending rose 11.4 percent in the year ending
in the second quarter, and retail sales have risen at an
average annual rate of 9.4 percent since 1972.
Acceleration in Inflation
The rate of inflation has burgeoned since late last
year. Both consumer and producer prices have risen at
"double-digit" rates since December. The surge in pro-
ducer prices has centered in food prices; farm products
and processed foods have risen at more than a 20 per-
cent rate. But there is no presumption that shrinking
supply has induced the renewed inflation.
It is easy to outline alternative explanations for the
current inflation, but it is difficult to place much confi-
dence in any specific alternative. It is possible to explain
inflation in terms of a wage-price, or a price-wage, spiral.
It is quite clear that there is strong momentum for wage
settlements well in excess of the growth in the economy's
real output. From the point of view of each interest
group, such increases are necessary in order to "keep up
with inflation." There is a widespread view that govern-
ment is responsible for inflation. Some blame the federal
Money Supply
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government's overpowering inclination to spend in excess
of tax revenues. Others point to excessive government
regulation, asserting that it has shackled the growth in
productivity. Still others point to excessive growth in the
money supply as the chief cause of inflation.
Easy Monetary Policy
Monetary' actions continue to be expansive. The
money supply defined to consist of checking accounts plus
currency, M-1, has risen at more than a 7 percent rate
since the end of last year and at an 8.6 percent rate since
March (see chart) . The money supply plus time deposits,
M-2, has expanded at just over an 8 percent annual rate
since December and at nearly a 9 percent rate since
April. These increases are substantially greater than dur-
ing the 1973-75 recession; they are also more rapid than
during the early phases of the economic recovery.
Interest rates have stabilized since early July. How-
ever, they remain at an extremely high level by historical
standards. The prime rate (the rate charged by banks to
major corporate customers) remains at 9 percent, the
highest level in more than three years. Interest rates on
short-term, highly liquid, investment-type securities—
such as Treasury bills — have moved higher than rates
available to ordinary savers on savings accounts. In the
past, such a state of affairs has led to "disintermediation"
— the flow of funds from savings institutions into market
instruments. In turn, home mortgages customarily made
by banks and savings and loan associations have become
increasingly difficult to obtain.
WILLIAM R. BRYAN
Local Illinois Developments
End of the Illinois Fiscal Crisis?
During fiscal year 1977 the state government cash
reserve balance fell to a perilously low total of $52 mil-
lion. With the yearly expenditures and revenues in the
vicinity of $6 billion, that cash reser\'e was grossly inade-
quate as a cushion between the inflow and outflow of
funds. The situation was such that state bills were being
paid irregularly, with creditors and local governments
waiting excessive lengths of time for payments. In fiscal
year 1977 state expenditures of $6,004 million exceeded
revenues of $5,930 million by a total of $74 million. If
this situation had repeated itself in fiscal year 1978 Illi-
nois would have seen a serious cash flow problem turn
into a crisis situation of not having necessary funds to
pay its obligations on a current basis.
However, the state's "checkbook" balance has been
slowly improving. In fiscal year 1978 revenues exceeded
expenditures by $33 million, thus bringing total cash
reserves up to $85 million. Projections for fiscal year
1979, which began on 1 July, are for revenues to exceed
expenditures by $11 million, bringing the cash balance
up to $96 million by the end of the fiscal year. If the
projections of the inflow and outflow of funds are reason-
ably accurate, there will be a further gradual improve-
ment in the state's financial position.
It is difficult to say exactly how much money a state
should hold in reserve. If the balance falls too low, credi-
Illinois State Revenues and Expenditures
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Water Use in Illinois
Illinois residents use 25 percent less water than the
per capita average for the United States. The US Geo-
logical Survey has been compiling data since 1950 which
show trends in water use in Illinois as well as in the rest
of the country. These trends are useful in appraising the
present, and planning future, utilization of the state's
water resources. The 1977 Survey shows that Illinois
residents use an average of 1,200 gallons of fresh water
per day per capita. This compares with the US average
of 1,600 gallons per day per capita.
In order to evaluate the reuse potential for water,
it is important to characterize it in terms of its initial use.
The latest Survey uses four categories: (1) public supply
(water obtained for domestic, commercial, and indus-
trial uses from a water utility that serves the general
public), (2) rural use (water obtained for domestic and
livestock use and not served by a water utility), (3) irri-
gation, and (4) self-supplied industrial (including ther-
moelectric power)
.
Given these four types of initial water use, it is pos-
sible to evaluate the reuse potential of the return flow.
For example, irrigation return flow may be contaminated
by pesticides and fertilizers, resulting in little reuse po-
tential. By comparison, nearly 90 percent of the water
withdrawn by manufacturing and other industries is re-
turned to water sources for additional use. Withdrawal
use is defined as the amount of water withdrawn from its
source; consumption is defined as water used and no
longer available because of evaporation, incorporation
into products and crops, constunption by people or live-
stock, or otherwise removed from the water environment.
Types of Water Use
In Illinois, as in the entire US, more water is with-
drawn and consumed for industrial use than for any
other category. Water used by electrical utility plants is
tabulated separately from other industrial uses in the
Survey because of its magnitude. Not only does the power
industry withdraw the largest quantity of water for off-
channel use (all withdrawal uses other than water with-
drawn for hydroelectric power generation), but the rate
of increase in usage by thermoelectric power plants makes
the self-supplied industrial use the fastest growing of the
major withdrawal uses. Because of the large demand,
thermoelectric plants find it economically necessary to
furnish practically all of their own water. According to
the latest Survey, frjsh water consumption in Illinois
reached 88 million gallons per day (mgd) for thermo-
electric power (electric utility) and other industrial uses.
This was only 1 percent of the national fresh water con-
sumption for this category. Fresh water withdrawn by
electric utilities and other industrial uses amounted to
10,740 mgd, 10 percent of the national total. This sug-
gests that utilities in Illinois have a relatively high effi-
ciency rate of returning water for additional use.
Rural fresh water consumption (domestic and live-
stock) was 54 mgd, only 2 percent of the national total
and second only to industrial fresh water consumption
in Illinois. Total water withdrawn for rural use reached
60 mgd, of which 42 mgd was withdrawn for (and con-
sumed by) livestock and 18 mgd for domestic purposes.
High consumptive use for livestock frequently results
from failure to limit the amounts of water being supplied.
In some instances, water from flowing artesian wells and
unbraked windmills is allowed to run over the land sur-
face where the water is either evaporated or transpired
by nonproductive vegetation.
Irrigation constituted the third major use of fresh
water consumed. Total Illinois fresh water consumption
for irrigation purposes was 41 mgd, compared with a US
total of 80,000 mgd. Data from the Survey show that in
1975, Illinois irrigated 68,000 acres. Illinois used no re-
claimed sewage water for irrigation.
Water used for public supplies in Illinois included a
total water withdrawal (ground and surface water) per
capita of 199 gallons per day (compared with 198 gpd
for the US) , water delivered for industrial and commer-
cial uses of 630 mgd (9,100 mgd in the US), water de-
livered for domestic use of 1 ,500 mgd ( 20,000 mgd in the
US), and fresh water consumption of 21 mgd (6,700
mgd in the US) . In addition to domestic and industrial
uses, public supplies include water used for firefighting,
street washing, and municipal parks and swimming pools.
Trends in Water Use
Over a recent five-year period, withdrawal use in the
US for all four categories rose by 1 1.5 percent. This com-
pared with a 10 percent increase in fresh water consump-
tion. Although the 1977 Survey does not explicitly de-
scribe trends in water use in Illinois, one may extrapolate
information, given US data. The Survey shows steady
rates of increase in water uses, with only surface water
used for irrigation showing an irregular trend. Industrial
withdrawal use rose by 12.8 percent and irrigation use
and public supplies increased by 10.8 percent and 7.6
percent, respectively.
Availability of water in any particular year strongly
affects water used for irrigation and may explain the
irregular trend for this category'. The trend also reflects
a slightly greater average amount of water required per
acre for irrigation purposes in 1975 than in 1970, but
less than the average amount of water needed from 1 960
to 1965. In addition, the increase in acreage in 1975 (9.4
percent) was considerably greater than the increases that
took place from 1960 to 1965 (1 to 3 percent).
It appeai-s from the Survey that less water has been
used than was forecast earlier. The general slackening in
the rate of increase was most evident in thermoelectric
power and general industrial water withdrawals. Despite
the slowdown in the rate of increase in withdrawals in
the US, the percentage increase in withdrawals averaged
about twice the rate of population growth.
SUSAN LINZ
Economic Data for Sele
Overview of Demographic Trends
Shaping the Nation's Future
PETER A. MORRISON
Demographic shifts include changes in the size, struc-
ture, and spatial distribution of the US population, and
the composition of the households and families into
which the population is grouped. Taken together, they
are altering— often drastically— the fortvmes of par-
ticular places and regions. During the past two decades,
major shifts have occuned in long-term demographic
patterns of fertility and migration. Demographic analysis
can draw attention to emerging and approaching issues
associated with these shifts and set the stage for public
debate on timely actions for dealing with those issues.
Overview of National Demographic Changes
Slowing Rate of Population Growth. Toward the end
of the 1960s, the US population entered a period of
transition to zero growth. Nationally, population increase
averaged 2.8 million each year between 1955 and 1965.
Since then, average annual increase has diminished to
1.9 million (less since 1971 )
.
Change in American fertility has been the key factor
in this slowing of population growth. The fertility rate
declined sharply and now stands barely above its historic
low (Chart 1).
The contemporary trend in fertility reflects an inter-
action between the widespread use of more effective
methods of contraception and changing attitudes toward
childbearing:
( 1 ) Contraceptive practice has been modernized over
the past 10 years. The increased use of highly reliable
Peter A. Morrison is a population analyst with
the Rand Corporation, 1700 Main Street, Santa
Monica, California 90406. This overview was pre-
pared at the request of the Joint Economic Com-
mittee of the US Congress and was presented at
committee hearings on 31 May 1978. The state-
ment draws on research supported by grants from
the US Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare, National Institute of Child Health and
Human Development, and the US Department
of Commerce, Economic Development Administra-
tion. The views expressed here are his own and
should not be interpreted as representing those of
the Rand Corporation or any of the agencies spon-
soring its research.
means of contraception, along with the availability of
legal abortion as a backup method, has afforded couples
virtually complete control over their fertility and has
Chart 1. US Total Fertility Rate:
Past and Projected
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ing (Chart 2).^ This dissimilarity in population and
household growth trajectories (which is likely to continue
for at least another decade) can be a source of confusion
in supposedly "declining" cities.^
While a number of uncertainties cloud the outlook
for national population growth, they are well defined
uncertainties, and there is a substantial body of evidence
on which to base an informed judgment about future
fertility trends. For now, the most reasonable conditional
forecast in light of current birth-expectations data is the
Census Bureau's projection series II, which assvunes 2.1
Chart 2. Contrasting Growth Rates:
Population vs. Households
The rate at which a population is changing at any
given time may vary widely from one age group to an-
other. Between 1970 and 1977, the total US population
growth rate (6 percent) concealed considerable uneven-
ness of change. For example, ( 1 ) the population aged 5
to 13 (students) declined 12 percent; (2) the population
25 to 34 (prospective homeowners) increased 32 percent;
and (3) the population 65 and older (heavy consumers
of health care) increased 18 percent. These different
rates of growth for different age groups reflect past fluc-
tuations in fertility that occurred during the economic
depression of the 1930s, the baby boom following the
second World War, and the sudden drop in the fertility
rate in the late 1960s. Each major rise and fall has left
its imprint on the population's age profile.
Peristalsis—• the way a python swallows a pig •— is
an apt metaphor for how the US has absorbed the impact
of these swings in fertility. The many children bom after
World War II crowded the schools during the next de-
cade and began forming their own households in the late
1960s. From birth to maturity they have overcrowded
maternity wards, then schools, then juvenile justice insti-
tutions, and then the housing market.
Chart 4. Families with Working Wives
and Two Paychecks
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The concentration of population in certain ages pres-
ages a number of unavoidable changes that will affect
not only school and college enrollments and the demand
for particular kinds of dwelling units suited to specific
age groups, but also various redistribution programs such
as social security.
Rise in Two-Worker Families. Intertwined with the
trend toward smaller families has been a sharp increase
in the percentage of wives who earn income and in the
closely related percentage of two-paycheck families
(Chart 4)
.
In 1977, 46 percent of wives were in the labor force,
compared with only 24 percent in 1950. Among today's
working-age men, by comparison, 78 percent are in the
labor force— about 10 percentage points lower than in
1950.^ The money contributions of working wives are of
'
crucial importance where they raise family income above
minimal levels. In 1974, only 4 percent of all husband-
wife families had incomes below $5,000 when the wife
was a worker (compared with 13 percent when she was
not). Among all wives who worked in 1974, the median
contribution was more than one-fourth of the total family
income.
In addition to increasing their labor force participa-
tion, wives are also ordering their careers as mothers and
income earners quite difTerently. They are starting work
earlier in life and continuing to work after children
arrive. Furthermore, their attachment to the labor force
is more permanent. Compared with their counterparts a
decade or more ago, many more of today's young wives
are likely to be working in their older years, and will
more often hold full-time jobs.
Among college women, there is a growing disinclina-
tion to confine their activities to home and family. An-
nual national surveys show that far fewer first-year col-
lege women endorse that traditional role now than they
did even in the recent past (only 20 percent in 1977
compared with 44 percent in 1967). First-year college
men show a similar decline (from 67 percent to 36 per-
cent). These preferences may be reflected in the rapid
increase in the representation of women in higher-paying
professional occupations. For example, women now ac-
count for 1 of every 8 physicians, compared with 1 of
every 18 in 1962. The participation of women in first-
professional degree programs also has risen sharply. In
law, for example, the proportion of women among total
enrollment rose from 7 percent to 23 percent between
1969-70 and 1975-76.
In sum, families with at least two workers are the
mode today, and in my judgment this trend will advance
considerably further in the years ahead. Smaller families
and the changing economic position of wives will rein-
force the new working patterns of women. The future
work lives of men and women will come to resemble each
other more and more, both in terms of occupational dis-
tribution and time spent in the labor force. The result
will be increasing numbers of multiworker families, each
with higher family income, in the years ahead.
Changing Geographic Distribution
of Population
Changes in migration patterns, in conjunction with
the falloff in the birthrate, are altering the national land-
scape of population growth and decline. Like wind drift-
ing snow, they have created new shapes, obliterated old
ones, and in some places exposed what lies beneath.
Metropolitan Areas and Their Central Cities. The
sharp decline in births has throttled back the rate of
population growth and in the process revealed migratory
comings and goings as the principal determinant of local
growth and decline in many places. Since 1970, 42 of
' Although the labor force participation rates of all women
have increased markedly, the increase has been especially note-
worthy among mothers, 49 percent of whom were in the labor
force in 1976 compared with 30 percent in 1960.
the nation's 259 standard metropolitan statistical areas
(SMS.^s) have failed to register any significant popula-
tion growth. Three-fourths of tlie 42 are in the northeast
quadrant of the countiy. The failure to grow is due
partly to the low birthrate, but mostly to the excess of
departing migrants over arriving ones. As the cities' mag-
netism has waned, population has stopped growing or
has begun to decline. Although this situation is not the
prelude to economic stagnation that it is widely thought
to be, it does severely strain traditional mechanisms of
municipal finance.*
Within metropolitan areas, the outflow of population
from declining cities continues, and with a predictable
order of march: affluent whites go first; the poor, the
elderly, and minorities (if they go) go last. In the interim,
the population that is left behind tends to grow more
disadvantaged and, disproportionately, to have special
needs. Problems of dependency and poverty, which are
not exclusively problems of these shrinking cities, accum-
ulate within them and clamor for solutions.
The most obvious and troublesome facet of this pro-
cess is metropolitan racial separation. Some blacks are
moving into the suburbs, to be sure, but most blacks
remain concentrated in large central cities; and as the
cities' populations shrink, the relative concentration of
blacks intensifies.
Chart 5. Age Composition of Whites
and Blacks in Large Cities
as just more metropolitan sprawl or "spillover," for it is
affecting distinctly remote and totally rural nonmetro-
politan areas as well as those adjacent to metropolitan
centers.
Regional Shifts. The changing directions of internal
migration during the 1970s signal, and at the same time
reinforce, new patterns in the regional distribution of
economic vitality. These shifts are responsible for a vari-
ety of new regional conflicts of interest as well as for the
new regional political coalitions whose power is starting
to be felt.
The fortunes of different regions present a complex
picture of growth and decline, with frequent marked
breaks from past patterns. The shift in migration, to-
gether with moderating natural increase, has determined
where the symptoms of national decline first appear.
The most striking illustration is the contrasting for-
tunes of the Northeast and the South (as defined by the
Bureau of the Census) . These two regions demonstrate
how recent shifts in net migration, together with the
overall drop in the birthrate, have produced sharply
diverging rates of population growth.
Chart 6. Population Changes in Northeast
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Chart 6 shows the average annual rates of population
change in both regions for the 1960s, the early 1970s, and
the mid-1970s. Population change is divided into its two
demographic components: natural increase (the excess
of births over deaths) and net migration. As the chart
shows, the rate of population growth has declined sharply
in the Northeast but not in the South. The losses of the
Northeast are due to both a downturn in net migration
and the falloff in the birthrate. Prior to 1972, the North-
east had a nominal migration gain. After 1972, net mi-
gration reversed and turned into a sizable rate of out-
migration. The Northeast now registers negative change
in population, because out-migration more than offsets
natural increase.
In the South, the population growth rate during the
1970s has not differed appreciably from that of the 1960s.
The source of this growth has changed, however: the net
migration comp)onent is substantially greater than it was.
In other words, a rising influx of newcomers has sustained
the South's population growth as natural increase has
waned. Although babies have become scarcer, the South
has managed to attract migrants; the Northeast is run-
ning out of both.
All in all, the South is growing ver)' little faster than
it did in the 1960s, and its lead over the Northeast is not
anything new— the South's growth rate has surpassed
that of the Northeast for at least 15 years. But the new
importance of migration has altered the political com-
plexion of the South. After all, migrants, unlike babies,
tend to be of voting age. The crux of interest, then, lies
not so much in gross figures on the national population
slowdown as in the political, economic, and cultural
changes that regions undergo as migrants move among
them.
Implications for Public Policy
The implications of these demographic changes are
exceedingly broad. Rather than attempting an exhaustive
inventory, let me illustrate two kinds of demographic
impacts: (1) demographic change modifies the groups
of recipients and donors involved in several important
kinds of redistribution, and (2) demographic change
undermines long-standing economic and political bal-
ances in the distribution of income, wealth, and employ-
ment growth.
Demographic Change and Redistribution Across Gen-
erations. The tribulations of social security (and of other
government retirement programs) illustrate how demo-
graphic change can destabilize public programs— in this
case, threatening to crack the cornerstone of intergenera-
tional transfer in our society. Some states and localities,
afflicted by the shift in the population's age composition,
have been forced to draw on general tax revenues to
finance their retirement programs. In doing so, they
create what are, in effect, new intergenerational transfer
programs.
Recognition of the problem was surprisingly long in
coming, all things considered. The problem originated
quietly but powerfully during the late 19V0s and 1950s
as sharply rising birthrates expanded the ranks of future
recipients, and gradually declining death rates kept cur-
rent recipients alive— and receiving— longer. That ex-
pansion encouraged planners to make the comfortable
assumption that fertility would remain moderately high.
(After all, it would take nothing short of a baby-boom-
size workforce at the end of the centur)' to generate
enough revenues to support the post-World War II
baby-boom generation when they began to reach retire-
ment age.) That assumption went out the window, of
course, with the onset of the "baby bust" in the late
1960s. It was not until the early 1970s that the public,
already hypei-sensitive to inflation and rising prices, came
to recognize the alamiing problems in store for social
security.
The fundamental demographic change can be traced
in the elderly dependency ratio (Chart 7). This ratio
10
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shows the size of the elderly population (65 years and
over) in relation to the working age population (ages 18
to 64) — expressed as the number of elderly dependents
per hundred working age ndults. The ratio has risen
steadily over recent decades; in the absence of another
baby boom or a surge of immigration, it is projected to
climb from 17 per hundred in 1970 to 32 per hundred
by 2030.
To some extent, rising rates of female labor force par-
ticipation will offset the financial impact of this rising
dependency ratio. Nonetheless, the message conveyed in
these figures is clear: Demographic changes can be ex-
pected to undermine the long-standing political balance
supporting intergenerational transfer. This gradually de-
teriorating demographic context is a formidable and
far-reaching influence, separate from other more imme-
diate threats to the social security system's financial sta-
bility. (The immediate "crisis" of the mid-1970s was
precipitated by a combination of inflation and the man-
ner in which social security benefits and contributions
were coupled.)
Social security is a program whose future script was
largely written when Americans began to shun large
families and settled on the two-child family as a norm
(with some families deciding to have only one child or
none at all)
.
The program's future is disturbing to con-
template. Barring a major war. the number of future
social security recipients will surely rise. With low birth-
rates, however, the number of prospective donors already
has shrunk, and may shrink even further depending on
how few children contemporary teenagers decide to have.
Demographic Change and the Distribution of In-
come, Wealth, and Employment Growth. Migration
shifts in both metropolitan and nonmetropolitan sectors
have begun to reshuffle traditional power bases across
the nation. These changes have been consolidated in new
regional alliances— the Coalition of Northeast Gover-
nors, the Southern Growth Policies Board, and others
— and will become more apparent in 1982 with con-
gressional reapportionment. The shifts are also posing
common kinds of problems in specific places:
( 1
)
Head-count concerns. When federal largess is
distributed among localities and regions— in such forms
as revenue sharing, community assistance, vocational
education, LEAA funding to states, and the like— the
formulas for distributing it typically give weight to the
number of inhabitants an area claims. Regions unable
to boast more people (or worse, unable to claim even as
many as they had last year) will lose funds, even though
they may require more federal assistance for that very
reason.
(2) Concerns about labor force quality. In recom-
posing a region's population, net migration may alter its
labor pool, augmenting or depleting its stock of human
capital. Skilled workers may depart from an area, to be
replaced by less skilled in-migrants; young adults edu-
cated at one region's expense may move themselves, and
that investment, to another region.
(3) Concerns about dependency. Some segments of
the population (for example, those on public assistance)
are recognizably a public burden, and others (such as
uneducated rural-to-urban migrants) are thought to be.
Their accumulation in a place, whether through in-
migration on their own part or through out-migration by
other people, can scarcely be a matter for local indiffer-
ence because of the real or perceived costs they impose.
(4) Concern over undocumented aliens. This issue
figures prominently in California, Texas, New York, and
a few other states to which many aliens make their way.
Illegal aliens used to stay close to the border, often in
rural areas; but substantial numbers of them are now
scattered throughout the nation. There is much disagree-
ment about what effects they have. Some obscners insist
that alien Mexican workers, for example, take jobs that
unemployed Americans or legal migrants could have
filled, and that illegal aliens overburden social ser\'ices of
all kinds, taking more in the form of social welfare ser-
vices than they contribute in ta.xes. Although evidence
is scarce, these allegations have nevertheless gained wide
currency.
(5) Local "shrinking pains." Newly declining areas
are discovering that decline is not a graceful process.
"Shrinking pains" have become commonplace, and not
in central cities alone. Nationwide, about one-sixth of
all metropolitan areas are losing population, and one-
third of metropolitan residents live in these areas of
population decline. For central cities, especially the large
ones and those in the Northeast, the problems are far
worse.
These nongrowing areas will continue to face prob-
lems of residential and productive obsolescence, most no-
tably vacant and abandoned housing, underused schools,
outmoded public facilities, and an aging inventor)' of
stores, offices, and factories. Selective out-migration will
add to the burden of dependency that elderly and low-
income citizens impose on a locality by lingering on after
younger and more mobile people have left. These forces
will worsen the fiscal situation of declining jurisdictions
in an obvious fashion: Tax bases will shrink, while ser-
vice demands may even grow.
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(6) Newly experienced growth. While some areas
resent the problems that migrants generate when they
leave, other areas equally resent the problems that arriv-
ing migrants cause : congestion, sprawl, and support
costs. Local officials often feel frustrated at their inability
to dampen the external forces that attract migrants. They
have, therefore, attempted to deal with the effects in-
stead, by instituting local population ceiling ordinances
(as in Boulder, Colorado; Petaluma, California; and else-
where)
;
proposing federal legislation to control the in-
flux of migrants (as the governor of Hawaii did last
year) ; and attempting to withdraw unilaterally from fed-
eral welfare programs (as in Plumas County, California).
Conclusions
The demographic processes that underlie the shifts
I have described are understood well enough that it is
possible to foresee some of their long-range implications.
Yet policymakers are not receiving the full benefit of
demographic analysis; demography seems to be only
partly understood and poorly used by those who make
policy decisions. There is room for improvement.
Demographic change proceeds slowly but on a mas-
sive scale. The problems it engenders are complex, and
it is not easy to promote public awareness of their exis-
tence and of why public action is needed. The monitor-
ing of demographic trends, periodic analyses of what has
changed and what the changes mean, and other forms
of demographic reporting build public recognition and
help pave the way for Congress to act. The debate can
then become a little more profound and the decisions a
little wiser.
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Income Growth Rate Unchanged In 1976
RUTH A. BIRDZELL
Illinois residents received an estimated $82.1 billion in
personal income in 1976, an increase of 9 percent from
1975. The rate of change was the same as in the previous
year, but fell slightly behind the 10 or 11 percent growth
in 1973 and 1974. The 9 percent rate put Illinois among
the slower-growing states : only eight other states showed
lower percentage advances (one loss) and nine other
states had the same rate of gain. Thus about two-thirds of
the states grew at a faster rate and contributed to the 10
percent average national expansion in personal income.
Comparing Illinois with other wealthy industrial
states shows that Illinois had a larger increase than New
York and matched Pennsylvania, but fell behind the
growth rates of Michigan. Ohio, Texas, and California.
Personal income on a per capita basis, at $7,332 in
1976. continued to run well ahead of the national aver-
age of $6,403. The 1975-76 ad\ance in per capita income
was a little larger than the gain from 1974 to 1975 and
reflected a small decline in population as well as some-
what higher total income.
Table 1 (pages 4 and 5) shows total personal income
for 1971 through 1976 for Illinois, the 10 standard
metropolitan statistical areas that lie wholly or partly in
Illinois, and the 102 counties of the State. Table 2 (pages
6-8) shows per capita personal income: and Table 3
(pages 9-11) shows total labor and proprietors' income
by place of work and by major industries.
Comparisons with the Nation
For many years Illinois has been considered almost
a mirror image, on a smaller scale, of the United States
economy. In the past couple of years, however, there
have been some noticeable divergences. For example, in
the US, labor and proprietors' income from farming
dropped in 1974, 1975, and 1976. The drop in 1975 was
Ruth \. Birdzell is an associate professor in the
Bureau of Economic and Business Research of the
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
about a third of that in 1976, which in turn was smaller
than the 1974 decline. By contrast, farm-related income
in Illinois dropped in 1974, swung sharply upward in
1975, and dropped substantially again in 1976. Thus,
1975 \vas considerably kinder to farmers in Illinois than
it was elsewhere.
Only five counties failed to share in the 1975 upswing
in farm income— Carroll, Clark, Crawford, Cumber-
land, and Johnson; 46 counties had increases in farm in-
come of at least 50 percent. That big surge accentuated
the 1976 drop for Illinois, 26.5 percent compared with
12.8 percent for the nation. Only two counties, Hardin
and Pope, did not suffer a sizable decline in farm-
generated income in 1976. Nonetheless, the 1973-76 shift
in fai-m income for Illinois was —16 percent, compared
with —30 percent for the US.
With the exception of 1974, increases in nonfarm
income in Illinois have lagged behind those in the US
throughout the early 1970s. In 1976 the gain in Illinois
was slightly more than 8 percent compared with one of
nearly 11 percent for the nation. Slower growth in the
private nonfarm sector was the most important factor by
far. This part of the Illinois economy accounted for 84
percent of total labor and proprietors' income by place of
work and 86 percent of nonfarm income in 1976. The
growth rate in Illinois that year was only three-fourths of
that in the US. Illinois growth rates lagged behind US
rates in most of the main sectors— mining, construction,
transportation and public utilities, trade, finance-insur-
ance-real estate, and ser\ices— and most particularly in
manufacturing, the biggest sector of all. Manufacturing
in Illinois accounted for nearly 30 percent of labor and
proprietors' income by place of work in 1976. Gains in
income from that source have generally fallen short of
the national average in this decade and in 1976 dropped
to about three-fifths of the US rate.
The difficulty lay mainly in the durables section,
which accounted for two-thirds of income from manufac-
turing activity. The rate of advance in that segment was
less than half the national rate. In the smaller nondur-
ables component, the rate of growth in Illinois was
roughly three-fourths of the US rate. In 1975, a year that
saw the end of the recession and the start of the recovery,
Illinois actually suffered a decrease in income from
manufacturing whereas the nation showed a fractional
advance. The drop in Illinois occurred in the durables
sector. Where it used to be considered that Illinois, with
its concentration in civilian goods, was not subject to the
ups and downs of defense procurement as some other
states have been, it now has to be wondered if the State
is losing ground even in the civilian markets.
The state's rate of growth for income from manu-
facturing in 1976 was 7.5 percent (9.5 percent for non-
durables, 6.6 percent for durables). Of 102 counties, 14
had less income from manufacturing in 1976 than they
had in 1975. Two of the 14 were metropolitan counties
but only Boone had a large manufacturing component
(two-thirds of its income). In addition, 22 other counties
saw increases in the amount of income earned in manu-
facturing which were less than the state average. Most
notable among those counties were Cook (with a gain of
7 percent, just under average) , Kankakee, Will, McLean,
Peoria, Tazewell, Champaign, Macon, and St. Clair, all
SMSA (and industrial) counties. Other SMSA counties
had increases ranging from 8 percent to 14 percent.
It might have been expected that transfer payments
as a percentage of personal income by place of residence
would drop in 1976 as the recovery progressed. In the
US as a whole that percentage dropped only from 14.2
to 14.0. In Illinois the percentage rose from 12.0 to 12.4,
to $10.1 billion. In only four counties were transfer pay-
ments a smaller part of personal income in 1976 than
they had been in 1975; in one county the share was the
same. In 44 counties the share of transfer payments in
personal income rose only a fraction of a percentage
point, but in 42 counties they were up by 1.0 to 1.9
points, in 10 counties they were up by 2.0 to 2.9 points,
and in one county the part of income from transfers rose
by 3 points.
Some of the wealthy northeastern suburban counties
owed the smallest share of their income to transfers and
several counties in the southeast the largest share. In the
northeastern counties, transfers were up to approximately
6 percent of the total; in the rural southeast, they made
up 24 percent.
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County Incomes as Percentage
of State Average, 1976
Source: Derived from US Department of
Per Capita Personal Income
For a more accurate view of economic well-being,
per capita personal income is useful. Such income ad-
vanced in Illinois in 1976 by nearly 9 percent, slightly
less than the US rate. In the previous three years, the
Illinois gain had been well ahead of the national advance.
After two years of loss or at least no increase in pur-
chasing power, per capita income for both the US and
Illinois showed a real advance in 1976. Measured either
by the consumer price index (CPI) or the implicit price
deflator for consumption spending (IPD) , real per capita
income rose about 3 or 4 percent (see tabulation).
Among the counties of Illinois, Cook, with a gain of
9.0 percent in per capita personal income, and Du Page,
with an increase of 9.3 percent, dominated the state
picture. Of the other 100 counties, 30 suffered a loss in
dollars of income and an additional 42 showed gains of
less than 5 percent. Thus, nearly three-fourths of the
counties of the State showed a loss of purchasing power
in 1976. Four of the remaining counties— Madison.
Hardin, Williamson, and Pope— had increases of more
than 10 percent: 26 counties had gains of 5.0 percent to
9.9 percent.
Per Capita Income Related to US and State
How all these changes left per capita incomes in
Illinois relative to the US average can be seen in Table
3. We could report last year that more than half of the
counties of Illinois had per capita incomes in 1975 that
were greater than the national average. For 1976 that
figure fell to 41. Ten counties still had incomes that were
less than 80 percent of the national average, compared
with 11 in 1975.
By and large, two trends are noticeable in per capita
personal income in the five-year period between 1971
and 1976. ( 1 ) Ten counties in the northeastern part of
the State, all of them urban and industrial and most of
them with per capita personal incomes well above the
national average, lost ground during the period. Some
counties in the area lost as many as 6 or 7 points from
their relatives. Du Page and Cook counties, two heavy-
weights in incomes received, each lost 3 points relative
to the US average. (2) Most of the nonmetropolitan
counties of the State gained a few points relative to the
national average. Gains occurred especially in the western
and southern parts of the State, where incomes generally
lag well behind the national level.
The accompanying map, which shows county per
capita incomes related to the state average, shows ho\v
many of the western and .southern counties trail the rest
of the State. It also shows clearly the weight Cook County
carries. Cook was one of only nine counties in Illinois
in 1976 with a per capita personal income above the
state average. With personal income equal to 107 percent
of the average and with the help of five other metropol-
itan counties, two prosperous farm counties, and one
small rural county, it balanced 93 counties with below-
average incomes.
Professor Birdzcll wishes to thank Jerrold Goldblatt, research assistant in
the Bureau of Economic and Business Research, for his assistance in pre-
paring the tables which accompany this article.
The Data
Each year the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the
US Department of Commerce makes available to the
University of Illinois Bureau of Economic and Busi-
ness Research its estimates of personal income for the
counties of the State. The reports give data for the
second year before and data for several earlier years.
Thus, the recently received 1978 reports include the
income data for 1971 through 1976. The table on
page 1 2 presents the report for one county.
The BEA bases its estimates primarily on adminis-
trative records of federal and state government pro-
grams, with additional information coming from
various censuses or from nongovernment sources. The
most important sources of administrati\e record infor-
mation are the state unemployment insurance pro-
grams, the Social Security Administration insurance
programs, and the Treasury' Department's tax pro-
grams. Census data include sur\eys that are part of
the Censuses of Agriculture and Population.
Personal income is defined as "current income of
residents of an area from all sources. It is measured
after deduction of personal contributions to social
security, government retirement, and other social in-
surance programs but before deduction of income and
other personal taxes. It includes income received from
business. Federal and State and local governments,
households and institutions, and foreign governments.
It consists of wages and salaries (in cash and in kind,
including tips and bonuses as well as contractual
compensation), various types of supplementary earn-
ings teiTTied other labor income (the largest item beina:
employer contributions to private pension, health and
welfare funds), the net incomes of owners of un-
incorporated businesses (fairn and nonfarm with the
latter including the incomes of independent profes-
sionals), net rental income, royalties, dividends, inter-
est, and government and business transfer payments
(consisting in general of disbursements to persons for
which no services are rendered currently, such as un-
employment benefits, social security payments, medi-
care benefits, retirement pay of governmental pro-
grams, and welfare and relief payments."
Personal income data are available for Illinois and
the counties of the State for $10 a set. These data
correspond to those shown on page 12 for Scott
County. Inquiries may be addressed to the Bureau of
Economic and Business Research, University of Illi-
nois, 428 Commerce W'est, Urbana, Illinois 61801.
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A Future Recession ^^'!>o '^
There is a great deal of speculation about the possi-
bility of recession in 1979. Those pointing to recession
are relying for the most part on the belief that a tighten-
ing in monetary policy will induce a weakening in the
economy. In addition, there is a feeling that time is sim-
ply running out on the current expansion. This view is
nurtured on the belief that an economic expansion gen-
erates cumulative imbalances. Eventually, individual
businesses institute corrective measures; in aggregate
these measures result in a recession.
In terms of performance, however, there is no per-
suasive evidence of economic weakness. Economic activ-
ity continues its moderate expansion. There has been no
diminution in the rate of growth in industrial output.
Employrnent continues to move higher, and unemploy-
ment has declined. Consumer spending increases have
not slowed. The major problems in the economy— in-
flation and rising interest rates — are s^Tnptoms of a busi-
ness expansion, not of an underlying weakness.
Tightening Monetary Policy ?
There is no doubt about the fact that interest rates
have increased sharply since August. The prime rate, the
rate of interest banks charge to their most creditworthy
customers, reached 1 1 percent in mid-November (see
chart). A year earlier the prime rate was 7.7,5 percent,
and by August it had edged upward to 9 percent. At
the same time, in order to secure funds to lend banks
have found it necessaiy to make comparable increases
in rates of interest they pay to depositors. In mid-Novem-
ber, banks were paying about 10.75 percent to customers
placing $100,000 or more into certificates of deposit. In-
terest rates on federal funds, commercial paper. Euro-
dollars, and other sources of bank funds also registered
corresponding increases.
It is a mistake, however, to jump to the conclusion
that interest rate increases have been caused by a tight-
ening in monetary policy. Federal Reserve officials
grimly acknowledge that fney are doing their unpleasant
duty in the face of an overheated economy. They point
to increases in the discount rate— the rate of interest
charged by the Federal Reserve on short-term loans to
member banks— to a record 9.5 percent. They show an
increase in reserve requirements (the portion of CD
funds that member banks must hold on deposit with the
Federal Reserve) on longer CDs with initial maturities
of 30 to 179 days. Any course in basic economics teaches
that these prudent measures are indications of a tightened
monetary posture.
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Even so, it is a mistake to accept these actions as
evidence of monetary tightening. Posturing is one thing,
and substantive actions are quite another. Discount rate
increases (or decreases) are largely symbolic. For the
most part, the Federal Reserve does not raise (or lower)
the discount rate until other interest rates have already
risen (or fallen). In any event, an increase in the dis-
count rate has an insignificant direct effect on bank costs.
In recent years member bank borrowing from the Fed-
eral Reserve has seldom risen above $1 billion to $2 bil-
lion. By comparison, demand and time deposits— the
chief liabilities of commercial banks— total about $875
billion.
The principal effect of the recent increase in reserve
requirements on large CDs (those of $100,000 or more)
has been to increase the cost to banks of such funds.
When the marginal reserve requirement on large CDs
was 6 percent, $94 of every $100 were available to lend.
If a bank were to pay a depositor 10 percent for a CD,
the effective cost to the bank of loan funds would be
10.64 percent. A rise in reserve requirements to 8 percent
would mean that a bank would lend only $92 of each
$100 CD deposit, driving the effective cost to 10.87 per-
cent. Such cost increases tend to be passed forward to
borrowers in the form of interest rate increases. Even so,
this supply-side factor has accounted for only about one-
eighth of the rise in interest rates since August. The re-
maining interest rate increases have resulted from de-
mand factors, as business loans have expanded at more
than a 10 percent annual rate since August.
If monetary policy is measured by the growth in
monetary aggregates, it is clear that monetary actions
continue to be expansive. The money supply, demand
deposits plus currency (usually referred to as M-1), has
expanded at more than a 9 percent annual rate since
August, even more rapidly than during the preceding
year (see chart). M-2, the money supply defined to in-
clude time deposits, has risen at nearly an 11 percent rate
since August. In the preceding year, M-2 rose 8.1 per-
cent. In short, the growth in monetary aggregates has
accelerated since August. Monetary policy has not
tightened.
Economic Weakness ?
Output of the economy has continued to edge higher.
Real GNP— that is, gross national product adjusted for
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Billions of dollars
360
are based on market prices. Therefore, their increases
mirror advances in the rate of inflation. Consumer prices
rose more than 8 percent during the year; hence, real
consumer purchases— that is, the items actually carried
home from the store— expanded about 4 percent over
the period.
Retail sales, which account for more than one-half
of consumer spending, weakened in October. Over the
past few months, personal income growth has been less
than the rate of inflation — thereby reducing real in-
come. In the face of ad\ersity, consumers tend to shift
their spending away from durables. Therefore, it is not
surprising that automobile sales have lagged in recent
months. It is always tempting to seize upon such an
economic weakness as "the tip of the iceberg." However,
the retail sales data are extremely erratic; they may dart
hither and yon with little substantial provocation.
The rate of inflation is the major economic problem
facing the nation. Consumer prices rose 8.2 percent over
the past year and have accelerated to more than a 9 per-
cent annual rate since last December. Producer prices
rose nearly 9 percent during the year, with food prices
showing the most rapid increases.
Inflation is a problem chiefly because it results in a
redistribution of real income and in a shift in the real
value of wealth holdings. Some individuals enjoy income
streams that rise more rapidly than the average rate of
inflation ; in general, such individuals experience rising
real incomes. Many others are struggling through a pe-
riod during which their incomes are rising less rapidly
than the rate of inflation. These people are finding it
necessary to reduce their standards of living.
Industrial Production
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Local Illinois Developments
Employment in Four SMSAs
One of the determinants of the economic vitality of
a region is the change in the absolute number of em-
ployed persons. The accompanying graph depicts non-
farm employment trends for four Illinois standard metro-
politan statistical areas (SMSAs) : Rock Island-Moline,
Rockford, Peoria, and Metro-East (the Illinois section of
the St. Louis area). These major cities vary widely in
their economic character and geographic location, thus
giving a general indication of economic trends in the
State.
In 1977, one-third of the workers employed in Rock
Island-Moline were in manufacturing, 23 percent were
in wholesale and retail trade, another 19 percent were
employed by various levels of government, and 10 per-
cent were engaged in service-related occupations. The
economy had a rather sharp downturn in 1970-71, but
survived the 1974-75 recession without any loss in area
employment.
Of the four cities, Rockford had the largest portion
of the area work force engaged in manufacturing -— 44
percent. Another 20 percent were involved in wholesale
and retail trade, 14 percent in services, and 10 percent in
Nonfarm Employment, Selected SMSAs
Illinois Business Indexes
Comparative Economic Data for Selected Illinois Cities, Sept
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The Illinois Timber Buyer
Little is known about the timber industry in Illinois.
Information about the timber buyer and his business
practices is needed for planning, developing, and man-
aging Illinois forest resources.
All people purchasing standing timber in Illinois
must be licensed by the Illinois Division of Forestry. To
obtain information, all the licensed timber buyers (368)
in 1976 for Illinois were sent questionnaires. Fifty per-
cent of the timber buyers returned completed question-
naires. The discussion that follows is based on an analysis
of those returned questionnaires.
Table 2. Acreage of Standing Timber
Cut in Illinois, 1976
Less than 50
50 - 99
100 - 249
250 - 499
500 - 999
1,000 or more
srcentage of buye
Standing Timber Purchased, 1976
In 1976, approximately 96.4 million board feet of
standing timber was purchased in Illinois. For illustrative
purposes, and assuming that the average amount of
lumber in a house is 10,000 board feet and that all the
Illinois timber cut went into houses, this was sufficient
volume to build approximately 9,600 houses. The stump-
age value of the standing timber, at $40 per thousand,
would be nearly $4 million. The 96.4 million board feet
was sold in approximately 1,960 separate timber sales.
Fifty-five percent of the licensed timber buyers pur-
chasing timber in 1976 were involved in no more than
five separate sales in Illinois. Only 20 percent of the
buyers had obtained more than 10 sales. In addition,
nearly two-thirds purchased a total of less than 250,000
board feet of Illinois timber in 1976 (Table 1).
Using the median number of purchases by timber
buyers, 4, and the median total amount purchased,
145,000 board feet, it can be estimated that the size of
each purchase was approximately 36,250 board feet.
Standing Timber Logged, 1976
The amounts of standing timber purchased and
logged are different because the time period to log a
tract generally is spread over several years. In 1976, it is
estimated that 122 million board feet of standing timber
were logged on 56,000 acres in Illinois. Using the $40
stumpage price, this volume was worth nearly $5 million
to landowners and was sufficient volume to build 12,200
homes. Again, nearly two-thirds of the timber buyers that
Table 1.
Standing
of the buyers in 1976.
Sixty percent of the buyers would accept timber sales
of less than 3,000 board feet, depending on species, size,
and quality. However, nearly 20 percent desired sales
greater than 5,000 board feet. All of the timber buyers
learned of at least one sale in 1976 via word of mouth.
In addition, more than one-third received one or more
bid invitations. Advertisements and state listings were
Table 3. Volume of Standing Timber
Cut, by Product, Illinois, 1976
Percentage Saw- Vene
of volume timber
logged
Percentage of timber buyer
26-50
51-75
76-99
100 29
The US Current Account in Structural Change: I
RICHARD D. BARTEL
During the past 15 years, the United States current
account has undergone a striking structural change. This
country's balance on international trade in merchandise
has reversed itself, and earnings on invisible, or service,
transactions have become an increasingly important fac-
tor in our international payments position. Until 1971
the United States had registered a merchandise trade
surplus throughout this century. In the 1970s, however,
rising trade deficits have displaced the solid surpluses of
the 1960s. Indeed, the unprecedented $31 billion trade
deficit experienced in 1977 may well be exceeded in 1978.
Meanwhile, the balance on invisible transactions, which
in the past was a relatively stable and modest part of our
balance of payments, has become a positive factor which
generated a surplus of some $20 billion in 1977.
The current account is only one among several alter-
native balances which the analyst can strike to study a
country's international economic transactions. Each bal-
ance has by definition a different scope and is useful and
informative for different reasons. The current account
conveniently summarizes receipts and payments on
goods, services, and transfers which can be related to
current gross national product (GNP). The balance on
current account indicates how a country allocates eco-
nomic resources with respect to the rest of the world. A
deficit signals that the US is absorbing more economic
resources than it is producing at home; that is, we are
consuming resources from the rest of the world. A surplus
implies the opposite ; domestically absorbed resources are
less than current output, and resources are freed to the
rest of the world.
From the standpoint of short-run economic develop-
ments and stabilization policy, the current account can
be used as a macroeconomic indicator showing the link
between economic activity in the United States and other
nations. Short-term economic downswings and recoveries
— the target of domestic demand management policies
— are clearly reflected in US trade performance and our
external position. The current account balance, viewed
from a different and longer-term perspective, indicates
the role our country plays in international investment
and finance. Tlie current account balance shows the size
and direction of capital flows between the US and the
rest of the world. A deficit signals that this country is a
net borrower (surplus corresponds to a net lender) and
how the resultant capital transactions affect our overall
international investment position.
US Trade Performance
The dramatic deterioration of the US trade position
in recent years has riveted the focus of policymakers and
the popular press alike. Not only has US trade moved
into deep deficit, but our trade structure has changed.
The transformation has affected both the commodity
composition and geographic distribution of US trade
flows and the interplay between commodity trade, trans-
actions in the service account, and international invest-
ment. Analysis of the geographic distribution and com-
modity composition of US exports and imports reveals
how trade structure has responded to powerful economic
transformations taking place in the global economy.
These include (1) the oil price increases since 1972 and
the increasing US dependence on oil imports as an energy
source; (2) divergent longer-run growth rates among
various trading partners; (3) sharp but relatively short-
lived cyclical fluctuations; (4) a substantial alteration in
dollar exchange rates; and (5) the rapid emergence of
the less developed countries (LDCs) as exporters of
manufactured goods. This latter development stems from
the widespread economic advance of the LDCs in the
1970s, including the transfer of modem production tech-
nology through international direct investment and de-
velopment assistance. Changing trade structure also
suggests something about overall US competitiveness in
the world economy— both the performance of our ex-
ports in world markets and the ability of our domestic in-
dustries to compete with foreign suppliers to US markets.
The impact of these dynamic, worldwide economic
transformations is evident in the US current account
(summarized in Table 1). Comparing US international
transactions on goods and services in the 1960s with ex-
perience in the 1970s brings out the striking shift in these
two components of the current account. From the mer-
chandise trade data, exports exceeded imports by an
average $4 billion a year in the 1960s, standing in sharp
contrast to the astonishing trade deficit of over $30 bil-
lion in 1977. After the net surplus on service transactions
hovered around $2 billion on average in the 1960s, it
soared to some $20 billion last year. Consequently, the
balance on goods and services swung from an average
annual surplus of $6 billion in the preceding decade to a
deficit exceeding $10 billion last year, and the balance on
current account displayed a similar reversal from a
modest surplus of some $3 billion to last year's $15 bil-
lion deficit.
Among the diverse current account transactions, the
most fundamental shift is the extraordinary rise in mer-
chandise imports in the 1970s. Separating fuel from non-
fuel imports (Table 1) shows how fuel imports have
soared in value from about $2 billion a year on average
in the 1960s to almost $48 billion last year. This jump
resulted not merely from the fivefold hike in oil import
unit values since 1972 but reflected a substantial rise in
US dependence on imported oil. Domestic oil consump-
tion continued to rise with the long-run expansion of our
economy, albeit interrupted by the 1974-75 recession.
Consequently, the volume of oil imports rose by about
35 percent in the five years through 1977, and imports
as a share of total US oil consumption climbed from
about 40 percent to 50 percent. In contrast to the extra-
ordinary surge in the value of oil imports, nonfuel im-
ports rose about fivefold from the average levels in the
1960s to the present.
Merchandise exports, meanwhile, grew more slowly
than total imports over this period. Once again, it is use-
ful to distinguish two broad export categories— agri-
cultural and nonagricultural exports— since fairly dif-
ferent sets of economic variables affect their movements
over time. This distinction underscores the importance of
agricultural goods — about one-fifth of total e.xports —
in our overall trade performance. Thus, the US as an ex-
porter of agricultural commodities stands unique among
other major industrial countries, in that we share some
common economic interests with other primary produc-
ing countries. In recent years, agricultural exports have
grown more slowly than in the early 1970s when receipts
were inflated both by steep rises in world commodity
prices and heavy demand stemming from poor harvests
elsewhere.
The value of nonagricultural exports, including a
wide range of processed and finished manufactures, con-
sumer and capital goods, grew somewhat more rapidly
than agricultural exports from the 1960s to the present.
One important recent development is masked by this
apparent growth, however. Nonagricultural exports by
volume remained essentially flat between 1974 and 1977
— the apparent gain, according to Department of Com-
merce data, being attributed entirely to price increases.
Viewing US merchandise trade in long-term per-
spective leads to some conclusions about our trade per-
formance over the past 15 years or so. The remarkable
deterioration in our trade deficit is in large part at-
tributable to surging oil imports, but oil is only part of
the story. Transactions in nonagricultural exports and
nonfuel imports— roughly balanced in the 1960s— also
registered a growing deficit in 1977. Other factors under-
lying this turnaround are discussed below, after a review
of international service transactions in the current
account.
"Invisibles": The Mounting Surplus
Service items in the US international accounts, or
"invisibles," have yielded a mounting surplus in recent
years. In 1977 the surplus exceeded $20 billion (Table
1). The strong upswing in net service receipts, since it
appears to be a significant change from the modest sur-
pluses recorded in the 1960s, adds an important positive
aspect in the current account to the othei-wise worrisome
trade position. Furthermore, the growth in net services
receipts, at least until 1977, more than offset the de-
terioration in the US trade accounts.
The rapid expansion of private investment income
(net) is the most prominent factor underlying the rise in
net service receipts. The increase in investment income
began to appear even before the onset of the oil crisis.
Net private investment receipts — interest, dividends,
and branch earnings from the cumulative stock of our
foreign assets— tripled from an annual average of nearly
$5 billion during 1960-69 to about $15 billion in 1973.
Net investment income then fluctuated erratically higher
in general response to global cyclical developments.
Moreover, higher earnings of petroleum affiliates resulted
both from skyrocketing oil prices, which generated siz-
able "windfall" profits on inventories as well as higher
per-barrel profits on current sales, and from increased
production. Growth in net receipts was interrupted in
1975, when the industrial recession shaved company
profits in general, and net receipts dropped off to $16
billion, but growth resumed in the subsequent recovery.
Particularly after the rise in OPEC oil prices, foreign
earnings of the oil industry represented the largest, and
a growing, share of overall US net investment income
;
Table 1. Changing Structure of the US Current
(Balance of payments basis; billions of dollars)
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manufacturing industry, commercial banks, and other fi-
nancial enterprises contribute the remainder. The bulk
of our net in\'estment earnings flows from investments in
Canada, Latin America, and OPEC.
Offsetting to a modest extent the income from private
investment abroad are the US government interest pay-
ments to foreign holders of Treasury securities and of
special deposits with the Treasury Department. The
growth of these interest payments in the 1970s largely
reflects the rise in dollar holdings by foreign official
institutions resulting from foreign central bank interven-
tion in the exchange markets and from OPEC invest-
ments in US securities. Most of our net interest payments
to foreigners are made to Western Europe and Japan.
Fees and royalties are an increasingly important
source of net income in recent years, generating over
$4 billion net in 1977. Fees and royalty income, which
makes up by far the largest part of "other net" receipts in
Table 1, originate from rentals, from the use of patents,
and from professional and management services. Our
foreign investment and capital goods exports often affect
the kind of technology transfer abroad which in turn
generates demand for US technological and managerial
expertise. Although Europe is a major source of this in-
come, fees and royalties flow in from all regions.
Among other service items, travel and transportation
transactions have consistently registered net payments,
which have trended upward over the longer term. The
deficit averaged over $1 billion in the 1960s and has
fluctuated around $3 billion more recently. Payments on
travel and passenger fares behave much like consumer
goods imports, responding to rising US per capita in-
come and to changes in relative prices and exchange
rates. Payments on freight tend to follow the long-run
uptrend in merchandise imports. Finally, United States
military transactions have swung around from a net defi-
cit in the 1960s to a growing surplus in the past several
years. This shift developed as US military spending in
Vietnam wound down and exports of military goods and
services, mostly destined for the Middle East, expanded.
These receipts are in large part offset by ongoing military
payments to Western Europe.
US Trade Structure and
Comparative Advantage
The structural characteristics of a nation's trade are
an important determinant of trade performance, both
in the short run in response to cyclical forces at home
and abroad and in the longer run as a reflection of com-
parative advantage. In a dynamically changing global
economy, however, trade structure and comparative ad-
vantage do not remain fixed. These structures adapt to
the changing requirements of world demand as well as to
transformations of tlie domestic economy. Therefore, a
detailed look at tlie commodity composition and geo-
graphic distribution of US trade helps to clarify how
structural problems have contributed to our rising trade
deficit.
One longer-term structural process affecting US trade
performance may well have accelerated with the pace of
technological change in a highly integrated world econ-
omy. Often termed the "product cycle phenomenon,"
this rather well documented process describes US leader-
ship in developing a new product or technology that be-
comes a basis for exports. Once the product or tech-
nology has been refined, production often shifts abroad
to minimize costs, with multinational enterprises typi-
cally operating as the instruments of this process. Con-
sequently what had been initially a net export position in
a product may in time shift to a net import position.
For the US to maintain our trade performance, then,
a new product or technology must appear and trigger
another "product cycle."
Evidence of a "product cycle phenomenon" in the
structure of US production and international trade can
be traced back at least 50 years, with prominent ex-
amples including man-made fibers, electrical household
appliances, and synthetic rubber. In the process of lo-
cating production facilities abroad, especially in recent
years, multinational firms have transferred modem tech-
nology through direct investment and licensing arrange-
ments to a large number of developing countries as well
as to other industrial countries. Thus, the LDCs have
emerged in the 1970s as efficient producers of a wide
range of standardized manufactured goods, including
consumer electronics products, textiles, clothing, shoes,
and industrial goods. At the same time, capital-intensive
production of automobiles, steel, and certain chemicals
has spread widely among some developing as well as
industrial countries. This widespread diversification be-
yond the traditional industrial countries, which carries
with it modem production technology in every area of
manufacturing, should not be underestimated in plan-
ning strategy with respect to US commercial policy, im-
port restraints, export promotion, foreign aid, and inter-
national investment.
Meanwhile, the US has moved deeper into high-tech-
nology, capital-intensive product lines, such as comput-
ers, aircraft, and capital goods, establishing a firm basis
for our international comparative advantage. Indeed,
US net export surpluses, according to studies based on
disaggregated commodity categories, are positively re-
lated across industries to human capital per man and to
a high research and development content. These findings
fit in well with the product cycle phenomenon and help
explain the pattem of trade surpluses across commodities.
The US appears to have a solid comparative advantage
in capital goods and certain chemicals, both of which
embody a high R&D content and a high capital in-
tensity, and in agricultural goods. Our comparative dis-
advantage is in consumer goods and industrial supplies
and materials.
Geographic Distribution of US Trade
An examination of US trade disaggregated by major
trading areas of the world and by commodity composi-
tion will indicate how our trade structure is changing
and how it affects the global US trade balance. The data
reveal both the cyclical fluctuations in trade and the
longer-term developments bearing on US comparative
10
advantage and the rapidly emerging new foreign sup-
plies of manufactures.
The pronounced deterioration in our trade per-
formance in the 1970s is apparent (Table 2) despite the
erratic year-to-year swings between deficits and surpluses.
The trade balance fluctuated in response to the world-
wide business cycle defined by peaks in economic activity
in major industrial countries in late 1973 and 1974, deep
recession troughs in 1975, and subsequent recoveries to
the present. Economic activity among our trading part-
ners revived with varying strength and progressed along
different time paths. Those differences affected bilateral
trade balances with major trading partners, particularly
the slowdown in the developing world that lagged the
recessions in industrial countries. At the peak of the
global business cycle in 1974, the overall US trade bal-
ance showed a $5.3 billion deficit and tlien swung to a
$9 billion sui-plus during the steep 1975 slide into reces-
sion. A deficit reappeared thereafter and widened
sharply to $31 billion in 1977. A good part of the overall
trade deterioration has been attributed to the more rapid
economic recovery in the US than in other industrial
countries and to the lagged slowdown in investment in
many developing countries.
One rather surprising observation from our regional
balances is that most of the $31 billion 1977 global deficit
on merchandise trade reflects the shortfall in our trade
with developing countries, which amounted to almost
$30 billion (Table 2). That negative balance widi de-
veloping countries was mostly generated by our trade
with OPEC, yielding a deficit of almost $23 billion. That
stands in sharp contrast to the nearly balanced trade
widi OPEC back in 1971, prior to the massive rise in
oil import prices and growing US dependence on oil im-
ports. Our trade with developed countries generated a
Table 2. US Merchand:
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Commodity Composition of US Trade
More can be learned about the sluggish growth of
US exports and the rapid rise in imports in recent years
by looking at the commodity composition of US trade
flows (Table 3), organized according to "end-use com-
modity categories." Traded commodities are grouped ac-
cording to how they end up being used in the nation's
economy. "Industrial supplies and materials," including
fuel, are in general used for current production and re-
spond sensitively to changes in industrial production.
"Capital goods," such as machinery and trucks, are used
in business investment and construction, with sales de-
pending on changes in the investment climate. "Con-
simier goods" — household products, appliances, cloth-
ing, and automobiles— satisfy the final demands of the
household sector, and purchases follow fluctuations in
disposable personal income.
Looking at the commodity composition of the US
deficit in 1977 gives a broad picture of where our com-
parative advantage lies. The strength of our international
trading position is solidly founded on exports of capital
goods and "food and feeds," where the US earned
surpluses of $25 billion and $6 billion, respectively.
These net earnings on merchandise exports, however,
were insufficient to purchase all the consumer goods and
industrial supplies and materials desired by the American
economy. Consequently, deficits on consumer goods and
automobiles ($19 billion) and fuel ($43 billion) resulted
in an overall trade deficit of almost $31 billion.
Spurred by the 1976-77 upswing in US economic ac-
tivity, our merchandise deficit worsened by over $40
billion with the ballooning trade imbalance in fuels ac-
counting for about half, or some $20 billion. Fuel im-
ports had continued to grow even during the 1975 reces-
sion and then surged ahead in the US economic recovery.
The balance of trade on income-sensitive consumer goods
behaved in expected cyclical fashion: the deficit nar-
rowed in the recession when imports declined and then
steadily deepened during 1976-77 when imports re-
bounded with the expansion of incomes, contributing
about a fourth of the deterioration in the deficit.
In sharp contrast, capital goods, the mainstay of
US export performance, registered a large surplus
throughout the period. In fact, capital goods exports ad-
vanced strongly even in 1975, despite the recession in the
12
industrial world, reflecting mainly the continuing de-
mand for US investment goods by OPEC and other
developing countries. As investment demand in the de-
veloping world slackened and the postrecession revival
of investment in the industrial countries proceeded at
best sluggishly, expansion of our capital goods exports
slowed markedly. Consequently, the trade surplus in
this category began to shrink in 1977. Agricultural trade
(foods, feeds, and beverages), the other important bul-
wark in the US export position, contributes a significant
surplus to our overall trade balance. That surplus de-
clined substantially from 1975, however, reflecting a
weakening of certain agricultural prices that held down
our export values, while imports rose, in part because of
higher prices of coffee and other consumer products.
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1979— A Lagging Economy
Economic activity during 1979 will reflect the con-
vergence of numerous forces. One set of forces is a legacy
from the past— about which nothing can be done. It
includes an accumulation of expansive monetary policy,
an entrenched spiral of inflation, an unusually high level
of unused resources, and a large adverse balance of trade.
Another set of forces is not fully determinable at this
time, but will emerge as the year unfolds. It includes
monetary and fiscal actions to be taken during 1979, con-
sumer and business responses to the business environment
as it takes shape, and one or more imexplainable "shocks"
Industrial Production
— a winter storm, a strike, an embargo, and so on —
that have a way of surfacing from time to time.
The central question for the coming year is whether
there will be a recession. There is a widely held view that
forces have been set in motion that can, at length,
weaken the economy— barring major shifts in govern-
ment economic policy or private attitudes.
A first step toward evaluating this question is to
gauge the strength of those forces already dominating the
economic scene. Following this, it is useful to speculate
about prospective government policy initiatives and po-
tential shifts in consumer and business response patterns.
Recent Economic Developments
Business activity expanded less rapidly last year than
in previous years of the current economic expansion. Real
gross national product— that is, GNP adjusted for
changes in prices— rose 3.5 percent in the year ending in
the third quarter of 1978 (the latest quarter for which
data are available). In the two preceding years, real
GNP rose 4.6 percent and 5.3 percent (1976 and 1977.
respectively) . The slower growth in activity can be traced
to a marked reduction in the growth of investment
coupled with a reduced growth in government spending.
Investment spending rose 13 percent from the third
quarter of 1977 to the third quarter of 1978; however,
after adjusting for inflation, investment increased only
4.3 percent. In the preceding year, investment expanded
nearly 24 percent— with real increases of nearly 14 per-
cent. Business investment is undertaken in the light of
businessmen's views regarding future profits. It is believed
that uncertainty regarding inflation, government policy,
and a host of other factors tends to retard investment. In
turn, shifts in investment tend to lead to larger swings
in the economy.
Government spending rose just over 10 percent last
year, nearly one percentage point lower than in the pre-
ceding year. However, it would be misleading to regard
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the slowdown in government spending as evidence of
fiscal policy— even tliough the direction of change has
been appropriate to the economic environment. Changes
in government spending occur as a result of explicit
spending initiatives or cutbacks, or as a consequence of
the natural growth or decline of programs. These changes
occur at both the federal level and the level of state and
local governments.
Consumer spending rose more rapidly last year than
in earlier years of the current economic expansion. Con-
sumers increased their outlays 11.7 percent in 1978, com-
pared with increases of 10.6 percent and 10.5 percent in
1976 and 1975, respectively (each year-over-year change
is on a third-quarter basis) . In real terms, however, con-
sumer gains have diminished since 1975. Put difiFerently,
inflation has taken a successively larger share of the con-
sumer dollar in each of the past three years.
The slowdown in economic activity is not in evidence
from an examination of production statistics. Industrial
production increased 7.3 percent in 1978 (12-month pe-
riod ending in November) , somewhat more rapidly than
in the two preceding years. Partly neutralizing the rise in
industrial output, however, construction activity was
essentially flat last year.
Similar to production trends, employment statistics do
not reveal a weakening in the economy. Employment rose
3.8 percent in the year ending in November 1978. This
rise was little changed from the 3.7 percent average an-
nual rate of employment growth since April 1975. Re-
flecting the strong rise in emplo^-ment, unemployment
dropped nearly a full percentage point in 1978.
The rate of inflation accelerated in 1978. Consumer
prices rose nearly 9 percent and producer prices rose 9.5
percent. In the preceding three years, consumer prices
rose at a 6.3 percent average annua] rate and producer
prices rose at a 4.6 percent rate. A strong surge in farm
and food prices led the advance in producer prices. In
1978 food prices rose nearly 15 percent, after edging up-
ward at a 3 percent rate from late 1973 to the end of
1977.
Interest rates jumped sharply in 1978, reflecting the
acceleration in inflation. Interest rates on short-term
securities— such as Treasury bills and commercial paper
— rose about four percentage points, while rates on
longer-term instruments— such as corporate or Treasury
bonds— rose about one percentage point. It is not un-
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ing the past several years. However, in recent months the
money supply has stopped growing. In part, the signifi-
cance of this develojjment depends upon why it has
occurred; in part, its significance depends upon how long
it persists.
The money supply (Mi) expanded nearly 8 percent
in the year ending in October, unchanged from the
growth rate that had prevailed over the two preceding
years. Since October the money supply has declined on
balance. This same pattern has been traced by other
monetary aggregates— such as Mj ( the money supply
plus time deposits).
It is not unusual for monetary growth to decline from
time to time— with prolonged periods of expansion
pimctuated by brief periods of decline. Typically, short-
term declines in money supply data have little signifi-
cance. They may reflect data problems— inadequacies in
the sample, seasonal adjustment difficulties, and so forth;
they may reflect short-run shifts in the economy; they
could reflect explicit policy actions of the Federal Re-
serve.
A protracted period of monetary deceleration is quite
likely to be of substantial significance. Here again, how-
ever, its significance depends upon the cause of the mone-
tary decline.
The crucial question is whether the change in mone-
tary growth is a result of a policy initiative or is a reflec-
tion of a shift in the economy. If the monetary change
represents a change in policy and if that policy change
persists, we can expect the economy to be weakened. In-
deed, that would be the purpose of the policy. If the
monetar)- change is a reflection of the economy, then the
economy has already weakened.
To differentiate between the cause of change is ex-
tremely difficult. Generally, we would expect to see an
explicit monetary tightening to be accompanied by an
upward movement in interest rates. In contrast, monetary
deceleration accompanied by a decline in interest rates
is likely to reflect a weakening in the economy.
The Outlook
It is my view that business activity will weaken in
1979. Indeed, the slowdown in monetary- growth along
with the stability in interest rates suggests that the weak-
ening has already begun. However, statistics relating to
economic developments provide little, if any, corroborat-
ing evidence of economic recession.
Consistent with this overall view, I project a real in-
crease in the economy of about 2 percent. Notwithstand-
ing the weakening in the economy, the rate of inflation
will accelerate. With an inflation rate of 8 percent, a 10
percent rise in gross national product will be forthcoming.
Money Supply
Billions of dollars
360
Local Illinois Developments
Female Labor Force Participation
Even though the stereotype statistical family still con-
sists of a male head-of-household, a nonworking wife,
and two school-age children, women can no longer be
considered "secondary" workers in Illinois. Females con-
stitute over 40 percent of the civilian labor force in Illi-
nois, compared with the national figure of 38 percent.
More important, adult females account for 62 percent
of the 10 million new entrants into the US labor force
in the past 4 years. Data from the Illinois Bureau of Em-
ployment Security indicate that the Chicago SMSA pre-
sents a reasonably accurate indication of female employ-
ment for the entire State. Moreover, state data are
believed to be significantly similar to national trends in
female labor force participation rates.
By the fall of 1978, for the first time, more than one-
half of the adult females in the US had joined the labor
force. According to the Handbook of Labor Statistics,
female labor force participation rates in the mid-1950s
reached 37 percent, rising gradually through the 1960s
and accelerating in the 1970s with annual increases of
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The Illinois Dairy Industry
Prices for dairy products are rising. On the supply
side, Illinois milk producers are finding that the oppor-
tunity cost of producing milk instead of beef is rising,
and are responding accordingly. On the demand side,
consumers are using dairy products such as cheese as pro-
tein substitutes to replace high-cost beef. As the demand
for cheese increases, cheese and fluid milk processors are
competing for the available raw milk supplies, driving
up the price of raw milk for the dairy industry as a
whole.
Consumption Trends
Illinois residents have joined the currently popular
"get-in-shape" trend sweeping the countr)' by consuming
proportionately less whole milk in the last decade. In the
mid-1960s, whole milk dominated the market. Now, 2
percent milk is "more than just a price item." According
to one of the largest milk processors in the State, the
composition of milk consumption in Illinois in the past 10
years went from 70 percent whole milk (30 percent less-
than-whole milk) to 70 percent less-than-whole milk con-
sumption. In 1977, state residents consumed approxi-
mately 80 percent of the fluid milk processed in Illinois,
of which about 14 percent was delivered to homes, 63
percent sold to supermarkets, and 4 percent distributed
to school systems. The remainder was shipped for out-of-
state consumption or sold to wholesale outlets (restau-
rants, nursing homes, hospitals) . The share of fluid milk
in the US dairy industry rose to 57 percent in 1976. but
reached only 42 percent in Illinois.
Production and Processing
Dairy farming is becoming a thing of the past in
Illinois as farmers are finding it more profitable to pro-
duce soybeans and corn than to raise dairy herds. Esti-
mates from the Department of Dairy Science at the Uni-
versity of Illinois are an indication of this trend. In 1971
there were 12,286 dairy herds in Illinois; today there are
only 7,588. This trend is most striking in Champaign
County, where the number of dairy herds dropped from
46 to 2 1 in the past six years.
Illinois cows (predominantly Holsteins) produce ap-
proximately 15 to 20 percent of the raw milk processed
in the State. Translated into 1977 figures, 234,000 milk
cows produced 2.48 million pounds of raw milk, or ap-
proximately 2 percent of the total milk produced in the
US. The rest of the milk processed in Illinois is shipped
by truck from Wisconsin, the largest milk producer in the
country (1.8 million cows producing a little over 21
million pounds of milk, or 17 percent of the national
total). Associated Milk Producers Incorporated, a re-
gional marketing agent in Illinois, controls the supply
and distribution of raw milk on the Illinois market.
In the past five years, more milk was produced during
the spring and summer than in fall and winter. Of the
total 120,356 million pounds of milk produced in the US
in 1976, 54 percent (63,270 million pounds) was pro-
duced from March to August, and 46 percent (57,085
miUion pounds) was produced during the remainder of
the year. To attribute these figures to seasonal variation,
however, may be misleading. Although weather may
affect milk production somewhat, according to the U of I
Dair)' Science Department, weather is less influential in
the milk production process than the calving season. The
apparent surplus resulting from increased raw milk sup-
plies during spring and summer and a decrease in de-
mand of approximately 4 percent when schools begin
summer vacation and soft drink consumption increases is
absorbed by the processing of dry milk. Total dry milk
production in the US in 1976 reached 1,004.3 million
pounds. Dn' milk is used in cottage cheese, yogurt, and
other cultured products.
Raw milk is sold to Illinois dairy processors on the
basis of butterfat content. On the average, incoming raw
milk has the butterfat content of whole milk (approxi-
mately 3.25 percent). Butterfat removed to make less-
than-whole milk is put into ice cream and butter produc-
tion. Cyclical variation in butterfat content results from
the milk production process. As milk production declines,
butterfat secretion also declines, but at a decreasing rate,
so butterfat content is higher during periods when milk
production is low.
Recent figures indicate that, on the basis of butterfat
content, it costs Illinois fluid milk processors approxi-
mately $1.00 per gallon for raw milk. In response to
market conditions, the bid price for raw milk has been
rising lately as cheese is competing for a larger share of
the raw milk market. Processing, packaging, transport,
and retailing costs are added to the raw milk bid price at
later stages of production and distribution: such costs
constitute somewhat less than half the price of a gallon of
milk sold in the supermarket. The costs attributable to
waste due to damage in transportation and due date ex-
piration have been estimated at less than 1 percent of the
total cost by a leading milk processor, and are not con-
sidered significant.
The market value of fluid milk shipments in the US
remained relatively stable from 1975 to 1976, increasing
by only 2 percent. However, since butterfat is the basis
of cost to the processor, the market values of high-butter-
fat-content products such as ice cream and creamers-
butter have increased more than the average ( 1 1 and 1
5
percent, respectively)
.
Employment Trends
The dairy industry employed 0.7 percent of the Illi-
nois labor force in 1976 (9,400 employees). This com-
pares with 2.4 percent of the labor force employed by the
dair)' industiy in the US. As economies of scale have been
achieved in the Illinois dairy industr)', there is evidence
of declining employment in fluid milk processing (2 per-
cent from 1975 to 1976) as tlie smaller Illinois dairies
are closing down. Major dairy firms in Illinois include
Meadow Gold, Borden, Prairie Farms, Dean, and Hill-
farm. SUSAN LINZ
The IBR this month presents the second of two
parts of Dr. Richard D. Bartel's analysis of changes
in the balance of payments position of the United
States since 1970. This part will complete the anal-
ysis and examine the implications of the changes.
The views expressed in this paper are solely the
author's and are not intended to represent or re-
flect the views of congressional members of the
Joint Economic Committee or its professional staff.
Dr. Bartel is an economist with the Special
Study on Economic Change, Joint Economic Com-
mittee, US Congress. Prior to joining the SSEC,
from 1969 to 1978, he was an economist in the In-
ternational Research Department and the Foreign
Department of the Federal Reser\e Bank of New
York. Dr. Bartel received his Ph.D. in economics
from Columbia University, where he served as an
instructor from 1965 to 1969.
The US Current Account in Structural Change: II
Policy Issues and Options
RICHARD D. BARTEL
The international economic transactions of the
United States since the early 1960s, discussed in the De-
cember issue of this Review, reveal structural changes in
the current account. The collapse of the US trade surplus
and its plunge into deep deficit in recent years have been
oiTset in part by the rapid rise in the surplus on service
transactions. The extent to which these changes are tran-
sitory or a more permanent structural feature of our in-
ternational economic affairs remains to be seen. Never-
theless, both the causes for the changes, and the focus
for corrective policies, lie in several broad areas: (1)
the competitive position of US goods in world markets;
(2) the adjustment of US industries to the rapid devel-
opment of manufacturing export industries in developing
countries; (3) the pattern of relative growth rates among
the United States and its trading partners; and (4) the
rising price of oil and the associated deterioration in the
US external terms of trade. Because of the complexity of
these economic forces and their interaction, economic
analysts are hard pressed to assign precise weights indi-
cating their relative contribution to the overall current
account deficit. Equally difficult is the task confronting
policymakers. Measures must be designed to correct the
external imbalances in ways which are compatible with
our domestic economic goals and our international re-
sponsibilities as the world's leading economy. This article
considers international policy issues in the light of recent
current account developments. It distinguishes the short-
term outlook for a significant improvement in our trade
account from the longer-term difficulties rooted in our
international competitive position and in our adjustment
to a rapidly changing global structure of production in
which developing countries will be playing an ever more
important role.
US International Competitive Position
The deteriorating trade balance in manufactures in
particular has naturally raised questions about our com-
petitive position in the world economy. This country's
international competitiveness is broadly relevant to both
our exports and imports. Those economic characteristics
which enable US goods to penetrate and maintain their
position in foreign markets are also important in holding
our markets at home against encroachment by foreign
imports. The structure of US production costs and prices
relative to those in other countries is an obvious economic
factor underlying our competitive position. Other more
intangible characteristics include product quahty and
refiability, the availability of service and maintenance,
delivery time, product adaptability to foreign uses, and
government programs for export promotion and financ-
ing. The capital- and technology-intensive quality of
many US manufactures are clearly a firm foundation for
this country's competitiveness in recent years, as evi-
denced by our export performance in aircraft, computers,
and certain chemicals and machinery.
In a dynamically changing world, however, technol-
ogy spreads rapidly, and a countr}''s competitiveness and
comparative advantage in exportables change over time.
A ranking of traded goods shows that some prominent ex-
ports of the past (steel, for example) have become im-
portant imports of the present. Thus the recent erosion of
our manufactures trade surplus poses questions as to
whether the US is losing its comparative advantage in
certain important manufactures to other industrial and/
or developing coimtries. If so, we can remain competitive
in a dynamically changing world so long as industry de-
velops new products and processes which can be exported
to replace those products which are rapidly being pro-
duced and exported elsewhere.
There are two aspects to the US competitive position.
On the export side, US producers strive to maintain their
shares in the markets of our major competitors— Ger-
many and Japan, for example— and in third countries,
such as the developing world. On the import side US
producers, even if they sell only to the American market,
confront competition from foreign imports whether they
are from developed or developing countries. If the econ-
omy loses productive efficiency, it risks losing not only our
share of foreign markets, but import-competing indus-
tries become more vulnerable to imports from abroad.
Changes in dollar exchange rates, and real economic ad-
justments to them, may come too late to prevent at least
a short-term deterioration in our international com-
petitiveness.
Moreover, in a highly inflationary environment, if
rising domestic production costs squeeze profits and de-
press the rate of return on capital, US firms may choose
to locate production abroad and perhaps ser\e the US
market with imports produced by their foreign affiliates.
In fact, the transfer of technology to developed and de-
veloping countries through direct investment or the sale
of patents and licenses to produce is one of the note-
worthy de\elopments reflected in our current account
data. Ultimately, these US-sponsored production facili-
ties abroad may be the source of manufactured imports
that displace domestic producers.
The combination of modem technology with low pro-
duction costs in developing countries provides an absolute
cost advantage which is difficult for mature industrial
Table 4.
ment demand abroad— are beyond the direct reach of
US policy, however. Therefore, achieving a significant
contraction in the trade deficit will take time and require
a mix of policy measures which addresses the specific
causes of the trade deterioration. No simplistic policy will
guide us speedily to an acceptable external equilibrium,
since a narrow course must be charted between resurgent
inflation on the one hand and the risk of serious recession
on the other.
Just as cyclical divergencies between the United
States and our major trading partners contributed to the
soaring US trade deficit in 1977-78, cyclical forces even
now appear to be narrowing the underlying trade deficit
expected in 1979. During the 1970s, the US growth rate
significantly surpassed those of our trading partners, and
this constellation of relative growth contributed to our
huge trade deficit. By contrast, US growth in the 1960s
had been slower than in other major OECD countries,
helping to generate our trade surpluses during those
years. Current prospects for growth in 1979 suggest a
reversal of the pattern of recent years, and the United
States, according to the prevailing consensus among fore-
casters, is expected to grow at roughly half the averaeje
rate expected in other OECD economies. Slower US
growth would dampen the recent rapid rise of imports
across a wide range of raw materials, processed goods,
and manufactures, including consumer goods. This
course, even though it brings a potential payoff of a siz-
able drop in imports, clearly risks a serious domestic re-
cession with very high costs in unemployment. At the
same time, more rapid expansion in OECD countries
would spur our recently sluggish exports.
The export side of a corrective trade policy is often
debated in the context of a so-called "locomotive" or
"convoy" approach to accelerate global economic growth
and exports. While the United States clearly has within
its policy reach the power to dampen imports, our in-
fluence on exports through more rapid income growth
abroad can be only indirect. Our government may per-
suade Germany and Japan to accelerate their growth,
and thereby stimulate purchases of US exports. We can-
not, however, compel them to reflate. Even more critical
is the extent to which Japanese and German fiscal stim-
ulus actually spills over into demand for US exports,
either directly, or indirectly through multiplier eff"ects on
third countries. On the basis of the structure of US trade
with Germany and Japan, it may be unduly optimistic to
expect fiscal stimulus to generate a large and immediate
impact on aggregate US exports. Further, fiscal stimulus
in OECD countries is likely to affect public sector employ-
ment, infrastructure investment, and consumer spending.
all of which will do relatively little for US capital goods
exports, which dominate our manufactures trade with
those countries. Finally, that caution against overopti-
mism is warranted is suggested by recent econometric evi-
dence in foreign growth as a spur to US exports. A
number of independent computer simulations indicate
that the US might expect an improvement in the trade
balance on the order of several billion dollars annually re-
sulting from increases of from 1 to 1 V2 percentage point in
the GNP growth of major OECD countries. This is a
fairly modest correction in a $30-35 billion trade deficit
The issue of relative growth rates between the United
States and its trading partners is important in another,
structural respect. Even if the United States and its im-
portant trading partners were to grow at the same rates,
according to some economists, the US trade balance may
still tend to move toward deficit, because of the relation-
ship between import and export elasticities among the
trading partners. For example, the US import elasticity
with respect to domestic GNP growth is greater than the
export elasticity with respect to foreign income growth,
while Japan's import elasticity with respect to domestic
GNP growth is less than its export elasticity with respect
to foreign growth. Thus, to get balance or a surplus in
US trade requires foreign growth to be more rapid than
US growth.
Export growth in response to macroeconomic stim-
ulus to foreign growth acquires another dimension when
we consider the markets among developing countries. It
is astonishing to realize that in 1977 US exports of manu-
factures (excluding agricultural and fuel trade) to non-
OPEC developing countries alone were more than four
times our manufactured exports to Japan and roughly
equal to manufactured exports to all of OECD Europe.
Thus, in a world of d)TiamJc change, sustained growth in
the developing world may be of greater longer-run signif-
icance for US manufactured exports than growth among
the major OECD countries. Viewed from the perspective
of the geography and commodity structure of US exports,
our foreign economic policy should not underestimate
the importance of the developing world when we look to
correct our trade deficit.
The emergence of developing countries as efficient
producers and exporters of manufactured goods, as al-
ready discussed, adds a dynamic dimension to the com-
petitive challenge confronting the United States and
other industrial countries. Consequently, our trade per-
formance in the future depends not only on worldwide
patterns of economic growth, including the contribution
to prosperity by the LDCs, but hinges as well on the sus-
tained competitiveness of US industry'. While US price
competitiveness relative to other major OECD countries
undoubtedly improved with the dollar's extraordinary de-
preciation since the latter 1960s, many LDCs still hold
substantial cost advantages in producing standardized
manufactures. Exchange rate changes alone cannot offset
their advantage, particularly since many LDCs peg their
exchange rates to the dollar, thereby evading this adjust-
ment mechanism. Nevertheless, the dollar's sharp decline
over the past year should measurably reinforce the im-
provement in the trade balance resulting from the more
favorable world growth patterns expected in 1979. Once
the benefits of a depreciated dollar have had their desired
impact on our trade balance, however, we still must look
to longer-term measures for protecting US competi-
tiveness.
It is essential to check our excessive inflation rate. This
can be accomplished with a mix of policies fostering
greater competition and price flexibility in domestic mar-
10
kets, fewer executive decisions which push prices up, and
prudent macroeconomic restraints. Perhaps even more
important in the longer run are policies to promote tech-
nological innovation and modernization of our aging
capital stock. Certainly new products and processes have
in the past formed the bedrock of US comparative ad-
vantage in international trade. US technological leader-
ship in the long run provides the most solid base for our
export competitiveness in the future. Yet our efforts
toward this objective should be bolstered, simply because
the rapid dissemination of knowledge among both the
industrial and developing countries makes it more diffi-
cult to maintain our position of tecl'mological leadership.
Given the important weight held by the advanced
LDCs in US trade and payments, these countries should
be encouraged to assume greater responsibilities in pre-
serving the efficient operation of the international pay-
ments system and the adjustment process. As their trade
surpluses rise and their dollar reserves accumulate, they
should allow changes in dollar exchange rates to reflect
their international competitiveness and growing economic
vitality. Moreover, clear willingness on the part of the
advanced LDCs to contribute to an efficient international
adjustment process would help to discourage rising protec-
tionist sentiment in this country and among other indus-
trial coimtries against imports from the LDCs.
The resolution of US oil and energy problems is
pivotal in correcting both the trade deficit and the im-
balances in the domestic economy. Oil imports contrib-
uted roughly half of the trade deterioration since 1975.
Moreover, OPEC's recent decision to hike oil prices
during 1979 underscores the likely future uptrend in
energy prices over the long term. A policy aimed at rais-
ing domestic oil and gas production while slowing
domestic consumption would cut our oil import depen-
dence, narrow the trade deficit, and relieve some pressure
from the dollar in the exchange markets. Formulating
and carrying out a domestic energy pohcy is fully within
the legislati\e and executive powers of the US govern-
ment, in contrast with the difficulties we encountered in
efforts to promote a more balanced pattern of economic
growth with our OECD partners. Oil, according to some
economists, is not a key to our persistent trade deficit.
Germany and Japan, they assert, depend almost entirely
on imported oil and yet run persistent trade surpluses.
This view neglects, however, that these economies have
for decades adapted their structures of domestic produc-
tion and foreign trade to sustain their energy imports. In
allocating national resources, they have freed sufficient
goods and services for export to pay for oil imports, while
allowing domestic cost and price structures to pass
through rapidly the increases in the real cost of imported
oil. The United States, in contrast, has only recently con-
fronted the realities of growing dependence on imported
oil. This country still has to complete the reordering of
domestic priorities in allocating our resources in the new
environment. If we choose to grow more dependent on
imported oil, then we must free more domestic resources
for export and/or reduce nonoil imports, while adapting
to the worsened terms of trade.
In the immediate concern to correct the trade dis-
equilibrium, the US should not neglect our responsibil-
ities as the world's banker and the dollar's position as the
key reserve currency and vehicle for financing interna-
tional trade and investment. As a result of the dollar's
international role, a vast quantum of dollar liquidity has
accumulated in the Eurocurrency markets. Should confi-
dence in US stabilization policy wane, foreign owners
may diversify their Eurodollar holdings. A cumulative
pattern of such diversification could drag the dollar
down, even if some progress is made in correcting the
trade disequilibrium. Finally, it should be clear from the
foregoing current account analysis that the United States
need not run a trade surplus, so long as we continue to
earn a large surplus on invisible transactions. We can
achieve an overall current account surplus even with a
trade deficit and meet our responsibilities as a provider
of real resources to the rest of the world, as an interna-
tional banker and lender, and as a provider of the key
reserve currency. In this possible future environment, the
international financial system may face the old problem
of inadequate international reserves. To resolve that re-
quires the cooperation of all countries in strengthening
international institutions charged with expanding global
liquidity consistent with growing world trade and invest-
ment. That is still another story.
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Illinois Leading Economic Indicator Shows Weakness
This month the Bureau of Economic and Business
Research commences publication of an Illinois Index of
Leading Indicators and an Illinois Index of Coincident
Indicators. Hopefully, the leading indicator will provide
an advance signal regarding the performance of the state
economy. The regional indexes are similar to the corre-
sponding US series published by the US Department of
Commerce.
The leading indicator is developed from underlying
statistical series that consistently change their direction
of movement prior to a prolonged change in the main
economic aggregates such as employment. Because it
Illinois Economic Indicators
IbU
Composite Index of Leading Indicators
1969
tors may be causal in nature. For example, the US lead-
ing indicators series includes money balances (Mi) as
one variable. Some economists believe this to be a vari-
able which causes changes in business cycle conditions,
so it is proper to include it in our analysis. Alternatively,
a series may change as a result of an excluded major
cause, but witli a time lag shorter than that of the overall
economy. The US index of 500 common stock prices is
an example of such a series. This variable's theoretical
basis lies not in its causation, but in tiie economic belief
(supported by statistical evidence) that stock prices are
determined by market forces tliat change prior to the
business cycle.
Second, the selection of variables is limited to those
that are available. This requirement, difficult for a na-
tional index, provides even greater problems for a state
index. Some statistical series used in the US series cannot
be applied to individual states. For example, money bal-
ances (Ml) already mentioned are clearly appropriate
only for the entire country. Similarly, stock market price
indexes are related to the economy of the country and
not to any single state. Other series could apply to a state
in a theoretical sense but are not available on a suffi-
ciently timely basis. The index of net change in business
inventories is one such variable; although it is used in
the US Index of Leading Indicators it is unavailable for
the state in time to be useful.
Finally, because any single series may have fluctu-
ations which are spurious or unrelated to the business
cycles, it is desirable to have a number of different types
of series in this kind of index. In addition, cumulative
changes in business activity may arise from a number of
different sources; each source would need to be repre-
sented in an overall indicator.
Two indexes have been constructed for Illinois, the
Illinois Index of Leading Indicators and the Illinois In-
dex of Coincidental Indicators. Our constructions are
based on the US indexes but altered, as will be indicated,
to meet state data availability. Six variables, similar to
those used in US indexes and available on a current basis
in Illinois, are (1) average weekly hours; (2) housing
units authorized; (3) layoff rate (Chicago) ; (4) real
weekly earnings; (5) retail sales; and (6) total employ-
ment.
The following steps were taken in identifying vari-
ables to be included in the indexes. First, montlily per-
centage changes of variables were computed by dividing
them by the long-run average of the changes. This stan-
dardization allows each series to have the same effect in
the longer run and keeps highly volatile or stable series
from having too great or too small an effect. The stan-
dardized changes were averaged into a single value to be
accumulated into the monthly index. Because some un-
derlying series fluctuate greatly, the final indexes were
smoothed by an appropriate time-series operator.
As with the US series, we anticipate revising each of
our series for two months after it is originally released.
Revisions will fold in series not available at the time the
index is first released and will correct for changes in pre-
viously available underlying data.
The Illinois Index of Leading Indicators is based on
the first tliree variables already listed while the coincident
indicator uses the second group of three. We hope in the
future to introduce leading indicators for several specific
cities in the state.
ROBERT W. RESEK AND CHUN-SANG CHEUNG
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Slow Growth in Employment in Illinois
RUTH A. BIRDZELL
Employment growth in Illinois continued to lag be-
hind the national rate in 1976, as it generally had
throughout the earlier 1970s. The only year in which
Illinois did better than the national average was 1974.
Even then, the state's performance was only slightly bet-
ter. In other years, Illinois showed smaller increases
(1973 and 1976), a larger decline (1975, the recession
year) , or a decline when the nation showed a gain
(1972).
The US Department of Commerce Bureau of Eco-
nomic .Analysis has estimated total employment in Illinois
at 5,119,198 in 1976, up 2.0 percent from the year before
and 4.2 percent from 1971. For the United States as a
whole, the BEA estimates indicate an advance of 2.6 per-
cent from 1975 to 1976 and 8.9 percent from 1971 to
1976.
The same pattern of lags emerged in wage and salary
employment and in private nonfarm emplo>Tnent. The
only difference was that the gap between the US and
Illinois was larger for wage and salary emplo^Tnent than
it was for total emplo)Tnent, and was larger still for pri-
vate nonfarm employment. Illinois rates of growth in
these and other categories are compared with US rates
in Table 1. Obviously the State did not keep up with the
national averages from 1971 to 1976 (coming closest in
services and government) and surpassed the national
rates only in ser\'ices from 1975 to 1976.
One result of the slower growth in Illinois has, of
course, been a decline in Illinois employment as a share
of total US employment — 5.4 percent in 1976 compared
with 5.7 percent in 1971. Similarly, private nonfarm em-
Table 1
Illinois lag in growth as the national economy moves
from one in which manufacturing takes first rank to one
in which services aie dominant.
Changes in Substate Areas, 1971 to 1976
Most Illinois workers live in metropolitan areas. Of
the estimated total employment in Illinois in 1976, the
counties which were part of standard metropolitan sta-
tistical areas accounted for 82.8 percent, 4,237,437 work-
ers. Total employment in the six-county Chicago SMSA
was 3,294,038 (64.3 percent of the State) and in Cook
County alone was 2,657,554 (51.9 percent of the State).
Of the 5 million-plus workers in Illinois in 1976, some-
what fewer than 882,000 worked in the 79 non-SMSA
counties.
An examination of percentage changes between 1971
and 1976 shows clearly the importance of Cook County.
In the State as a whole, employment rose by 4.2 percent
over the five-year period, but in the State outside Cook
County increased by 10.3 percent. The largest gain, 16.2
percent, occurred in the Chicago SMSA outside Cook
County, with lesser gains posted elsewhere — 11.4 per-
cent in all SMSA counties excluding Cook and 8.4 per-
cent in the non-SMSA counties combined. Obviously,
the 0.8 percent drop in Cook between 1971 and 1976
was the chief factor in holding back growth in the State.
In terms of job numbers. Cook County lost roughly
22,200 jobs over the five years while the rest of the Chi-
cago SMSA was gaining 88,700, a net gain of 66,500
jobs for the six counties. The rest of the SMSA counties
picked up 72,700 jobs and the non-SMSA counties 68,600
jobs. The total gain for the State was an estimated
207,850.
The same pattern prevailed for wage and salary em-
ployment— not surprisingly, given the weight of such
employment in the total. Most of the percentage changes
were somewhat larger than for the total because of the
smaller base figures.
Considering nonfarm wage/salary employment, how-
ever, a divergence showed up between SMSA and non-
SMSA counties. In the non-SMSA counties, private non-
farm employment showed a smaller percentage gain, with
the difference made up by a larger relative advance in
government employment.
In the three major categories of private nonfarm em-
ployment, a drop of 9.1 percent in manufacturing jobs
in Cook County from 1971 to 1976 was the preeminent
factor in the overall drop of 3.2 percent in the State.
During the same period such employment was growing
by 2.5 percent nationally. The Chicago SMSA outside
Cook County rolled up a 12.6 percent gain; Illinois ex-
cluding Cook County and SMSA counties excluding
Cook showed advances of 5 to 7 percent. Non-SMS.\
coimties indicated a rise of 1.8 percent in manufactur-
ing jobs.
In trade, also. Cook County was the dominant influ-
ence in holding state growth to about half the national
rate. SMSA areas outside of Cook Coimty showed good
gains and the Illinois-less-Cook rate was 15.1 percent,
slightly higher than the US rate.
Even in services, where the Illinois rate (16.3 per-
cent) was considerably closer to the US rate (17.7 per-
cent), Cook County was the laggard, with a rate of 12.1
percent. The growth rate for the Chicago SMSA minus
Cook was three times the Cook County figure, and the
rate for all SMSA counties except Cook was two times
as high.
It appears that these figures have to be taken as con-
firmation that Cook County is not keeping up with the
rest of the State, especially other SMSA counties, in gen-
erating jobs, and that jobs are actually filtering out of
Cook County.
Growth from 1975 to 1976
With two exceptions, all the substate areas mentioned
thus far showed employment gains in all the major com-
ponents and categories from 1975 to 1976. The two ex-
ceptions occurred in government emplo^inent: an almost
unnoticeable decrease in Illinois outside Cook Count)'
and a decline of four-tenths of 1 percent in non-SMSA
counties. From the taxpayer's point of view, this hold-
down might be welcomed ; from the job market perspec-
tive, it is likely to be viewed with mixed feelings.
In total employment, Illinois minus Cook, the SMSA
counties minus Cook, and the combined non-SMSA
counties in Illinois roughly matched the 2.6 percent na-
tional rate of expansion. The Chicago SMSA minus Cook
showed a gain of 4.5 percent. Cook, however, advanced
only 1.4 percent in 1976, so the state rate was 2.0 percent.
Approximately the same relationships prevailed for total
wage/salary employment and private nonfarm jobs.
In the largest of the private nonfarm categories, man-
ufacturing, the picture was different. None of the sub-
state groupings used here matched the national rate of
4.0 percent. The Chicago SMSA minus Cook (3.7 per-
cent) and the combined non-SMSA counties (3.6 per-
cent) came closest. Cook County had 0.6 percent more
manufacturing jobs in 1976 than in 1975.
In wholesale and retail trade combined, all the sub-
state areas except Cook County surpassed the national
average of 4.2 percent. The five suburban counties of the
Chicago SMSA saw a 6.6 percent increase. The state
increase was 3.4 percent; that in Cook County was 2.5
percent.
In the case of services, Illinois and all the substate
groupings that exclude Cook County had growth rates in
1976 that exceeded the national average. Cook trailed
behind with a 3.1 percent advance compared with 4.1
percent for the State and 3.7 for the US.
Employment by County
Only six counties in the State showed a decline in
total employment from 1971 to 1976; the same number
lost wage and salary emplo^nnent. In private nonfarm
employment, 22 counties showed lower levels of employ-
ment in the later year, a reflection in major part of a
loss of manufacturing jobs.
At the other end of the scale, gains of 20 percent or
more were shown by 7 counties for total employment and
by 18 to 25 counties for wage and salary employment,
private nonfarm employment, and manufacturing em-
Wage/
employ-
'no manufacturing In
Employment Data Available
Detailed BEA employment data are available
for each of the 102 counties of Illinois for 1971
through 1976 for the breakdown shown in Table 2
on page 5. Those interested in obtaining additional
data may write to the Bureau of Economic and
Business Research, University of Illinois, 428 Com-
merce West, Urbana, Illinois 61801. A charge will
be made to cover costs.
The Great China Trade Fever
GEORGE T.YU
The 1979 visit of Deputy Prime Minister Deng Xiao-
ping of the People's Republic of China to the United
States ushered in a new era in Sino-American relations.
The visit represented the culmination of developing in-
teraction between the two countries since former Presi-
dent Nixon went to China in 1972. More important,
Deng's visit symbolized the end of three decades of Sino-
American conflictual interaction. A new relationship
based upon cooperation was now anticipated.
For the United States, normalization held a number
of promises, strategic, economic, and political. The new
relationship was expected to enhance the prospects for
stability and peace in Asia, it would contribute to greater
regional and global economic interaction and growth,
and it would result in a stable system of independent na-
tions in .\sia. These objectives were directly linked to our
national interests.
An interest of more immediate concern and impor-
tance was the expected economic benefits to be gained
from the new Sino-American relationship. Speaking be-
fore a group of American business leaders, Secretary of
State C)Tus R. Vance put it thus: "It is particularly use-
ful .. . to note some of the economic benefits we expect
to flow from the establishment of diplomatic relations
with [China]. These include our participation as a regular
supplier of agricultural commodities to China, the ability
of US exporters to compete on an equal basis with other
suppliers, and the resumption of shipping, air, banking,
and other nonnal economic relations with China."
Clearly, there would be opportunities for American busi-
ness. A new China market awaited US products.
Americans have long been lured by the promise of a
China market. In earlier times, there was the expectation
of supplying oil for the millions of lamps of China; later,
it was the anticipation of selling cloth to clothe the 400-
million-plus Chinese. A contemporaiy version of a China
market open and awaiting American products was ex-
pressed by an agricultural leader who said that chicken
consumption in China could be raised to American levels
George T. Yu is Professor of Political Science
and of Asian Studies at the University of Illinois,
Urbana-Champaign. Professor Yu is the author and
editor of a number of books on Chinese politics and
foreign policy. His most recent book, Intra-Asian
International Relations (Westview), was published
in 1978. Professor Yu received his Ph.D. from the
University of California, Berkeley, and taught at
Stanford University and the University of North
Carolina, Chapel Hill, before coming to Illinois.
Table 1. China: Major
vided by the USSR and East Exiropean countries helped
build a Chinese machine-building industry; other sectors
of the economy also received Soviet and East European
aid. However, advances were checked by various events.
In addition to the termination of Soviet bloc assistance,
the economy was also aflfected by waves of political tur-
moil, including the Cultural Revolution of the 1960s and
the "Gang of Four" of the 1970s. In the latter instance,
Chairman Hua has asserted that, between 1974 and 1976,
because of the influence of the "Gang of Four," China
lost $53 billion in industrial output, $21 billion in reve-
nue, and 28 million tons of steel production. Whatever
the contributing factors, political, economic, foreign, and
otherwise, and notwithstanding the advances to date,
China's economy remains at a low level of development.
As China's leadership has declared, there is a clear need
for the rapid development of the economy.
It is well known that under the Hua Guofeng/Deng
Xiaoping leadership China has embarked upon an ambi-
tious economic modernization drive. The 10-year plan
(1975-85), as presented by Chairman Hua in 1978, the
real date of the beginning of the drive, calls for produc-
ing 400 billion kilograms of grain by 1985; the value of
agricultural output is to increase by 4 to 5 percent in
each of the eight years from 1978 to 1985. Modern-
ization of the agricultural sector is to "achieve 85 per-
cent mechanization in all major processes of farmwork,"
with the goal of laying "a solid foundation for agricul-
ture." In the industrial sector, "construction of an ad-
vanced heavy industry is envisaged." This includes the
construction of 120 new industrial projects: 10 steel
works (producing 60 million tons of steel by 1985), 9
nonferrous metal complexes, 8 coal mines, 10 oil and
natural gas fields, 30 power stations, and others. Six new
trunk railways and 5 key ports are also to be built. With
respect to light industrial development, textile, sugar,
paper, and other products are to be greatly ex-panded, as
Table 2. China: Imports by Leading
Countries, 1976 (in millions of $)
Table 3. Composition of Chinese Imports
By End Use, 1974-76
Country
Australia
Canada
France
Italy
Japan
Netherlands
Switzerland
United Kingdon
United States
USSR
West Germany
Total 4,138
Source: Adapted by the author from Richard
E. Batsavage and John L. Davie, "China's
International Trade and Finance," in Chinese
Economy Post-Mao, p. 735.
Categories Percentage
Capital goods
Machinery - 16%
Transport Equipment - 11%
Foodstuffs
Grain - 10%
Sugar - 3%
Others - 2%
Consumer durables
Industrial supplies
Metals - 29%
Textile fibers, yarn,
and fabrics - 8%
Fertilizers - 4%
Others - 16%
Source: Batsavate and Davie, op. cit., p. 717.
well as "production of articles of daily use." Petrochemi-
cal products such as chemical fibers and plastics will take
up a larger proportion of the raw materials supplied to
light industry. In all, during each of the eight years from
1978 to 1985 industrial output is to increase by over 10
percent. The completion of the 1978-85 plan will be fol-
lowed by three five-year plans, which by the year 2000
will allow "China to take its place in the front ranks of
the world economy."
Clearly, these are ambitious targets. Given China's
weak industrial base, especially in the capital equipment
sector, much of the success of the modernization drive
will depend upon cooperation with foreign supphers, or
expanding imports from abroad.
The dependency upon external suppliers for China's
economic development represents a major departure
from the policy of "self-reliance," enunciated by the now
purged "Gang of Four." That policy stressed reduced
reliance on foreign assistance and limited foreign pres-
ence ; it is now blamed, among otlier reasons, for China's
current economic problems as already noted. A question
of vital importance is, have the policies of the "Gang of
Four" been eliminated by their arrest? This in turn raises
the larger question of the present and future political
stability of the current Hua-Deng leadership.
In any discussion of contemporary Chinese politics,
modesty should be very much in order. This has been
especially true relating to our capacity to understand and
predict China's political process. It is only necessary to
cite the Cultural Revolution or the reemergence, subse-
quent fall, and re-reemergence of Deng Xiaoping. I am
not saying political instability and policy changes in the
near future should be expected; on the other hand, we
must take full cognizance of China's political develop-
ments and be alert to future changes.
Whatever the political uncertainties, we do know that
there is a present Chinese commitment to economic mod-
10
emization, to the need for foreign suppliers, and that
imports from abroad will play a major role in China's
production drive. It has been estimated that Chinese
purchases from external suppliers to support economic
modernization by 1985 could reach $20 billion. This
would represent a major increase measured in terms of
China's 1976 import bill of $6 billion. The new great
China trade rush has just begun!
Granted the role of foreign suppliers in China's eco-
nomic modernization, what will determine the choice of
trading partners and what will be the nature and level of
US participation in the China trade? The primar>' objec-
tive of China's production drive is to increase yields in
major agricultural crops and to expand output for major
industrial products, as already noted. Thus a determining
factor in the selection of foreign suppliers will be their
ability to fill these needs; in the case of agriculture, this
will include, and has included, the capacity to provide
grain, at least until China's own production can be in-
creased. Table 2 provides a list of major imports in 1976
by China in terms of countr)' of origin and amount. Sev-
eral facts should be noted. First, China's imports from
Australia and Canada included large shipments of grain,
for example, wheat, $124 million and $145 million for
the year from the two suppliers respectively. Second, the
11 foreign suppliers were all industrial states and pro-
vided China with industrial products. Third, while the
reliance upon one supplier, Japan, was especially great,
China did appear to seek to distribute its imports to
various sources. Finally, the total import bill from the 1
1
foreign suppliers came to $4,138 billion, or almost 70
Table 4. Leading Imports from the United
States to China, 1976-77
Special purpose vehicles
Soybean oil
Synthetic fibers
Raw cotton
Soybeans
Nitrogenous fertilizer
Internal combustion engines
Aluminum
Organic chemicals
Fats, tallow
Machine tools
Kraft paper and paperboard
Parts for instruments and apparatus
Other inorganic chemicals
Other chemical products and preparations
Taps, cocks, valves
Statistical machines
Other electrical measuring and controlling
instruments
Excavating, leveling, boring machinery
Sulphite wood pulp
Plastic materials
Pumps for gases, etc.
Tools for hand or machine use
Parts for motor vehicles
Lifting and loading machinery
Source: Adapted by the author from Martha Avery
and Williaui Clarke, "The Sino-American Commercial
Relationship," in Chinese Economy Post-Mao, p. 753.
percent of China's total import bill of $6 billion. It
should be clear that China's imports are closely linked
to domestic needs. The pattern is likely to continue,
providing support for China's economic modernization.
We must also look briefly at the specific distribution
of China's imports. For 1974—76, the composition of im-
ports by end use was reported as shown in Table 3. With
Chairman Hua's 1978 reaffirmation of China's produc-
tion drive, trade expansion in the various categories cited
can be expected. This will especially include purchases of
foreign plants and equipment and industrial supplies. In
the latter instances, imports are expected to increase
immediately as planned growth in industrial output cre-
ates demands for steel, nonferrous metals, rubber, chemi-
cals, and other supplies. Purchases of capital goods will
also increase, including acquisition of complete plants
and other foreign technology. However, given the lagged
effect on trade of technology purchases, this sector is not
expected to show increases in China's imports until later.
.As for agriculture, imports will var)' with the perfor-
mance of Chinese agriculture, but are expected to con-
tinue. In simi, imports have been, and will continue to
be, tailored to China's specific economic requisites;
China's needs also make clear that the industrial coun-
tries will play a major role as suppliers.
America's present and future participation in China's
economic modernization was well demonstrated during
Deputy Prime Minister Deng's visit. Deng and members
of the Chinese delegation toured the Ford plant in Mari-
etta, Georgia (Ford has sold China 700 trucks worth
$3.5 million), the Hughes Tool plant in Houston, Texas
(Hughes Tool has sold Cliina $10 million of oil drilling
tools), and the Boeing Aircraft Company in Seattle,
Washington (Boeing had just signed a $156 million con-
tract to sell China three Boeing 747s) . In addition to the
Chinese purchases mentioned, others reported include a
$1 billion iron ore mines and processing facilities from
U.S. Steel, a $100 million contract with Bethlehem Steel
to develop Chinese iron ore mines, a $5 million agree-
ment with Kaiser Engineers for mining development, an
$800 million contract with Fluor for copper mine devel-
opment, and a $1 million agreement with John Deere
for tractors. There can be no doubt of America's role as
a supplier to China. America has caught the "China
fever"!
Indeed, America enjoyed a special advantage as a
supplier for China's economic modernization. This was
especially true of, but not limited to, the area of high-
technology products. A quick glance at the leading 25
imports from the United States to China for the 1976-77
period (see Table 4) provides support for this claim.
The table also reveals our role as a supplier of agricul-
tural products, soybeans, and cotton. (Wheat, while not
included in Table 4, has also been imported.) It should
be pointed out that 1976-77 was an "ofT" period in Sino-
American trade relations, following the peak in 1973 and
1974 which followed the opening of interaction in 1972.
Notwithstanding, Table 4 and the purchases mentioned
earlier provide a good indicator of the range and t^^pes
of American products required by China. The 1979 nor-
malization of relations with China should further pro-
11
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mote interest in American industrial and agricultural
products.
Accepting the role of the US as a supplier to China's
economic modernization, we must also examine the ques-
tion of future development of the relationship. Several
considerations should be noted. First, being a late entry
to the "China fever," the United States faces very strong
competition. There are two levels to this consideration.
On the one hand, because of political and other uncer-
tainties in the relationship until the 1970s, American sup-
pliers could not always gain access to the Chinese mar-
ket and were unfamiliar with Chinese business practices
and needs. The American delegation/technical seminar
groups going to China have done much to introduce
American products as well as to allow familiarization
with China by American suppliers, but much remains to
be done if a greater range and level of American prod-
ucts are to be introduced. On the other hand, present
and future American suppliers face a host of foreign
competitors for a share of the China market. For exam-
ple, Japan is likely to remain one of the strongest com-
petitors. However, it is unlikely that any one country will
be allowed to monopolize China's imports; a balance will
be sought, with China purchasing required products from
the best suppliers.
Second, there is the question of how China will pay
for the purchases. It is thought that China's $5 billion in
hard currency reser\es will be sufficient for developmen-
tal spending for only 1979. The issue becomes, where will
China secure the funds? One source will be the develop-
ment of tourism, already a growing industry. China's
agreements with Intercontinental Hotels and Hyatt to
build fifteen 1,000-room hotels (and with Coca-Cola to
provide drinks for the tourist) can be seen as a way
to earn hard currency. Another source is expected to be
China's developing oil industry'. Estimates of Chinese
crude oil reserves ranged from a low of 3 billion metric
tons (bmt) to a high of 10 bmt. During the 1974-76
period, crude oil exports constituted 9 percent of China's
total exports ($21,090 million) ; the percentage was ex-
pected to grow as China's oil industn,-, with American
oil-drilling equipment, expanded (production was esti-
mated to have reached 1.8 million barrels a day in 1976)
,
earning for China additional funds to finance the re-
quired purchases. The question, of course, was whether
China's oil industry can maintain the growth rates of 20
to 25 percent expected over the next 7 years (1979 to
1985). Indeed, the question of China's ability to pay for
imports, and hence the program of economic moderniza-
tion, is directly linked to domestic production. Even with
greater production in all sectors of the economy, most
students of the Chinese economy do not believe that ex-
ports will provide the magnitude of foreign earnings re-
quired for China's economic plans. China may require
sizable borrowing abroad to achieve the goals of the 10-
year plan. In this instance, there may yet be a role for
American banks in China's economic development.
Finally, trade constitutes a two-way street ; Americans
cannot ex-pect a growth in ex-ports to China without a
concurrent growth of Chinese imports. Given the crucial
relationship between imports and exports for China, the
United States must be prepared to gready ease the im-
portation of Chinese products, such as by the extension
of most-favored-nation (MFN) tariff treatment. This is
a difficult problem, with the potential of affecting Ameri-
can industries and imports from other countries. But the
problem is not without solution; we are already importing
Chinese cnade oil, textile, and other products. (Chinese
imports were $324 million in 1978.) China's import of
American products will not depend totally upon our im-
portation of Chinese commodities; for certain products
such as offshore oil-drilling equipment, America is the
leading world supplier. However, a solid and healthy
trade relationship requires a willingness on the part of
the United States to also buy Chinese products.
The great China trade fever is upon us. An apprecia-
tion of the political and economic situational-environ-
mental context will help to ensure a role for the United
States in the new China market.
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The Economy Weakens
The economy has weakened since the end of last
year. Although economic activity continues to expand,
the rate of growth has slowed. Evidence of lagging busi-
ness activity is provided by statistics relating to produc-
tion, employment, income, and sales. Interest rates have
also leveled off. Notwithstanding the moderation in the
economy, the rate of inflation has accelerated.
At the outset, however, it should be pointed out that
these interpretive remarks about the economy may be
premature. Not enough time has passed to be confident
that an economic retrenchment is firmly in motion. Also,
it turns out that the early part of the past three years
has shown economic weakness. Hence we must be at
least mildly skeptical of our ability to distinguish between
changed seasonal patterns, on the one hand, and cyclical
shifts, on the other.
Slower Output Growth
Output growth has slowed since the end of last year.
Industrial production, which rose nearly 8 percent in the
year ending in December 1978, has since expanded at
only a 2 percent annual rate (see chart) . Output growth
also slowed markedly in the early part of 1978 and 1977.
These declines were chiefly caused by inordinately severe
weather. Even though the data are adjusted for ordinary
seasonal influences, the adjustments can Ix; overwhelmed
by unusual sea.sonal shifts.
Weakness early this year ha.s centered in the pro-
duction of automobiles, steel, and coal. Declines in those
areas offset gains in production of construction supplies
and consumer goods, and the generation of electric
power. In light of inflationar)' expectations it is reason-
able to presume that there has been an increase in de-
sired inventory levels. Surprisingly, however, output of
goods held in inventories has not expanded sharply.
Reduced Employment Growth
Employment growth appears to have slowed this
year, but the statistics present an ambiguous picture.
Payroll employment has risen at only a 3.9 percent rate
since December, down sharply from a 5.1 percent rate
of increase from September to December 1978. Payroll
statistics are derived from records of employers; they
represent a count of jobs— including people with two
or more jobs. Total employment statistics, which con-
tinue to show a rapid growth, are accumulated from sur-
veys of households; they represent a count of employed
people— regardless of the number of jobs an individual
might have. Changes in payroll employment may be
more closely related to changes in the economy than are
changes in total employment.
The unemployment rate has drifted downward since
the end of last year, reaching 5.7 percent of the labor
force in mid-February. Based on data from household
surveys, the number of people unemployed has declined
131,000 since December 1978. Over this same period,
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employment rose by 745,000. Thus, for every person
drawn from the ranks of the unemployed it was neces-
sary to create nearly 6 jobs. The remaining jobs were
filled by those entering, or reentering, the labor force.
Moderate Spending Increases
Both consumer and business spending have moder-
ated this year. Consumer spending has slowed markedly.
Retail sales, which rose a whopping 17 percent in 1978,
have since inched upward at about a 5 percent annual
rate. Moreover, these statistics are market values— in-
cluding the effects of inflation; hence, the physical vol-
ume of sales has probably declined. Automobile sales
have registered weakness, especially in domestically pro-
duced autos. The composition of sales appears to be
shifting increasingly toward small cars.
Business spending this year is expected to rise some-
what less than in 1978. According to a Commerce De-
partment survey of capital expenditure intentions, busi-
nesses plan to increase this investment spending by 11.3
percent; last year capital expenditures rose 13.3 percent.
After adjusting for inflation, investment spending is ex-
pected to rise 3 percent this year; in 1978, such spending
rose about 5 percent.
A weakening in capital spending adversely affects the
economy. In the short run, a moderation in investment
spending serves to dampen spending in other sectors of
the economy. In the longer run, weakness in capital
ex-penditures tends to lead toward slower productivity
growth. The US economy would benefit from more rapid
increases in productivity— output per man-hour. Pro-
ductivity growth makes it possible for wage increases to
occur without corresponding increases in prices of out-
put. Thus, improved productivity growth is an important
element in our ability to reduce inflationary pressures
over the next decade.
Accelerating Inflation
The rate of inflation has accelerated again. Consumer
prices have risen at more than a 12 percent annual rate
since year-end. Last year they rose just over 9 percent.
Producer prices have exploded at nearly a 15 percent
rate since the end of last year. Food prices have risen at
more than a 20 percent rate during the period.
It is likely that these recent price increases at the
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more than a 10 percent annual rate from March to Sep-
tember 1978, has since remained unchanged (see chart)
.
The money supply plus time deposits (Mj) rose at nearly
an 11 percent rate from March to September, but has
since risen at only a 3.3 percent rate. Statistics are un-
av£ulable on the growth in NOW (negotiable orders of
withdrawal) accounts at savings and on loan associations
and share drafts at credit unions.
The slower growth in money does not represent a
tightening in monetary policy. Instead, it reflects the
weakening in credit demands and the absence of upward
pressure on interest rates. Even so, if the reduced rates
of monetary e.vpansion persist over an extended period
of time, they will, at length, contribute to a further weak-
ening in the economy. william r. bryan
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Job Creation in Illinois— A 10-Year Perspective
General trends in nonfarm emjiloyment within Illi-
nois and the Chicago Standard Metropolitan Statistical
Area (SMSA) are similar to those exhibited in the
United States during the last 10 years. Whereas service-
related employment has risen from 1969 through 1978
in all three geographic areas, the number of individuals
engaged in the production of goods (mainly manufactur-
ing, but also construction and mining) has fluctuated
in the national economy, and fallen in the Illinois and
Chicago economic regions, .\hhough there is a corre-
sponding pattern in the growth of total employment in
these three areas, the percentage increase in employment
has been far greater in the country as a whole than in Illi-
nois and the Chicago SMS.\ during this 10-year period.
The strong steady growth in overall service-related
employment can be attributed partly to the mature na-
ture of the United States economy. Given an established
industrial sector, such as in the US, when incomes rise
individuals tend to consume services at an increasing
rate in proportion to manufactured goods. Service-re-
lated employment in the United States, which exempli-
fies this trend, increased from 46 million in 1969 to 60
million in 1978, for a net rise of just over 30 percent.
The Illinois and Chicago experience is closely parallel
with a gain from 2.74 million to 3.36 million employed
in ser\'ices in the state and from 1.9 million to 2.21 mil-
Pcrccntage Change in Nonfarm Employment
in the US, Illinois, and the Chicago SMSA,
1969-78 (1969 = 100)
30
25
^3e
otN-^s'o.-'or-
< CO CO ro «-H CNo
-r-i-o-=roooOLn
oaoco-=rrviix)o
(NinmincN o
3(N.—i.-iooinro
-iinoMTiaooor--
HOOr^OrHfN-^
^L^'^D^-^OLn'.0
JOrOf—iCTM^r-
Ti-HLO'^oororo
-imo^r~rHr-i
'^(Ti'^roOrH.-l
O-S".—(r-KNi—llTl
")(-HLnoJr^Ln<x)
-ir-i-iM30CNi^
oooO(Ti^Or-ir— ro
cr*^ cTioj roIDr^
f-H-a-cocNLncNro
inooovocN-s-
I—oiDLOor^
r^.-iorv)in
CO'^On-ioOv
<Noo o in
cNJCTKro-n^tr.
LTUXJOr-IOOO
Ln.-if—inoo'^j'
invjoinr-r-ir^-
c^^^n•<3>voo^^o
inun.-iwDoJo
LniD(NvDLnCT>
CO r*-- roo <T» CO
Lncom.—iinr^j
roroocoro
(T>o.-ir-i^Ln
•c3-r-H(Nr^.-10
>*oooro,-i^
cTtCNji-oroLno
vi3Lnv.ocM00Ln
roiX!CNO(Nir-J
r-i-=ri£ico^oo
Or-lfMCOC^O
r-HtNJ.—IVDCNC^J
voroi—fo^XJvo
aO.-HCMr-l(NlX>
(NLn-arni.o.-i
T)T--cO"3>'cro^
co^oa^c7^<^C0
(NinirnDinr^
uno^c^(X)^^lao(Nr-iroo<Nn
ldooncoooo
romocn o
r^LTiLnoo .-H
LOrH'^rOLnr-
r-l-a-lTKNtTlr-l
r-roinoOTTCNi
rH ID
rov^<T»r-v£)Lr)
OO.-HI^O'T^
ooinnvDCMo
•^Lnc^•=3".—ICO
LnOM^-^Or-H
r-~<Ncoi^coLn
in'*oo'3'oro
r-r<HDi/io>rN
oocNr-immtTi
ovDor~-r-Hoo
Ln'>3"cocoou~i
(j\vocooc?io-i
ooirnjo.-nnin
rinrOLOrnLn
ininmcMCNr
"S-invxxNor
COOOJCMlTlr-
rooor~Lnmv
o^omoa^^
rMO^o^a^o^-
r^r-irNiocoi£>
.—lUDOO<N(N
(NirnrxTitNCNj
aNroco'X>oorM
r^ocr»aOLn^
(NinLTKTiCMfN
CTi'^—li-OCO>X>
^ixjLnaor—iro
U-I0^r-HOCN.-I
CNO'^O'^CD
r^rrrOC^r-K-M
co^Dr-ii^mrr
rOLDcT^rO'sDCO
rOi—loocooMD
cNoo m
r-i-a-ooooin
r-i.-(.-n.OkDr-i
vDr^oa>rorH
ror^Lno^mr^l
o^omo'3'o
(T»t— I
—
^OOlO
o.-ir^r~Lno>
0O'X>CTvror*^
in.-l(N0Or-HfN
^gB
is
ess
oc^l^ioOQO(^
rocoroi-iaMri
rocoo CO CM
(Na^cxlf^Ju^ro
o^^MO r~r-{
rorsio (Ni^
HO'3-i-o,-|.ri
l-Olr-irOTTCO
cor-j r-j
C^^sJa^^ocT^r—
I
vr).-HO.—icor~
^ tnoooco
cor-ir^cooo'^
r~i a^00rH^
OOCN,-ICN
cNLDOotno
.—i-a-^a-ooom
r-l OOOr-ILn
ocoocor-icM
cOLnlnooo^
inoiricooo-sr
^~-r-~c^a•.-l.-^
co-=rroooo
LDlTlCNJOOOLTt
^a^^^OLno
incNONOino
O'-nOM^O-lfM
oorrcocNr-
OLDOunr
•^oor-r
I'^OLnooD
oocoo'T^
OON CMCNfM
>ooocNcor-~
(Nrsiinro.—ir^
vooNcni—oo
CncTiCOCOON'^
mLna>ocoirt
otrir-ir~-rM.—
I
•-ir~-.-H<Nu~)'a'
LniJ-l(Nr-<l— CO
OSvr)CN!NH~-->.0
^LTicotT.rsi'cr
rococo^c3T
(Mr^o^tNiri
f-ir~-fNavo^ OfNO'3^<r^o
inmcMcsia~irM
ovjDtnonnv^
rOi-HOLn^xJtn
no-=rocovDo
nrcoi^<TvaN(Ni
ooN^or~-vo
-1 lDvO CO .-H<T\
r^^ (T* cTi o> r^
Or-iy^rsiino
^LTlOVDOyS
r~-c^lr~a^ooo
.-unr-rM^i) CO
mLnco>X)r-jro
OLfirO'croi^
r-ir^invnoT
0^0(N0,-(
roroo^LDLO
ooo'vOrounxX)
•^iJSCMlJDr-IO
vD f^J cT\ o^ ^J* o^
LOcorj^OT
rooooro-g-u-i
LOCO'-'COU-ICO
^CNPOr^*.oro
.—ir-cocr*cN.-H
(NO^rHCNIrOrr
LTimocomvx)
-yr^>x>cNorj
^ in r^ CO .-I.—
I
r-r^'-noco^
orsiijj,—(cor^
•<a•coo^a^cx)
r^r—l'^ cNro
LDor^cot^vo
^mcocTi-a-^
cor~r»-i^fNLn
'sDM^LTit-HV-Om
3LOCSlroa>0
(Nc^lt3'r-a^
o^a^O^OO^L^
<Na^L/^(^^nco
orNcor--inn
ncsi'^.-icocN
r^oOc-HLnrriOJ
oou~ia3.—ICO
cor^mcNjoocn
roo^f^^Too
.—It-Of—lOOMJ-l
CT^P0Or^^^]0^
8i9§85
leg
oorO'^r-
oincMooovo
^DCMOCTiro^o
•"S'oONrvJi^o
ooa^^o^Moo
O^OlO'^ON
iomr-~invDin
oirivDroooo
o^ ro r^ cT»o> r^
^o.—'L^l,-l•<a
o^o3••^tnLn
CNKN-a-.—iroro
oo^r^rooooo
oor^coooro
CM—iOf-icMr~-
ror^tNr-Lrif—
I
OJ,—(LO'XJmo
.-ir-~Lnor-^
—
'
roco CO
)in,-<fMO'3'
J COC33 CO
orsmr-Hi^oo
ro(Noo<^oao.—
I
oJoocom.-iro
5)•'-oococ^•<3
-Tr-.—I'^oJ
o^coirtm<T>
Of—lOOMDlTi
<T»f—(v^oroin
l-1(NOO00CN
r-(n.-i(Nm<:
roCT>r-ror-r
ininorMu^r
r-i'^aor^uDr^
CNlCNf-H(>Jr-((N
O'^rrxiocTi
kOror-r-JCMro
(-ni-DOOOM^VD
cT>r^mc^oo
LPCTMO'^OrOLO
OLnro(Ni.-ioo
r^ T* CTt f^ ^J* (T*
Lnor>j<j\^oro
nr-QOi-n'-iro
roo».ocNa\ro
roooOr-iirnD
rntNr^(Nror~
tNlLO
I—IO^OL^L^CT^
Dr-ILnr-rOrH
-ir-(Nir^cMo
'orviOM^cNir-j
cninot-icoro
CTMTimfM.—ii^
CM,—icounoo'X)
inr^ON-^ou")
0OCOCD^n'3•CT^
r^cOLnmovD
fNjLn^a>o.-i
co'^o~ir-oa>
(Nr-t-io
0> <T*ro L/*» (T\ CTt
a^CN^(Nr^!(Nao
r~'3'Orounr-
A Changing Federal Budget
THOMAS B. BRYAN
The federal government's budget has experienced u
remarkable growdi o\er the last quarter-centuiy. In
addiuon, its composidon has changed dramatically. The
change is in evidence on boUi the expenditures and re-
ceipts side of the budget. It is the purpose of this article
to examine these trends and their possible implications.
Federal Expenditures
Federal government expenditures ha\e outpaced the
growth of the naUon's gross national product over the
last quarter-centur>-. Since 1950 the annual growth in
GNP has averaged 7.2 percent while total federal gov-
ernment expenditures have grown at a 9 percent rate.
The chief compositional change in federal expendi-
tures has been the relative decline in purchases of goods
and services and the rise in transfer payments and grants-
in-aid to state and local governments (see the table and
Chart 1 ) . Twenty-five years ago purchases of goods and
services constituted 75 percent of federal expenditures.
Transfer payments and grants-in-aid accounted for only
15 percent and 4 percent, respectively. By fiscal 1978,
purchases of goods and services had declined to just 35
percent of federal e.xpenditures, while transfer payments
had risen to over 40 percent of total expenditures, with
grants-in-aid accounting for 16 percent.
In terms of GNP, direct federal purchases of goods
and services have dropped from 16 percent to 8 percent
over the last 25 years. The major reason for the decline
has been the fall in military expenditures relative to total
federal outlays. Whereas in the mid-1950s military ex-
penditures accounted for 56 percent of total federal gov-
ernment outlays (or 7.7 percent of GNP), in 1977 they
accounted for only 22 percent of total e.xpenditures (just
under 5 percent of GNP) . Ahhough military expendi-
tures constitute nearly two-thirds of federal goods and
services expenditures, defense outlays currently account
for a lower proportion of total budget outlays than at
any dme since World War II.
Other major components of federal goods and ser-
vices expenditures include space exploration; federal law
enforcement; construction of flood control and naviga-
tion projects; operation of the federal airway system;
medical and other scientific research; operation of na-
tional forest, park, and recreation areas, and capital ex-
penditures of government-sponsored enterprises. These
federal purchases are relatively controllable, since a large
proportion are subject to the appropriations process.
Consequently they are among the first to be affected
when the government attempts to restrain budget ex-
penditures, with many having been held down or cut
in recent years.
Transfer payments represent government actions to
redistribute income, and thereby shift spending decisions
from one sector of the economy to another. Whereas
government purchases of goods and services determine
what will be produced, transfer payments affect who will
decide what goods to produce.
The major programs that fall under the heading of
Federal Governnent Budget
Chart 1. Federal Government Expenditures
Billions of dollars
Chart 2. Personal Income Tax and
Social Security Receipts
Billions of dollars
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The other half of the 12.1 percent payroll tax is
paid by the employer. It is believed that this share is
largely passed on to the consumer in the form of higher
prices. Thus, a change in the payroll tax— such as we
have experienced this year and will again experience
next year— is likely to have a greater effect on the rate
of inflation than would a change in personal income
taxes.
Federal Borrowing
Even though federal government receipts rose at a 9.5
percent rate over the decade, federal expenditures rose
even more rapidly. As a result there has been a federal
budget deficit in every year of the current decade. During
the 1970s federal deficits have been unusually large,
amounting to more than $20 billion in fiscal 1971 and
1972, and then rising to $66 billion in 1976, $45 billion
in 1977, and roughly $49 billion in fiscal 1978. As a result
of the series of deficits registered thus far, the US Trea-
sury has been confronted by a formidable financing task.
The economic implications of persistent and large
federal deficits are serious. To the extent that federal
expenditures are financed by borrowing from the general
public, resources are transferred from the private sector
to the public sector. Government borrowing represents
an increased demand for credit. There is a view that
federal borrowing will put upward pressure on interest
rates. Higher interest rates may lead to reductions in
private investment and consumption. In turn, these re-
ductions exert downward pressures on the level of output
and employment.
Alternatively, the federal government's deficit may
be financed by borrowing from the Federal Reserve
(either directly or indirectly). To this extent, federal
expenditures are financed, in effect, by printing money
— or what is more formally called "monetizing the debt."
Increased monetary expansion may add to inflationary
pressures over an extended period.
It is possible to argue that the majority of the funds
raised through debt financing go directly for increases in
spending for social programs. Even though social security
taxes have expanded more rapidly than any other federal
tax (from $40.8 billion in 1968 to $123.5 billion in 1978)
,
these taxes have not kept pace with the rise in expendi-
tures for social programs. Social program expenditures
have increased over the past 10 years from $48.1 billion
to $180.4 billion. The large difference between expendi-
tures on social programs and social security tax receipts
have been highly correlated with federal budget deficits
(see Chart 3).
In contrast, federal purchases of goods and services
closely parallel personal income tax receipts. Between
1950 and 1975 personal tax receipts increased from $18
billion to $126 billion, while purchases of goods and ser-
vices rose from $19 billion to $124 billion.
Conclusion
Although there has been much concern about the
increasing size of federal government expenditures, little
attention has been focused on the changing composition
of those expenditures. Likewise, even though there is
much concern about growing taxes and large budget
deficits, insufficient attention has been given to identify-
ing their causes.
The evidence appears to pin the blame for regular
federal budget deficits firmly on growing transfer pay-
ments. It could be argued, however, that the major con-
tributing factor in the growth of transfer payments has
been legislators' willingness to let deficit spending per-
sist. If transfer payments had to be financed with tax
receipts, it is unlikely that legislators would have toler-
ated them at their current levels. Politically, very few
legislators would be able to push for tax increases of the
magnitude necessary to finance current levels of social
spending.
Whatever the underlying cause of transfer payment
growth, the evidence suggests that the techniques used
in their financing are working counter to the intention
of the expenditures. Couple the regressive features of
the social security tax with the inflationary pressure in-
herent in deficit spending, and it can be seen that a sub-
stantial burden is being placed on the bottom two-thirds
of the American income pyramid.
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Unemployment and Inflation: But Not Stagflation
The economy appears to be in the early stages of a
cyclical slowdown. If so, imemployment is likely to edge
higher as the year unfolds. At the same time, there is a
strong probability that inflation will continue near its
double-digit rate. As these events materialize, there again
will be a strident hue and cry about "stagflation."
The chief thrust of this article is that recent and on-
going economic developments are not symptomatic of
stagflation. Beyond that, the misuse of the term amounts
to more than a breach of economic etiquette. It has led to
a cacophony of economic prescripUons, serving chiefly
to postpone economic initiatives that might stand a
reasonable chance of ameliorating conditions at hand.
Recent Economic Performance
wage increases or higher prices of goods sold. To adjust,
it has become necessary to cut back. Households are
attempting to reduce their rate of consumption growth;
they need to repair their savings positions. Business finus
that are unable to push all costs forward are likely to
continue postponing investment projects.
Longer-Run Trends
Notwithstanding the current pause in activity, the
economy has turned in a strong performance since the
1973-75 recession. During this period, the annual real
growth in GNP has averaged 4.9 percent. In the 1965-75
decade, real GNP rose at an average annual rate of 2.6
percent. During the 20-year period ending in 1978, real
growth averaged 3.5 percent per annum.
Economic activity slowed in the first quarter. Real
GNP— that is, gross national product adjusted for the
estimated effects of inflation— moved upward at a 0.7
percent annual rate from the final cjuarter of 1978 to the
first quarter of this year. Such an increase is well within
the bounds of statistical error. Thus, as figures are revised
in coming months, the first quarter may show a moderate
decline.
The first quarter slowdown was widespread. Con-
sumer spending rose more slowly than in the preceding
quarter, as the flow of household saving rose to 5.2 per-
cent of after-tax income fcompared with 4.8 percent in
the fourth quarter of 1978). Business spending was
mixed; inventory accumulation quickened, but fixed in-
vestment moderated. Government's annual rate of spend- /^,
ing rose only $5 billion, compared with nearly a $15 ':
billion increase in the preceding quarter. Finally, the
nation's net export position deteriorated at a $2.7 billion
rate; in contrast, during the fourth quarter net exports'^^^
registered a $3.1 billion gain. '-/"•: '
The current weakening in the economy is cyclical. It
has resulted from revisions in economic positions, in light 'f-
of unsustainable increases in "position-making" costs. "C,^^
Households and business firms have found themselves
trapped within a web of rising costs. Increasingly, they
have found themselves unable to recoup rising costs by
Industrial Production
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Employment
interest rates and the pace of monetary expansion have
stabilized since last fall.
Alternatively, there is a view of the money supply
process suggesting that its changes are caused by the ebb
and flow of the economy. As economic activity quickens
and there develops up^vard pressure on interest rates, the
Federal Reserve tends to accommodate the e.xpansion.
But as the economy weakens and upward interest rate
pressures abate, money supply growth tends to moderate.
It is this view of the money supply process that is most
consistent with developments since 1973.
To some extent, the expansive fiscal and monetary
policy stance has been intentional. Policymakers have
been reluctant to take action diat might lead to higher
unemployment. In another vein, the hope has persisted
that President Carter's voluntary wage-price restraint
program would result in a diminution of inflation without
reducing aggregate demand. It is my view that these
hopes will, at length, be smashed by monthly infladon
statistics. Policy timidity is likely to be replaced by an
overwhelming temptation to go for a quick solution. I
expect police-makers to be slow to counter the emerging
economic weakness. Indeed, they may nudge it along—
if only through inadvertence.
The remainder of the story has been told many many
times. As unemployment mounts, policy measures will be
set in motion to rebuild aggregate demand. We will re-
flate too fast. Inflation will again accelerate. But this is
the stoi7 of the next half-decade. \villiam r. hryan
The Consumer Price Index and the Producer Price Index
Beginning with this issue, the Illinois Business Review
will report the Bureau of Labor Statistics' recently intro-
duced Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers
and the Producer Price Index for All Commodities.
Previously the CPI measured the changes in the price
of goods and services purchased by typical urban wage
earners and clerical workers. The new CPI for All Urban
Consumers includes coverage of the typical "market
basket" of not only urban wage earners and clerical
workers, but also of professional, managerial, and tech-
nical workers, the self-employed, short-term workers, the
unemployed, retirees, and others not in the labor force.
Whereas the old CPI covered appro.ximately 40 percent
of the national population, the new index covers roughly
80 percent of the total noninstitutional civilian popula-
tion of the US. Excluded from this new CPI are persons
in military service and in institutions, and those living
outside urban areas.
In an effort to improve this economic indicator,
changes have also been made in the selecdon, collection,
and weighting of the price data used in die index.
The Producer Price Index measures average changes
in prices received by producers of commodities in primary
markets. Previously, price data of this nature were pre-
sented as the Wholesale Price Index. The Bureau of
Labor Statistics believes that the term "Producer Price
Inde.x" more accurately reflects the coverage of the data.
The sample used for calculation of producer prices con-
sists of some 10,000 price quotations on nearly 2,800
commodities in all stages of processing.
Producer and Consumer Price Indexes
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Local Illinois Developments
Total Construction Declines
Construction in Illinois declined in 1978. The aver-
age value of newly constructed single-family units rose.
Residential construction declined 18 percent from
1977 to 1978. Excluding additions and alterations, 42,377
new residential buildings were constructed in 1978, nearly
10,000 less than in 1977. The majority of the new resi-
dential construction was in the form of single-family
units (including semidetached, row, and town houses).
Constituting 93 percent of the total residential construc-
tion, over 39,000 one-family houses were built in 1978.
A total of 1,872 single-family units was demolished in
1978. This figure is 17 percent less than the number
demolished in 1977. Relative to demolition rates in other
categories of residential construction, 17 percent does
not seem to be a significant decline.
The share of apartments in the total Illinois housing
stock rose in 1978. Apartment complexes of five-or-more
units accounted for nearly 5 percent of total new resi-
dential construction in Illinois in both 1977 and 1978.
Apartment construction declined by 11 percent from
1977 to 1978 as the number of new units put in place
fell from 1,622 to 1,488. Demolitions also declined during
this period by 33 percent. While the share of apartments
has risen in the past year, appropriate figures on the
housing stock in Illinois are not available to determine
whether this is part of a long-run trend.
Duplex construction, constituting approximately 2
percent of total new residential construction in Illinois,
fell 15 percent in 1978. Indeed, the number of two-
family buildings constructed in 1978 barely replaced
the number destroyed in the preceding year. There were
813 buildings demolished in 1977 and 842 constructed
in 1978.
Construction of three-to-four-family buildings fell by
23 percent last year. However, such construction accounts
for only about 1 percent of the total new residential con-
struction in Illinois. Demolitions in this category were
reduced by 26 percent, leaving the total stock of three-
to-four-family buildings relatively unchanged.
According to figures published by the US Department
of Commerce and compiled by C-S. Cheung of the Bu-
reau of Economic and Business Research at the Univer-
sity of Illinois, the average value of newly constructed
single-family units in Illinois rose from $41,000 in August
1977, to $49,000 in August 1978. The average value of
newly constructed single-family units for some Illinois
counties in August 1978 is shown in die table.
Average value differentials by county may be ex-
plained in part by the age composition and real income
level of the county. These two factors, along with the
cost of financing a home, also affect housing demand.
In turn, housing demand is an important determinant
of residential construction. Mortgage rates in Illinois
were driven up in 1978 as US fiscal and monetary policy
Average Value of Newlv
Single-Family Units by
Councy -- August 1978
directed toward reducing inflation caused funds avail-
able for lending to become more expensive to financial
institutions. To the extent that housing is viewed as an
anti-inflation hedge and expectations of a substantial
fall in interest rates are tenuous, the impact of higher
mortgage rates on housing demand seems likely to be
less than in the past.
Residential construction in Illinois will be aided by
federal subsidies totaling about $53.7 million in 1979.
These subsidies have been made available for building
and rehabilitating some 1 1,900 housing units for the poor
and elderly. The value of construction ultimately to be
produced by the $53.7 million has been estimated at
$179 million.
Nonresidential construction also declined in Illinois
during 1978. The num-
—^—-^^-^^^-^-^^~-
ber of nonresidential units
i"*^ constructed last year
reached nearly 27,000, 36
^"= percent of total construc-
tion in the State. The
•> composition of nonresi-
5 dential construction re-
^
mained about the same.
2 Over one-half of the con-
l struction classified as non-
* residential was involved
3 in the building of resi-
3 dential garages and car-
ports. Stores and other
s mercantile buildings ac-
l counted for 6 percent of
total nonresidential con-
^l
struction, while only ap-
l
proximately 5 percent
3 consisted of industrial
16 buildings.
Transient hotels, mo-
',] tels, tourist courts, and
,1 cabins are classified as
\l
nonhousekeeping residen-
tial buildings, and ac-
^8 counted for less than 1
S3 percent of the total new
6 construction for the State.
^3 Illinois authorized
J more housing units in
\l 1978 than any other state
" in the Great Lakes Re-
gion. Housing units au-
" thorized ranged from
91 slightly over 2,000 to ap-
proximately 7,800 per
7 month.
Comparative Economic Daca for Sel :ted Illinois Cici
Buildin)
(000)
Electric
(000,000 kwh)
3,653.1"
1,817.9
420.9
84.9
+7.0
+9.7
128.8'^
+5.9
49.2
ILLINOIS S 28,770
foec. 1978 .... -7J.7
Percentage change from |j^^^ j„g _ _ _ _^g_j
NORTHERN ILLINOIS
Chicago S 16,381
(Dec. 1978 .... -79.6
Percentage change from |j^^_ ^„j, _ _ _ _^^_^
Aurora $ 755
[Dec. 1978 .... -6J.6
Percentage change from
^j^^_ ^^^g _ _ _ ^^^ .,
Elgin ? 87
fOec. 1973 .... -95.2
Percentage change from
^j^^_ ^,,3 _ _ .^^^^
JoUet S 202
foec. 1978 .... -63.7
Percentage change from Ij^^_
^^^^ .... -55.2
Kankakee S 76
[Dec. 1978 .... -96.5
Percentage change from
^j^^_ ^,^3 _ _ _ _ _^^_^
Rock Island-Mollne $ 3,385
fDcc. 1978 .... +2J5.8
Percentage change from
j^j^^_ ^^3 _ _ _ _ +j75.,
Rockford S 985
[Dec. 1978 .... -5J.9
Percentage change from
[j^_^_ ^„g _ _ _ _ .^,_g
CENTRAL ILLINOIS
Bloomlngton-Norraal S 788
fOee. 1978 .... -65.4
Percentage change from L^^_
^,^^3
_ _ _ _
+13..
3
Ciiampaign-Urbana $ 469
fDec. 3978 .... -J5.9
Percentage change from
^j^^_ ^,^3 _ _ _ _ _75_^
Danville S 438
[Dec. 1978 .... +82.5
Percentage change from
^j^^_ ^,^3 _ _ _ _ ^3^ _
,
Decatur $ 93
fDec. 1978 .... -97.5
Percentage change from
^j^^_ ^„3 _ _ _ .^^^
Galesburg S 775
fDec. 1978 .... +55.
J
Percentage change from
^j^^_ ^,^3 _ _ _ ^^„_,
Peoria $ 317
[Dec. 1978 .... -79.8
Percentage change from
^j^^_ ^,^3 _ _ _ _„_5
Qulncy $ 139
fDec. 1978 .... -44.6
Percentage change from
^j^_^_ ^„3 _ _ _ _g^_5
Springfield $ 707
[Dec. 1978 .... +0.1
Percentage change from
Jan. 1978 .... -64.2
SOUTHERN ILLINOIS
East St. Louis $ 10
[Dec. 1978 .... -9«.i
Percentage change from |j^_^_ ^,^3 _ _ _ _ _g^_,
Alton $ 2,929
fOec. 1978 .... +27.9
Percentage change from |j^_^_ ^,^3 _ _ _ +6g7_j
Belleville S 146
foec. 1978 .... -77.
J
Percentage change from
^j^_,_ ^,,3 . _ . +j4.0
Carbondale-Murphysboro S 88
IDec. 1978 .... -98.5
Percentage change from j 1978 -87 3
'Local sources; data include federal construction projects. ^Local power companies.
period ending 26 January 1979. "Illinois Department of Labor; preliminary.
^Total for cities listed, ''includes immediately surrounding territory. "^Includes Eas
141.5
+5.9
27.1
+5.4
-3.5
83.8
+6.3
+7.0
27.5
+29.6
Postal
ecelpts
(000)
54.0
+9.5
Personal Income 1977
Dollars
(millions)
Percent change Percent of
national
average
Population
(thousands)
Unit 216,339
Great Lakes
Illinois
Indiana
Michigan
Ohio
Wis iin
SMSAs
Bloomington-Normal
Champaign-Urbana
Chicago
Davenport-Rock Island-Moline
Decatur
Kankakee
Peoria
Rockford
Springfield
St. Louis
Counties
Sum of SMSA counties
Sum of Non-SMSA counties
303,531 11
89,404 9
36,894 11
69,4 38 13
75,871 11
31,925 13
59,800
2,9 35
979
675
2,936
2,030
1,464
17,905
75,423
13,980
88
Personal Income 1977 (continued)
De Kalb
De Witt
Douglas
Du Page
Edgar
Edwards
Effingham
Fayette
Ford
Franklin
Fulton
Gallatin
Hancock
Hardin
Henderso
Jackson
Jasper
Jefferson
Jersey
Jo Daviess
Johnson
Kane
Kankakee
Kendall
Knox
Lake
La Salle
Lawrence
Lee
Livingston
Logan
McDonough
McHenry
McLean
Macon
Madison
Total personal income
Personal Income 1977 (continued)
Total personal Income
The Illinois Coal Industry in Transition— A Bright Future?
ROSS KOPLIN
At present the Illinois coal industry is characterized
by excess supply, falling spot market prices, and declin-
ing production levels. The industry is in an 8-year slump
which has been further aggravated now by a short-term
downward fluctuation in demand largely seasonal in
nature. The situation has been worsened by the difficulty
in transporting mined coal because of a relatively severe
midwestern winter, and a national shortage of coal-
carrying railroad cars.
Most Illinois coal is marketed through long-term
contract and the future of the industry is dependent on
the number of these contracts which will be renewed and
whether additional markets can be found. An analysis of
projected future national and regional demand indicates
that this downturn in Illinois coal output will not carry
through to tlie next decade.
General Background
Illinois is a major producer and net exporter of coal
to the midwestern and southeastern regions of the
country. The State has reported bituminous coal re-
sources of between 30 and 40 billion recoverable tons,
about 25 percent of the national total. These reserves
exist in relatively thick seams at shallow depths. The coal
has a high Btu content per ton and a natural proximity
to major consumers, factors which combine to render
favorable competitive conditions for mining and market-
ing-
Coal extraction is a major industry in Illinois, em-
ploying approximately 17,000 persons with a payroll of
about $350 million. The estimated total value of coal
produced approached $1 billion in 1977. Out of a total
production in 1976 of 58.2 million tons, 25.4 million were
used in the State and 32.8 million were exported.
Despite its favorable position as a coal supplier, total
production in Illinois has declined steadily since 1970;
in 1970 it was 64.9 million tons and by 1977 it was only
53.9 million tons (see the chart). As of the first quarter
of 1979, the industry' is still suffering declining produc-
tion and relatively slack demand. Most Illinois coal is
consumed by electric power plants and the single most
significant factor in the production declines has been the
ramification of environmental regulations to curtail the
emission of sulfur dioxide from coal-fired generating
facilities.
Slack Demand in the 1970s
Illinois coal contains a relatively high sulfur content
ranging from 3 to 5 percent. When this coal is burned,
as in an electric utility, it combines with oxygen, releas-
ing sulfur dioxide (SO2) in the flue gases. Sulfur dioxide
in the atmosphere is an irritant to the lungs and upper
respiratory tract, an acknowledged health hazard.
In an effort to curtail increasing environmental
pollution. Congress passed the Federal Clean Air Act of
1970, part of which provided for the limitation of SO2
emissions from stationary sources, many of which are
electric generating plants. Regulations were established
in two parts, applying to those plants to be constructed
in the future, and to tliose already in existence. New
Source Performance Standards (NSPS) applied to all
steam-generating units of capacity greater than 250 mil-
lion Btu heat input per hour if their construction or
modification began after 17 .August 1971. Individual
states were given responsibility for devising a state imple-
mentation plan (SIP) for the regulation of all plants
constructed before this date, with final approval coming
from the federal government.
The New Source Performance Standards mandated
that tlie newly constructed electric utilities could not ex-
ceed an emission ceiling of 1.2 pounds SO2 per million
Btus of heat input. State implementation plans have
adopted less stringent ceilings which are largely contin-
gent on the existing environmental quality of the region
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in which the plant is situated. (In Illinois they are 1.8
pounds SO2 per million Btus for plants located in one of
three urban air quality maintenance regions, and 6.8
pounds SO2 per million Btus everywhere else.) Accord-
ing to EPA data, the combined force of all regulations
has been to reduce effectively SO2 concentrations in
urban areas an average of 30 percent from 1970 through
1975.
Over the last 8 years the difficulty for Illinois coal
has come mainly from the imposed standards for curtail-
ing the release of sulfur dioxide mandated by the state
implementation plans on existing sources of pollution. To
conform to regulations electric utilities in the midwest
could either (1) use flue gas desulfurizers (scrubbers) to
cleanse the stack gases of sulfur dioxide, or (2) switch
from the use of locally supplied high-sulfur coal to that
with a naturally occurring sulfur content small enough
to emit sulfur dio.xide conforming with standards. Because
of the immature nature of scrubber technology, and its
high capital cost (estimated at approximately $80 million
for an average-size, 800-megawatt generation station),
many utilities chose to switch to the use of lower-sulfur
coal, delivered mainly from western states. Much of this
coal from west of the Mississippi River has a sulfur con-
tent of less than 1 percent, but its delivered price per ton
to the Midwest is far in excess of, and its heating value
lower than, that produced locally.
Because approximately 85 percent of total Illinois
production is used by electric utilities, this switching and
consequent influx of western coal to the Midwest has
significantly slackened demand for Illinois and other
midwestem coal in the last 8 years. During 1970 29.5
million tons were used by Illinois utilities, of which 28.4
came from the Midwest. By 1976 coal usage by Illinois
utilities had increased to 35 million tons, of which now
only 23.3 million tons was mined in the Midwest. By the
mid-1970s, western coal was approximately 41 percent of
that burned in Iowa, 33 percent in Illinois, 26 percent in
Wisconsin, and 14 percent in Indiana. As the coal must
be shipped farther east it becomes relatively more expen-
sive in comparison with alternative methods of SO2 re-
striction, and hence has made greater inroads in the
western sections of the Midwest region.
-Fired PowerpUnts Becueen 1978-
550 Yes
Projected Short-Term Steadying in Demand
For the short-term future (1-3 years) the demand
for Illinois coal production should stabilize as a result of
nearly all of the older power plants having come into
compliance with SIP regulations. Only a limited number
of existing utilities in the Midwest may still come into
conformity by switching to lower-sulfur coal. For those
that do not, stringent noncompliance penalties will be
imposed after 7 August 1979.
For example, in the state of Indiana there are three
generating plants that are either not in compliance or
on an approved compliance schedule, out of a total of
29 in the state. In Wisconsin only one utility in the state
is not in compliance out of a total of 26. And in Illinois
only one utility is actually in violation and not on an ap-
proved compliance schedule, out of 48 in the State. This
pattern is similar in other states of the Midwest, where
most Illinois coal is consumed. The state of Ohio has
been the least timely of all in the devising and enforce-
ment of an approved state implementation plan. Fully 21
plants are still in violation and not on approved com-
pliance schedules, out of 52 in the state. Ohio utilities,
however, are closer to eastern coal sources and generally
do not use coal produced in Illinois.
Tliere are a few power plants in the Midwest which
use Illinois coal and may still conceivably switch to
western coal ; however, most of the damage that could be
done to the Illinois coal market by these older midwestem
utilities switching to nonlocal coal has, for the most part,
already taken place. This major factor in the continuous
slackening of demand over the previous eight years will
soon cease to exist.
Stronger Future Demand
In the longer term, the demand for Illinois coal will
be contingent upon the overall growth of demand for
coal in the United States. This, in turn, should depend
largely on the growth in electricity consumption, which
according to estimates will be appro.ximately 4.5 percent
per year at least through 1985, and on the construction
of coal-fired generators to meet this increased demand.
Table 2. Projected National Electric Gener-
ating Capacity Under Alternative New Source
Performance Standards (net GW)
Utilities in the US have reported plans to bring approxi-
mately 255 new coal-using generating units on line by
1987, which will require an additional 440 million tons
of coal yearly. There are several utilities coming on line
between 1978 and 1981 which are committed to using
Illinois-supplied coal. Most Illinois coal has in the past
been sold in the Midwest, but new markets are being ex-
ploited, particularly in the rapidly growing southeast
section of the country (see Table 1 )
.
In the foreseeable future almost all new electric
power plants will either use coal or be nuclear-powered.
The present 39 percent of total generating capacity fired
by relatively expensive oil and natural gas is expected to
diminish comparatively with the present 38 percent
which is coal-fired and the 9 percent which is nuclear-
powered. A rapidly rising price of oil should accentuate
this projected trend. Nuclear power will be a definite
competitor to coal-fired units, but the near future is
clouded by safety considerations. Coal, therefore, will be
increasingly used for generating electric power, the de-
mand for which is expected to grow over time (see
Table 2^.
The relative competitive position of Illinois coal in
this generally strong projected market will be enhanced
by proposed revisions to the NSPS. These modifications
are pursuant to the Clean Air Act .Amendments of 1977,
which contains a provision that standards for electric
utilities must "reflect . . . the percentage reduction achiev-
able through application of the best technological system
of continuous emission reduction which . . . the [EPA]
Administrator determines has been adequately demon-
strated" (Section III (a) (1) (C) . The proposed version
of the standard would require electric utilities not only to
conform to an absolute emission ceiling of 1.2 pounds of
SOo per million Btu, but also all new plants must have
flue gas desulfurizers (now deemed by the administrator
to be the "best technological system"), or some other
technology, which will reduce SO2 emissions by a pro-
posed 85 percent. Most Illinois coal, subjected to the
mandatory- scrubbing process, will conform to the abso-
lute ceiling level of emissions.
Only if total SO2 discharges are under a floor of .2
of a pound per million Btu will power plants not need
to use flue gas desulfurizers. Most western-produced coal
will not fall under this stringent emission floor when
combusted, necessitating die use of flue gas desulfurizers
in the burning of this low-sulfur coal. Near full scrubbing
equipment required, regardless of the type of coal used,
will efi'ectively dissipate the present economic advantage
of using lower-sulfur western coal, and it is predicted
that Illinois will regain its former market share.
The exact nature of the revised NSPS are not sched-
uled to be final until 1 June 1979. At this point evidence
suggests that die final policy may be to lower somewhat
tlie maximum emission ceiling from the 1.2 pounds
initially proposed, and possibly allow for less than full
(85 percent) scrubbing when lower-sulfur coal is used.
Either of these changes will make the final regulations
slightly less favorable to Illinois; however, the total efTect
of the revised NSPS will still be to strengthen consider-
ably the demand for Illinois coal.
1975 Current Revised
actual standards (full contro]
standards
Rather extensive economic analysis has been made to
model the future interregional flows of coal under various
regulation scenarios. In December 1978, the USEPA pro-
jected that midwestem coal production will rise from the
1975 level of 151 million tons to 348 million tons in 1990,
if current standards remain in force (see Table 3).
Under the revised NSPS, however, coal production in the
Midwest would reach a higher 390 million tons by 1990.
The amount of western coal shipped east of the Missis-
sippi River would rise from a 1975 level of 20.8 million
tons to 84 million tons by 1990 under current provisions.
With the revised standards, the change will be a less
dramatic rise to 62 million tons. .An exhaustive analysis
conducted by Argonne National Laboratory has yielded
similar results. Exact estimates may prove to be imprecise
because of the great number of variable factors; however,
the general implications of these studies are positive for
the future of the Illinois coal market.
An examination of the recent actions and future plans
of the major Illinois coal companies provides additional
evidence of the healthy long-term demand for Illinois
coal. Many have embarked on expanding existing mines
and opening new facilities. An official of Monterey Coal
Company has recently stated that operations at their
No. 2 mine are being expanded to achieve greater capac-
ity by 1981. M.'\PCO Inc. has recently announced
plans to open a large new mine in White County. Other
companies have actively engaged in purchasing Illinois
reser\'es. These companies make current expansion plans
on the basis of their prediction of what the long-term
market will be for their coal.
The Industry in Perspective
In perspective, the yearly production of Illinois coal
has fluctuated considerably over 5-to-lO year periods
since the early 1920s. The current 8-year downturn in
output of coal can be considered an aberration in the
otherwise growing demand after 1960. This break in pro-
duction growdi can be largely attributed to emi.ssion regu-
lations api)lied in 1970 to new and old electric utilities.
Even with the production declines over the past 8 years,
the economic effect on Illinois coal-mining regions has
been minimal, as total mine employment has actually
risen from 1970 through 1978. This reflects declining
(continued on next page)
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Illinois Economic Indicators
Our two indicators scored small gains in February as
several components increased. After a slight decline in
Januar)'. both building permits for residential housing
and average weekly hours in manufacturing rose on a
seasonally adjusted basis. Weekly earnings in manufac-
turing took a jump in Februar)^ after taking inflation into
consideration. Employment in manufacturing also in-
creased slightly in the same month. Data for retail sales
and layoff rate were not available at press time. .Vlthough
most series recorded increases, the increases were just
large enough to recover from the decline in Januar)'.
Since mid- 197 7 the leading indicator shows a \veakening
in the growth the State has enjoyed in the last three
years.
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A Perspective on the Multinational Firm
JOHN L. BUNGUM
Over the past three decades the multinational cor-
poration (MNC) has received considerable attention in
the academic and popular presses; in recent years the
literature has been of a decidedly negative nature, ap-
pearing at times to be rather unobjective and frequently
presenting strident demands for extensive control of
MNC operations.
In this brief article, I shall present a difTerent per-
spective on the MNC— one that hopefully will provide
a more objecti\e framework with which to view the
MNC and one that will identify why the MNC is fre-
quently criticized. Organizationally, I shall initially look
at the de\elopment of the MNC and the potential bene-
fits— which incidentally must be fairly substantial, for
otherwise a nation would not let a MNC establish a
productive facility within its territory. Second, I shall
explain why there has been growing hostility toward
the MNC in the last decade or so. These remarks will
focus on the costs of MNC activity. I shall close with
some very broad, general remarks on the nature of eco-
nomics.
John L. Bungum is an assistant professor of
economics at the University of Wisconsin-Platte-
ville. In the past several years he has presented
and/or discussed papere at the annual conventions
of the American Economic Association, the West-
ern Economic Association, the Midwest Economic
Association, the Missouri Valley Economic Asso-
ciation, and the Mid-South Academy of Econo-
mists, and has published a book review and four
articles in respected academic journals. His pri-
mary research interests are the state of economic
science and the sociology of the economics profes-
sion, although he occasionally focuses on problems
in international economics and macroeconomics as
well. Dr. Rungum holds degrees from Luther Col-
lege, the University of Iowa, and the University
of Nebraska.
Before discussing the development of MNCs, we
should recognize that they are not uncomplicated insti-
tutions. We tend to think of them as big US firms operat-
ing plants abroad, who e.xploit cheap foreign workers
and resources, especially in poor countries.
This is misleading for a variety of reasons. First, for
many decades companies headquartered in other coun-
tries, especially British companies, have set up produc-
tion facilities abroad. Second, much of the investment of
US MNCs is in Europe, where labor and other resources
are anything but cheap. Third, foreign fimis are more
and more becoming MNCs. As is well known, Volks-
wagen recently set up a plant in Pennsylvania. Volvo
did the same several years ago in Virginia, and foreign
companies are buying considerable amounts of agricul-
tural land in this country. Finally, some of the socialist
bloc countries are engaging in multinational production
activities. So the nature of multinational economic ac-
tivity is complex and changing and we must be cognizant
of this complexity when attempting to deal with the
resultant difficulties. What is appropriate for MNCs in
Indonesia may not be suitable for a MNC operating in
the US or France.
Development of MNCs Since 1950
Looking at the recent activities of multinational cor-
porations, two periods are identifiable. The first is the
"honeymoon" period, which spans the years appro.xi-
mately from 1950 to the middle 1960s. The second is the
mid-1960s to the present which some have called the
"counting-the-costs" period.
The Honeymoon Period— The Benefits
In the honeymoon period, most attention was given
to the benefits accruing to the recipient or host countrv'.
In Western Europe, production by US firms was heralded
in this period because European economies truly needed
help. Their economic structures had for the most part
been devastated by the war. They needed US capital,
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us knowledge, and US organizational talent to rebuild
their economies. American firms were welcomed. In
Canada and Australia, US investment was desired in
order to develop their natural resources. In the less
developed countries (LCDs), which were becoming
aware of the economic potential of their resources, espe-
cially the mineral resources, foreign companies were
sought to provide the necessary capital and organiza-
tional skills needed to exploit this potential.
During this period, from 1950 to the mid-1960s, the
differences in technology' and managerial skills between
the US and the rest of the world were at their ma.ximum
level; and countries adopted very generous policies to-
wards MNCs to encourage them to locate production
facilities within their boundaries. In fact, countries com-
peted with each other in attempting to woo MNCs to
their lands. For the most part only the benefits were
considered, and these benefits included new skills, knowl-
edge, and organizational abilities being brought into the
economy, more employment opportunities for local resi-
dents, and, of course, higher incomes and the potential
for higher tax revenues, among others. The associated
economic, political, and psychological costs, which will
be discussed later, were rarely identified.
By the mid-1960s, attitudes toward the MNC began
to change in most parts of the world, including the
United States. The costs, which were slighted in the
honeymoon period, became more prominent; and it may
be, too, that the benefits to the host country decreased
as time passed. As a consequence, pressures for control-
ling multinational activity arose in most countries and
at the United Nations, where a study group was estab-
lished and a report issued in 1974.
Sources of Hostility— The Costs
Why the growing hostility toward the MNC? MNCs
are big and important— at least 20 percent of the free
world's industrial output is produced by them. Further,
in many economies the MNCs have increased their rela-
tive importance and in some sectors of these economies
they completely dominate. Bigness usually generates hos-
tility, especially so if foreign, and the MNCs are no
e.xception.
In the arena of politics, bigness is a very special
problem. Governments, increasingly I believe, like to
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have power, particularly power to control their econo-
mies, and if MNCs are significant in an economy, there
is a large element over which local political leaders do
not have complete control. A related fact is that a MNC
can in many cases move its production facilities to an-
other country if one government becomes too "oppres-
sive." Without a doubt, this has frustrated politicians
the world over, and most significantly in countries having
some type of central planning. It is known, too, that
some MNCs, in the process of selecting a location for a
new plant will play one government against another in
order to obtain the best arrangements. Political leaders
are not exactly enamored with this process.
Taxes are another problem. Typically, most host
countries feel they do not receive an adequate tax return
from MNCs, at least compared with what was expected
when the firm set up production. Likewise many parent
countries, that is, those where the company headquarters
are located, feel they are not receiving appropriate taxes
on the profits earned abroad. A variety of consequences
follow, including the development of pressures within
the host country and parent country for higher taxes on
MNC profits, and then a clash between the host and
parent country governments on how to handle taxation
of MNC profits.
Another example of how the MNCs have brought
governments in conflict with one another is when the
parent country government has attempted to regulate
what the MNC does in another country. Host country
governments find this particularly distasteful— they
think of it as a violation of their sovereignty. A simple
illustrative case: the US government controls the sale
of US merchandise to the Soviet Union. Let us say the
US government has denied the sale of computer equip-
ment to the Soviet Union. So now the Soviet Union
goes to a French subsidiary of an American company
and makes a deal, and the French government does not
object. The question is, should the US government be
able to prevent this sale? It is an obvious case of over-
lapping jurisdiction. The key point is that the govern-
ments of the two countiies are in conflict, and no matter
what the MNC does, it is going to make one govern-
ment unhappy.
Ideological differences certainly play a role, too, in
the growing hostility towards the MNC. Given the po-
litical developments in many of the poorer countries in
the world, that is, those developments of a revolutionary,
socialist nature, one would naturally expect growing hos-
tility to the MNC which frequently is considered an
agent for capitalist exploitation. Of a similar nature is
the search for identity of most of the newly formed na-
tions, socialist and nonsocialist. MNCs are prominent
and distinctive reminders of their colonial past.
General cultural differences need to be recognized
also. There is little reason to expect that relations be-
tween business and goveiTiment in this country should
be the same as they are abroad. Significant differences
exist and they can be a source of hostility. In the United
States, for example, there is considerable individual
executive decision-making; in Japan, the emphasis is
on obtaining a consensus— that is, group decision-mak-
ing. It is obviously easy for hostility to arise because of
this difTerence. Another example: US business regula-
tion has tended to be "hands off," at least until recently.
By this I mean that regulation is fairly general and ap-
plies equally to all firms, that is, it is nondiscriminatory'.
In other countries, regulation takes a more specific and
discriminatory form. Special rules may be established for
foreign firms or perhaps for different sectors of the econ-
omy. US business executives find themseKes uneasy in
this situation and it naturally creates hostility.
We must remember, as well, that as an economy de-
velops, some groups gain relative power while other
groups lose. Typically, of course, the most vocal groups
are the losers and the MNCs are a readily available
scapegoat. Some writers have commented that MNCs
"can't win in the politically charged atmosphere of the
late 1960s and early 1970s." Regardless of what they do,
they will be criticized.
As a final source of hostihty, let us recognize the atti-
tudinal change of organized labor in this country to for-
eign investment by US firms. Until the middle-to-late
1960s, organized labor's attitude was relatively positive;
but now it is distinctly negative, since the feeling exists
that it causes a loss of jobs for .Americans. To be sure,
foreign investment causes US workers to change some
jobs, but it is much less certain that it actually causes
a net loss of jobs.
To summarize, the sources of growing hostility are
simple bigness, political problems deriving from MNC
flexibility and choice, tax-related problems, ideological
differences, cultural differences, and attitudinal changes
by groups adversely affected by MNCs.
Some Concluding Thoughts
In conclusion, some broad, general comments about
the fundamental nature of economics and the relation-
ship of economics to anti-MNC political activity can be
made. I suppose these remarks will reflect my training
as an economist, but they are ideas which I think should
be kept in mind.
There is a popular expression in economics, "There's
no free lunch." In the context of multinational economic
activity, its obvious meaning from the foregoing is that
there are both benefits and costs to MNC activity; and
if a country wants the benefits, it must be willing to
accept the costs. To some extent the costs may be re-
duced or controlled but still, the benefits do 7iot come
free.
In the long run, countries must develop their own
economies, and perhaps the current dislike of MNCs
throughout the world, especially in the LDCs, will force
upon these nations an awareness that they must do the
job of developing their economies themselves. A friend
from Kuwait once said to me, '"the best thing the US
can do is not to give us any aid; then we will start doing
things oursehes." That seems to be a bit harsh, but it
is probably fairly close to the truth. Developing a country
economically is not easy; in fact, for all developed so-
cieties it has been quite painful because traditional ways
must change and resistance to changing traditional ways
is always very strong, especially in agriculturally oriented
societies. Further, in most countries the transition to the
new ways has not been ver>' smooth.
We must remember that most of the MNC problems
are political and psychological in nature, and that for
most of the world, except the industrialized world, the
real problem is economic in nature. Simply put, it is
that not enough goods and services are being produced
to generate a high standard of living for most of the
people of this world. To be sure, it is exciting to be op-
posed to MNCs and to engage in activities leading to
their expulsion and/or regulation; but, per se, that con-
tributes very little to resolving the real economic prob-
lems of most societies— especially of the underdeveloped
ones. Expanding the output of goods and services is still
the world's most fundamental problem.
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Regulation of the Financial Industry in Illinois
C. S. CHEUNG
Regulation of the financial system is frequently the
object of legislation in Springfield and Washington. To
gain insights into the relevant issues, it may be helpful
to review the functions of the financial system, and to
identify important changes in its operation. Such a re-
view may permit a more meaningful evaluation of the
merits of specific types of regulation.
Functions of a Financial System
In order to maintain high employment and promote
sustained economic growth, funds must be channeled
into productive investment. Financial intermediaries are
an important part of this process. They enable borrowers
to obtain funds at lower rates and on easier terms than
if they borrowed directly from savers. Because of their
lending expertise, administrative economy, and ability
to diversify elTectively, financial intermediaries reduce
the risk embodied in their loans. As a result, the value
of their loan assets is enhanced. Other features typically
associated with intermediaries— such as deposit insur-
ance and regulatory provisions designed to assure their
solvency and liquidity— result in making their liabilities
safer. Intermediation by financial institutions thus satis-
fies the portfolio preferences of both lenders and bor-
rowers. If funds are to be used efficiently and effectively
in productive investment, a financial system must be safe,
sound, efficient, responsive, and socially responsible. The
problem is to promote and maintain a financial system
which does the job and at the same time satisfies the
foregoing criteria.
Developments of the Last Two Decades
In the past two decades, the financial system has
been buffeted by changes in technology, changes in the
way funds flow into financial intermediaries, changes in
the way funds are channeled into various uses, and by
changes in public attitudes. In j)articular the financial
system has not escaped imjxict of the new computer
technology. The de\elopmcnt of electronic funds trans-
fer (EFT) has been made possible by computer tech-
nology; however, the specific application of that technol-
ogy is a subject with which lawmakers in Washington
and Springfield have been struggling. As EFT is inte-
grated into the financial system, it is likely to alter the
competitive structure of the financial industry.
The ways in which funds are drawn into financial
intermediaries have been affected by several factors. The
unstable economic conditions of the last two decades
have been accompanied by wide swings in interest rates
— especially on the upside. Financial institutions arc
adversely affected by high interest rates, as ceilings on
various kinds of their deposits make it harder or impos-
sible for them to compete for funds. As a result, six-
month market certificates tied to the T-bill rate were
authorized for banks and thrifts in June of last year.
In recent years, savings and loan institutions have
developed negotiable orders of withdrawal— referred to
as NOW accounts ^— and more recently banks have of-
fered automatic transfers between their savings and
checking accounts. These innovations have come about
largely because of competitive pressures and general eco-
nomic conditions. They have brought new challenges to
liability management for all financial institutions.
The ways funds are channeled into various uses have
also changed. Just as unstable economic conditions have
affected the ways funds flow into financial intermediaries,
so too they have affected the flow of funds out. The high
rate of inflation has made mortgage lending more risky.
Generally rising prices mean that dollars repaid later
buy less goods and services. Inflation also drives up all
interest rates, thereby depreciating market values of
mortgages. The variable-rate mortgage and other devices
have been developed to meet the problems of inflation
and volatile mortgage rates. In addition, the rapidly
growing market for consumer credit requires new ideas
for asset management. Financial instititions have been
competing vigorously in this market.
Changes in public attitudes also have had an impact
on the financial system. The civil rights movement in
the last two decades and the urban crisis in the 1970s
resulted in the Anti-RedHning and the Community Re-
in\estment Act. Social responsibility has become more
important.
Effects of Changes on Financial Institutions
in Illinois
The structure of the financial system in Illinois is
unusual. Like other states, Illinois banks and other thrift
institutions compete for the funds of savers. Unlike most
other states, banks in Illinois are not allowed to have
full-service branches. Under the Illinois Banking Act
of 1976, each bank is allowed to have one limited-service
facility within 3,500 yards of the home office. But this
limited-service facility cannot lie within 600 feet of the
headquarters of another bank. The restriction on full-
service branching fosters a geographic monopoly for each
bank. The other unique feature of the Illinois financial
system is that there are a few large banks in Chicago
with the rest of the state serviced by relatively small
banks.
In contrast, federal chartered savings and loan asso-
ciations and credit unions were recently empowered to
open an unlimited number of full-scrsice branches any-
where in their home states. The Illinois General Assem-
bly promptly granted parity to state-chartered savings
and loan associations by allowing them to move their
headquarters to a new county, leaving the former head-
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quarters as branch offices. This relocation has the effect
of allowing full-service branching for S&Ls in Illinois.
This suggests that monetary policy and other changes
may affect banks and thrifts differently and changes may
have uneven impact on the few large Chicago banks and
the other smaller banks. EFT, made possible by com-
puter technolog)', presumably will increase consumer
convenience even though the banking system in the State
has not yet made this service available to consumers.
The reason is that the unit banking system currently
prevails in the State. Any forms of electronic funds
transfer systems such as automatic teller machines and
point of sale terminals are considered branches and are
therefore, prohibited in Illinois. It is often argued that
the unit banking system in Illinois— characterized by
the coexistence of a few large banks and many small
independent banks— has prevented favorable changes
in the state's financial system. According to this view,
the financial system in Illinois is not responsive enough
to receive the benefits brought about by new develop-
ments.
Problems in the Regulation of Financial
Institutions in Illinois
The task of regulation is to enable financial institu-
tions to serve their purpose and at the same time satisfy
the already mentioned criteria. This is difficult and has
rarely been successful in the past. Serious conflicts have
always existed in the criteria. Safety considerations re-
quire more restrictions on liability management of finan-
cial institutions and serve to reduce competition among
institutions. Changes in the unit banking system to re-
duce geographical monopolies would foster increased
concentration of bank resources. The preponderance of
small independent banks in Illinois suggests that the
state's banking industry may not be acliieving sufficient
economies of scale.
Branching would probably alter the geographic allo-
cation of funds. Proponents of branching allege that, as
a result, economic growth would be promoted. Even so,
efforts to change the structure of the unit banking system
have not been successful. Some point to the fear that,
with branching, a few large Chicago banks might drive
out the smaller independent downstate banks. Also, there
is a reluctance to accept the risk of further concentration
of banking resources.
The financial system in Illinois is an open system
constantly under the bombardment of change. The pro-
posed Illinois Bank Act of 1979 introduced before this
year's session of the General Assembly would permit a
limited form of multibank holding companies. Whether
this proposed act will create concentration of economic
resources in a few large banks is of concern to the legis-
lators and to small independent banks. The changes in
the last two decades have been so rapid that legislators
and regulators seem unable to keep pace with them. To
maintain our financial system in good health, these
changes must be dealt with.
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Pessimistic Scenario
So far this year the economy has operated at near-
capacity and has continued to register lackluster increases
in productivity. Although evidence remains inconclusive
about whether a recession in the economy is imminent or
already under way, recent data point toward an end of
the rapid four-year expansion, and energy shortages are
becoming increasingly difficult.
The second quarter got off to a slow start. Growth
in industrial output was hampered by the Teamsters'
strike. Consumer purchases, hindered by gasoline diffi-
culties, have risen more slowly than the rate of inflation.
Labor markets weakened in the spring, the first slow-
down since mid-1978. Reflecting these developments, the
rise in consumer income was held to its smallest increase
in over two years.
Reduced Output Growth
The supply side of the economy has become increas-
ingly important in constraining further gains in output.
The first quarter saw near zero growth because of
weather-induced supply disruptions. April data were
dominated by the Teamsters' strike, and May figures fell
victim to gasoline shortages.
Real GNP— that is, gross national product adjusted
for the estimated effects of inflation— probably grew by
only about 3 percent this past quarter, compared with an
over-8-percent growth rate in the second quarter of 1978.
However, quarterly growth rates of real GNP have
proved highly unstable in recent years, and have occa-
sionally been inconsistent with changes in other data such
as industrial production and employment.
Sharp drops in two economic indicators at the be-
ginning of the second quarter caused overall economic
growth estimates for the remainder of the year to be
revised downward. Factory orders for durable goods fell
over 8 percent in .April, after showing strong gains in the
preceding four months. The decline in new factoi7 orders
was the largest since the 6.6 percent plunge at the end of
1974. April orders for nondefense goods, often used as
bellwether for future plant and equipment spending,
dropped over 13 percent.
Despite recent declines in overall utilization rates,
capacity usage remained at a relatively high level in the
second quarter. The overall capacity utilization rate
hovered only about 2 percentage points below its 1973
record for the past half year. Factories operated at nearly
85 percent of capacity in April, the lowest operating rate
since mid- 1978. Even so, the April rate was only slightly
below the adjusted 86. 1 percent in March. Industrial pro-
duction fell sharply in April— primarily because of the
Teamsters' strike and the related steel haulers' dispute,
then rebounded in May. In the spring of last year, the
overall operating rate was an adjusted 83.7 percent.
In spite of uncertainties regarding the economic out-
look, businesses began beefing up inventories in the first
quarter of this year. This is good for the short-term health
Industrial Production
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of the economy. Strong business spending and inventory
buildup could add momentum to the current expansion,
which has already lasted more than four years. Moreover,
inventory' buildups could proceed for a protracted period.
Inventories continue to be low relative to sales. In March,
the inventon,'-to-sales ratio was 1.37, the lowest level since
September 1950. At the same time, expectations regard-
ing heightened inflation place a premium on expanded
business inventories. Indeed, the recent inventor)' in-
creases may be in response to the sharp rise in raw ma-
terials prices and the uncertainty surrounding possible
shortages, particularly with oil-related products.
Construction activity is leveling ofif. Construction
spending has fluctuated around a seasonally adjusted
annual rate of $210 billion since mid- 1978. Given the rise
in housing costs, this would imply that real activity has
actually declined. Housing starts fell over 2 percent early
in the second quarter after rebounding sharply in March.
Housing expansion appears to be slowing down gradually,
rather than abruptly, despite rising costs and record
mortgage interest rates. The number of building permits,
an indicator of future construction activity, has been ris-
ing but still remains about 4 percent below last year's
figure.
Productivity Declines
Productivity in the private business sector has declined
and unit labor costs have soared. Productivity, defined as
output per hour of work, fell at a seasonally adjusted
annual rate of 4.5 percent in the first quarter of this year.
The drop in productivity, combined with an 11.1 percent
rate of increase in hourly compensation, propelled the
labor costs of producing a unit of output to a 16.3 per-
cent adjusted annual rate of increase. Partly responsible
for the decline in productivity was a sharp increase in
employment in the first quarter. With the addition of new
workers, hours worked rose at a snappy 5 percent ad-
justed annual rate, while output rose by only 0.3 percent.
In the manufacturing sector, productivity fell at an
annual rate of about 3 percent, the first drop since the
first quarter of 1978. Unit labor costs in this sector rose
at about a 13 percent rate. The productivity decline in
manufacturing centered in durable goods. Between 1965
and 1973, the average annual growth in productivity in
the nonfarm sector was about 2 percent, down from 2.6
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percent in the two preceding decades. In recent years,
however, the increase has been averaging 1 percent or
less
Income Growth Weak
Personal income joined the list of statistics indicating
weakness in the second quarter. Trucking stoppages and
flooding helped hold personal income in April to the
smallest increase in more than two years. Personal income
rose a scant 0.3 percent, or $6 billion, in April. The in-
come figures are far from a testimonial to the economy's
strength. If the trucks, airlines, factories, and rivers had
behaved as usual in the beginning of the second quarter,
personal income was estimated to increase only 0.7 per-
cent. Wages and salaries rose an average 2 percent in the
first quarter of 1979, compared with 1.5 percent in the
final quarter of 1978 and 1.9 percent in the first quarter
of 1978. The wage and salary increase for the 12 months
ending March 31 was 7.8 percent.
The first quarter jump in corporate profits rekindled
the debate whether the earnings are fueling or from in-
flation. After-tax corporate profits climbed a seasonally
adjusted 5.7 percent in the first quarter, a relatively
moderate increase considering the rate of inflation. But
profits were also 35.1 percent above the first quarter of
1978. the fattest increase in three years.
Inflation Continues Unabated
Inflation prospects are not good, hindered by poor
productivity performance and continued large increases
in food and energy prices. Consumer prices are expected
to rise 10.3 percent over the four quarters of 1979. The
inflationary surge has been developing for a long time.
Consumer prices rose at an annual rate of 4.5 percent
in the fall of 1976, the lowest pace since the 1974-75
recession. In the following two years, the inflation rate
doubled, and since last fall the price rise has accelerated
further. The beginning of the second quarter of this year
saw price increases equivalent to a 13.2 percent annual
rate. These price explosions provide a dismal outlook on
the economy and could lead to a recession.
The upward price pressure continues unabated. Gaso-
line prices have been the most noticeable inflation prob-
lem in recent months. They jumped 6 percent in April
alone, the largest monthly increase since the oil embargo
in 1974 when prices were pushed up 7.3 percent. Since
the beginning of the year, gasoline prices have risen a
seasonally adjusted 14.4 percent.
Food prices are also skyrocketing. During this year's
first quarter, food and beverage prices rose at an annual
rate of 17.6 percent, up from a 14.4 percent rate a year
earlier, and the highest quaiterly increase since the 17.7
percent rise in the second quarter of 1978. Housing costs
have been rising steadily at about 1 percent per month
this year. Producer prices for finished goods were also
rising at the beginning of the second quarter at a 10.8
percent annual rate. susan linz
Illinois Economic Indicators
The leading indicator slipped for the second time in
the last three months as one of its major components de-
clined. Although building pennits inched up slightly in
April, the decline in average weekly hours was so large
that it caused the leading indicator to fall. The coincident
indicator scored a small gain in the same month. Weekly
earnings in manufacturing, which is one of the com-
ponents in the coincident indicator, dropped slightly after
adjusting for inflation. Employment in the nonagricul-
tural sector continued to increase for the last few months.
Data for retail sales and layoff rate were not available
at press time. chun-sang cheung
Lead
between discovery of a new drug and the FDA's final
approval.
The increase in the costs of research and development
per drug introduced is even more spectacular than the
increased time required for approval. A recent survey
estimated that the cost of developing a new single-chem-
ical entity rose from $1.2 million in 1962 to $11.5 million
in 1972 and $24.4 million in 1974, a 20-fold increase.
Major causes of rising costs included the accelerating
costs of medical care in the clinical trials, more elaborate
toxicology studies required by stricter government regu-
lation, inflation, and the requirement for more complex
and sophisticated research techniques.
Competition in the Industry
Pharmaceuticals are one of the more competitive
industries in the US. The Census Bureau lists about 400
establishments in the US which produce 99 percent of
the product (production measured in dollars) . In a study
of market shares held by the 4 leading firms in each of
the 453 manufacturing industries, the Census Bureau
found the pharmaceutical industry to be one of the least
concentrated. The 4 leading firms have about 26 percent
of all the market and the top 20 firms account for over
74 percent of all domestic sales.
Companies have also been grouped by sales categories
to evaluate the degree to which the market is shared. In
the US, 21 companies with sales over $100 million ac-
counted for 86.7 percent of the market. The largest com-
pany represents 8.2 percent of total sales. Firms with sales
between $30 million and $100 million shared 11.3 percent
of the domestic market. The remaining 2 percent came
from companies with sales under $30 million.
Many pharmaceutical firms have diversified in recent
years. Most larger firms now also make a variety of "over-
the-counter" products available for sale without a pre-
scription. Many also produce pharmaceuticals for veteri-
nary use. An increasing number of companies manufacture
medical equipment, medical devices, diagnostic products,
and hospital supplies. Some firms are important suppliers
of chemicals used in other industries.
Employment
The direct economic contribution of the industry is
substantial. During 1977 the industry employed nearly
300,000 persons in domestic and foreign operations and
in 1976 in Illinois it employed over 14,000 persons, up
about 10 percent from 1975. Of the nearly 169,000 US
employees, over 50 percent were production workers, an
increase of 6.2 percent over 1976. About 22 percent were
in marketing and distribution. In Illinois, production
workers represent about 37 percent of the labor force.
Research and Development
Of all US industries, the pharmaceutical industry is
the most research-intensive. It spends 4 to 5 times as
much of its sales income on research, and much more
of its total research budget on fundamental research than
US industry overall. Government funds play a small role
in this effort, accounting for less than 1 percent of all
spending. Go\emment funds, on average, account for 37
percent of all spending for US industry as a whole.
The cost of research has risen substantially in recent
years. .\t the beginning of World War II, the pharmaceu-
tical industry was spending only a few million dollars
annually on research and development. Since little drug
research existed outside the industry, this amount was
relatively significant. By 1951 tliese R&D expenditures
reached $50 million per year, and by 1977, R&D budgets
had soared over $1.3 billion annually.
Most of the applied R&D ( that is, research with spe-
cific commercial objectives) is allocated to the search for
drugs to treat central nervous system diseases, infections,
neoplasms, and cardiovascular problems. Pharmaceutical
products acting on the central ner\'ous system accounted
for 25.2 percent of domestic sales in 1977.
The share of basic research of total R&D expenditures
has declined under the impact of stricter regulatory re-
quirements, even though expenditures for it have risen.
Basic research is conducted without specific commercial
objectives, but directed toward advancing scientific
knowledge that is necessary before applied R&D can
begin.
The sums allocated to R&D compared with sales pro-
vide one measure of the extent to which companies are
committed to research. In comparing companies by R&D
expenditure category, the highest R&D to sales ratio is
found among firms with expenditures ranging from $10
to $30 million. The ratios for domestic R&D range from
14.4 percent for companies in the $10-$30 million cate-
gory to 3.6 percent for those under $1 million.
Drug Equivalency and Generic Prescribing
Pharmaceutical products all have 2, and many have
3 separate and distinct names; all drug products have
both the scientific or chemical name(s) and the generic
name(s) of the active ingredients. The manufacturer may
also give the product a brand name. The scientific name
gives the exact chemical composition of the basic chemo-
therapeutic agent. The generic name is shorter and sim-
pler, and sometimes is informative as to chemical com-
position.
The National Formulary (NF) and the US Pharma-
copeia (USP) are the US books of standards for the
chemical content of individual drug entities included in
drug products. When a product meets the USP or NF
standards it does not necessarily mean that it is as good
as any other product meeting the same standards. There
is more to a pharmaceutical product than the chemical
and physical characteristics of the active ingredient (s)
.
Two products that contain equal amounts of the same
active ingredients may not contain the same amounts or
types of inert ingredients and may not have equal bio-
availability. In nontechnical terms, bioavailability is the
degree to which a drug is absorbed to produce the de-
sired therapeutic effect. Some products may exceed USP
or NF requirements of purity of quality.
Generic prescribing means that the physician uses tlie
established (generic) name of the drug without identi-
(Continued on page 12.)
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Illinois Income Mirrors that of the US
The Illinois economy has been described as a micro-
cosm of the national economy. Close parallels are ob-
served in terms of labor force distribution by occupation
and industrial classification, composition of gross product,
and the relative weights of output by specific sectors.
The locadon quotient is yet another measure of die
extent to which the state's economy is representative of
the entire country. The state locadon quotients presented
in the first row of this table were calculated by dividing
the percentage of total Illinois earnings derived from each
major source of income by the percentage of total US
earnings from similar sources. A location quotient of 1
indicates that income from an economic sector in the
state is generated in a proportion similar to the nation
for any given sector. Farm income in 1977, for example,
represented 2.29 percent of total earnings in Illinois. The
location quotient of 1.0203 simply means that slightly
more income is generated in the agricultural sector in
1977 Personal Income By Major Source Location Quotients
Illinois than in the agricultural sector of the US as a
whole. Similarly, income derived from the construction
industry in Illinois yields a location quotient of .9430,
indicating that slightly less income is generated in this
sector than in the US.
On the whole, Illinois personal income is "located"
in proportionately the same areas as in the US, the only
major exception being the amount of income generated
in the government sector. Income derived from state and
local governments in Illinois yields a location quotient of
.8901. At the federal level, civilian and military, location
quotients are found to be .5862 and .4506, respectively.
Location quotients are also presented for each of the
counties in Illinois. They are useful in identifying counties
which have the same composition of income as the state,
as well as counties where certain economic sectors pre-
dominate. Mining, for example, generates a dispropor-
tionately large share of income in several counties in the
southeastern portion of the state.
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Stock Options: Characteristics and Uses
JOHNE. GILSTER.JR.
In 1972 there were no organized exchanges for trad-
ing stock options. The option exchanges (started in 1973)
now trade an options volume greater than the common
stock volume of the American Stock Exchange and all
regional exchanges combined. On several occasions daily
trading has exceeded the share volume of the New
York Stock Exchange itself.
One reason for this growth is obvious to anyone who
has ever traded options. They are one of the world's
most exciting investments. On 31 March 1978 the Dow
Jones Industrial Average rose 1.6 percent; the average
(call) option rose 16 percent. On 16 October 1978 the
Dow Jones Industrial went down 6 percent ; the average
(call) option went down 31 percent (in a single day!).
Many investors consider common stock exciting. Options
multiply this excitement many times over.
Option Mechanics
An option is a side bet between investors over the
future price of a common stock. The "writer" of a call
option sells the purchaser of the option the right to buy
a stated number of shares of stock at a stated price at
any time prior to a specified expiration date. For ex-
ample, if General Motors common stock is selling for $54
a share, an option to purchase it for $50 at any time be-
fore August might sell for $7 (this option would be called
a "GM August 50" ) . The option is valuable because it
entitles its owner to buy stock at a bargain price (that is,
$54 GM stock can be bought for $50) . Ironically an op-
tion usually sells for more than its immediate conversion
value (the GM option would only save the investor $4
on a stock purchase, yet it sells for $7). The amount by
which the option's price ("premium") exceeds its im-
mediate conversion value ("tangible value") is called the
"time premium." Time premiums exist because the un-
derlying stock might go up substantially before the op-
tion expires. For example, if GM stock were to rise to
$70 a share, the conversion value of the option just
described would increase to $20 (a $70 stock could be
bought for $50), a substantial gain on a $7 investment.
Time premiums tend to decrease as the option expiration
date approaclies. The shorter the time to expiration, the
less time remains for the stock to make a large profitable
price movement. On the e.xpiration date the time pre-
mium disappears completely and the option sells for its
exact conversion value.
Spectacular gains usually involve spectacular risks.
Options are no exception. For example, if GM stock were
to drop to $50 a share or lower (an 8 percent decrease)
the conversion value of the GM August 50 just described
would be zero. If an investor holds the option to expira-
tion and GM stock remains below $50 a share, the in-
vestor will lose his entire investment (what would you
pay someone for a piece of paper that lets you buy a $50
stock for $50 and expires immediately?)
.
A study published by Fischer Black and M. S. Scholes
("The \'aluation of Option Contracts and a Test of Mar-
ket Efficiency," Journal of Finance, Vol. 27 (May 1972),
pp. 399-417) suggests that call options offer a very high
average rate of return. Unfortunately, this high average
rate of return is the average of tremendous gains and
terrible losses. The risk of this type of investment is so
great that I have estimated that if an investor continually
invests all of his resources in call options, he is certain
to go completely broke eventually. Some particularly ag-
gressi\e inxestors may wish to invest a ma.ximum of 20
percent of their portfolios in options. This limited option
investment reduces the risk of total bankruptcy while per-
mitting the investor to enjoy some of the high average
returns call options offer.
A call option is a side bet between the option seller
("writer") and the option buyer. If the option buyer en-
joys high average returns, the option wiiter must suffer
high average losses (that is, the writer is the source of the
buyer's gains). If the buyer suffers high risks due to
the extreme uncertainty of the outcome of his investment,
the writer must also suffer high risks of uncertain out-
comes (the writer's risk is the mirror image of the buyer's
risk).
With high risks and negative returns, why would any-
one write call options? The answer lies in the ver^- special
nature of the risk. The buyer of an option benefits from
increases in stock price. The writer benefits from de-
creases. If options are written on stocks already held by
the \vriter, the stock risk and the option-writing risk
partly offset each other to produce a combined invest-
ment which is generally lower in risk than the stock
alone. Black and Scholes have indicated that the average
return of this combination is also lower than the a\erage
stock return but this lower risk and return may be attrac-
tive to some investors.
The actual mechanics of the option writing/common
stock combination can be illustrated using the GM ex-
ample. The option writer was paid $7 for his GM August
50. The option buyer then has die right to gi\e the op-
tion writer $50 for a share of stock at any time prior to
e.\piration. If the option is exercised, the writer gets a
total of $57 ($7 for the original option and $50 when
exercised) no matter how high the stock may ha\e gone.
The option writer will regret having written the option
if it is exercised when the stock is above $57. However,
even if the stock has risen to $200 the option writer still
gets his $57 (total) for a stock originally worth only $54.
He is worse off only in the sense that he would have made
even more had he not written the option.
The option will only be exercised when the stock is
above $50. If the option is not exercised prior to its
e.xpiration and the stock is below $50 on that date, the
option expires worthless. The option writer gets to keep
his stock and the $7 paid him for the option.
.\ call option is the option to purchase stock at a
specific price. Another type of investment available to
investors in the '"put" option. A put entitles its owner to
sell stock at a specific price at any time prior to a speci-
fied e.xpiration date. Therefore, much of the preceding
discussion of call options is applicable in reverse to put
options. Call owners hope for good news; put owners
pray for disaster.
Option-Pricing Theory
In equilibrium an option cannot sell for less than its
immediate conversion value (otherwise it would be con-
verted) and it cannot sell for more than the value of the
underlying stock (if the option sells for the same amount
as the stock, why buy the option? The stock never expires
and probably pays dividends). In the GM August 50
example, these principles limit the price of the option to
a price between $4 and $50, which is not very helpful.
Yet for many years this was about all that could be said
with confidence about option pricing.
In a 1973 journal of Political Economy article ("The
Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities," Vol. 81
(May-June 1973), pp. 637-54), Black and Scholes cre-
ated an elegant mathematical model of option pricing.
The model requires the creation of a risk-free hedge by
buying common stock and writing options on that stock.
The proportions of stock and option in\estments must be
such that a slight movement in the stock will be exactly
oflFset by a slight opposite movement in die option writer's
position. (An option's price movement is usually less than
the stock's price movement. The strategy will generally
require more option writing than stock purchases to
achieve perfect balance.) After each tiny price movement
the relative weighting of options and stocks will be
changed (if necessary) so that the next tiny movement
can be perfectly offset. This is done continually until
the option e.xpires. The strategy is designed to be riskless
(all movements are perfectly offset) and will tiierefore
yield the rate of return appropriate to riskless investments
(that is, the Treasury bill rate)
.
Black and Scholes use differential equations to de-
scribe this continuous rebalancing strateg)'. They assume
stock returns can be described as "white noise" (totally
random movements— like the motion of subatomic par-
ticles) and solve their differential equation by applying
the heat transfer equation of thermodynamics. This pro-
cedure yields a theoretical price for options.
-Mthough Black and Scholes's derivation is extremely
complex, the option-pricing equation they derive is rela-
tively easy to calculate and use. The model offers some
surprising conclusions. For example, according to the
Black-Scholes equation, the value of an option is totally
unrelated to the average rate of return predicted for the
stock. Other things being equal, a stock which is ex-
pected to double will have the same option price as a
stock expected to drop in half! Perhaps this is correct. I
admit to serious doubts.
Option-Trading Techniques
By themselves options are usually a risky investment.
In combination with other securities they can be used to
reduce risk. For example, a combination of an option and
a savings account (or better yet, a Treasury bill) can be
used as an alternative to common stock investment. In-
stead of paying $54 for the GM stock already described,
an investor might pay $7 for the GM August 50 option
and put the remaining $47 into a savings account. If GM
stock rises to $65 the option's conversion value will rise
to $15 (the option may sell for more prior to expiration)
and the savings account/option combination will be
worth at least $15 4- $47 = $62. The combination in-
vestment would have done almost as well as the direct
stock investment. On the other hand, if GM stock drops
to $35 a share on the option's expiration date, the option
will expire worthless but the savings account will still be
worth $47 plus interest. The investor has been sheltered
from most of the losses suffered by common stock owners.
Options may also be helpful when an investor expects
a substantial stock price movement but is unsure of the
direction of the movement. In this case he could buy a
put (a bet that the stock will go down) and a call (a bet
that the stock will go up) on tlie same stock. If the stock
moves substantially the investor stands to lose money on
one of the two options and make money on the other. If
the movement is large enough the profits will far exceed
the losses. Unfortunately, if the stock price does not
move, the investor stands to lose money on both options
as the time premiums he paid on the options disappear
as the expiration date nears.
A more complex strategy (called a "spread") involves
buying a call and writing a call on the same stock. In
the GM example the investor might write a GM August
55 and receive $4 and buy a GM August 50 for $7 (a
cash outflow of $7 — $4 = $3) . If GM is above $55 w^hen
the option expires the .August 50 will be worth exactly $5
more than the August 55 (that is, there is no time pre-
mium at expiration and the "50" lets you buy the same
stock $5 cheaper than the "55"). Netting this $5 inflow
against his original $3 outflow gives a net profit of $2.
The reader should note that the investor makes exactly
$2 for any stock price above $55 (that is, he makes $2 if
the stock is at $55 or $555
1
)
.
Unfortunately, if the stock price is below $50 on
expiration both options expire worthless and there is no
final cash inflow to offset the original $3 outflow— the
investor loses his entire investment. This particular spread
is called a bull spread because its success depends on a
reasonably prosperous (bullish) stock market.
The investor could ha\e created a bear spread and
profited from a declining (bearish) stock market by re-
versing the option buying and writing positions akeady
described. He would buy the August 55 for $4 and
write the August 50 for $7 for a cash inflow of $3. If
the stock stays below $50 both options expire w^orthless
and the investor keeps his $3 profit. This investor is in
trouble if the stock goes up. (Continued on next page.)
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Summary
The trading of options in tlieir present form is rela-
tively new but the market has already enjoyed consider-
able success. The interest in options is probably due to
their high-risk/high-retum nature and to the fact that
they can be used in combination with each other and
other types of securities to produce an almost limitless
variety of risk and return combinations.
1977 Income and Employment
Data Available
Detailed BEA income and employment data are
available for each of the 102 counties and 10
SMSAs of Illinois for 1971 through 1977. Those
interested in obtaining the data may write to the
Bureau of Economic and Business Research, Uni-
versity of Illinois, 428 Commerce West, Urbana,
Illinois 61801. A charge will be made to cover costs.
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Regulation Q: The Crime of '66
EDWARD J. KANE
This presentation sounds a single theme, but a theme
which has many variations: that the congressionally
mandated system of deposit-rate ceilings at commercial
banks, mutual savings banks, and S&Ls is a monstrous
economic and political crime wave, monstrous because
its principal victims are the nation's least fortunate citi-
zens. The root crime was committed in 1966 when, as a
"temporary" emergency measure to forestall a few S&L
bankruptcies. Congress extended Regulation Q ceilings
to thrift institutions. Although this system of compre-
hensive ceilings on deposit interest rates has been admin-
istered in ways that discriminate grossly against small
savers, Congress has renewed it routinely. It is currently
on the books through 1980.
This "Crime of 66" and its aftermath should disturb
even the imperturbable conscience of a cultivated modern
This article is taken from testimony given on
20 March 1979 before the Subcommittee on Com-
merce, Consumer, and Monetary Affairs. Hearings
by this subcommittee of the Committee on Govern-
ment Operations of the US House of Representa-
tives have been part of an overall review of
congressionally mandated deposit-rate ceilings at
commercial banks, savings and loan associations,
and other thrift institutions.
Kdward J. Kane is Reese Professor of Banking
and Monetary Economics at Ohio State University.
In addition to other current responsibilities, he is a
consultant for the Joint Economic Committee's
Special Study on Economic Change and is president
of the /Vmerican Finance Association. Dr. Kane re-
ceived his Ph.D. in economics at MIT in 1 960.
\\'iLLiAM R. Bryan
congressperson. The structure of these ceilings mocks our
constitution's fundamental commitment to equal oppor-
tunity. It cynically permits vastly higher interest rates to
be paid on sizable accumulations of funds.
Regulation Q ceilings tax the poor to finance "wel-
fare" for the rest of us, equivalent in their distributional
efifects to a confiscatory federal tax that falls on the
financial wealth of small savers only and whose proceeds
are designated to subsidize homebuilders, homeowners,
and inefficient depository institutions.
Differential Opportunities for Regulatory Escape
in Financial Markets
Regulation Q ceilings victimize small savers dispro-
portionately for seseral reasons. First, small savers are
frozen out of securities markets by the structure of trans-
actions costs. One of the main functions depository insti-
tutions perform is to intennediate securities denomina-
tions by pooling small individual deposits into amounts
large enough to trade in fully diversified round lots of
high-denomination instruments. The smaller the amount
of funds a household controls, the fewer the alternative
assets into which it can economically put its savings.
Whether ceilings exist or not, small sa\ers tend to hold
a large proportion of their accumulated savings in "reg-
ulated financial assets," a term I use to designate assets
(deposits and US savings bonds) whose yields are held
down administratively as a result of deposit-rate ceilings.
However, sophisticated households with sizable
amounts of savings can shop among a variety of assets.
They can and do rearrange their financial-asset portfolios
to lessen the burden that deposit-interest ceilings would
otherwise place on them. Moreover, the longer the ceil-
ings have remained in force, the more fully have finan-
cial markets and institutions been able to adapt to help
them. The rapid growth of money-market mutual funds
and credit unions— and the development of small-
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denomination bonds by large issuers such as Sears—
provide examples of this adaptation. Although such
regulation-induced innovations reduce the burden of
deposit-interest ceilings on large savers, they institu-
tionalize imperfectly diversified patterns of intermedia-
tion that are economically less efficient than the ones
tliey replace. This is a cost borne by society as a \vhole.
For small savers, possibilities for adapting their finan-
cial portfolios are severely limited and have been further
compressed by government action to reduce disinterme-
diation, notably the 1970 increase in the minimum
denomination of US Treasury bills. Small savers lessen
the burden of low ceiling rates of interest on regulated
financial assets principally by reducing their saving. But
cutting back their savings plans prevents them from im-
proving their station in life and spreads the burden that
this regulation places on their standard of living far into
the future. These households will continue to bear the
costs of the Regulation Q era long after it has faded into
history.
Ceilings on thrift-institudon deposit interest were not
intended to shaft small savers and promote inefficient
financial arrangements. They were adopted to protect
the solvency of the nation's weakest S&Ls and savings
banks against the effects of rapidly increasing market
interest rates and to promote housing activity by assuring
a continued flow of mortgage funds. But e\ery regulation
must be judged by its unintended effects as well as its
intended ones.
Real Estate As an Opportunity for Escape
During the Reguladon Q era, for most households the
inflation-adjusted after-tax rate of return has been nega-
tive on the few financial assets their wealth permits them
to buy. Even in the 20 percent tax bracket, a 5.25 percent
return on passbook savings yields only 4.20 percent after
taxes. In the 30 percent bracket, the after-tax yield falls
to 3.68 percent. It is hard to remember when the rate of
inflation in product prices did not exceed these low rates
of return. This means that savings invested in these assets
have less real value with each passing year.
In the absence of government-enforced ceilings on
deposit interest rates, market forces would have pushed
financial-institution deposit rates up at least enough to
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promise low-bracket depositors a small andcipated net
yield. Given die Q ceilings are in place and that transac-
tions costs keep small savers out of bond and stock mar-
kets, many households have found that real estate assets
offer their accumulated savings the best protection
against erosion in purchasing power. Real estate has been
traditionally attractive to Americans and returns on real
property have been taxed much more favorably than
returns on financial assets. Federal tax treatment of a
property's capital income is especially generous for
owner-occupants. Real estate gained attractiveness under
comprehensive deposit-rate ceilings because well-devel-
oped mortgage markets pro\ided a convenient vehicle for
small savers to leverage their modest savings enough to
cover the purchase price of a residence or rental property.
Survey data depicting the composition of household
assets indicate that in the face of unremitting inflation,
deposit-rate ceilings have markedly changed the age dis-
tribution of real-estate ownership. This is shown in the
table. Even as early as 1970 (unfortunately, this is the
latest year for which representative household balance
sheet data have been collected), households whose heads
were less than 55 years in age had sharply increased the
proportion of their accumulated savings held in real
estate, while older households had shifted their funds out
of both real estate and regulated financial assets into
"unregulated financial assets" (stocks, marketable bonds,
and mutual funds)
.
Although this point is not yet widely appreciated,
small savers' efforts to protect their savings against the
efl'ects of unfair deposit-rate ceilings provide the motive
force for the current speculative boom in housing. These
ceilings have greatly contributed to secular inflation in
housing costs and, by discouraging die flow of saving
into strictly financial instruments, have also reduced the
pool of savings available for new business investment.
Even though Reguladon Q is intended to help housing,
authorities by no means meant to push it so assiduously
and at such a high cost in macroeconomic destabilization.
(Proporiloni
Costs and Victims of Deposit-Rate Regulation
Costs imposed on households by deposit-rate regula-
tion fall into two categories: (1) forgone interest on
regulated assets actually held; and (2) distortions in the
level of household saving and in its allocation among
competing assets.
The value of deposit interest forgone by households
has been assessed for scattered years or regions by several
economists, but die most comprehensive figures are those
of David H. Pyle ("Interest Rate Ceilings and Net Worth
Losses by Savers" in Kenneth Boulding and Thomas
Wilson, eds., Redistribution Through the Financial Sys-
tem (New York: Praeger, 1978), pp. 87-101). Pyle esti-
mates that between 1968 and 1975 holders of savings
accounts lost at least $22 billion. Although open-market
interest rates did not greatly exceed ceiling rates on pass-
book savings in 1976 and the first half of 1977, since then
the ceilings have misappropriated many more billions of
dollars of household interest.
Even neglecting the forgone interest that accrued dur-
ing 1976 and the first half of 1977, one can easily sup-
port an estimate of $20 billion in lost interest for the
three years and three months that have passed since
Pyle's period of estimation. In September 1978, roughly
$425 billion were held in passbook savings accounts at
commercial banks, savings banks, and S&Ls, with about
another $610 billion in certificate accounts at these insti-
tutions. Using these totals as a base and assuming that,
over the last 18 months, forgone interest averaged two
percentage points on passbook accounts and one per-
centage point on certificates provides a relatively simple
way to justify my $20 billion figure. One could con-
servatively add another $1 billion a year in interest that
would have been paid on US savings bonds if the Trea-
sury had not feared upsetting the Regulation Q apple-
cart. Pulling these figures together produces a grand
estimate of about $55 billion dollars in forgone interest.
Because senior citizens (those over 65 years of age) hold
a vastly disproportionate amount of total funds in savings
accounts (35 percent of regulated assets in the 1970
survey), about $19 billion of these dollars were diverted
from the old.
The second category of costs is much harder to evalu-
ate. These must be viewed as "people costs" rather than
mere dollar magnitudes. Households have been able to
rearrange their portfolios to push their overall portfolio
rate of return well above the 5-to-6 percent level avail-
able on regulated assets. Except for relatively high-income
and older families, they have accomplished this prin-
cipally by stepping up investments in real estate to coun-
terbalance the low yields available to them on financial
assets.
The big losers in the Regulation Q game are family
units who do not own any real estate assets at all. Com-
pared with other families, these households are drawn
disproportionately from the ranks of the black, the fe-
male, the poor, and the young. In competing for mort-
gages, these groups are customarily disadvantaged. How-
ever, deposit-interest ceilings severely aggravate that
disadvantage by driving up both the cost of housing and
demands for mortgages among other groups, while re-
ducing the disadvantaged sectors' ability to accumulate
the wherewithal to make an acceptable down payment.
What Can Be Done to Lessen These Costs?
The regulatory effort to keep deposit rate ceilings in
place is reminiscent of the final stages of our nation's
involvement in the infamous Vietnam War. Federal
authorities have focused their energies on a few enclaves
of savings funds, while guerrilla action has moved more
and more household wealth to areas beyond regulators'
sphere of control. When the current extension of deposit-
rate ceilings expires in December 1980, authorities should
plan to accept a staged withdrawal.
In the meantime, much could be done to undo at
least the grosser elements of discrimination against small
savers that is inherent in the current regulator^' structure.
First, early withdrawal penalties applicable to certificate
accounts could be lightened or (better) deregulated com-
pletely. Current penalties impose an excessively punitive
forfeiture of promised interest, one that is unrelated to
differential costs that early withdrawals actually impose
on depository institutions. Households that cannot confi-
dently put funds aside until a certificate's maturity date
have more to lose than to gain from buying a certificate
whose maturity matches the holding period planned for
their savings.
Second, the discriminatory effect of early withdrawal
penalties need not be heightened by restrictions to mini-
mum denominations. These restrictions could be aban-
doned or at least relaxed to allow institutions to assist
their customers to pool their funds into eligible amounts.
Third, the principle of variable-rate ceilings— so suc-
cessful in the case of money-market certificates— could
be extended to passbook accounts.
Fourth, almost no justification e.xists for regulating
interest rates on intermediate and long-tenn certificates
of deposit. Treasury officials could induce industr>- pres-
sure against regulatory ceilings and minimum denomina-
tions for long CDs by offering US savings bonds at more
competitive rates and maturiues.
A Moral Perspective
In conclusion, let me emphasize that the issue is not
whether homebuilding or thrift institutions should be
subsidized. IVhether to subsidize something and how to
finance the resulting subsidy are separate issues. Deposit
rate ceilings are far from the only way to help home-
building and thrifts. The ceilings are merely tiie sneakiest
way. They hide the subsidies from public view and leave
the dollar magnitudes involved hard to evaluate.
The issue is, who should ultimately pay tlie freight
for subsidizing S&Ls and housing, if indeed the govern-
ment wants tlie subsidization to continue. The overriding
question is whether our current ?ncans of helping the
beneficiary industries — by a discriminatory system of
deposit-rate ceilings— is morally defensible. How can
we pretend that the end justifies tlie means?
Playing It in Peoria
The Illinois labor force distribution by major occu-
pation approximates that of the aggregate US labor
force. The same holds true for the relative job distribu-
tion in Peoria.
One measure of the degree of similarity is the em-
ployment location quotient shown in the following table.
The employment location quotient for the State is de-
rived by dividing the percentage of total Illinois wage
and salary employment in an economic sector, for exam-
ple, farming, by the percentage of total wage and salary
employment which that sector constitutes in the US
economy. A location quotient of .5538 means that the
share of farm emplo>'ment in Illinois is only about half
that of the US. In most cases, the state employTnent loca-
tion quotient is close to one. That is, the location of
industry and jobs in Illinois parallels that of die US. The
1977 Employment By Type and Broad Industrial Sources -- Location Quotients
Farm Mining Construction Manufacturing Transportation Wholesale
and public trade
utilities
diverse state economy makes the Illinois labor force less
susceptible to shocks of select industrial goods markets
because production is not concentrated in a few indus-
tries.
Peoria has been popularly labeled as the heart of
America. In terms of relative employment shares, this
is indeed the case. Manufacturing, services, and retail
trade are the major economic sectors in the Peoria SMSA
as in the US economy. With the exception of farming,
mining, and federal government, the employment loca-
tion quotients are all close to one.
The employment location quotient can also be used
to measure the relative importance of an economic sector.
Manufacturing accounts for about 25 percent of the total
wage and salary employment in Illinois. The location
quotient for manufacturing in Coles County is 1.0032,
indicating that a similar proportion of workers are em-
ployed in manufacturing in Coles County as in the State.
The service sector represents about 18 percent of total
employment in Illinois. A location quotient of .7461 im-
plies that the service sector in Coles County accounts for
somewhat less— approximately 13 percent.
Retail
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Local Illinois Developments
Employment
Total employment in Illinois increased a modest 1.2
percent from March of 1978 through March of 1979.
The unemployment rate also showed improvement as it
dropped to a 6.0 percent rate in March, dovm from the
6.7 percent level a year ago. The rate of unemployment
in Illinois is still slighdy above the nation's 5.8 percent
rate.
Statewide, the Champaign-Urbana-Rantoul area
showed the greatest increase in total employment. During
die past year, total employment in the area increased by
4.7 percent while the unemployment rate in the area
dropped from 5.7 percent to a healthy 4.7 percent rate.
The Bloomington-Normal and Springfield areas
showed slight decreases in total employment over the
past year. This was due to decreases in the total labor
forces of the two areas, not to increases in unemploy-
ment. No area in Illinois has shown either an increased
number of workers unemployed or an increased unem-
ployment rate over the past year.
The Davenport-Rock Island-Moline area continues
to have the lowest unemployment rate in the State. The
current 4.4 percent rate is a substanUal drop from the
statewide low 5.5 percent rate the area maintained a
year ago.
The 7.0 percent unemployment rate that the Decatur
area registered in March proved to be the highest unem-
plo>'ment rate in the State. Though high, the area's cur-
rent rate is 1.0 percent below the statewide high 8.0 per-
cent level Decatur had a year ago.
Earnings
The state's production workers' average weekly earn-
ings increased by 6.5 percent between 1977-78. This was
down from the 8.0 percent increase in the 1976-77 pe-
riod. Thus far in 1979, earnings are accelerating at over
a 9 percent annual rate of increase. As of March average
weekly earnings in Illinois stood at $291.14.
Throughout the State weekly earnings ranged from a
high of $336.28 in the Springfield area to a low of $255.16
in the Champaign-Urbana-Rantoul area. The largest
gains by production workers have taken place in the
Bloomington-Normal area. Since 1977 average weekly
earnings in this area have been increasing at over a 20
percent annual rate. This has been due both to substan-
tial increases in hourly wages and hours worked per
week. Earning increases throughout the State have
stemmed basically from increased hourly wages, not in-
creased hours worked per week.
Table 1. Labor Fo
Comparative Economic
A Disaggregation of Service Employment
in Declining Metropolitan Areas
DAVID L. McKEE
No one would dispute the fact that the American
economy is service-oriented and that services are basically
an urban phenomenon. Traditionally it was felt that
services were an increasing function of city size but that
manufacturing and not services was what caused cities
to grow. Indeed the designation of primary, secondary,
and tertiary activity (that is, services) clearly defined the
line of march vis-a-vis economic expansion. Services were
the final layer of activity and presumably would not
have been needed in the absence of a labor force present
to perform secondary tasks (that is, manufacturing). In
an urban context they were nonbasic and perhaps even
peripheral with respect to the strength and growth poten-
tial of the urban complex.
These views are accurate enough in an historical sense
but they do not provide an adequate explanation for the
role of services in contemporar)' America. Recent studies
support the hypothesis that services have assumed a much
more important role in urban agglomerations. In fact,
the growth of services appears to be causing urban ex-
pansion in some areas. This new service thrust appears to
be independent of actual population size among metro-
politan areas.
Indeed, although services appear to have assumed a
causative role in urban expansion, it is the national econ-
omy and not urban areas per se which has given services
the stimulus to expand. Although many services were
originally based in large metropolitan complexes, ad-
vances in communications have created a demonstration
effect. Thus, people in other areas can see their utility
if not their necessity. As a result, service activities have
proliferated throughout the nation and every city of
significant size has felt their impact.
Writing in 1973, Michael Grossman and Victor Fuchs
pointed out that "when one speaks of the shift to a
'service economy' it is important to distinguish between
shares of output and of employment" ( "Intersectoral
Shifts and Aggregate Productivity Change," Annals of
Economic and Social Measurement, Vol. 2 No. 3 ( 1973)
,
pp. 227^3) . They go on to suggest that the output share
of the service sector has not experienced any significant
change. This conclusion is in keeping with some of Fuchs's
earlier work where he suggested differences in produc-
tivity between services and manufacturing. Thus it ap-
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pears that what can definitely be defined as a service
economy from an employment standpoint cannot be so
obviously categorized from the point of view of output.
Certain studies have alluded to weaknesses and po-
tential problems in the service sector (David L. McKee,
"Surplus Labor in a Mature Economy, .\n Old Setting
for a New Problem," El Trimestre Economico, forth-
coming) . In fact, it was suggested that the service sector
in advanced metropolitan areas might be the seat of dis-
guised unemployment. In an effort to understand the
situation better, it was decided to examine SMSAs that
had declined in population during the 1960s. The results
demonstrated that "Even in cities with declining popula-
tions, service employment is rising— in many cases by
substantial amounts" (ibid.). Service employment gained
in significance in relation to the total workforce and also
in relation to manufacturing employment.
Although such aggregate results are interesting and
suggest that there may be a problem, they are only a
starting point. Obviously the entire service sector does
not suffer from weakness. There are wide variations in
skill and remuneration from one service category to
another. Defining the service sector to include only activ-
ities performed for profit, the 1960 Census listed 17
categories; by 1970 these had expanded to 21. If the
problems alluded to in earlier studies are to be unmasked,
then the service sector must be disaggregated.
This paper will begin the task of service disaggrega-
tion. Using data for SMSAs that experienced population
declines during the 1960s, components of the ser\'ice sec-
tor will be examined with an eye to determining which
are related to population and which are not. This infor-
mation should narrow the search for those services, if
any, which are in tune with the national demonstration
effect alluded to earlier. It should also provide a clue to
possible uncalled for service expansion, disguised unem-
ployment, and any consequent structural weaknesses de-
veloping in the economy.
A summary of aggregate service data is reproduced
here. The data are from final 1970 Census reports. Table
1 shows aggregate service emplo)'ment for 21 SMSAs
experiencing declines in population during the 1960s.
(For the purpose of the present study it was felt that
Jersey City should be eliminated because of its relation-
ship to the New York metropolitan complex.) These ur-
ban complexes are either in declining regions, have been
eclipsed by growth centers in their region, or are located
in remote areas which bear a questionable relationship to
the national economy.
With the exception of Pittsburgh, the centers are
of relatively modest size. Thus it would seem that at least
in a traditional sense they constitute relatively poor soil
for the growth of services. However, the data in Table 1
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Recession with Inflation
The economy has weakened since the end of last year.
Real ouput and productivity have declined. Labor mar-
kets and consumer spending have softened. It is widely
believed that a moderation in the economy will lead to
a diminution in inflation. However, such a result occurs
only if the decline in economic activity is caused by a
reduction in demand. The present weakness in the econ-
omy chiefly reflects an adverse shift in aggregate supply.
As a result, inflation has accelerated and interest rates
have moved higher.
Economic policy measures have probably been restric-
tive on balance so far this year. .Mthough the pace of
monetary expansion has accelerated since spring, the
growth in government expenditures has been sharply
reduced.
Real Economic Activity Declines
The economy's output of goods and services has
slowed markedly since the end of last year. Real gross
national product— that is, GNP adjusted for the effects
of price level changes— declined at a 2.4 percent annual
rate from the fourth quarter of 1978 to the second
quarter of this year.
Moreover, there is reason to believe that output has
continued to drift lower since the second quarter. In-
dustrial production— which includes output of mines,
factories, and utilities— has declined at nearly a 4 per-
cent annual rate. Cutbacks in automobile production
have been a major source of weakness.
Housing starts, another mea.sure of physical activity,
have moved downward since June. At 1.8 million units in
August, housing activity was more than 10 percent lower
than during much of last year. It is probable that new
home building has been retarded by high interest rates.
Even though mortgage interest rates have moved to
historical highs, interest rates in other sectors of the
economy have jumped even higher. As a consequence,
funds have been diverted from housing.
Demand for Labor Weakens
Emplo>-ment growth has slowed, reflecting the moder-
ation in real output increases. Since the end of last year,
employment has expanded at a 2.4 percent annual rate;
by comparison total employment grew 3.6 percent in the
preceding year.
Emplo)Tnent would have grown even less rapidly—
indeed, it might have declined — if the nation's produc-
tivity growth had not fallen away from historic patterns.
Since last year's fourth quarter, productivity has declined
at a 3.3 percent annual rate. This decline follows sub-
par productivity gains during the preceding six years.
Declines in productivity mean that more labor is required
to produce a given level of output.
In part, recent productivity declines are a cyclical
development. As business firms cut production in the
early stages of recession there is normally a rise in the
number of employees relative to plant and equipment
usage. In addition to cyclical factors, the sharp and per-
sistent rise in energy prices has rendered a portion of the
existing capital stock and the corresponding production
process economically inefficient. Increasingly, labor has
become an economically efficient substitute for plant and
equipment.
Unemployment has moved moderately higher since
the end of last year. The rise in unemployment chiefly re-
flects the slowdown in employment growth. As a portion
of the labor force, unemployment jumped to 6 percent
in mid-August. The rate had fluctuated around the 5.7
percent level during the preceding half-year. In contrast,
the unemployment rate had edged downward in the pre-
ceding 3V2 years.
Household Spending Adjustments
Consumer spending has slowed markedly thus far in
1979, and its composition has shifted. Retail spending,
which is importantly affected by "big-ticket" durables
and other discretionary expenditures, has risen at a 4
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percent annual rate since last December, sharply lower
than the 13.5 percent increase last year. The weakening
in retail spending is even more dramatic after correcting
for changes in consumer prices. Such spending rose about
6 percent in 1978; thus far this year, households have re-
duced their real retail purchases at more than a 6 percent
annual rate.
Total consumer spending, including all nondiscre-
tionary items (such as medical expenditures, food, and
housing) has e.xpanded at an 8.6 percent rate this year
compared with a 12.4 percent rise last year. In real terms,
consumer spending has declined at only a 1.2 percent
rate, compared with a 4.5 percent increase in 1978.
In short, consumers are shifting their spending away
from those expenditures that can be postponed, and pay-
ing what they must for those that cannot be avoided.
This adjustment is in response to a sharp slowdown in
Industrial Production
1967=100
Consumer and Producer Prices
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than those received by others than it is to accept explicit
decreases. To the extent that the illusion of improvement
persists, the economy's output of goods and services can
be sustained or expanded. At length, the change in the
distribution of real income is accomplished in disguise.
Inflation also has an important impact on the US
economy's international position. It makes the US econ-
omy a less attractive market in which foreigners may
purchase goods and services, thereby slowing the growth
in US e.xports. By the same token, domestic inflation en-
courages the growth in US imports. The nation's worsen-
ing trade position has contributed to the persistent
deterioration in the value of the dollar compared with
foreign currencies.
Just as domestic inflation has served to camouflage
the redistribution of real income in the US, it has ob-
scured the international redistribution of income. OPEC's
increases in oil prices have expanded the flow of nominal
income to oil-exporting nations. In order for an oil-
exporting nation to convert increases in nominal income
into increases in real income, that nation must import real
goods and services. To the extent that oil-importing
nations— such as the US— are experiencing inflation,
they deprive oil exporters from gains in real income.
Economic Policy Tightens
It would be astutely Machiavellian for policymakers
to induce inflationary increases in demand in order to
disguise, distort, and frustrate the redistribution of real
income flowing from increases in the relative price of
energy. Even so, it is imlikely that these policy moves
have been deliberate.
Expansive monetary actions are a case in point. Their
stimulative character runs contrary to the stated policy of
the Federal Reserve System. Since March the money
supply has expanded at more than a 10 percent annual
rate. In the preceding year it rose 4.6 percent. Thus,
monetary growth has accelerated along with the accelera-
tion in inflation.
At the same time, it is popularly believed that mone-
tary policy has tightened. This belief stems from the
notion that a rise in interest rates is importantly influ-
enced by the Federal Reserve. Although it may be well
within the Fed's awesome power to change the level of
interest rates, outside observers would seldom be wrong
if they regarded all interest rate changes as the result of
shifts in private demand and supply factors. In the
present setting, interest rate movements are probably
dominated by swings in the rate of inflation — or expec-
tations of future swings.
The Federal Reserve tends most often to accommo-
date shifts in credit demands. Thus, as interest rates rise,
money supply growth accelerates; as rates fall, monetary'
growth slows. Recent and current interest rate increases
do not represent restrictive monetary actions. They reflect
accelerating inflation. The real rate of interest— that is,
interest rates adjusted for expected inflation— has prob-
ably fallen in recent months.
Notwithstanding the ambiguous stance of the mone-
tary authorities, overall economic policy actions have
probably fostered a restrictive environment. In particular,
the growth in government expenditures has been cut back
sharply. So far this year government purchases of goods
and services have risen at only a 3.5 percent annual rate.
By compai-ison, they rose nearly 10 percent in 1978, and
11.5 percent in 1977. Real purchases (inflation-adjusted
purchases) by government have actually declined.
The near-term economic outlook will be dominated
by the following features: further rapid increases in
prices ; higher interest rates ; declining real output ; slower
employment growth; and rising unemployinent.
WILLIAM R. BRYAN
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Local Illinois Developments
Food stamp usage in Illinois outpaced the national
experience. While food stamp payments grew nationally
at a 17.2 percent average annual rate from 1972 to 1977,
payments to Illinois residents increased at a 20.8 percent
rate.
The payment of food stamps represents a public assis-
tance type of transfer payment. Total transfer payments
to Illinois residents grew in proportion to the national
average. Both increased at a 14.9 percent average annual
rate between 1972 and 1977. Transfer payments in gen-
eral serve to redistribute income, thereby shifting spend-
ing decisions within an economy. Food stamp payments
enable dollars to be freed that would otherwise be going
for food purchases, thus enabling the recipient to pur-
chase alternative goods and services. Other major cate-
gories of transfer payments include social security
benefits, unemployment insurance, medicare and medic-
aid, and federal pensions.
Examining the growth of food stamp payments or
transfer payments in general, two elements can be iden-
tified as having substantial impact on their growth—
inflation and unemployment. These two factors have led
to more persons becoming eligible for food stamps. Thus
it is primarily increased numbers rather than increased
benefits which have resulted in the rapid rise in these
payments.
Food prices have not increased nearly as rapidly as
the growth of food stamp payments. Even so, the 9.2 per-
cent average increase in food prices was a major element
in payment increases during the 1972-77 period. Actual
food stamp payments have been much larger with greater
volatility than the steadily rising price of food. This is
due primarily to the effects of unemployment. Tracing
the movement of food stamp payments mirrors the move-
ment in the unemployment rate over the 1972-77 period.
Food stamp payments showed their most rapid rates of
increase during the recession in 1974^75, increasing at
over a 41 percent average annual rate. During that same
period unemployment rose from an average 4.9 percent
in 1973 to over an average 8.5 percent rate during 1975.
These large jumps in both unemployment and food stamp
payments were followed by a leveling-off period during
1976, with both showing declines during 1977. Unem-
ployment dropped to an average 7.0 percent level during
1977 as food stamp payments dropped some 4.5 percent
between 1976-77.
An examination of the distribution of food stamp
payments by county in Illinois shows Kane County ex-
perienced the largest growth in payments during the
1972-77 period, with a 36.8 percent average annual rate
of increase. Even with this rapid growth in payments
Kane County still has a lower proportion of food stamp
usage than its proportional makeup of the state popula-
tion.
The effects of higher prices and higher levels of un-
employ-ment did not appear to affect either Crawford
County's or Marshall County's demand for food stamps
as both actually registered drops in food stamp usage be-
tween 1972-77. Growth rates of some of the other
counties include a steep 30.5 percent average annual in-
crease in Sangamon County and a high 23.1 percent aver-
age annual rate in Cook County. Peoria and Champaign
counties showed much smaller rates of increase with 8.4
percent and 9.9 percent average annual increases re-
spectively.
As might be expected, the greatest part of the food
stamp payments to Illinois goes to the residents of Cook
County. What is surprising is the level at which the
stamps are used in that county. Cook County accounts
for a little over 47 percent of the state's population, but
on average receives over 71 percent of the total food
stamp pa)Tnents to Illinois. This figure is more interesting
when looking at the relative income of the county. Cook
County accounts for 57 percent of the state's personal
income. Only one other county in Illinois uses proportion-
ately more food stamps compared with the population
that could be classified as wealthy by looking at personal
income. This is Du Page County, which could be con-
sidered the wealthiest county in the State with personal
income of its residents accounting for 4.2 percent of the
state figure but with a population making up just .5 per-
cent of the State. Even with this large personal income
figure Du Page County uses close to .6 percent of all
food stamps in Illinois.
Aside from Cook and Du Page counties only 6 of
Illinois's 102 counties use more than their populational
proportion in food stamps. These counties include Alex-
ander, Gallatin, Hardin, Kankakee, Pope, Pulaski, and
St. Clair. The high percentage use of food stamps in these
counties is more easily understood in that all of these
counties have proportionally low personal incomes. For
example, St. Clair County uses an average 4.8 percent of
all food stamp payments in Illinois while having a popula-
tion that makes up just 2.5 percent of the total. However,
the personal income generated within St. Clair County
accounts for only 1.5 percent of the state's total.
Other counties such as Henry and Marshall also have
personal incomes well below their proportional makeup
of the state's population, but still manage to keep food
stamp usage quite low. Henry- County accounts for .5
percent of the state's population with only .29 percent of
the state's personal income. It accounts for just .1 percent
of total Illinois food stamp payments. Marshall County's
lack of dependence on food stamps is even more evident
as it has a proportional population makeup six times
greater than its proportional usage of food stamps. Differ-
ing costs of living, poorly distributed incomes, and atti-
tudes toward accepting public assistance, could all be
identified as factors causing such wide variations in food
stamp usage among counties. thomas brvan
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The World Bank and the International Development
Association: Increased Food Production I
ROLAND W. BARTLETT
There has been a more rapid increase in the world's
population than in food production. This presents a basic
problem. The World Bank and the International Devel-
opment Association (IDA) have initiated activities in
over 80 countries designed to aid in resolving this prob-
lem and to improve living standards. There is evidence
that the World Bank/IDA projects have been helpful,
and ofTer promise for the future. Food production and
incomes have already been increased substantially in
several countries where World Bank/IDA projects were
initiated several years ago. Examples of this are Cam-
eroon, Upper Volta, and India.
Massive contributions by countries throughout the
world are concrete evidence of the respect of these coun-
tries for the expertise of the World Bank/IDA personnel
in initiating, carrying out, and monitoring their projects.
In 1978 the total cost of 236 projects initiated by the
World Bank/IDA was $31.9 billion. Loans and credits
from the World Bank/IDA in 1978 were $8.4 billion, or
only 26 percent of the total. Hence, 74 cents of every
dollar invested in these projects in 1978 came from coun-
tries where the projects are located or from outside
countries. Individual countries contributing to World
Bank/IDA projects in low-income countries in 1978 were
Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Iran, Italy, Ku-
wait, Netherlands, Norway, Nova Scotia, Sweden, United
Kingdom, and the United States. These contributions
were in addition to their investments in the World Bank.
Successful World Bank/IDA Projects
Cameroon has participated in several World Bank/
IDA projects. Cameroon, located on the west coast of
Africa, is an area larger than California. In 1975, it had
a population of 6,398,000 and a gross national product
of $290 per person, or slightly under the $325 average for
western Africa. Cocoa and rubber are among its agri-
cultural exports.
An IDA project to expand rice production and in-
crease incomes of small farmers was initiated in Cam-
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eroon in 1972. This activity has resulted in a large ex-
pansion in rice production on 11,000 acres along the
Logone River in northern Cameroon by irrigation, flood
control, double-cropping, and improved transplanting
methods. A new rice mill has been constructed in this
area and several roads upgraded. By 1985 rice production
in this area alone could meet 40 percent of Cameroon's
expected demand. Incomes of some 13,000 small farmers
were increased fivefold as a result of this activity. IDA
gave a $3.7 million credit, or 49 percent of $7.6 million,
the total cost for this project. The other 51 percent or
$3.9 million, was contributed by the Cameroon govern-
ment. Success in the rice project paved the way in 1975
for initiation of a large cocoa project and of a rubber
project.
In 1975, the World Bank initiated a project in Cam-
eroon to improve the productivity of 123,000 acres near
Yaounde used to produce cocoa. As soon as expanded
cocoa production gets underway, incomes of some 32,000
farm families may be increased substantially.
Expertise of the World Bank/IDA in setting up,
carrying out, and monitoring its projects appears to be
helpful in attracting outside funds. The World Bank is
loaning only $6.5 million, or 27 percent of the cocoa
project's total cost of $23.8 million. The remaining funds
are being provided jointly by the French agencies, Caisse
Central de Cooperation Economique and Fonds d'Aide
et de Cooperation, and the local Cameroon government.
In essence, the French agencies and die Cameroon gov-
ernment are assuming the "risk" costs of this cocoa proj-
ect, with Cameroon making use of World Bank personnel
to ensure wise use of funds.
Under an IDA project begun in 1975, around 15,000
acres in Cameroon will be cleared and planted with high-
yielding rubber. Credits of $16.0 million, or 56 percent of
its total cost of $28.5 million, were obtained from IDA.
The remaining costs were financed jointly by a French
agency and the Cameroon government. It is estimated
that the estate will have a peak production of 13,000
tons of rubber annually once the new plantings come
into full production. Around 3,000 farm families will be
provided with improved housing, health, education, and
social facilities, as a result of increased income from this
project.
World Bank/IDA have extended their activities to
projects other than rice, cocoa, and rubber. In 1974, the
World Bank made a loan to Cameroon to develop live-
stock products of 150 private ranches and farms, and of
three 50,000-acre ranches. The dreaded tsetse fly will be
cleared from 2 million acres included in these ranches
and farms.
In 1978, the World Bank made a loan to establish
a new palm oil estate in Cameroon to meet the rising
domestic demand for palm oil and also inaugurated a
program for the development of small holdings. In addi-
tion to increasing the food supply, each successful project
materially improved li\-ing standards of those employed
in carrying out the project.
The Upper Volta has benefited from World Bank/
IDA projects. Upper Volta is located in an inland pla-
teau region in West Africa. It is appro.ximately the size
of Colorado, having a population of 6,032,000 in 1973
and a GNP of $1 10 per person. Its GNP was thus only a
third of the $325 average for western .\frica. Over 90
percent of tlie people in Upper Volta are subsistence
farmers, with cattle and sheep being their principal
export.
In 1972 the ID.A began what it termed a "new-style"
project. This consisted of a series of small-scale actions,
including 250 wells dug to provide clean water for do-
mestic use ; 650 village warehouses built to store grain
:
3,700 acres of land improved through soil and conserva-
tion measures; and 240 miles of feeder roads upgraded.
These results were obtained under the strong leadership
of the Upper Volta Project Authority, the regional devel-
opment a,ssociations, and labor donated for construction
activities by local communities. The success of this proj-
ect has paved the way for several new agricultural
projects in Upper Volta since then.
The climate in Upper \''olta is extremely dry. Prior
to any assistance from ID.^, an irrigation project was
initiated from a United Nations Special Fund, using
water from the Black Volta, the White Volta, and water
pumped from underground. The IDA 1972 Upper Volta
project was successful in providing well water, building
village warehouses, and improving the productivity of
the land and building feeder roads.
The success of the 1972 project helped to generate
large contributions from outside countries and agencies
in funding a $17.2 million IDA agricultural project in
1977 supplementing an ID.\ credit of $3.6 million and
$1.6 million of Upper \'olta government funds. The re-
maining $12 million was provided by Canada, the Arab
Development Fund, and the Swiss Technical Cooperation.
This project was directed toward several purposes : to
increase the production of cotton and cereals: to initiate
simple irrigation systems to increa.se the production of
rice, other grains, and vegetable products; to construct a
granary; to build village grain storage facilities; to build
a training center for extension workers; to construct
feeder roads; and to introduce labor-saving devices to
improve the condition of women. It is estimated that
46,500 farm families will benefit from this project.
Cattle production is a major industry in Upper Volta.
In 1975, the IDA initiated a study to improve its effi-
ciency by introducing more up-to-date commercial ranch-
ing in place of traditional methods. This was to be
brought about by establishing a ranch development center
and nine group ranches; constructing a livestock market;
providing improved veterinary services; and upgrading
456 miles of stock routes. It has been estimated that
330,000 cattle producers will benefit by this project.
Between 1974 and 1978, the Worid Bank/IDA ini-
tiated four agricultural projects in Upper Volta. Bank/
IDA loans or credits for these projects were $30 million,
or 56 percent of their total cost.
India has benefited from World Bank/IDA programs.
India, a member of the British Commonwealth, has been
an independent republic since 1951. One-third the size
of the United States, in 1975 it had a population of
608,072,000, or nearly three times that of the US. Its
GNP in 1975 was $140 per person, or about the same as
the $137 average of South .^sia.
The foundation for successful World Bank/ID.\ proj-
ects to expand food production and improv-e living
standards in India was laid between 1952 and 1973 by
six US land-grant universities and various private foun-
dations. During this period 339 men and women from
these universities spent a total of 600 man-years to im-
prove institutions and increase food production in India.
Nine land-grant universities were established, built on a
research, teaching, and extension program similar to that
used by land-grant universities in the US. The American
institutions which sponsored the universities in India were
the Universities of Illinois, Ohio State, Tennessee, Mis-
souri, Kansas State, and Penn State.
World Bank/IDA projects have also resulted in in-
creased food production. Major attention has been
centered on providing improved farm credit, getting more
water for crops, improving seed and cropping practices,
building grain storage facilities, upgrading roads, and
training people in each locality to use practices to im-
prove their standard of living.
Increased availability of farm credit is essential for
most needed changes. More water is probably most im-
portant in increasing food production. Machinery is nec-
essary to dig wells, electric pumps are necessary to pump
underground water, and lining of irrigation ditches is
often necessary to conserve water. In some areas a new
dam is needed to conserve water between seasons.
To prevent famine, village storage facilities are nec-
essary to store grain from good years to bad years. Up-
grading of roads is vital to prevent starvation in remote
areas. Some projects help to improve the diet by ex-
panding the production of fish, milk, and fruit.
Between 1970 and 1978, the Worid Bank/IDA initi-
ated 46 agricultural projects for increasing food produc-
tion and improving living standards in India. The total
cost for these projects was $3.6 billion; the Indian gov-
ernment contributed $1.7 billion and the World Bank/
IDA $1.9 billion, or 53%.
Partially reflecting these projects, in 1976 and 1977,
the growth in food producUon in India was greater than
the growth in birthrate. High food production in both
years resulted in part from favorable monsoons. Also
between 1955 and 1974 there was a 17 percent decline
in the birthrate, partly because of birth control programs
of Prime Minister Gandhi.
In this article, attention has been directed toward
World Bank/AID assistance to three specific countries.
Another approach to discussing the operations of these
agencies is to concentrate on the types of as.sistance they
11
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offer. In a subsequent issue there will be a presentation
of assistance geared toward transportation systems, power
projects, industrialization, water and sewage systems, ser-
vices, education, and nutrition.
1977 Income and Employment
Data Available
Detailed BEA income and employment data
are available for each of the 102 counties and 10
SMSAs of Illinois for 1971 through 1977. A charge
of $20 will be made for the entire set to cover
xeroxing and handling costs. A minimum charge
of $2 will be made for individual county requests
totaling 3 counties or less, and $1 per county for
additional counties requested. A charge of $12 will
be made for the 1977 transfer payment data for
the 102 Illinois counties. Those interested in ob-
taining the data may write to the Bureau of Eco-
nomic and Business Research, University of Illinois,
428 Commerce West, Urbana, Illinois, 61801.
Please make check payable to the University of
Illinois.
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Federal Reserve Action and Market Reaction
The Federal Resene has announced two significant
changes in monetary arrangements. One, reserve require-
ments have been extended on certain bank liabilities that
were previously exempt from reserve requirements. Two,
the Federal Reserve has shifted its attention to move-
ments in monetary aggregates as a gauge for the short-
term effects of monetary policy. In addition to these
important changes, the Fed announced a full percentage
increase in the discount rate.
Financial markets have made dramatic adjustments
to the Federal Reserve actions. Interest rates have
jumped sharply, while the stock market has sagged.
Effects on the economy will not be discernible for some
time to come. However, in terms of intention this much
is clear. Monetary policy has tightened. The test for the
monetarists may be at hand.
Changes in Federal Reserve Rules
After three months on the job, Paul A. Volcker, the
newly-appointed Chairman of the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System, has announced an im-
portant series of changes.
First, the discount rate was increased by a full per-
centage— from 11 percent to 12 percent. The discount
rate is the rate of interest charged by Federal Reserve
Banks for borrowing by member banks. The chief im-
pact of this action has been on expectations of market
participants, businessmen, and others who evaluate eco-
nomic policy measures. The discount rate increase does
not represent a significant cost increase to banks. Mem-
ber bank borrowing totaled just over $1.5 billion in mid-
October— little more than one-tenth of 1 percent of
total bank credit. Indeed, a relatively small number of
the 14,000 banks throughout the nation ever borrow
from the Federal Reserve.
A second action was of substantially greater signifi-
cance. Reserve requirements have been extended to in-
clude Eurodollar and federal funds borrowing by mem-
ber banks from banking institutions that are not members
of the Federal Reserve System. For each $100 of such
borrowing a bank must hold an additional $8 in its
deposit account at its Federal Reserve Bank. The broad-
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ening of reserve requirements to include Eurodollar and
federal funds borrowing has two consequences. One,
there is an immediate and substantial increase in the
cost of such borrowing. For example, suppose the cost
of borrowing prior to reserve requirements were 12 per-
cent. The imposition of an 8 percent reserve require-
ment raises the effective cost of borrowing to just over
13 percent. Two, and fundamentally more important,
by making Eurodollar and federal funds borrowing sub-
stantially subject to reserve requirements the Federal
Reserve strengthens its ability to control bank liabilities.
The chief monetary effect of reserve requirements is
to set an outer limit on the size of bank liabilities. Sup-
pose, for example, that the reser\'e requirement on bank
deposits and borrowings is 8 percent; also suppose that
total bank reserves are $50 billion. This would mean
that total bank liabilities could reach a maximum of
$625 billion (.08 X $50 billion = $625 billion). It also
means that when the Federal Reserve expands bank re-
serves by $1 billion, total bank deposits and borrowing
can rise by $12.5 billion.
There is another side to the monetary coin. By limit-
ing the grovrth of bank liabilities, the Federal Reserve
controls the growth in bank credit. Thus, by extending
reserve requirements to apply to Eurodollar and federal
funds borrowing the Federal Reserve strengthens its con-
trol over the volume of bank lending.
The remaining link in strengthening the monetary
management process was for the Federal Reserve to re-
inforce its control over bank reserves. This link was
potentially strengthened when Volcker announced that
monetary actions would henceforth be geared toward
achieving target growth rates in so-called monetary ag-
gregates. Heretofore, short-term Fed operations were
directed toward achieving a level of money market in-
terest rates (for example, the interest rate on federal
funds borrowing), or toward maintaining rates within
a narrow range.
The Federal Reserve pursues its objectives by buying
and selling government securities. These purchases and
sales are referred to as "open market operations." If the
Fed wishes to resist market pressures serving to drive
interest rates higher it must purchase government secu-
rities. It buys on the open market. By purchasing, the
Federal Reserve adds to bank reserves. Conversely, in
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ing 15 percent in late October. Yields on short-tenn com-
mercial paper and Treasury bills have also risen more
than 150 basis points. (For example, a rise from 11 per-
cent to 12 percent is referred to as a 100 basis points
increase.)
Longer-term securities have also experienced an im-
portant increase in yields. Yields on United States Trea-
sury securities maturing in 3-5 years rose from just over
9.5 percent in late September to about 10.6 percent in
late October. Long-term US Treasury securities yields
have risen about 75 basis points. Holders of US Treasury
securities (or holders of many bonds issued by corpora-
tions) receive semiannual interest payments-— in an
amount determined at the time any particular issue was
initially sold by the Treasury to the public. The size of
the semiannual payments does not change. Instead, as
market interest rates rise, diere are declines in the prices
of already outstanding securities. Thus, good news to
new investors is sour medicine to investors who may have
been holding securities for several years.
Monetary Effects of Fed Changes
It is too early to determine whether the pace of
monetary expansion has slowed. In fact, the Federal
Reserve actions were not fully implemented until mid-
November.
But the background against which change may be
judged is clear. From April to mid-October, the narrow
money supply (Mi) expanded at more than an 11 per-
cent annual rate. The broad money supply (M2), which
includes net time deposits in addition to M,, rose at a
12.5 percent rate. Over this same period, business loans
at large banks exploded at a 26.6 percent annua! rate.
These past rates of expansion of money and credit
are e.xtremely rapid. At the same time, the financial
system has been extremely inventive in devising tech-
niques by which medium-to-large investors can place
their funds into interest-earning assets and, at the same
time, maintain ready access to liquidity. Certain money
market mutual funds and municipal bond funds are ex-
amples of such financial innovations. Thus, while the
traditional money supply has been expanding rapidly,
its substitutes have also grown at an extraordinary pace.
By the time this piece will have gone to press we will
have accumulated several weeks' monetary growth ex-
perience. Hopefully, a slowdown will be in evidence.
Monetary Change and the Economy
An extended period of time will be required before
the economy will show the effects of the recent monetary'
change. Certainly, the change was introduced with as
much fanfare as can be imagined. Moreover, as indi-
cated, the aftershock on financial markets has been dra-
matic. In short, the seeds have been sown for a pro-
nounced change in e.xpectations.
For years, monetarists have advocated the type of
stance Volcker has taken. The test of monetarist propo-
sitions may be at hand. The test, though proposed chiefly
by academics, is not taken by academics. Instead, the
consequences fall on the population at large — for good
or for ill. william r. bryan
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A Description of the Primary Wood-Using Industries in Southern IlHnois
The primary wood-using industries of southern Illi-
nois are those that purchase raw forest products. These
industries produce lumber, veneer, timbers, cooperage,
and dimension stock. The products of the primary indus-
tries are frequently used by other firms in the production
of finished or secondary forest products such as furniture,
wall paneling, packaging materials, and so on.
The data contained in this article were obtained by
in-depth personal interviews. All known industries were
included in the study.
In 1978, there were 37 primaiy wood-using firms in
southern Illinois. Thirty-two firms were sawmills. In
addition, there were two chip mills, a veneer plant, a
handle mill, a firewood-processing plant, and a log home
assembly plant.
In comparison 30 years ago there were approximately
200 sawmills, 9 container veneer mills, 4 box mills, 2
handle plants, and 4 charcoal plants (USDA Forest Ser-
vice, Paper 123).
More than half of the firms in 1978 had been in
operation under present ownership less than 10 years.
This was the first year of operation for one-fifth of the
plants. The oldest finn had been in operation 52 years.
Two-thirds of the plants, in their first year of operation,
began as "new" firms as compared with being purchased
from prior owners or having been moved from another
location.
Most of the firms were individual ownerships or part-
nerships. Four firms were part of larger wood-using cor-
jxyrations that were headquartered in surrounding states.
Capital investment varied from less than $10,000 to
more than $2 million. Eighty percent of the firms had
an original capital investment of less than $250,000,
with nearly a third less than $50,000. The size of land
area required for the plant and log yard was relatively
small. All but one of the plants occupied less than 30
acres, with three-fourths using 10 or fewer acres.
Nearly two-thirds of the firms purchased less than
500,000 board feet of roundwood. Thirty percent of the
firms purchased more than 1.5 million board feet. The
primary wood-using industry in southern Illinois pur-
chased approximately 45 million board feet of round-
wood in 1978. The average purchase volume was slightly
more than 1 million board feet. The total volume pur-
chased in 1978 was the same as in 1947.
The firms generally were somewhat selective in the
species of timber purchased. Only 12 firms bought both
pine and hardwoods. One fimi, the log home assembly
plant, purchased only pine. The most popular hardwoods
were oaks. Two sawmills, producing specific dimension
stock (for handles and snow skis) , specialized in hickoiy.
Ash and pin oak were also singled out for selective pur-
chase. It was of interest to find a few firms rejecting
Cottonwood sawlogs, although the veneer mill specifically
procured Cottonwood veneer logs.
The major source of roundwood was from private
ownerships, with three-fourths of the firms procuring all
or a portion of their timber supply from private lands.
Roundwood delivered by loggers FOB at the mill served
as a timber source for half of the firms. Only five firms
obtained timber from federal lands, with three of these
plants obtaining less than one-fourth of their total sup-
plies via federal sales. Four firms obtained a portion of
their roundwood from company lands.
Two-thirds of the firms procured most of their round-
wood within the resident county. In a study of the timber
buyer in Illinois, it was found that more than half of
the timber buyers traveled less than 50 miles, one way,
to purchase stumpage.
Three-fourths of the firms purchasing stumpage did
all of their own logging, and 16 percent logged a portion
of their stumpage purchases. The remaining firms sub-
contracted the logging of their stumpage purchases. This
latter practice is becoming more popular with increases
in ( 1) the costs of workmen's compensation and (2) gov-
ernment regulations.
More than two-thirds of the plants resold some of
the roundwood jjurchases, especially veneer logs and
specialty sawlogs. The volume resold varied from 3 per-
cent to 33 percent. However, most firms sold less than
10 percent of their total timber purchases. More than
two-tliirds of the firms experience a slack procurement
period during the winter season when the weather is
very cold and wet conditions exist.
When asked "How have your procurement practices
changed during the past five years?" the most frequent
change given was tlie foregoing observation that firms
were subcontracting their logging and/or purchasing
more roundwood FOB at the mill. The second most fre-
quent reply was the yarding of veneer logs and specialty
sawlogs for reselling. A fourth of the plants replied that
the available timber supplies were becoming smaller in
both volume and size. However, one-fourth of the firms
planned expansion of the volume of timber purchases.
Two final changes taking place in procurement prac-
tices were (1) less residue was being left in the woods
due to the increasing demands for wood and firewood:
and (2) there were fewer "gypo" loggers because saw-
mills can pay higher prices by reselling logs to veneer
and export buyers.
The most frequent products j)roduced by southern
Illinois's primaiy wood-using industiy were railroad ties,
rough lumber, pallets, and mine timbers including ties,
header boards, and matts. A few firms produced graded
lumber, mill blocking, wood chips, and firewood. Spe-
cialty products included handle blanks, wood reels, hick-
ory ski billets, veneer lumber, and log homes.
Nearly a third of the plants were limited in daily
capacity by the scale and/or age of tlieir equipment.
Four firms indicated a shortage in the quantity and
quality of available labor as a limiting factor to increased
production. When asked "What do you consider the
greatest change confronting your plant and what do you
consider the greatest challenge confronting your industry
during the next several years?" half of the firm spokes-
men said a shortage of adequate (quantity and quality)
timber supplies. Firm spokesmen also listed one or more
of the following: (1) RARE II, proposed US Forest
Service wilderness areas; (2) federal and state regula-
tions; (3) demand for products dependent upon an un-
certain mining industiy; and (4) inflation.
The market outlets used by the firms varied by prod-
uct. Half of the plants marketed part or all of their
products through wholesalers. Railroad ties and lumber
were the products most often sold to wholesalers. One-
half of the firms sold a portion of their products directly
to customers and/or manufacturers, especially pallets
and mine timbers. Retail sales were made by less than
5 percent of the plants.
More than 90 percent of the firms, not tied to parent
firms, credit "word of mouth" as their major source of
customers. Eighty percent relied totally on "word of
mouth." Other means used to obtain customers included
long-standing contracts, buyers, brokers, advertising, and
their own salesmen.
Excluding the firms tied to parent firms, and the two
specialty mills, the following market areas were found
to exist. ( 1 ) Finns producing railroad ties and mine tim-
bers sold their product within southern Illinois (generally
resident and neighboring county). (2) More than three-
fourths of the pallets were sold in the Chicago area.
(3) Lumber was marketed in a 3- to 4-state area.
When asked, "What changes do you anticipate in
your marketing practices during the ne.xt two years?"
two firms' spokesmen indicated their firm planned to ex-
pand the variety of products produced through "new"
product sales. The small number of responses suggests
that the primary wood-using industry in southern Illinois
plans no major expansion; but, on the other hand, does
not plan major reductions in production.
The primaiy wood-using industry in southern Illinois
in 1978 employed approximately 400 full-time people.
The estimated annual payroll was more than $4.5 mil-
lion. Seventy percent of the firms employed less than 10
full-time employees. Only 10 percent of the firms had
more than 30 employees. Over the past five years the
number of people employed by the primary wood-using
industry in southern Illinois has remained relatively
stable.
All but two firms utilized fine and coarse residue.
However, only 40 percent of the plants utilized bark
residue. The firms generally gave away or sold coarse
residue for household fuel and/or the manufacture of
fiber products. Thirty of the fiims sold coarse residue to
the pulp industry. The fine residue was generally given
away or sold for mulch, livestock bedding, and so on.
Only one firm used residue as a source of energy for
operational purposes, other than burning for heat.
It is estimated that approximately 36,000 tons of fine
residue and 54,000 tons of coarse residue resulted from
the production of the primary wood-using firms in
southern Illinois during 1978.
The following conclusions are warranted by the study
findings : ( 1 ) The primary wood-using industries have
a significant financial impact on the economy of southern
Illinois; (2) The industry has been relati\ely stable the
past 30 years, relative to raw material purchases, but
the number of firms has declined; (3) The type of
products manufactured by the industry generally utilizes
relatively low-quality timber, with the veneer quality
roundwood being resold to firms outside of southern Illi-
nois; and (4) The supply of timber in southern Illinois
could support an enlarged industry.
DWIGHT R. MC CURDY*
* Professor, Department of Forestiy, Southern Illinois
University, Carbondale.
Illinois Economic Indicators
The Bureau of Economic and Business Research has
broadened the coverage of the leading indicator to in-
clude the effect of vendor performance. For this reason,
the series has been revised for the period of November
1978 to the present. The leading indicator is now based
on the following series: layoff rate, new housing starts,
weekly hours, and vendor performance.
In the last few months the underlying series have
behaved very well given the widespread view that a
recession is on the way. Average weekly hours have actu-
ally increased on a seasonally adjusted basis from 39.5
hours per week in January to 41.1 in the most recent
period. The layoff rate reached its lowest point in 10
years in September 1978 at 0.2 percent and remains now
at 0.4 percent, which by comparison even with past peri-
ods of prosperity is very low. Housing starts are substan-
tially lower than a year or two years ago, and are the
only negative element in the index. We expect that this
will worsen in the next few months.
The new element in the index, vendor performance,
is at a relatively high level, having dropped a mere 10
percent from a year ago. In January 1975— a previous
slow period— the index was 37 percent below its pres-
ent level. Overall the index shows the leading elements
of the Illinois economy to be performing well.
CHUN-S.\NG CHEUNG
Illinois E
Local Illinois Developments
The Downstate Teachers' Retirement System has in
recent years shown signs of increasing financial sound-
ness, despite demographic factors which are currently
working their way through the state's school system.
Of the five major public pension systems, the Down-
state Teachers' Retirement is by far the largest. At the
end of fiscal 1978 this system accounted for over 55 per-
cent of the total assets of all the state-supported pension
systems. The otlier major pension systems, which are
supported in part by appropriations from state funds,
include the State Employees' Retirement System, the
State Universities Retirement System, the Judges' Re-
tirement System, and the other member of the State
Teachers' Retirement System, the Chicago Teachers'
Pension and Retirement System.
Under the contributing method of financing state
pension funds, contributions to the system are received
from the employee and the employer (the State of Illi-
nois). Employees contribute a portion of their salary
with the contribution rate ranging from 4 to 11 percent
depending upon the pension system and whether or not
the employee participates in the federal social security
program. Downstate teachers contribute 8 percent of
their salary to the Dovmstate Teachers' Retirement Sys-
tem. The State is then required to pay the cost of an
annuity over and above that provided through employees'
contributions. The past practice of the State has been to
appropriate an amount each fiscal year which is approxi-
mately equal to the estimated annual benefits paid by
each system. Membei-s' contributions and investment in-
come are then invested with the purpose of increasing
the asset base of the system.
Since 1974 total income of die Downstate Teachers'
Retirement System has grown at a 15.1 percent average
annual rate while total expenses of the system increased
at only an 11.4 percent rate. This is quite a turnabout
when compared with an income growth of 11.8 percent
during the 1970-74 period while expenses were growing
at over a 17 percent average annual rate. The main rea-
son for this improvement is that the investment income
of this system has grown at a 27.5 percent average an-
nual rate over the past five years.
Another financial improvement of the system is re-
lated to its asset and liability structure. The asset base of
the Downstate Teachers' Retirement System has grown
at an average annual rate of 15 percent since 1974 while
the liabilities of the system grew at only 8.9 percent.
\^iewed another way, while the assets of the Downstate
Teachers' Retirement System have continually repre-
sented 55 percent of the total assets of the five state-
supported pension systems, the liabilities of this system
have proportionally dropped during the 1970s. In 1971
the Downstate Teachers' Retirement System accounted
for over 65.6 percent of all state pension funds liabilities.
By fiscal year 1978 their total liabilities structure ac-
counted for 54.8 percent of the total liabilities of all
state-supported pension systems. A related result is that
the unfunded obligation of the State (the difference be-
tween liabilities and assets) has over the past five years
grown at a 4.6 percent average annual rate for the
Downstate Teachers' Retirement System compared with
a 10.8 percent annual growth rate for all other state
pension systems during the same period.
E\'en though the financial structure of the down-
state system has shown improvement, it is believed by
some that this system could be in financial trouble in
years to come. This concern stems primarily from demo-
graphic factors and related legislation.
Enrollment of elementary school children has dropped
some 16 percent nationally in the last decade. As the
smaller birth cohorts of the mid-1960s have been reach-
ing high school age, high school enrollments have begun
to decline. High schools will thus increasingly experience
the decreases in enrollment that have been occurring in
elementary schools. The effects that this fact will ha\e
on the employment of teachers and thus the contribu-
tions into the retirement system is uncertain.
In an effort to stimulate the hiring of new teachers
the State, as of August 1, adopted legislation which al-
lows elementary and secondary school teachers with 20
years of experience to retire at age 55 without taking a
cut in pension payments. The prior law penalized teach-
ers that retired early by cutting the pension for each
year not worked before age 60 by 6 percent.
According to the Illinois Education Association, about
6,000 of the state's approximately 110,000 teachers will
he eligible for early retirement at the end of the current
school year. The Downstate Teachers' Retirement Sys-
tem estimates that the no-penalty early retirement legis-
lation will increase the state's share of the cost by some
1.2 million dollars per year downstate. This increase
should have no effect on the state's ability to pay as it
State-Supported Pension
Member contributions
Government Payments to Illinois Farmers Decline
Cash receipts from marketings of crops, livestock, and
li\estock products are the major source of income for
Illinois farmers. In 1977 cash receipts for crops totaled
over $3.9 billion, compared with the $2 billion from
li\estock. Illinois marketings represented over 5 percent
of the total US cash receipts for both categories, which
puts Illinois fourth among the United States in the sale
of all farm products. Illinois was the leading state in
cash receipts from corn and soybeans and the second
leading state from the sale of all crops. Cash receipts
from Illinois crops increased nearly 100 percent in the
last decade, while those from livestock rose about 40
percent. The major portion of this increase occurred in
1973 with livestock and crops rising by 22 and 38 per-
cent, respectively.
Recent trends in cash receipts do not present an
equally favorable outlook on the incomes of all types of
Illinois farms. Cash receipts from livestock marketings
rose by 5 percent from 1974 to 1977, but increased by
less than 2 percent between 1976 and 1977. Crop mar-
ketings displayed a less favorable trend, with cash re-
ceipts remaining unchanged or declining between 1974
and 1977.
Government payments constitute another relatively
important but declining source of income to Illinois
farmers. The government payments allocated directly to
Illinois fanners are from farm programs such as the
Feed Grain, Wheat, Agricultural Conservation, and
Wool Incentive Programs. Over half of the farmers in
Illinois Cash Farm Income
by Commodities, 1977
Livestock and Livestock Products 32%
Eggs 1%
Crops 68%
I Agricuhural Statbtics, Bullcun 78-4
Illinois are not eligible for government assistance because
they do not participate in the land set-aside program, or
produce feed grains or wheat (see chart). Government
payments, designed to control production, are inversely
related to agricultural prices, and hence are sensitive to
world market conditions. The increase in foreign de-
mand for Illinois agricultural products in the early 1970s
is reflected in the sharp increase in Chicago feed grain
prices. Coincident with the price increase is a reduction
in the percentage of feed grain production put under
government support and a decline in the support price
per bushel. For example, the cjuantity of com put under
support in the US fell from 420 million bushels in 1973
to 77 million bushels in 1974, while the support price fell
from 70 to 51 percent of parity. The combined effect
reduced government payments to US farmers over 86
percent.
A similar pattern is found in Illinois. While govern-
ment payments to Illinois farmers totaled nearly $200
million in 1969, by 1977 they had declined to only $32
million. This figure represents less than 30 percent of
the 1969-77 average. Government payments to Illinois
farmers reached a peak in 1972 at $244 million and fell
to less than $10 million in 1974 and 1976.
County Income Estimates
Farming is more profitable in McLean County than
anywhere else in the state. Recent fairn income estimates
indicate that McLean County generated total farm in-
come in excess of $64 million, followed closely by Li\-
ingston, Iroquois, and Champaign counties. Total farm
income is derived by subtracting production costs from
cash receipts, government payments, and other farm in-
come (imputed income and rent received) . Cash re-
ceipts from McLean County livestock marketings were
over $25 million in 1977, slightly less than the 1969
figure. Livestock marketing receipts averaged $26 million
in the last decade, reaching a high of $30 million in
1973 and 1975, and a low of $23 million in 1972. Cash
receipts from crop marketings have displayed a signifi-
cant upward trend since 1973 when receipts totaled
nearly $116 million, a 40 percent increase from 1972.
Crop receipts were over $164 million in 1977, down
nearly 10 percent from 1976.
The declining trend in government assistance to
farmers is evident in McLean County. Government pay-
ments to McLean County farmers reached a 1972 peak
of $5.3 million before plunging to $100 thousand in 1976.
On average, McLean County received $4.3 million in
government payments annually between 1969 and 1973,
and only $200 thousand annually from 1974 to 1977.
Farm income and expenditure estimates for Illinois
counties from 1969 to 1977 are now available. A fee of
$15 is charged for the entire set with a minimum charge
of $2 for requests for five counties or less. Inquiries
should be addressed to the Bureau of Economic and
Business Research, University of Illinois, 428 Commerce
West, Urbana, Illinois 61801. susan j. linz
Era Ends in the Telephone Industry
Illinois is unique among the states because every
facet of its telephone industry, from research and de-
velopment of new electronic equipment to warehousing
final products, takes place within the State. The direct
economic contribution of the telephone industry in Illi-
nois is substantial, yet employment is tapering off as the
industiy becomes increasingly electronic.
The concept of scale economies is often associated
with the telephone industry because there are overhead
expenditures which must be undertaken on a certain
scale before any service can be provided. The overhead
costs of installing the main cables and wires, for example,
have the same scale regardless of the subsequent number
of phones put in operation. The advantages of expand-
ing productive capacity to increase output at propor-
tionately lower average costs are evident in Illinois. The
telephone industry is divided up into companies classified
by average annual operating revenues. Of the 54 tele-
phone companies in Illinois, 31 have average annual
operating revenues exceeding $250,000 (class A com-
panies), and 17 fall \vilhin the $100,000-$250,000 range
(class B companies). The remaining corporations are
organized on a cooperative basis for the furnishing of
telephone senices.
Operating Statistics
The telephone industry is expanding. Illinois tele-
phone companies operated 974 exchanges in 1978 to
serve the state's 9.9 million telephones (up from 8.7 mil-
lion in 1974). Approximately 5.2 million of the state's
telephones are main stations (one line serving one tele-
phone) and 4.7 million are extensions. Operating reve-
nues for the entire telephone industiy in Illinois total
about $2.5 billion, up from $1.9 billion in 1975.
Two firms, Illinois Bell and General Telephone of
Illinois, dominate the telephone industry in the State.
However, the Illinois Commerce Commission estimates
that the remaining class A telephone companies in Illi-
nois operate nearly 340 exchanges and account for over
455.000 main stations. This subset of class A telephone
companies generates net income of about $26 million, or
$57 per main station annually, and pays Illinois taxes
of about $16 million, or $35 per main station each year.
Illinois Bell dominates the more populated regions
of the State. ^Vholly owned by AT&T, it serves over 3.3
million customers with some 8 million phones, and em-
ploys over 37,000 people in the State. Operating 229
exchanges, Illinois Bell generates net income of about
$243 million, or $57 per main station, and pays Illinois
taxes in excess of $15 million annually, or about $3.60
per main station. The entire Bell System— Illinois Bell,
Western Electric, AT&T Long Lines, Bell Telei^honc
Laboratories, and Teletype Coqjoration— employs over
59,000 people and spends more than $2.4 billion a year
in Illinois. Total payroll, the biggest single expenditure
of the Bell System, reached $1.2 billion in 1978. Pur-
chases ranked second at $586 million, and local taxes
third at $250 million. The economic impact of the Bell
System in the State is augmented by the dividends that
AT&T pays to shareholders in Illinois, which totaled
over $202 million in 1978.
General Telephone of Illinois is the second largest
telephone company in the State, operating 327 exchanges
which service nearly 485,000 main stations and 393,000
extensions. General Telephone generates net income of
about $34 million annually, or $70 per main station, and
pays Illinois taxes of $2.4 million each year.
Class B telephone companies operate slightly more
than 2 percent of the total number of telephone ex-
changes in the State, to serve about 10,000 main stations
and 6,000 extensions. Combining all Illinois class B tele-
phone companies yields a net annual income figure of
about $450,000, or $42 per main station. These com-
panies add over $22,000 annually to Illinois tax revenues.
Moultrie Independent Telephone Company is the largest
class B company in the state in terms of total operating
revenues, generating $236,000 in 1978.
The six cooperative telephone companies in Illinois
operate 61 exchanges, sei-vicing nearly 22,000 main sta-
tions and 13,000 extensions. These companies generate
net income of $545,000, or $25 per main station, an-
nually.
Recent Developments
An era ended in 1978 when the last manual central
office in the Bell System was retired and replaced with
a modem electronic switching system. Switching equip-
ment is central to the telephone network. It registers the
phone number a customer dials and perfoiTns the neces-
sary steps to connect the two parties. About 30 percent
of the Bell System telephones have been converted from
electromechanical to electronic switching systems. In-
deed, these new electronic switching systems, manu-
factured by the Western Electric facilities in Lisle and
Chicago, were being installed in 1978 at the rate of
about one per day. Their advantages over the older sys-
tems include greater speed and reliability, and lower
operating and maintenance costs. For example, elec-
tronic tandem switching, designed for stored program
control, allows large corporations with widely scattered
locations to control and monitor their networks from
centralized consoles.
Electronic components are the building blocks of the
telephone industry. Among the new electronic products
is a microprocessor designed especially for telecommuni-
cations use. The microprocessor, about one-tenth the size
of a postage stamp, contains 7,000 transistors and has
the information-processing capability of a computer.
The Bell System has also been conducting a service
trial of its lightwave transmission system in Chicago. This
system uses lasers and light-emitting diodes to transmit
voice, data, and video signals on hair-thin glass fibers.
SUSAN J. LIN'Z
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The World Bank and the International Development
Association: Increased Food Production II
ROLAND W. BARTLEH
This is the conclusion of the article of this title pub-
lished in the October issue of this review.
To become self-sufficient in times of food shortage,
a country must have adequate transportation. The World
Bank/IDA has given high priority to projects for improv-
ing roads, rivers, railroads, and ports for both water and
air. In 1978 there were 34 projects in 29 countries cen-
tered on improving transportation. Total costs for these
in 1978 were $5.1 billion. World Bank/IDA loans and
credits for these projects were $1.1 billion or 22 percent
of the total.
One project initiated in 1978 forms £ui important
part of the overall development of northern Cameroon.
It serves several agricultural, industrial, and administra-
tive centers in the country. Another in Egypt will in-
crease the depth of the Suez Canal so that by 1980 it
will accommodate ships widi a gross weight of 470,000
tons drawing water up to 53 feet in depth. A third 1978
project on the Ivory Coast will include the improvement
of the roadbed of the Regiedes Chemin de Fer, the pur-
chase of locomotives, and provision for maintaining
equipment and training facilities for the railroad.
In developing countries, large amounts of capital
are necessary to develop industries and services needed
for improving living standards. In 1978 the World Bank/
IDA had 25 projects in development of finance com-
panies in 19 countries. A total of $1,174 million was
made available, four-fifths of which came from the
World Bank/IDA. Power distribution lines, road im-
provements, and water transmission will be provided in
Colombia. As a result of this project both exports and
employment will increase in Cartegena, the capital of
one of the country's poorest states. In Upper Volta
credit and technical assistance to artisans and small and
medium-sized enterprises will be provided. In India
high-priority industrial projects located in low-income
areas will be helped financially, which will help increase
exports.
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In 1978, curriculum development, teaching aids, and
regional centers for adult education was begun in So-
malia.
Telephones, television, and radios are a prerequisite
to improved living standards in developing countries. In
1978 the World Bank/IDA initiated 5 projects in 5
countries. They contributed about one-fifth of the to-
tal cost of $1,192 million. In El Salvador the installation
of additional local automatic telephones, long-distance
equipment, and teleprinters in areas currently without
service will be made possible. One hundred isolated
locations will be provided with local telephone service
in Nepal with funds from another project. The \Vorld
Bank is working with the Indian government in a pro-
gram to add more than a half million lines in India
between 1977 and 1979.
Improved living standards for developing countries
are dependent, in part, on improved nutrition and family
planning. Two World Bank/IDA projects in two coun-
tries were started in 1978; the total cost will be $137.5
milhon, including a loan of $58.1 million from the
World Bank.
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What's Wrong With Workers' Compensation? The Lump-Sum Payment?
ALLAN J. HARRISON
There is really no serious dispute in the US regarding
the purposes of a workers' compensation system. As
stated by the National Commission on State Workers'
Compensation Laws, the program should provide all in-
jured or diseased workers with ( 1 ) complete appropriate
medical care; (2) physical and vocational rehabilitation;
and (3) continued earnings. An effective system would
also (4) encourage safet)-; and (5) deliver benefits "in
an efficient manner." The commission, however, appar-
ently failed to consider adequately the most serious ob-
stacles to accomplishing these goals. This becomes most
obvious in a state such as Illinois, where the law was
revised, in large part, based on the National Commission's
recommendations. Although the law was properly modi-
fied for certain administrative changes such as allowing
an employee a choice of his own doctor, and was also
greatly altered to increase benefits, fundamental institu-
tional relationships in the workers' compensation system
— relationships which frustrate all of the foregoing goals
— were not altered.
Whether paid as an award as a result of a hearing
Allan J. Harrison is professor at the Institute
of Labor and Industrial Relations, University of
Illinois. He has been working with occupational
safety and health policy and worker's compensation
since the passage of the Occupational Safety and
Health Act. He has produced a handbook. Ques-
tions and Answers on Illinois Workers Compensa-
tion, which has been widely distributed throughout
the State and is in its fifth printing. This article is
primarily the result of extensive discussions with
people directly involved in the day-to-day problems
of Illinois workers compensation; it also is in part
tiie result of a sabbatical in England and Germany
which permitted the comparison of work safety,
health, and worker's compensation programs with
those of the US.
or reached in compromise with the employer or his in-
surer, the nexus of these problematical institutional rela-
tionships is the lump-sum payment or lump-sum settle-
ment for permanent partial disability or impairment. The
lump-sum settlement provides the economic incentive
for a host of problems created by the activities of legal
and insurance institutions. Indeed, the useful functions
of these institutions have been greatly distorted by the
lump-sum settlement system. Although the problems may
be exaggerated, examining the Illinois system makes clear
the harmful defects of the present system as they occur
in varying degrees throughout the nation.
Complete Appropriate Medical Care
The Illinois law permits an employee to choose his
own doctor and to receive full payment for any and all
medical care. Employers' and employees' concern over
the ultimate settlement have, however, led to the selec-
tion and reselection of doctors and to medical treatment
and examination based not mainly on medical need but
on the high-stakes game of the amount to be paid for
partial disability.
Since, in any serious injury, the ultimate settlement
is largely based on medical evidence indicating the per-
centage of disability in a given limb or organ, knowledge-
able and calculating employers, employees, and repre-
sentatives of both, jockey from the outset to obtain a
physician who is either very conser\'ative or very liberal
in his estimates of impairment. Ironically the company-
selected physician exaggerates his effectiveness while the
employee's doctor minimizes his. Medical prognosis, then,
replaces medical performance as the standard for select-
ing an attending physician. There is no independent judg-
ment of the doctor's expertise or effectiveness in actually
treating industrial injury or disease, and the extent of
recovery is not the basis for his selection and retention.
As a consequence, many Illinois employers continue
to have company doctors for referral purposes, and al-
though employees may select their own doctors at the
company's expense, most are urged to go to the company
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doctor. Likewise, unions and employee attorneys have
particular doctors to whom they guide injured workers.
In Illinois and nearly all states, the judgment on per-
centage of disability is determined not by a medical spe-
cialist, but by a layman employed by the appropriate
state agency to act as a hearing officer or arbiter in the
matter. In reaching his decision, he uses the medical
evidence, some institutionalized rules of thumb, and
other evidence which is only tangentially related to the
actual extent of disability. The evidence of one party
is thrown against the evidence of the other, and the
state arbiter, in Solomon-like wisdom, cuts the baby
somewhere in between. Unfortunately, in the process of
developing the medical record and other evidence bear-
ing on the extent of disability, the worker's care becomes
a secondar)- concern.
Since an Illinois employee is not required to remain
with one doctor, his attorney may advise him to keep
changing physicians until the "right one" is discovered.
And, even in states not requiring an employer to pay
for any doctor, an injured worker often seeks, at his
own expense, a doctor who will better the evidence in
his case.
The employer, on the other hand, may apply pres-
sure from the outset to get his employee to go to the
company doctor. At a minimum, the law permits the
employer to require examinations by a medical specialist
of his choosing. Thus, activities that are dysfunctional
are encouraged by the present system.
Physical and Vocational Rehabilitarion
Real rehabilitation is obviously not encouraged in
such circumstances, as there is no objective examination
and evaluation of the employee's progress but only the
self-serving submissions of two litigious parties attempt-
ing to persuade a layman to cut the permanent disability
cake in their favor.
Other factors also work against both physical re-
habilitation— the restored use of all faculties— and
vocational rehabilitation— the restoration of the em-
ployee's ability to hold gainful employment comparable
with his previous work.
Whether explicidy recognized or not, the award of
permanent partial disability is influenced by the amount
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of time an employee is unable to work at the time of his
injury—• that is, the length of temporary' total disability-.
Consequently, there is an attempt to get a worker back
in the plant, mine, store, or office as soon as possible,
regardless of his ability to perform any real work. This
sham does nothing for an employee's respect for his em-
ployer, and more important, may interfere with the
worker's receiving proper physical therapy and voca-
tional retraining where they may be necessary. There are
also, of course, employees who hang back from return-
ing to work and resist treatment that would expedite
their return as full participants in the work force. ^Vhy?
Because they have learned, or been told, that this pays
big dollars in the final settlement. Again the emphasis is
distorted by legal gamesmanship.
Finally, there is great resistance to the reemployTnent
of seriously injured employees, although reemployment
is the basic factor in successful vocational rehabilitation.
And payment of a large lump-sum settlement constitutes
an implicit assumption that reemployment is not realis-
tically expected. It would appear in many instances that
if the money spent on litigation to obtain such settlements
were used instead to ensure the worker's reemployability,
a primary purpose of workers' compensation legislation
would be advanced.
Continued Earnings
Due to the 1975 amendments wliich attempted to
bring Illinois law into line with the National Commis-
sion's recommendations, it can be said that income has
been maintained for the temporarily totally disabled.
Because of the incentives latent in the lump-sum settle-
ment approach, however, this cannot be said with cer-
tainty for either death or permanent total disability
cases. It is still more questionable in the case of perma-
nent partial disability.
Through the ignorance of many sun-iving depen-
dents and the permanently totally disabled employee, the
cupidity of some lawyers, and the fundamental policy
of insurance companies, many of the totally disabled and
the survivors of death cases never obtain their proper
entitlement of continuing benefits adjusted annually for
inflation. Since insurance companies do not wish to have
an unspecified indeterminate liability, they willingly dan-
gle a large sum (albeit much less than they would ulti-
mately have to pay) before the permanently totally im-
paired and the dead employee's survivors. Although no
reputable attorney would take any substantial portion
of benefits due in such cases, there are some, as in any
field, who are not quite so ethical. Clients are sometimes
encouraged, contrary to their own best interest, to settle
for lump sums, so that their lawyers may more readily
collect large fees.
In cases of permanent partial disability, there seems
little question that a seriously injured employee who
accepts a lump sum is actually receiving an amount
completely unrelated to his future loss of earnings. In
some cases it may be greater, in some less, but the pres-
ent system is not designed to compensate for long-term
loss of earnings realistically. Also, lump-sum settlements
usually require an employee to release his rights to
future medical care related to his injury.
There is, however, a provision in Illinois law that
allows the employee an option called "Partial Incapacity
to Pursue Usual Employment." This provides for the
payment of two-thirds of the difference between his pre-
vious earnings and the wage he receives at his new em-
ployment. Experience shows that injured employees are
seldom advised of this aspect of the law, and for all
intents and purposes, it is an unknown provision. That
injured workers are rarely told of this choice may be
explained by the fact that this alternative eliminates any
lump-sum payment and, at a minimum, complicates the
attorney's claim to some portion of the settlement.
LumfHSura payments, then, are often a poor solution
for the individual worker and sometimes costly for the
general public. Although a lump sum is supposedly off-
set against social security, the success of this mechanism
depends entirely on an individual recipient's admitting
that he has received workers' compensation. The Na-
tional Commission found that 10 times as many people
were receiving social security for work-related permanent
total disability as had received workers' compensation
awards for permanent total disability. This, of course,
is subject to various interpretations. Many people settle
for less than total disability, and social security is un-
doubtedly much freer with public money than insurance
companies are with theirs. But it is hard to resist the
jxjssible conclusion that social security is being used as
a back-up fund for injured employees who take their
lump-sum money and run. Consequently, both social se-
curity and the employee lose.
Encourage Safety
The present litigious system has the added deleterious
effect of, at a minimum, confusing and, more often, de-
stroying, the relationship between the costs of workers'
compensation cases and the actual safety record of the
company. A company's experience in terms of costs is
as apt to result from extraneous factors as it is likely to
reflect the actual accident and sickness situation. Many
factors contribute to the destruction of that relationship.
( 1
)
Intimidation— some employers and/or insurers
have been known to use intimidation to frustrate an
employee's rights under the law. Large, but untold, num-
bers of employees never file any claims at all through
fear of employer retaliation. Neither the law nor the
insurance system has any effect on this fear, and the
result is a payment system based not on accidents and
disease rates, but on the lack of ethical behavior of an
employer and/or his insurance carrier.
(2) Ignorance— in many states the burden lies en-
tirely on the employee to pursue his rights, and many
have not the slightest idea what those rights are. Again,
neither the administration of the law nor insurance insti-
tutions encourage employee knowledge in this matter.
The greater the ignorance, the less the cost.
(3) In combating the elements of intimidation and
ignorance, an active, informed union can make a great
difference in whether claims are pursued or not. Thus
the existence of such a union can result in increased costs
which do not reflect a greater incidence of injury and
illness, but a more frequent pursuit of cases.
(4) The amount of any given award today depends
on the presence, and relative abilities, of attorneys for
tiie contesting parties. Again, the cost bears no relation-
ship to the actual safety record of the employer.
(5) As previously discussed, die type of doctor con-
sulted and the evidence he presents are both critical to
the resolution of disputed cases. Again, there is no rela-
tionship to safety conditions.
(6) Finally, hearing officers in the State of Illinois
are political appointees whose expertise may vary greatly.
Thus, substantially different awards for the same injury
may occur and this again, is unrelated to actual condi-
tions.
In summary, the present system not only fails to de-
liver the desired level of worker benefits, but fails to
provide an incentive for safety.
Deliver Benefits "in an Efficient Manner"
Additionally, the system renders impossible the ful-
fillment of the goal of efficiency— which, simply stated,
is to maximize the percentage of the employers' dollars
paid for workers' compensation which actually goes to
provide employee benefits of medical care, rehabilita-
tion, and income. Obviously, attorneys' fees and insur-
ance administration costs take a big bite of those dol-
lars, and the unnecessary or inappropriate use of doctors
consumes still more. Finally, the lump-sum method of
paying off claimants cannot be the best way of accom-
plishing society's main goal— getting the injured em-
ployee back to work as a contributing member of society
rather than throwing him on social security. Such a sys-
tem both sacrifices the productive potential of the indi-
vidual and increases the costs of the producti\e part of
society that pays for social security.
Finally, the present system means that today workers'
compensation claims are handled like other claims in
litigation and the peculiar nature of workers' compen-
sation is not recognized. Consequently, the insurance in-
dustry does not specialize in it to any great degree, and
it is just one of many risk insurance services provided to
private industry. Were fewer more specialized insurance
institutions involved, they could provide services to en-
able employers to prevent accidents and provide rehabili-
tation. The present system provides little incentive for
such specialization.
Recommendations
The following recommendations for improvement are
jjerhaps too Utopian, as they would entail confrontations
with powerful lobbying institutions in any state : the bar
association, the insurance industry, and possibly the medi-
cal association. The accomplishment of the first of these
recommendations, however, is presently within the capa-
bility of organized labor, or could be within a brief
period of time.
( 1 ) Organized labor should, as it has for many years
in England, train its own personnel to represent em-
ployees in workers' compensation cases. When there is
no question that a given injury arose from employment,
the law is neither so difficult nor are the facts, aside
from medical, so often in dispute that they cannot be
handled by a layman. Certainly anyone able to present
grievance arbitrations competently is also competent to
present nearly all workers' compensation cases. Indeed,
unions presently often do much of the law)'er's work
gratis. This could be made quite attractive to employees
both in terms of results and costs. Rather than charging
on a percentage basis, die union could charge on an
hourly basis with established flat minimums and maxi-
mums. The service would easily pay for itself. And, by
removing many attorneys from the process, except in
those highly difficult cases requiring an attorney's assis-
tance, it would eliminate the chief benefactors and pro-
ponents of the present system.
(2) Lump-sum settlements should not be permitted
except in very rare cases, such as that of a retiring
worker. In permanent partial disability cases the existing
option of awarding two-thirds of the difference between
the employee's present wage and his new earnings should
become the rule rather than the rare exception. The
award should be reviewed regularly, perhaps every three
to five years, to permit adjustments for the employee's
lack of, or continued, improvement. Legal fees or fees
to the employee's representative should be based on the
amount of time actually spent on the case, and should
be paid by the employer. The fees and their payment
should be a clearly stated part of the award, and in case
of controversy, the arbiter should be empowered to de-
termine the appropriate fee.
(3) Medical care should be provided only by certi-
fied specialists recognized as professionals in the fields of
industrial injuiy and disease by both labor and manage-
ment. From among these certified specialists, an em-
ployee might choose his doctor. In small communities
where such specialists are not available, the emplo)ee
would first, of course, receive treatment from his local
physician. If the percentage permanent disability system
has not been completely eliminated by change to the two-
thirds option award, he might then choose one of the
recognized specialists to certify his degree of disability.
(4) The state, in cooperation with labor and man-
agement, should establish a single insurer for all em-
ployers; that insurer should be governed by a body con-
sisting of equal numbers of labor and management.
Along with its more usual insurance functions of col-
lecting premiums and paying claims, the insurer would
also ( 1 ) experience-rate every employer and adjust his
rates accordingly; (2) provide free safety and health
consultation to both labor and management at cither's
request; (3) establish and maintain rehabilitation facili-
ties; (4) provide training in health and safety; and
(5) accredit health and safety specialists and review the
performance of doctors specializing in industrial health
and safety. Lacking provision for a monopoly, such a
state insurer should be established to compete with the
present private system.
Although these recommendations require a degree of
legislative courage not often encountered, without such
fundamental reform the goals established by the National
Commission will never be achieved. It is indeed ironic
that those who are most victimized by the present system,
employers and employees, seem to be hopelessly locked
in a political confrontation that has little to do with the
system's inherent shortcomings. They have permitted
those hired to serve their interests, lawyers and insur-
ance institutions, to become instead the masters and chief
beneficiaries of the system. Moreover, since the attorneys
and insurers are the primary information sources for
not only employers and labor, but also elected officials,
it is extremely unlikely at this time that basic change will
receive a hearing, let alone a chance. Yet there is always
a possibility that labor and management will awaken to
their and to society's self-interest. When that occurs,
fundamental change cannot be far behind.
Illinois Business Indexes
Leading Indicator (1969=100)
CO IM 03
g S
O r^ -H
"q; h aauoQu&.O'w H
Since the Fed Action
The Federal Reserve System announced important
changes in monetary management procedures on Oc-
tober 6. The discount rate was increased from 1 1 percent
to 12 percent: resen.e requirements were imposed on cer-
tain "managed liabilities" of member banks and Edge
Act corporations, as well as those of United States
branches and agencies of foreign banks. Moreover, Paul
\'olcker, the recently appointed chairman of the Board
of Governors, announced that day-to-day operations of
the Fed would henceforth be directed toward controlling
monetary aggregates— such as bank reserves, the money
supply, or total bank credit. Interest rates would be per-
mitted to move to their market level, given the policy-
determined rate of growth in monetary aggregates.
Nearly two months have elapsed, at this writing, since
the announced change in Federal Reserve management
procedures. However, more than a month was allowed
before the changes became fully effective. Even so, the
period has witnessed a marked change in several impor-
tant financial indicators.
Slower Monetary Growth
The growth of the narrow money supply (Ml) has
slowed sharply since early October. Indeed, as the chart
indicates, the money supply declined in the three weeks
immediately following the policy change. In contrast,
from spring to early October money expanded at more
than a 10 percent annual rate.
The broad money supply (M2), which includes net
time deposits, has also declined since early October (see
chart). From spring to October this measure of money
had expanded at nearly a 12 percent annual rate.
The declines in money reflect a reduction in bank
lending. Business loans by large commercial banks have
dropped sharply since early October. In turn, banks have
found it necessary to cut back their lending because the
Federal Reserve has reduced bank resen^es and, as al-
ready stated, has increased reserve requirements.
The volume of bank reserves sets a limit on the size
of bank liabilities— because banks must hold reserves in
proportion to the size and composition of their liabilities.
This role of bank reserves is sometimes difficult to under-
stand— in that it runs counter to our normal under-
standing of the process. From the point of view of the
individual bank, reserves are acquired as they accept de-
posits from their customers. Individual banks lend funds
deposited by their customers. However, causation is re-
versed in considering the banking system as a whole.
From this perspective, it is the Federal Reser\e that
determines the total volume of bank reserves. The Fed
adds to bank reserves by purchasing government securi-
ties; it reduces bank reserves by selling securities. If the
banking system receives injections of reserves it is in a
position to make additional loans. Rising loans (assets to
the banking system) cause rising bank deposits (liabilities
to the banking system) . Since early October, however,
this process has been reversed.
Rising Interest Rates
Immediately following the Fed policy announcement,
interest rates bolted upward (see chart) . The prime rate,
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the rate of interest banks charge their most credit-worthy
corporate borrowers, rose immediately from 13.5 percent
to 14.5 percent, then moved to a high of 15.75 percent.
Most other interest rates— including all ranges of the
maturity structure— also moved higher.
The federal funds rate skyrocketed following the
Fed's October 6 announcement. The federal funds mar-
ket is a market in which banks lend and borrow reserve
balances. Federal funds were trading about 1 percentage
point above the discount rate prior to its increase to
12 percent. Notwithstanding the increase, by the end of
October, the federal funds rate was more than 3.5 per-
centage points above the discount rate. As a result, the
Federal Reserve became an increasingly attractive source
of funds. Borrowing from Federal Reserve banks rose
from just under $1 billion in early October to more than
$3 billion in late October (see chart)
.
Continued High Interest Rates
In recent weeks interest rates have backed off from
highs reached in early November and member bank bor-
rowing has edged downward. This development has con-
tributed to speculation regarding whether interest rates
have already peaked or whether they are likely to peak
in the near-term future.
It is plausible to construe the recent interest rate
declines as a short-term correction. Spurred by uncer-
tainties generated by the Fed announcement, interest
rates bolted somewhat above their equilibrium level.
Over the longer term, interest rates are determined by
the interplay between the supply and demand for credit.
An important ingredient in this market process is the
expected rate of inflation. As long as the basic rate of
inflation remains near 10 percent, interest rates will re-
main near, or above, present levels. Interest rate declines
over the longer term depend upon what happens to the
rate of inflation.
It is not a foregone conclusion that restrictive mone-
tary measures will afTect the rate of inflation. For any
measure to be effective it must, at length, impinge on
the myriad pricing and wage-setting decisions through
which the inflation process exerts itself. Aside from a
short-term psychological impact of an announced policy
change, presumably these price and wage decisions will
be influenced over an extended period of time by per-
sistent insufficient demand — that is, by slack markets.
Here again, however, there is no solid presumption that
wages and prices will stabilize. It is argued that major
segments of the corporate and union structure have suf-
ficient power to hold the line on prices— or increase
tiiem and, instead, cut production. In any event, even if
the hoped-for effects of monetary restriction materialize,
the economy must brace itself for a long wait.
Other Economic Developments
Meanwhile, the underlying economy continues to ex-
hibit weakness. Although real GNP— that is, gross na-
tional product adjusted for changes in prices— rose in
the third quarter, there has been essentially no net
growth since the end of last year. Similarly, industrial
production •— the output of mines, factories and utilities
— has registered little gain since last December. Housing
starts, which averaged just over 2 million units last year,
are down about 10 percent on average in 1979.
Reflecting the weakness in physical output, the
growth in employment has slowed sharply since spring.
Whereas total employment had been expanding at about
a 4 percent annual rate during the last months of 1978
and the early months of this year, since March employ-
ment growth has averaged less than 2 percent. As a re-
sult, unemployment has moved higher.
Notwithstanding the weakening economy, the rate of
inflation continues to be robust. For the year, consumer
prices have risen at a 13.5 percent rate. Producer prices
have also risen rapidly, as sharp increases in industrial
prices have overwhelmed the relative stability in food
prices. william r. bryan
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Our two indicators showed mixed results in Septem-
ber. The leading indicator scored a small gain, whereas
the coincident indicator reported a slight decline. Aver-
age weekly hours in manufacturing rose by a small per-
centage on a seasonally adjusted basis. \'endor perfor-
mance also increased slightly in September. Since data
for retail sales, layoff' rate, and building permits were
not available at press time, the results presented here
are tentative and may be subject to revision.
The Tokyo Round: Results and Implications
S.C.SCHMIDT
The General Agreement on Tariflfs and Trade
(GATT) provides the framework for negotiations to
free international trade of tariffs and other trade barriers.
Since its establisliment in 1947, GATT has been the
forum for seven successive rounds of negotiations in
which the level of tariffs on imports has been progres-
sively reduced. The most recent initiatives, officially
launched in September of 1973 and called the "Tokyo
Round," were concluded five-and-one-half years later,
on 12 April 1979.
The accords reached in the Tokyo Round are em-
bodied in a large number of separate agreements that
may be grouped under three areas: taritl reductions;
multilateral agreements and arrangements on a number
of nontariff measures; and other sectoral and nontarifT
agreements.
Tariff Reductions
The tariff reductions apply to over $125 billion in
world trade in 1976 values and would cover a substan-
tially higher amount now. The value in this context is
measured by calculating the value of existing trade in
tariiT categories affected by the concessions. Industrial
products accounted for most of tariff cuts covering $110
billion of trade. Reductions were also exchanged on
nearly $15 billion of world trade in agricultural products,
out of a total of $48 billion of farm trade in 1976.
Industrial Tariffs. Estimates of tariff concessions by the
major developed countries suggest a one-third reduction
in the level of industrial tariffs taken together; they
average about 31 percent for the US, about 27 percent
for the European Economic Community (EEC), about
28 percent for Japan which had much higher tariffs
than others, and 34 percent for Canada.
Tariffs on raw materials are scheduled to drop 52
percent, rates on semimanufactured goods 30 percent,
and customs duties on finished manufactures 33 percent.
The largest reductions were made in fuels excluding pe-
troleum, nonelectrical machinery, wood products, chem-
icals, and transport equipment. Less than average re-
ductions were made in textiles and leather sectors.
Agricultural Trade Concessions. The US has reached
bilateral agreements with 41 countries, including 19
Stephen C. Schmidt is Professor of Agricultural
Marketing and Policy, Department of Agricultural
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developing nations. The US received concessions in the
form of reduced tariffs and nontariff barriers of $4 bil-
lion. The main commodities benefiting from these con-
cessions include soybeans, rice, and cotton, and a number
of specialty products such as meats, tallow, tobacco, fresh
and canned fruits and juices, vegetable oils, and protein
meals.
The largest export gains, estimated at over $250
million, are expected to be in livestock and livestock
products (Table 1). Tobacco exports are seen to in-
crease by about $86 million and oilseeds by about $83
million as a result of trade concessions. Among major US
exports, grains are expected to realize the smallest gains
in sales. The increases are mainly in exports of feed
grains to developing countries and in rice to the EEC.
Most of these concessions were granted by the United
States's two chief trading partners— the EEC and Ja-
pan. The US has won greater access to the EEC market
for about $970 million of farm commodities comprising
beef, poultry, rice, tobacco, and fruit products. The EEC
also committed itself not to raise tariffs on various prod-
ucts above their current rates bound under GATT. This
binding is of importance for US soybeans which now
enter the EEC market dut> -free.
Japanese trade concessions covered agricultural ex-
ports of $1.3 billion (1976 base). The concessions were
granted in the form of tariff cuts averaging about 35 per-
cent from statutory rates and increases in import quotas.
Tariff reductions that will be of interest to the US are
those on fresh grapefruit, lemons, limes, almonds, raisins,
beef offals, pork, and chicken legs. The two largest con-
cessions to the US by Japan cover trade in beef offals and
pork worth respectively about $108 million and $102 mil-
lion in 1978. Expansion of import quotas for high-quality
beef, oranges, and citrus juice will increase US export op-
portunities for these commodities. Japan has also com-
mitted itself not to raise tariffs on various products above
current rates. These bindings, especially the current duty-
free status of soybeans, will provide a continued un-
hindered access to the Japanese market for important
US agricultural exports. Canadian concessions were
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$422.5 million; of this, $412.6 million involved com-
modities for which tarifTs were reduced. Among develop-
ing countries, the US has received offers of concessions
from Mexico, the Philippines, Korea, India, and others.
The US has obtained improvements in access to
foreign country markets by offering access to its own
market; concessions were extended on agricultural im-
ports valued at around $2.6 billion (1976 basis). About
half were made to developed countries for fresh and
frozen beef, lamb meat, wool, live cattle, and certain
grain products. Most of the remainder is in vegetable
oils, inedible molasses, fruits, vegetables, and preserv-ed
beef with concessions mainly to developing countries.
Also, the US has raised import quotas on certain cheeses
by 15 percent over 1978 levels. The imposition will put
about 85 percent of US cheese imports under quota, com-
pared with the current level of about 50 percent. The
new trade bill which will implement die agreement
reached in GATT negotiations will authorize the Presi-
dent to limit the amount of some cheeses entering the
US in any year after 1979 to not more than 1 10,000 tons.
Multilateral Agreements and Arrangements
Agreements and arrangements were concluded aimed
at the reduction or elimination of specific measures that
distort trade or at more effective international control.
These agreements are grouped under three categories:
(1) framework for the conduct of world trade; (2) non-
tariff measures ; and (3) agriculture.
The framework agreements are designed to achieve
three broad objectives: the granting of special or more
favorable treatment to goods traded by developing coun-
tries; codification of practices and procedures under
which restrictive trade measures may be taken for bal-
ance-of-payments purposes or safeguard measures to help
development; and to improve the legal framework for
the conduct of trade. Of special importance to develop-
ing countries is that the agreement gives a permanent
legal status to trade preferences granted by developed
to developing countries or by developing countries to
one another. As to improvements in the operation of the
international trading system, the major achievements
came in the revision of GATT's procedures for settle-
ment and surveillance of trade disputes.
Nontarifj Measures. The number and diversity of non-
tariff barriers made it impossible to find a general solu-
tion for their treatment or to dispose of them altogether.
As a start, action was taken on a selected number of
barriers that fall into five categories.
The customs valuation code eliminates the use of
widely varying and arbitrary assessment methods, some
designed to keep out foreign products. It establishes a
uniform set of international rules for customs valuation
purposes making impckrted goods dutiable on an ad va-
lorem basis. For the US the application of the new code
will require the abandonment of the selling price cus-
toms valuation system. While this change is expected to
help US exporters and importers, it will have no major
impact on US agricultural trade.
The government procurement code is designed to
discourage discrimination against foreign suppliers when
governments purchase articles for their own use. Essen-
tially, it opens up government procurement contracts to
international bidding through agreed nondiscriminator)'
procedures and practices. On the whole, the application
of this code is estimated to provide US access to about
$20 billion. Because agricultural procurement programs
are excluded from the regulation the code will have little
or no impact on US agriculture.
The code on import licensing simplifies the proce-
dures for the issue of licenses and seeks to eliminate
their import-restrictive effects regardless of the way or
purpose of application. The US import licensing pro-
cedure is in accord with the code. I
The subsidies and countervailing duties code sets
out the conditions and obligations covering the applica-
tion of such practices and provides a mechanism for
dispute settlement. The code bans subsidies on exports
of manufactured products and minerals and stiffens rules
for their application on exports of agricultural and other
primary products. Basically this code aims at reducing
the danger of losing traditional markets by exporting
countries because of subsidized competition.
Subsidized competition in export markets has been
especially keen for such commodities as wheat, flour,
barley, oilseeds, daily products, and vegetable oils. US
agricultural exports stand to gain from the tightening of
rules on the use of export subsidies in the world market.
On countervailing duties, the code made no sub-
^
stantive changes in existing G.\TT regulation. New ele- |
ments are the establishment of special procedures for
settlement of disputes about injury to the domestic in-
dustry, and more precise definitions of material injuiy
and of casualty. The new code retains the right of self-
defense of importing countries against injuries by sub-
sidized import competition in their home markets.
On technical barriers to trade the code sets out rules
of conduct on product standards, product testing, and
product certification systems. It establishes dispute settle-
ment procedures, secures reviews of complaints, and sets
rules for the redress of violations. The code applies to
both agricultural and industrial products. Special tem-
porary exceptions are provided where questions of public
safety, health, environmental protection, or national se-
curity are involved.
Agricultural Arrangements. Plans to conclude compre-
hensive multilateral agreements covering wheat, dairy,
and meat trade did not materialize. Only consultative
arrangements were established for the regulation of trade
in bovine meat and dairy products.
The arrangement on bovine meat provides for the
expansion and stabilization of international trade in beef,
veal, and live cattle. This is to be achieved by the pro-
gressive dismantling of trade restrictions and improve-
ment of international cooperation in this sector. Beef-
exporting and -importing countries will participate in
an international meat council, established within GATT,
to serve as a forum for regular consultation on matters
affecting international trade in beef products and live
cattle. The coimcil will make recommendations of pos-
10
sible remedial measures for problems that may arise for
participants. Developed countries offered technical assis-
tance for developing countries, if needed, to improve
their meat sector.
The international dairy arrangement calls for an
expansion and liberalization of world trade in all dairy
products; achievement of greater stability in this trade:
mitigations of fluctuations in prices and supplies; and
encouragement of developing countries to participate in
the expansion. The arrangement has three protocols con-
taining specific provisions, including minimum prices, for
international trade in (1) certain milk powders; (2) milk
fats including butter; and (3) certain cheeses. To im-
plement it an international dairy products council is to
be established within GATT. The council will hold con-
sultations on problems needing resolution among partici-
pants. Developed countries agreed to provide technical
assistance to developing countries and committed them-
selves to make dairy products available to de\eloping
countries as food aid.
The protocol on milk powder sets rules on how
Australia, New Zealand, EEC, Canada, and other coun-
tries will export powdered milk for use as animal feed
under a control system.
Other Sectoral and Nontariff Agreements
An important agreement has been reached under the
heading, Trade in Civil Aircraft, signed by Canada,
EEC, Japan, Sweden, and the US. The signatories are
committed to eliminate by 1 January 1980 all customs
duties and similar charges and all import restrictions
on civil aircraft.
Another category of agreements was grouped under
the heading of Amendments of the Antidumping Code
signed by 10 of the participants in the multilateral trade
negotiations. It updates provisions on the determination
of injur)'; price undertakings between exporters and the
importing countiy; and the imposition and collection of
antidumping duties with the relevant provisions of the
code on subsidies and countervailing duties.
Implementation Schedule
The agreements concluded in the negotiations re-
quire legislative approval. With the passage of the Trade
Act of 1979 in July, Congress approved the Tokyo Round
package. The protocol will be open for acceptance by
the participants until 30 June 1980. It will go into force
on 1 January 1980 for participants who have ratified it
before that date. The tariff cuts will be phased in mostly
over an eight-year period stardng 1 January 1980 with
the total reduction to become effective no later than 1
January 1987. Participants, however, have the option of
implementing reductions at earlier stages. Developing
signatory' countries may delay application of tarifT reduc-
don schedules and the adoption of new codes of behavior
to limit nontariff distortions of trade.
Implications of Results
Expected Gains. The negotiations have opened up new
trading opportunities that can yield broadly based bene-
fits to certain sectors of the economies of signatory coun-
tries. In principle, benefits could materialize in terms of
( 1 ) consumption gains in lower costs or a greater avail-
ability of products; (2) production gains by providing an
incentive for making investments and greater confidence
in production decisions; and (3) a more competitive
and efficient domestic economy by exposing national pro-
ducers to desirable competitive influences.
With respect to tariff cuts the negotiations fell short
of expectations because the agreed-on reductions aver-
aged only about half of the 60 percent target the US
had set. Moreover, because of the long implementation
period, the impact of the modest tariff reductions will
be gradual and hence the net effect on the US balance
of trade, employment, and prices rather small.
The benefits of the reduction on nontariff barriers
are difficult to assess. Benefits should come from a greater
degree of control over export subsidies and the applica-
tion of import licensing, customs valuation, and perfor-
mance standard procedures.
It remains to be seen whether the new subsidies code
can be enforced so that unfair trade advantages created
through the use of subsidies, especially in markets for
grains, can be eliminated. Given the inherent efficiency
of its agriculture, the US will have far more to gain than
lose from the reduction of trade barriers in a number of
markets. Overall, agriculture is expected to benefit more
from the reduction of specific nontariff barriers than
from tariff concessions. Estimates are that the benefits
to the US from the concessions may be equivalent to an
increase in the value of total output of $1.0-$1.5 billion
per year in current prices.
Developed-developing country relations are likely to
be a central concern of trade policy in the 1980s. A
widening of the split between developed and developing
countries could tempt the developing countries to estab-
lish the UN Conference on Trade and Development as
the future major trade policy forum, supplandng GATT.
There is considerable fear that with high levels of
inflation, lingering recessions, and balance-of-payments
deficits, the benefits of restrictive trade measures will
become irresistible to governments in both advanced and
developing countries. The developing countries fear that
access to industrialized country markets for their products
will continue to be limited.
Unsettled Issues. Notwithstanding the gains in trade
liberalization, there is room also for improvements in
several areas: (1) further reductions of tariffs by in-
dustrialized countries; (2) more progress in removing
specific quantitative restrictions; (3) resolution of the
rules on emergency safeguard action against disruptive
imports; and (4) clarification of GATT rules, especially
on dispute settlement including definition of the role of
the GATT secretariat in this process.
A major failure of the multilateral trade negotiations
was its inability to reconcile divergent views on the rules
of emergency or escape clause actions against disruptive
imports. Under the present GATT system a nation may
only restrict imports of a product on an across-the-board
basis from all foreign suppliers instead of just the coun-
try disrupting the market. However, this rule was in the
11
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past largely evaded by euphemistically termed "volun-
tary export restraints."
Developing countries feel that their needs and inter-
ests received less attention than desirable at the multi-
lateral trade negotiations. The results not only fell short
in correcting the unfavorable trading position of the
developing countries but also in ensuring improved ac-
cess to markets for their exports. In particular, tariffs
were neither reduced on all products in which they have
an interest, nor were tariff cuts deeper than those to
which the general formula was applied (Table 2). Also
in the areas where the developing countries have achieved
substantial export pwtentials, such as textiles and foot-
wear, restrictions by industrial countries have not been
mitigated. It should be noted, however, that the lower-
than-average overall cut in tariff rates is due, in part,
to reduced rates already applied on products eligible for
the generalized system of preferences.
Summary and Conclusions
The key issues in negotiations centered on the gaining
of an improved international framework of rules and
procedures for conduct of world trade. Improved access
to markets was sought through the reduction of tariff
and nontariff barriers. The agreements in relation to
tariffs provide for a one-third reduction in the level of
industrial tariffs and for a 41 percent reduction of agri-
cultural tariff rates on products on which concessions
were exchanged. The US is committed to reduce by 31
percent its industrial tariffs, the EEC by 27 percent,
and Japan by 28 percent.
Although the size of tariff cuts appears substantial,
the value amounts to the cuts are relatively small. More-
over, most will be phased in over eight years beginning
1 January 1980. In the case of sensitive products such
as textiles and steel, the tariff reduction program will
begin later in 1982. Therefore, trade expansion will be a
gradual process without any major and abrupt impact
on production and employment.
The US received concessions in the form of reduced
tariffs and nontariff barriers on $4 billion of agricultural
exports. It has won greater access to Europe and Japan
for its high-quality beef, pork, poultry, meat, tobacco,
citrus fruits, and oilseeds. Concessions extended by the
EEC cover US agricultural exports of $970 million and
those made by Japan are $1.3 billion. In exchange the
US gave concessions on agricultural imports valued at
around $2.6 billion. These concessions involved beef,
lamb, meat, live cattle, inedible molasses, fruits, vege-
tables, and the raising of import quotas on certain
cheeses. Eventually, US agricultural exports are ex-
pected to increase by some $510 million annually as a
result of trade concessions made during the Tokyo
Round. Concessions by the US are worth about $106
million annually. Thus, the net improvement in our
agricultural trade balance from the Tokyo Round may
amount to a modest increase of about $400 million ( 1976
values)
.
On nontariff barriers, the new codes of conduct cov-
ering a wide range of measures could turn out to be
the most significant achievement. In particular, they
are capable of doing much to remo\e or reduce and to
bring under continuous surveillance and control a num-
ber of the most trade-distorting nontariff measures.
A major failure of the Tokyo Round was the inability
of participants to reach agreement on the use of safe-
guards under which imports that threaten a domestic
injury can be temporarily restricted. Overall the results
of the multinational negotiations are less substantial than
was initially expected, partly because of modest progress
on agriculture and on a mmiber of nontariff barriers.
Trade in beef and daiiy products is to be regulated by
international consultative arrangements under GATT.
It was not possible to reach an agreement in the cereal
sector. The Tokyo Round is only a beginning in dealing
with complex protectionist measures likely to persist for
many years to come.






